ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS Melani Cammett and Ishac Diwan New York London First published 2014 by Westview Press Published 2018 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2014 by Taylor & Francis All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe Every effort has been made to secure required permissions for all text, images, maps, and other art reprinted in this volume A CIP catalog record for the print version of this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 13: 978-0-8133-4944-2 (pbk) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS Map 0.1 The Middle East and North Africa ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS Since the last edition of this book was published, revolutionary movements have swept across the Middle East The “Arab Spring” began on December 17, 2010, in Tunisia, where Mohamed Bouazizi, a vegetable seller in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, set himself on fire to protest mistreatment by local police and government authorities Bouazizi’s act incited a wave of protests, beginning in rural areas and later spreading to urban coastal areas, which encompassed a diverse array of participants ranging from informal-sector workers, like Bouazizi himself, to unemployed graduates, workers, lawyers, and cyber-connected youth Ultimately, these mass protests led to the ouster of Zine al-Abdine Ben ‘Ali, who had ruled Tunisia in an increasingly repressive manner for over two decades Protesters demanded justice and accountability from their government and refused to step down, even in the face of brutal repression and government promises to create new jobs and to expand civil and political liberties The revolutionary movement then spread to Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak, who had held power for almost thirty years, was ousted after several weeks of protests in Cairo and other cities In Egypt, too, protesters remained steadfast in the face of a harsh crackdown, calling for Mubarak and his key henchmen to step down In February 2011, Mubarak resigned and later faced trial for complicity in the murder of protesters From Tunisia and Egypt, protests spread across the region to Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, and even Saudi Arabia More sporadic and, in some cases, short-lived protests took place in Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine Revolutions and rebellions are complex phenomena Likewise, the motivations for the Arab uprisings are multifaceted Political concerns, such as outrage over dictatorial rule, repression, and restrictions on basic liberties were undoubtedly important For many people, however, economic issues were equally if not more salient A 2005 poll conducted by Zogby International found that expanding employment opportunities, improving the health care and educational systems, and ending corruption were the most important priorities of citizens across the region Democracy and civic and political rights, though also cited, were ranked lower than socioeconomic concerns (Zogby International 2005) Similarly, the 2010 Arab Youth Survey found that the greatest perceived challenge and concern of Arab youth was the cost of living, followed by unemployment and then human rights The largest change relative to the THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS previous survey, which was conducted one year earlier, was the increased perception of income inequality (ASDA’A/Burson-Marsteller 2010) More fundamentally, it is difficult to extricate the economic and political motivations for the uprisings given the evolution of Arab political economies over the past few decades The rise of crony capitalism, which we discuss later in the chapter, underscores the ways in which politics and, more specifically, political connections have shaped economic opportunities in the region As implied by the slogan “Bread, freedom, and social justice,” which protesters chanted on Avenue Bourguiba and in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in the region, inequality of opportunity was a central concern Thus, a political economy approach has much to contribute to interpretations of the initial motivations for the uprisings and of the dynamics of ongoing political and economic transitions Despite momentous political changes in the region, many insights from the third edition of this book, which was published over two years before Bouazizi set himself on fire, remain relevant Some of the core economic and political challenges described in the book were important factors that either directly or indirectly contributed to the uprisings Richards and Waterbury pointed to insufficient job creation, labor market pressures exacerbated by the youth bulge, the mismatch between educational systems and labor market needs, the declining quantity of water and rising dependency on food imports, the continuing decay of the public sector, the mixed record of economic liberalization, a growing housing crisis in urban areas, and the rise of political