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22/03/2014, 23:20
... be
58
AsEME’sbegintoindustrialize,theyinitiallyhave the benefit of rapidurbanization(asagriculturalproductivity
rises)and the internationaltransfer of technology.Overtimeboth of these“catchup“factorssupportinggrowth
becomelessimportant.
59
It is importanttonotethat the debatewaswith the Keynes of the “Treatise”andnotyet the Keynes of the
“GeneralTheory”.In the TreatiseonMoney,Keynescalledformonetaryauthoritiestotake“extraordinary”,
“unorthodox”monetarypoliciestodealwith the slump.Kregel(2011)p1,contends
that The unorthodoxpolicies
thatKeynesrecommendsareanearlyperfectdescription” of the ultraeasymonetarypoliciesfollowedinJapan,
andmorerecentlyin other countries.Recall,asnotedabove,thatKeynes’enthusiasmforsuchmonetarymeasures
hadfadedby the time of the GeneralTheory.
... shadow
banking.Finally,supposethatcentral bank purchases of governmentpaperarearesponsetoa
marketdriven“run”thatcouldbecomeselffulfilling
120
. Is thisnotexactly the kind of situation
115
Inmid2012,somecommentatorssuggested the ECBshouldstartpayingnegativeinterestratesonreserves
heldat the ECB. The initialECBresistancetothissuggestionwasbasedinpartonthisconcern.Anotherworry,
arising from recentDanishexperience,wasthat banks wouldthenhavetorecouplosses
byraisingratesonloans.
Inthisway,monetaryeasingmightprovecontractionary.
116
Leijonhufvud(2009)makes the relatedpointthat,inchoosingwhotosupportandwhonot,central banks are
makingchoiceswithdistributionalimplications.Issues of distributionfallmorenormallyin the realm of politicsand
willattract the attention of politicians.
117
Hanoun(2011)expressesconcernthat the focus of central banks onpricestabilitywillbedilutedbyfinancial
dominance,fiscaldominanceandalsoexchangeratedominance.Thislastconcernrefersto the “fear of floating”,
referredtoabove,thathasextended the creditdrivenproblemsin the AMEsto
the EMEsaswell.
118
The central banks of manycountrieshaveoperatedwithnegativecapitalfordecades;e.g.,Chile,Jamaicaand
others.
119
Thisauthor,andBorioandothersat the BIS,havebeenmakingthispointformanyyears. The practical
implication is thatpricestabilitytargetsshouldextendoverahorizonlongenoughtoallowimbalancestounwind.
Thus,toleanagainstacreditbubble is toleanagainstsomecombination
of possiblenearterminflationary
pressuresand/or the possibility of excessivedisinflation(orevendeflation)over the mediumterm.SeeWhite
(2006a).Operationally,thisimpliesthatseparating the pricestabilityfunction from the financialstabilityfunction
atcentral banks is logicallywrong.SeeWhite(2012a).Issing(2012)remindsus,however, of
someimportant
politicalconsiderationsthatcouldqualifythisconclusion.
120
The problem is one of multipleequilibria.Asovereignmaybesolventgivenreasonableinterestrates,butnotif
arunpushesupratesbeyondsomelimit.
... waspart (indeed the core) of the traditional
mandate of central banks. Theywouldnotethat,sincefinancialinstabilitycanleadtodeflation
(which is notpricestabilityeither), the concernsaboutpriceandfinancialinstabilityaresimply
twosides...