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22/03/2014, 23:20
... BIS
WorkingPapersbyBorioandZhu(2008),Gambacorta(2009),Disyatat(2010)andAltunbasetal
(2010)allprovideevidence of the importance of whattheycall the “risktakingchannel” of the
transmissionmechanism of monetarypolicy
91
.Tobias ... Germany after reunification, Japan after the “bubble”, South East Asia
after the Asian crisis, and the US after the TMT crash of the early 2000’s. In effect, a secular
increaseinglobalsupplywasmetby a decreaseinglobaldemandwith the predictableresult of
reducing ... shadow
banking.Finally,supposethatcentralbankpurchases of governmentpaperare a responseto a
marketdriven“run”thatcouldbecomeselffulfilling
120
.Isthisnotexactly the kind of situation
115
Inmid2012,somecommentatorssuggested the ECBshouldstartpayingnegativeinterestratesonreserves
heldat the ECB. The initialECBresistancetothissuggestionwasbasedinpartonthisconcern.Anotherworry,
arisingfromrecentDanishexperience,wasthatbankswouldthenhavetorecouplosses
byraisingratesonloans.
Inthisway,monetaryeasingmightprovecontractionary.
116
Leijonhufvud(2009)makes the relatedpointthat,inchoosingwhotosupportandwhonot,centralbanksare
makingchoiceswithdistributionalimplications.Issues of distributionfallmorenormallyin the realm of politicsand
willattract the attention of politicians.
117
Hanoun(2011)expressesconcernthat the focus of centralbanksonpricestabilitywillbedilutedbyfinancial
dominance,fiscaldominanceandalsoexchangeratedominance.Thislastconcernrefersto the “fear of floating”,
referredtoabove,thathasextended the creditdrivenproblemsin the AMEsto
the EMEsaswell.
118
The centralbanks of manycountrieshaveoperatedwithnegativecapitalfordecades;e.g.,Chile,Jamaicaand
others.
119
Thisauthor,andBorioandothersat the BIS,havebeenmakingthispointformanyyears. The practical
implicationisthatpricestabilitytargetsshouldextendover a horizonlongenoughtoallowimbalancestounwind.
Thus,toleanagainst a creditbubbleistoleanagainstsomecombination
of possiblenearterminflationary
pressuresand/or the possibility of excessivedisinflation(orevendeflation)over the mediumterm.SeeWhite
(200 6a) .Operationally,thisimpliesthatseparating the pricestabilityfunctionfrom the financialstabilityfunction
atcentralbanksislogicallywrong.SeeWhite(201 2a) .Issing(2012)remindsus,however, of
someimportant
politicalconsiderationsthatcouldqualifythisconclusion.
120
The problemisone of multipleequilibria. A sovereignmaybesolventgivenreasonableinterestrates,butnotif
a runpushesupratesbeyondsomelimit.
...