Islam across the region The Arab Spring also created new developments that cannot be fully appreciated without new analytical tools that were not in earlier editions of this book With ousted leaders and struggles over the construction of new political institutions in some countries, the classification of regime types in the region must be revised Even in countries where incumbent rulers remain entrenched, the nature of the political game has changed Across the region, “street politics” is an increasingly important form of political expression and citizens are making more forceful and more frequent demands on their leaders At this juncture, the context of policymaking is altered: New political regimes are emerging, and with the rise of claim-making, rulers are compelled to respond more effectively to citizen demands Evolving political systems as well as economic developments demand new perspectives on the political economies of the region The Arab uprisings also highlight issues that require more in-depth analysis than prior editions of this book emphasized In particular, the perceived increase in inequalities, discontent with public services, the political economy of cronyism, the narrowing composition of authoritarian coalitions, and succession issues in Arab republics have proven to be important developments across the Arab world What explains the origins and dynamics of the Arab uprisings? We believe that a political economy approach has much to offer in addressing this question Neither purely political concerns, such as the desire of populations for democracy, nor simple economic trends can explain the decisions of protesters to call for the downfall of autocratic rulers Rather, the interaction of political factors and real and perceived economic developments brought about the uprisings As we argue later, narrowing Cross-Regional Variation in the Arab Uprisings authoritarian coalitions in the context of crony capitalism, the rollback of the state, and declining welfare regimes alienated formal-sector workers and tenuous middle classes In the context of unequal life chances and rising insecurity, growing portions of Arab societies perceived that the inequality of opportunities was on the rise Thus, neither growth rates nor absolute levels of income inequality can account for popular movements to overthrow incumbent dictators Rather, perceptions of socioeconomic trends in the context of evolving political economies were at the root of mass protests In this epilogue, we develop these claims in more detail First, we sketch out a picture of regional variation in the uprisings, pointing to a variety of factors that differentiate the countries of the region and help to explain their distinct trajectories thus far during this period of momentous change The following section develops a framework for understanding the uprisings The final part focuses on the dynamics of the transitions across the Middle East, analyzing the ways in which political and economic factors are interacting to shape the construction of new political institutions and economic reform programs CROSS-REGIONAL VARIATION IN THE ARAB UPRISINGS The outcomes of the uprisings thus far have varied across the Arab world In some countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, rulers have been deposed and political actors are engaged in struggles over the creation of new institutional rules In Yemen, regime change occurred through a more “pacted” transfer of power negotiated by elites, although mass mobilization initially precipitated the ouster of former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih In February 2012, voters endorsed a deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, approving a two-year transitional presidency for Salih’s vice president of eighteen years, ‘Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi In other countries, regimes have pushed back decisively against protesters In Syria, the regime’s harsh crackdown on initial protests sparked a bloody conflict that continues unabated as of this writing In Bahrain, too, the ruling al-Khalifa family has harshly repressed protesters who are calling for regime change, although far less blood has been spilled than in Syria The international community has responded in divergent ways to the crises in Syria and Bahrain Direct intervention from neighboring Saudi Arabia and limited condemnation from the United States, which has a strategic alliance with Bahrain, have bolstered the ruling family’s control The United States and other countries have hesitated to intervene directly in Syria, in part because of Russian opposition to international involvement and in part because of stated concerns about the fragmentation of the opposition and the role of Islamist extremists in the armed opposition to the As’ad regime Not all uprisings in the Arab world have culminated in or even called for the dismissal of authoritarian rulers In some countries, sustained protests were met with concessions by rulers In Jordan, protesters by and large have not demanded an end to the monarchy but rather have issued demands for increased economic opportunities and greater freedoms under the current system In response, King Abdullah replaced the prime minister multiple times and called early elections, although these The Difficulties Ahead: Politics and Economic Reform During Transitions 25 the attention of political leaders is presently focused elsewhere—largely on the role of Islam in politics and society The price to pay for past sins seems enormous and carries over not just to economic technocratic issues but also to the necessity of coalition-building and long-term institutional reform We briefly review the nature of the political and economic challenges facing the Middle East and discuss their implications for policymaking at the present juncture Political Developments After the Uprisings Even where rulers have been deposed, genuine regime change remains in doubt in the Arab world In Egypt, Mubarak was removed from power, but elements of his authoritarian coalition remain entrenched The army retains significant privileges, despite the forced retirement of its top leaders, such as General Mohamed Hussein Tantawi Although a new constitution was adopted and several rounds of elections were held, the process of political reform has been contested in Egypt, with opposition groups across the ideological spectrum claiming that they were marginalized and threatening to boycott elections The process of writing the new constitution was rushed and fraught with tensions, with an Islamist-dominated body hastily writing and approving the draft while their opponents claimed they were sidelined from the process In Yemen, the new president’s cabinet and elements of the security forces retain many loyalists of the former president In Libya, a sharp break took place in terms of both the identities of the new political leaders and the system of rule Mu’ammar Qaddhafi was ousted, and the members of his family and close advisers are either under arrest or indicted in absentia Nonetheless, the outcome of the revolution remains uncertain Government authority is tenuous, and armed militias control much of the territory Of all the Arab countries where the protests successfully deposed dictators, Tunisia initially made the most progress toward the establishment of a new democratic system In October 2011, elections for a constitutional assembly were held, ushering in a coalition government dominated by the main Islamist party, Al-Nahda, in alliance with secular parties The process of writing the constitution has been more inclusive than in Egypt, with multiple drafts subject to public debate and input from diverse civil society groups Yet politics have become increasingly polarized, particularly across the Islamist-secularist divide Tensions have emerged over constitutional articles on the status of women and the role of religion in the constitution Opposition groups claim that Al-Nahda has overplayed its hand by abandoning an inclusive process of political change and allying itself with, or at least tolerating, more extremist Islamist elements, which have perpetrated acts of violence with alarming frequency As a result, further progress on political reform and efforts to tackle Tunisia’s formidable economic problems are stalled The electoral victories of political Islam in the Arab transitioning countries were to be expected, given that Islamist parties were more organized early in the process and appeared to have deeper grassroots support Even in Tunisia, where Islamists were brutally suppressed and virtually wiped out under Ben ‘Ali’s rule, Al-Nahda managed to maintain a subterranean base of supporters and quickly reactivated and expanded its local networks after its leadership returned to the country Yet the grab 26 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS for power by Islamists was surprising In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood sought and won the presidency, despite earlier commitments to moderate its control over government institutions In Tunisia, Al-Nahda became less and less willing to compromise with secular opponents once it secured the lion’s share of the vote (although not the support of the majority of Tunisia when accounting for voter turnout and the inflationary effects of electoral rules on the distribution of seats) Efforts by Islamists to monopolize power made sense in the short term, given that political domination in this critical historical moment would enable them to mold new political institutions in their favor Moreover, the leadership of previously banned or heavily repressed Islamist groups feared that former regime elements as well as their secular opponents would deprive them of their “rightful” victories, if given the chance In retrospect, however, Islamist domination of the political arena was probably a mistake In light of the deterioration of political, security, and economic outcomes and the huge obstacles to delivering tangible improvements to people’s lives, Islamists may face a serious drop in popular support Mainstream Islamists, who had developed a reputation for “moderation” in the past decade, now also face the challenge of being outbid by other, more orthodox or extremist Islamist groups Political liberalization has facilitated the rise of “Salafists,” a diverse and heterogeneous category that threatens to chip away at the bases of more moderate Islamists In response, groups such as Al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are compelled to cater to more extremist constituencies and are becoming increasingly factionalized and splintered in the process At the same time, mainstream Islamist groups, whose constituencies were based in the middle classes under authoritarian rule, are obliged to answer to a wider swath of society For the first time, political Islam is being put to the test Divisions between Islamists and secularists reflect real tensions in society In more consolidated democracies, political institutions should be able to manage these differences, addressing distributional and ideological conflict alike In the context of institutional flux, in which new rules of the game need to be written and adopted, it is far more difficult to handle such tensions Without capable leaders willing to compromise across ideological divides, polarization is the inevitable result In the Arab transitioning countries, liberal elements have been pushed to reconstitute their ranks rapidly by radicalizing and mobilizing their supporters, focusing more on winning upcoming elections and blocking Islamist initiatives than on achieving good economic performance For their part, Islamists have viewed the resort to street politics by liberal, secular groups as a nondemocratic rejection of their legitimate electoral gains Their heightened sense of unfairness adds to a spiral of conflict that has ratcheted up tensions, making compromise all the more difficult Ideally, upcoming parliamentary elections will reduce the cycle of polarization as coalitions are formed to craft social and economic programs, but whether inclusive elections can take place is uncertain under present circumstances At the minimum, it is now clear that transitions will take longer than expected In the meantime, paralysis has taken hold, blocking decision-making by governing bodies Moreover, the current environment, in which protracted insecurity, food short- The Difficulties Ahead: Politics and Economic Reform During Transitions 27 ages, and even economic collapse are real possibilities, invites the prospect of coups and military takeovers The formation of a new political order has proved to be the greatest challenge in the Arab transitioning countries, bedeviling efforts to address the region’s serious economic challenges Economic Challenges After the Uprisings The revolutions were experienced as a negative economic shock Tourism took a hit, capital flight accelerated, exports declined, and investment collapsed in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen As a result, economic growth declined sharply in 2011—it was negative in Tunisia (−2%) and Yemen (−1%) and low in Egypt (1.8%) and Bahrain (2.1%) Output collapsed in Libya, given the disruption to its oil production (−60%) Across the region, unemployment increased Syria has been devastated The human toll in death and suffering is staggering Millions have been made refugees, in their country and in neighboring countries Economic production has taken a big hit, and the destruction of assets is already estimated in the tens of billions of dollars The economies of Lebanon and Jordan have also been negatively affected by regional instability and the influx of refugees Initially, governments reacted with expansionary policies to smooth out the downturn, especially in the face of rising social demands and the high expectations generated by the uprisings Public-sector wages, subsidies, and government investment were increased in many countries around the region In the Gulf countries, budgets were massively expanded For example, expenditure increased by over onethird in Saudi Arabia In the oil-importing countries, both external accounts and budget balances deteriorated By 2012, fiscal deficits in Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon had shot up to between and 7% of GDP In Egypt, the fiscal deficit ballooned at 12% of GDP, and international reserves plummeted As a result of these developments, by 2012 governments in oil-importing countries had no fiscal space to continue with stimulus programs, and therefore growth remained low in 2012 (about to 3%) Expansionary policies were supported mainly by domestic debt levels as aid did not rise, despite repeated promises.16 Unlike other regions that have undergone economic and political transitions simultaneously, notably eastern Europe, no external actor has eased the transition with large-scale aid and promises of a future economic and political union Indeed, the uprisings occurred in the context of a global economic downturn and the Eurozone crisis, which has restricted the availability of external support As a result, in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, economic indicators are presently flashing yellow, and macroeconomic crises with sharp currency depreciation and banking crises are possible in the future IMF programs are being developed in these countries, but the “street” may not allow the passage of minimal reform programs that can contain deficits to levels that are financeable (let alone sustainable) By the beginning of 2013, it had become clear that economic recovery could not proceed until the political crises were resolved Indeed, a downward spiral may ensue as polarized politics exacerbate economic difficulties, in turn leading to more fractious politics 28 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS While in opposition, the Islamist movements that came to power in Egypt and Tunisia had frequently criticized the economic policies of the previous regimes and had promised to combat corruption, poverty, and inequality In the face of the political turmoil generated by the rush to fill the power vacuum, write constitutions, and compete for elections, however, Islamists have been unable to move on any of their big promises Their commitments to promoting social justice, reducing subsidies in order to provide more fiscal space in budgets, attacking cronyism, and eliminating waste in bloated bureaucracies have not been realized thus far Going Forward: Economic Reforms for the Future The political and economic challenges facing the Arab transitioning countries are compounded by high popular expectations and problematic legacies of the past How political challenges are addressed will largely determine the course of economic policies Unless new surprises arise, the contours of the emerging political settlement will include fewer favors for elite capital Yet new rulers should attempt to make peace with large capital-holders and convince them to invest in the future, as is already happening in Egypt, rather than withdraw, as happened with the socialist revolutions of the 1960s At the same time, the interests of the poor should be balanced with those of the middle classes, which benefited disproportionately under authoritarian bargains Certain technical challenges will remain difficult to resolve, even if politics become less polarized The first and most immediate challenge is economic stabilization in order to avoid an economic and financial meltdown, which would further complicate the political process Building a package of measures that reduce expenditures, raise revenues, and command some minimum level of popular support is a tricky endeavor in the best of circumstances, and it will be very challenging in the current hyperpoliticized environment A more stable political environment, however, also offers the possibility of initiating other important reforms over the next three to five years The second area of focus should be the modernization of the state and the rehabilitation of public services, especially health, education, and social protection New governments with broad popular support should be able to redirect expenditures toward social services and away from subsidies that benefit the better-off and to make tax systems more progressive while enlarging the tax base Improving service delivery and fighting petty corruption will require increases in public-sector wages, which will be complicated by the large size of the civil service, particularly in Egypt The third agenda concerns the business environment and job creation Past experiences, and especially the failures of both socialism and state capitalism, limit policy choices for the Arab region For example, developing an effective industrial policy that supports rising sectors of the economy with targeted subsidies, as was done in East Asia, would be an unreasonable goal in the next three to five years, given institutional weaknesses and the risks of capture by powerful interest groups Priority issues such as improving competition, democratizing credit, and reducing the constraints faced by the informal sector not have easy solutions Notes 29 These are complicated challenges, technically, politically, and administratively In the end, what will make a difference is the process by which solutions adapted to the particular environments of each country are found and implemented The greatest contribution of the “revolutions” to these challenges should be in fostering greater popular participation in the policymaking process It is the sense of empowerment of new actors such as labor unions, employers’ associations, student groups, and other civil society groups—who can cross ideological lines to represent social interests and hold their representatives accountable—that constitutes the real revolution NOTES See Pepinsky (2009) and Slater (2010) on the importance of coalitions for authoritarian durability In 2005, the percentage of the population living on $2 per day was about 17% in the Middle East and Latin America, 39% in East Asia, 73% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 74% in South Asia When measured by the percentage of the population living on $1.25 per day, the Middle East has by far the lowest poverty rate of all regions (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005) For example, the share of the informal sector in the economy was 44% in Morocco, 33% in Egypt, 34% in Syria, 30% in Tunisia and Lebanon, and 26% in Jordan This is higher than the share in many developing countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, where the informal sector accounts for about 21% and 16% of the economy, respectively In the United States, the informal sector accounts for about 9% of the economy (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010) For example, public spending on education as a percentage of GDP has hovered around 5% since the late 1970s (World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years) For reviews of this literature, see Posusney and Angrist (2005) and Schlumberger (2007) For example, spending on energy subsidies exceeds social expenditures by two to three times in Egypt and Tunisia In Egypt, real wages in the public sector declined over time The minimum wage, which anchors all wages, declined from 60% of per capita GDP in the early 1980s to a mere 13% in 2007 (Abdelhamid and El Baradei 2009) Data from the World Values Survey also suggest that the average financial satisfaction of the poor has deteriorated, that of the middle classes remains stable, and that of the rich has risen, further bolstering a sense of rising inequality during the period (Diwan 2013) In 2000, however, young people were much more likely to support democracy than their elders (Diwan 2013) 10 Between 1998 and 2006, according to household surveys, GDP rose by 60% in nominal terms, while consumption stayed essentially at the same level all along the distribution, suggesting that large parts of the increase may have accrued to the undercounted rich and that very little has trickled down to the rest of society 11 In Egypt, average years of education had risen from two years in the 1980s to eight years by 2009 (Barro and Lee 2010; Campante and Chor 2011) 12 The plight of the main character of the novel The Yacoubian Building, written by the Egyptian author and dentist Alaa al-Aswany (2006), shows poignantly the frustration of 30 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS well-educated youth whose families lack the social standing and relationships to enable them to realize their professional aspirations 13 During the sustained protests in Tahrir Square that led to Mubarak’s resignation, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups (along with other non-Islamist citizen groups) helped to solve the coordination problems that constrain social mobilization by opening up mosques as meeting points and medical treatment centers 14 Similar processes of moderation took place in Turkey and Tunisia In Turkey, a combination of the lessons from repression, opportunism, and the growth of a friendly middle class compelled the AKP to moderate (Demiralp 2009; Mecham 2004) In Tunisia, the Al-Nahda leadership claimed in 1981, “We have no right to interpose between the people and those whom the people choose and elect” (Tamimi 2001) 15 In Egypt, state repression increased after the electoral gains of the Muslim Brotherhood in 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Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture, Washington, D.C., Brookings Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad, Belhaj, Nadia, and Assaad, Ragui (2011), “Equality of Opportunity in Education in the Middle East and North Africa,” Cairo, Egypt, Economic Research Forum (ERF) Schlumberger, Oliver, ed (2007), Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, Stanford, Stanford University Press Sfakianakis, John (2004), “The Whales of the Nile: Networks, Businessmen, and Bureaucrats During the Era of Privatization in Egypt,” in Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, ed S Heydemann, New York, Palgrave Macmillan Shahin, Emad El-Din (2005), “Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?” Working Paper, Madrid, Spain, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) Slater, Dan (2010), Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Tamimi, Azzam S (2001), Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat Within Islamism, Oxford, Oxford University Press Tessler, Mark (2011), Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens, Bloomington, Indiana University Press Tlemcani, Rachid (1999), État, Bazar, et Globalisation: L’Aventure de l’Infitah en Algérie, Algiers, Les Editions El-Hikma Vandewalle, Dirk (1998), Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building, Ithaca, Cornell University Press Vitalis, Robert (2007), America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press 34 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS World Bank (2005), World Development Indicators, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog /world-development-indicators (2009), From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, D.C., World Bank (2010), World Development Indicators, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog /world-development-indicators Yom, Sean L., and Gause, F Gregory, III (2012), “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” Journal of Democracy, 23, 4, 74–88 Yousef, Tarik M (2004), “Development, Growth, and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa Since 1950,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 3, 91–116 Zogby International (2005), Attitudes of Arabs: An In-Depth Look at Social and Political Concerns of Arabs, Washington, D.C., Arab American Institute INDEX As’ad regime, 3, Atatürkian model, 19 Authoritarian coalitions evolution of, 19–21 monarchies and, 5–6 narrowing of, 2, 3, 8, 15, 18 Authoritarianism bargains, 4, 9, 10, 12, 19–20, 23, 28 external support for, 12 legitimacy, 18–19 Avenue Bourguiba, Abdullah, King, Accountability, 1, 29 Agriculture subsidies, 9, 13 AKP See Justice and Development party Alawi regime, Algeria, 1, 4, 7, 14, 16 Ammar, Rachid, 17 ancien régime, 18 Arab Barometer, 23 Arab Gulf monarchies, Arab Spring, 1, 2, 6, 8, 20 Arab uprisings, 1–30 concessions and, 3–4 contribution of, 29 cross-regional variation in, 3–6 as defining moment, 24 dictatorships and, 1, 3, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25 economic challenges after, 27–28 ethnoreligious diversity in, 4–5 framework for explaining, 3, 8, 23–24 motivations for, 1–2, policymaking process and, 2, 29 political developments after, 25–27 political economy perspective in, 2–3, 6, 7, 8, 18 political Islam and, 2, 22–24, 25, 26 regimes and, 2, 3, 4, 5–6 revolutionary movements and, sectarianism and, socioeconomic foundations of, 6–24 unemployment and, 1, 6, 7, 20, 24, 27 youth and, 1–2, 6, 7, 20, 24 Arab Youth Survey, 1–2 Bahrain, 1, 3, 4, 27 Bargains, authoritarian, 4, 9, 10, 12, 19–20, 23, 28 Ben ‘Ali, Cyrine, 17 Ben ‘Ali, Zine al-Abdine, 1, 7, 8, 16, 17, 25 Bouazizi, Mohamed, 1, Bourguiba, Habib, 7, 19 “Bread, freedom, and social justice,” “Bread riots,” 10 “Businessmen” cabinet, 16 Business-state relations, 8, 15–18, 24 Cairo, Capitalism See Crony capitalism Carrots, sticks and, 15, 24 Chaebols, South Korean, 15 Colonial period, 4, Concessions, Arab uprisings and, 3–4 Conservative monarchies, 7, 10 Constitutional reforms, of Morocco, Co-optation, 13–14, 15, 24 Corruption, 1, 16–17 Credit, democratizing, 28 35 36 Crony capitalism, 2, 3, 8, 15–19, 21–22, 23, 24 Cross-regional variation, in Arab uprisings, 3–6 Decline, of public welfare functions, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10–12, 15, 24, 29 Democracy, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25–27 Democratization, 12, 17, 23 Democratizing credit, 28 Deterioration of economic security, state rollback and, 8–13 Dictatorships, 1, 3, 12, 15, 19, 22, 25 See also Authoritarian coalitions Divide-and-rule strategies, 24 East Asia, 11 (fig.), 28 Economic challenges, after Arab uprisings, 27–28 Economic downturn, global, 6, 27 Economic foundations, of Arab uprisings, 6–24 Economic liberalization See Liberalization Economic performance indicators See Government spending Economic reforms for future, 28–29 middle classes and, 10 1980s, 9–10 1990s, 15 revolutions and, 25 Economic security, state rollback and, 8–13 Education constitutional guarantees to, 10 decline of, 11, 22 energy subsidies and, 14 labor market needs versus, low public-sector wages and, 19 rehabilitation of, 29 Zogby International poll and, Egypt Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16–18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 stock market, 17–18 Empowerment, 12, 24, 29 Empowerment Right Index, 13 (fig.) Energy subsidies, 6, 13–14, 14 (fig.) Index Ethnoreligious diversity, 4–5 Eurozone crisis, 27 External support, for authoritarian rule, 12 Ezz, Ahmad, 16 Ezz Steel, 16 Fire protest, Bouazizi and, 1, Food crises, Former Soviet bloc, Framework, for explaining Arab uprisings, 3, 8, 23–24 Freedom and repression indices, 12–13, 13 (fig.) Gini coefficients, 6, 21 Global recession, 6, 27 Global South, 10, 11 (fig.) Government spending on health, 11–12, 12 (fig.) 1975 and 2005, 10–11, 11 (fig.) 1982–2007, 9, (fig.) Gulf Cooperation Council, Hadi, ‘Abd Rabbo Mansour, Hashemite monarchy, 4, Health constitutional guarantees to, 10 decline of, 11, 22 energy subsidies and, 14 government spending on, 11–12, 12 (fig.) low public-sector wages and, 19 out-of-pocket spending on, 11–12, 12 (fig.) rehabilitation of, 29 Zogby International poll and, Housing crises, Hussein, Saddam, Identity-based differences, politicized, 4–5 Income inequality, 2, 3, 22 Inequality, of opportunities Arab Spring and, 20 Arab Youth Survey and, 1–2 crony capitalism and, 2, 16, 21–22 income and, 2, 3, 22 perceived, 2, 3, 7, 8, 20–22 Infant mortality, 10 Index Institutional reform, 25 Iran revolution, 20 subsidy reforms, 14 Iraq Arab uprisings and, 1, ethnoreligious cleavages and, Islam, Arab uprisings and, 2, 22–24, 25, 26 Jordan, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3–4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 16, 21, 27, 28 Justice and Development party (AKP), 20, 23 al-Khalifa family, 3, 4–5 Kuwait, Arab uprisings and, 4, 14 Labor market, 2, 6, 19, 20, 21 Latin America, 10, 11, 14 (fig.) Legitimacy, 5, 18–19 Liberalization cronyism and, middle classes and, 19–20 “Salafists” and, 26 Libya, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 6, 16, 22, 25, 27 Mabrouk, Marwan, 17 El-Maghrabi, Ahmed, 17 Market reforms, 15–16, 20 Mass mobilization, 3, 7, 8, 24 MENA region, 13 Middle classes authoritarian coalition and, 19–21 co-optation of, 13–14, 15, 24 economic reforms and, 10 Tunisia and, 7–8 Middle East former Soviet bloc and, poverty rates, 7, 10 revolutionary movements and, Mobilization, mass, 3, 7, 8, 24 Monarchies Arab Gulf, authoritarian coalitions and, 5–6 conservative, 7, 10 Hashemite, 4, Jordan, 3–4 37 al-Khalifa family, 3, 4–5 legitimacy, Morocco, Arab uprisings and, 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 17, 20, 21, 27 Mubarak, Gamal, 16, 17 Mubarak, Hosni, 1, 17, 25 Muhammad VI, Muslim Brotherhood, 22, 23, 26 Al-Nahda, 23, 25, 26 al-Nasser, Gamal ‘Abd, 19 National Democratic Party, 16 Nazif, Ahmad, 16, 17 Neoliberalism, 19 North Africa, 11 (fig.), 12 (fig.), 13, 14 (fig.) OECD countries, 10, 11 (fig.) Oil-wealth, Arab uprisings and, 4, Opportunities, inequality of See Inequality Orange Tunisie, 17 Ousted leaders, 1, 2, 3, 22, 25 Out-of-pocket spending, 11–12, 12 (fig.) Palestine, Palm Hill Corporation, 16–17 Perceived inequality, 2, 3, 7, 8, 20–22 Physical Integrity Index, 13, 13 (fig.) Policymaking process, Arab uprisings and, 2, 29 Political developments, after Arab uprisings, 25–27 Political economy perspective, Arab uprisings and, 2–3, 6, 7, 8, 18 Political Islam, Arab uprisings and, 2, 22–24, 25, 26 Political liberalization, “Salafists” and, 26 See also Liberalization Political reforms, 25, 26, 28 Politicized identity-based differences, 4–5 Politics, street, 2, 26 “Populist” republics, 7, 10 Postcolonial period, Poverty rates, 7, 10 Public health See Health Public welfare functions, decline of, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10–12, 15, 24, 29 Qaddhafi, Mu’ammar, 25 38 Index Recession, global, 6, 27 Reforms constitutional, of Morocco, institutional, 25 Iranian subsidy reforms, 14 market, 15–16, 20 political, 25, 26, 28 See also Economic reforms Regimes, Arab uprisings and, 2, 3, 4, 5–6 Regional variation, in Arab uprisings, 3–6 Religion, ethnoreligious diversity in Arab uprisings, 4–5 Repression and freedom indices, 12–13, 13 (fig.) Republics, “populist,” 7, 10 Revolutionary movements complexity of, in Iran, 20 length of, 25 in Libya, 25 messiness of, 24 Middle East and, socialist revolutions of 1960s, 28 See also Arab uprisings; specific revolutions Rollback of state, 3, 7, 8–13, 15, 19, 21, 24 Sticks, carrots and, 15, 24 Stock market, Egyptian, 17–18 Street politics, 2, 26 Sub-Saharan Africa, 10, 11, 11 (fig.) Subsidies, 6, 9, 13–14, 14 (fig.) Succession issues, Sunnis, 4, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 17 Syria, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 21, 27 “Salafists,” 26 Salih, ‘Ali ‘Abdullah, Samizdat tracts, 16 Saudi Arabia, 1, 3, 14, 27 Sectarianism, Arab uprisings and, Security deterioration, economic, 8–13 Shi’a groups, 4–5 Socialist revolutions, of 1960s, 28 Socioeconomic foundations, of Arab uprisings, 6–24 South Asia, 11 (fig.) South Korean chaebols, 15 Soviet bloc, State rollback, 3, 7, 8–13, 15, 19, 21, 24 State-business relations, 8, 15–18, 24 Variation, in Arab uprisings, 3–6 Tahrir Square, Tantawi, Mohamed Hussein, 25 Tax rates, 14–15, 24 Tax systems, 28 Trabelsi family, 8, 16 Transjordanians, 4, Tunisia, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 6, 7–8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 Unemployment, Arab uprisings and, 1, 6, 7, 20, 24, 27 United Arab Emirates, 14 Uprisings See Arab uprisings Welfare functions See Public welfare functions Women Arab uprisings and, 24 political Islam and, 22, 25 World Values Survey, 19, 23 Yemen, Arab uprisings and, 1, 3, 6, 14, 16, 22, 25, 27 Youth, Arab uprisings and, 1–2, 6, 7, 20, 24 Zogby International poll, $55.00 US, $63.50 CAN 528 pages 978-0-8133-4928-2, paperback 978-0-8133-4929-9, e-book Purchase the Updated 2013 Edition of A Political Economy of the Middle East, Third Edition
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UJUMFT ... explaining both the durability and the breakdown of authoritarian rule points to the broader value THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS of a political economy approach for understanding the emergence... progression of uprisings in the Arab countries In the next section, we spell out the core elements of such an approach PROLONGED DISCONTENT: THE SOCIOECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS Many of the. .. in the revolt again the ruler and his cronies (Kaboub 2012) In the next section, we develop the elements of a more systematic account of the Arab uprisings Toward a Political Economy of the Arab