Moral Psychology This is the first philosophy textbook in moral psychology, introducing students to a range of philosophical topics and debates such as What is moral motivation? Do reasons for action always depend on desires? Is emotion or reason at the heart of moral judgment? Under what conditions are people morally responsible? Are there self-interested reasons for people to be moral? Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction presents research by philosophers and psychologists on these topics, and addresses the overarching question of how empirical research is (or is not) relevant to philosophical inquiry Valerie Tiberius is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series editor: Paul K Moser, Loyola University of Chicago This innovative, well-structured series is for students who have already done an introductory course in philosophy Each book introduces a core general subject in contemporary philosophy and offers students an accessible but substantial transition from introductory to higher-level college work in that subject The series is accessible to non-specialists and each book clearly motivates and expounds the problems and positions introduced An orientating chapter briefly introduces its topic and reminds readers of any crucial material they need to have retained from a typical introductory course Considerable attention is given to explaining the central philosophical problems of a subject and the main competing solutions and arguments for those solutions The primary aim is to educate students in the main problems, positions and arguments of contemporary philosophy rather than to convince students of a single position Ancient Philosophy Christopher Shields Moral Psychology Valerie Tiberius Classical Modern Philosophy Jeffrey Tlumak Philosophy of Art Noël Carroll Continental Philosophy Andrew Cutrofello Philosophy of Biology Alex Rosenberg and Daniel W McShea Epistemology 3rd Edition Robert Audi Philosophy of Economics Julian Reiss Ethics 2nd Edition Harry J Gensler Metaphysics 3rd Edition Michael J Loux Philosophy of Language 2nd Edition Willam G Lycan Philosophy of Mathematics 2nd Edition James Robert Brown Philosophy of Mind 3rd Edition John Heil Philosophy of Perception William Fish Philosophy of Psychology José Luis Bermudez Philosophy of Religion Keith E Yandell Philosophy of Science 3rd Edition Alex Rosenberg Philosophy of Social Science Mark Risjord Social and Political Philosophy John Christman Forthcoming: Free Will Michael McKenna Metaethics Mark van Roojen Philosophy of Literature John Gibson This page intentionally left blank Moral Psychology A Contemporary Introduction Valerie Tiberius First published 2015 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Taylor & Francis The right of Valerie Tiberius to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data CIP data applied for ISBN: 978-0-415-52968-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-415-52969-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-11756-9 (ebk) Typeset in Garamond Pro and Gill Sans by Apex CoVantage, LLC Contents Preface xi PART I Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy 1 What Is Moral Psychology? Distinguishing the Questions Distinguishing Psychological States Structure and Aims of the Book Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 11 13 14 14 14 What Are Philosophers Doing Here? Moral Agents or Blobs of Flesh? Moral Realism and the Challenge from Evolution Responses to the Challenge Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 15 16 18 19 22 26 26 27 27 PART II Motivation and Moral Motivation: The Basics 29 Moral Motivation: What It Is and Isn’t Moral Theories and Moral Motivation The Challenge of Psychological Egoism Psychological Egoism and Empirical Research Taking Stock 31 31 36 38 42 viii Contents Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings Desires and Reasons Some Background Distinctions Reasons Internalism and Externalism The Humean Theory of Motivation Taking Stock Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 43 43 44 44 46 47 51 54 60 62 63 64 65 PART III Moral Motivation 67 Emotion and Moral Judgment What Is an Emotion? Emotions and Moral Judgment Amoralists, Psychopaths and the Debate between Moral Judgment Internalism and Externalism Taking Stock Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 69 70 74 Sentimentalism and Rationalism Rationalism and Sophisticated Sentimentalism The Kantian Challenge to Sophisticated Sentimentalism The Empirical Threat to Rationalism Taking Stock Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 87 88 94 97 104 105 106 106 107 Virtue What Kind of State Is a Virtue? Are There Any Virtues? The Empirical Challenge Defending Virtue 108 109 114 118 79 83 83 85 85 86 Contents Taking Stock Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings ix 123 124 124 125 125 PART IV Agency and Moral Responsibility 127 The Psychology of the Responsible Agent Holding People Responsible Methodology Real Self Theories Normative Competence Are We Competent? Challenges from Psychology Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 129 130 133 134 138 141 146 147 147 148 Moral Responsibility, Free Will and Determinism Free Will and Determinism Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy Libertarianism and the Challenge from Neuroscience Can I Be Excused? Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 149 149 153 156 160 164 165 166 166 PART V Three Big Questions 167 10 Why Be Moral?: Well-being and the Good Life Prudential Reasons and “Good For” Theories of Well-Being Psychological Evidence for the Well-Being–Morality Link Conclusion Summary Study Questions Notes Further Readings 169 169 170 178 182 184 185 185 186 Bibliography 227 Fischer, J M 2007 “Compatibilism.” In Four Views on Free Will, J M Fischer, R Kane, D Pereboom and M Vargas (eds), 44–84 Blackwell Fischer, J M., R Kane, D Pereboom and M Vargas 2007 Four Views on Free Will Blackwell Fischer, J M., and M Ravizza 1998 Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility Cambridge University Press Fleeson, W 2001 “Toward a Structure-and Process-Integrated View of Personality: Traits as Density Distributions of States.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80 (6): 1011–1027 Foot, P 1972 “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.” The Philosophical Review 81 (3): 305–316 ——— 2001 Natural Goodness Oxford University Press ——— 2002/1967 “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.” Reprinted in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy Oxford University Press: 19–32 Frankfurt, H G 1971 “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy: 5–20 ——— 1988 The Importance of What We Care about: Philosophical Essays Cambridge University Press Frankish, K 2010 “Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.” Philosophy Compass (10): 914–926 Gauthier, D P 1986 Morals by Agreement Oxford University Press Gibbard, A 1992 Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment Oxford University Press ——— 2006 “Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1: 195–215 Goldie, P 2007 “Emotion.” Philosophy Compass (6): 928–938 Goldman, A 2012 “A Liberal Learns To Compete.” The New York Times magazine, July 27 www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/magazine/a-liberal-learns-to-compete.html Greene, J Forthcoming “Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.” Ethics ——— 2013 Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them Penguin Press Greene, J., F Cushman, L Stewart, K Lowenberg, L Nystrom and J Cohen 2009 “Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment.” Cognition 111 (3): 364–371 Haidt, J 2001 “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108 (4): 814–834 ——— 2007 “The new synthesis in moral psychology.? Science 316 (5827): 998–1002 ——— 2012 The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion Penguin Haidt, J., and J Baron 1996 “Social Roles and the Moral Judgement of Acts and Omissions.” European Journal of Social Psychology 26 (2): 201–218 Haidt, J., and F Bjorklund 2008 “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Morality.” In Moral Psychology, vol 2, W Sinnott-Armstrong (ed), 181–217 MIT Press Halberstadt, J B., and T Wilson 2008 “Reflections on Conscious Reflection: Mechanisms of Impairment by Reasons Analysis.” In Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, J Adler and L Rips (eds), 548–565 Cambridge University Press Hare, R D., and H Vertommen 2003 The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Multi-Health Systems 228 Bibliography Harman, G 1999 “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 315–331 Harris, S 2011 The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values Simon and Schuster Haybron, D M 2008 The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being Oxford University Press Heathwood, C 2007 “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire.” Philosophical Studies 133 (1): 23–44 ——— 2011 “Preferentism and Self-Sacrifice.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1): 18–38 Herman, B 1981 “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty.” The Philosophical Review 90 (3): 359–382 Hill, T E 1992 Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory Cornell University Press Hobbes, T 1994/1651 Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, Edwin Curley (ed) Hackett Publising Company Hume, D 2000/1739 A Treatise of Human Nature D F Norton and M J Norton (eds) Oxford University Press Hursthouse, R 1999 On Virtue Ethics Oxford University Press ——— 2013 “Virtue Ethics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2013 ed http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/ethics-virtue/ Isen, A M., and P F Levin 1972 “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 (3): 384–388 Jacobson, D 2011 “Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N Zalta (ed) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/ fitting-attitude-theories/ Jayawickreme, E., Peter Meindl, E G Helzer, R M Furr and W Fleeson 2014 (Invited and under review) “Virtuous States and Virtuous Traits: How the Empirical Evidence Regarding the Existence of Broad Traits Does Not Undermine Virtue Ethics.” Theory and Research in Education 12 (3) John, O P., R W Robins and L A Pervin 2008 Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research The Guilford Press Johnson, R N 1999 “Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194): 53–72 Jones, E E., and V A Harris 1967 “The Attribution of Attitudes.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (1): 1–24 Jones, K 2006 “Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz.” Philosophical Explorations (1): 45–53 Joyce, R 2006 The Evolution of Morality MIT Press Kamtekar, R 2004 “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.” Ethics 114 (3): 458–491 Kane, R 2007 “Libertarianism ” In Four Views on Free Will, J M Fischer, R Kane, D Pereboom and M Vargas (eds), 5–43 Blackwell www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5217X.pdf Kant, I 2002/1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, A Zweig (trans), T E Hill, Jr and A Zweig (eds) Oxford University Press Keim, B 2012 “Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them.” WIRED www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision Kelly, D R 2011 Yuck!: The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust MIT Press Kennett, J 2006 “Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?” Philosophical Explorations (1): 69–82 Bibliography 229 Keteyian, A 2010 “Madoff Victims Vent Their Anger In Print.” CBS News March 18 www cbsnews.com/8301–500690_162–5090670.html Kitcher, P 2011 The Ethical Project Harvard University Press Korsgaard, C M 1996 The Sources of Normativity Cambridge University Press Kraut, R 2009 What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being Harvard University Press Latane, B., and J M Darley 1970 The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? Appleton-Century Crofts Lazarus, R S 1991 “Cognition and Motivation in Emotion.” American Psychologist 46 (4): 352–367 Lerner, J S., J H Goldberg and P E Tetlock 1998 “Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24 (6): 563–574 Libet, B 1985 “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (4): 529–566 Little, M O 1997 “Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind.” Nous 31 (1): 59–79 Lyubomirsky, S 2008 The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach to Getting the Life You Want Penguin Machery, E., and R Mallon 2010 “Evolution of Morality.” In The Moral Psychology Handbook, J Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds), 3–46 Oxford University Press Mackie, J 1990 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Penguin McCann, K 2012 “Altruistic Donation: ‘I Could Save a Life—and That’s All That Matters’.” The Telegraph, November 22 McDowell, J 1979 “Virtue and Reason.” Monist 62 (3): 331–350 Mele, A R 2006 Free Will and Luck Oxford University Press Merritt, M 2000 “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (4): 365–383 Milgram, S 1963 “Behavioral Study of Obedience.” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (4): 371–378 1974 Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View HarperCollins Miller, C 2013 Moral Character: An Empirical Theory Oxford University Press 2014 Character and Moral Psychology Oxford University Press Nagel, T 1970 The Possibility of Altruism Clarendon Press Nahmias, E 2011 “Scientific Challenges to Free Will.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, T O’Connor and S Constantine (eds), 345–356 John Wiley & Sons 2012a “The Psychology of Free Will.” The Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Psychology Oxford University Press www2.gsu.edu/˜phlean/papers/Nahmias_Psychology_ of_Free_Will_prepublication.pdf 2012b “Free Will and Responsibility.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science (4): 439–449 Nahmias, E., S G Morris, T Nadelhoffer and J Turner 2007 “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 28–53 Nichols, S 2002a “How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism.” The Monist 85 (2): 285–303 2002b “Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment.” Cognition 84: 221–236 2004 Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, vol 13 Oxford University Press 230 Bibliography Nichols, S., and J Knobe 2007 “Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.” Nous 41 (4): 663–685 Nisbett, R E., and T D Wilson 1977 “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.” Psychological Review 84 (3): 231–259 Nozick, R 1974 Anarchy, State, and Utopia Basic Books Nussbaum, M C 1995 “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.” In World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, J E J Althan and R Harrison (eds), 86–131 Cambridge University Press 2001 Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge University Press 2003 Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions Cambridge University Press 2009 Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law Princeton University Press Pereboom, D 2001 Living without Free Will Cambridge University Press Petrinovich, L., and P O’Neill 1996 “Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions.” Ethology and Sociobiology 17 (3): 145–171 Piliavin, J A 2003 “Doing Well by Doing Good: Benefits for the Benefactor.” In Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the Life Well-Lived, C L M Keyes and J Haidt (eds), 227–247 American Psychological Association Prinz, J 2004a “Embodied Emotions.” In Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, R C Solomon (ed), 44–58 Oxford University Press 2004b Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion Oxford University Press, USA 2006 “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.” Philosophical Explorations (1): 29–43 2007 The Emotional Construction of Morals Oxford University Press 2012 Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape Our Lives Penguin Raibley, J 2010 “Well-Being and the Priority of Values.” Social Theory and Practice 36 (4): 593–620 Railton, P 1984 “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2): 134–171 1986 “Moral Realism.” The Philosophical Review 95 (2): 163–207 Rawls, J 1951 “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics.” The Philosophical Review 60 (2): 177–197 1971 A Theory of Justice Harvard University Press 1980 “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (9): 515–572 Roberts, R C 2003 Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology Cambridge University Press Rosati, C S 2009 “Self-Interest and Self-Sacrifice.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109: 311–325 2011 “Moral Motivation.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E N Zalta (ed) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/ Roskies, A 2003 “Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from ‘Acquired Sociopathy’.” Philosophical Psychology 16 (1): 51–66 2008 “Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance.” Neuroethics (1): 19–30 2010 “Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will.” In Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, W Sinnott-Armstrong and L Nadel (eds), 11–22 Oxford University Press Bibliography 231 Ross, L 1977 “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10: 173–220 Ryan, R M., and E L Deci 2001 “On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being.” Annual Review of Psychology 52 (1): 141–166 Scanlon, T M 1982 “Contractualism and Utilitarianism.” In Utilitarianism and Beyond, A Sen and B Williams (eds), 103, 110 Cambridge University Press 1998 What We Owe to Each Other The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Schachter, S., and J Singer 1962 “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State.” Psychological Review 69 (5): 379–399 Scherer, K R 2000 “Psychological Models of Emotion.” In The Neuropsychology of Emotion, Joan C Borod (ed), 137–162 Oxford University Press 2005 “What Are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?” Social Science Information 44 (4): 695–729 Schnall, S., J Haidt, G L Clore and A H Jordan 2008 “Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (8): 1096–1109 Schroeder, M A 2007 Slaves of the Passions Oxford University Press Schroeder, T 2004 Three Faces of Desire Oxford University Press 2006 “Desire.” Philosophy Compass (6): 631–639 Schwitzgebel, E 2011 “Bartels and Pizarro: Consequentialists Are Psychopaths.” The Splintered Mind http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2011/09/bartels-and-pizarro-consequentialists html Seidel, A., and J Prinz 2013 “Sound Morality: Irritating and Icky Noises Amplify Judgments in Divergent Moral Domains.” Cognition 127 (1): 1–5 Seligman, M E P 2002 Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment Simon & Schuster Shafer-Landau, R 2003 Moral Realism: A Defence Oxford University Press 2008 “Defending Ethical Intuitionism.” In Moral Psychology, vol 2, W SinnottArmstrong (ed), 83–96 MIT Press 2012 “Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge.” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 7: 1–37 Shenhav, A and J Greene 2014 “Integrative Moral Judgment: Dissociating the Roles of the Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex.” The Journal of Neuroscience 34 (13): 4741–4749 Sin, N L., and S Lyubomirsky 2009 “Enhancing Well-Being and Alleviating Depressive Symptoms with Positive Psychology Interventions: A Practice-Friendly Meta-Analysis.” Journal of Clinical Psychology 65 (5): 467–487 Singer, P 1972 “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public Affairs (3): 229–243 Sinnott-Armstrong, W 2008 “Framing Moral Intuitions.” In Moral Psychology, Vol 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuitions and Diversity, W Sinott-Armstong (ed), 47–76 MIT Press , ed 2014 Moral Psychology, Vol 4: Freedom and Responsibility MIT Press Slater, L 2004 Opening Skinner’s Box: Great Psychological Experiments of the Twentieth Century W W Norton & Company Smetana, J G 1981 “Preschool Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules.” Child Development 52: 1333–1336 1993 “Understanding of Social Rules.” In The Development of Social Cognition: The Child as Psychologist, M Bennett (ed), 111–141 Guilford Press Smith, M 1987 “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” Mind 96 (381) New Series (January 1): 36–61 232 Bibliography 1995a “Internal Reasons.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1) 109–131 1995b The Moral Problem Blackwell Snow, N E 2010 Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory Routledge Sober, E., and D S Wilson 1998 Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Harvard University Press Solomon, R C 1973 “Emotions and Choice.” The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1): 20–41 Sommers, T 2005 “Interview with Jonathan Haidt.” The Believer www.believermag.com/ issues/200508/?read=interview_haidt Sousa, R De 1979 “The Rationality of Emotions.” Dialogue 18 (1): 41–63 Steinberg, D 2003 “Kidneys and the Kindness of Strangers.” Health Affairs 22 (4): 184–189 Stich, S 2007 “Evolution, Altruism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critique of Sober and Wilson’s Argument for Psychological Altruism.” Biology & Philosophy 22 (2): 267–281 Stich, S., J M Doris and E Roedder 2010 “Altruism.” In The Moral Psychology Handbook, J Doris (ed), 147–206 Oxford University Press Stocker, M 1976 “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 73 (14): 453–466 Stocks, E L., D A Lishner and S K Decker 2009 “Altruism or Psychological Escape: Why Does Empathy Promote Prosocial Behavior?” European Journal of Social Psychology 39 (5): 649–665 Strawson, P F 2008 Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays Routledge Street, S 2006 “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 109–166 2010 “What Is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?” Philosophy Compass (5): 363–384 Sumner, L 1996 Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics Oxford University Press Swartwood, J D 2013 “Wisdom as an Expert Skill.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3): 511–528 Thoits, P A., and L N Hewitt 2001 “Volunteer Work and Well-Being.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 42 (June): 115–131 Thomson, J J 1976 “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.” The Monist 59 (2): 204–217 2008 “Turning the Trolley.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (4): 359–374 Tiberius, V 2008 The Reflective Life: Living Wisely with Our Limits Oxford University Press 2009 “The Reflective Life: Wisdom and Happiness for Real People.” In Philosophy and Happiness, L Bortolotti (ed), 215–232 Palgrave Macmillan 2013 “In Defense of Reflection.” Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 223–243 Tversky, A., and D Kahneman 1981 “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211 (4481): 453–458 Twain, M 1994/1884 Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Dover Publications Wallace, R J 1990 “How to Argue about Practical Reason.” Mind 99: 355–385 1994 Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments Harvard University Press Weinstein, N., and R M Ryan 2010 “When Helping Helps: Autonomous Motivation for Prosocial Behavior and Its Influence on Well-Being for the Helper and Recipient.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 98 (2): 222–244 Wheatley, T., and J Haidt 2005 “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe.” Psychological Science 16 (10): 780–784 Wiggins, D 1987 Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value Oxford Bibliography 233 Williams, B 1981 Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 Cambridge University Press Wilson, T D 2002 Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious Harvard University Press Wilson, T D., and D Kraft 1993 “Why Do I Love Thee?: Effects of Repeated Introspections about a Dating Relationship on Attitudes toward the Relationship.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19 (4): 409–418 Wilson, T D., D Kraft, and D S Dunn 1989 “The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Attitudes: The Moderating Effect of Knowledge about the Attitude Object.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 25 (5): 379–400 Wilson, T D., D J Lisle, J W Schooler, S D Hodges, K J Klaaren and S J LaFleur 1993 “Introspecting about Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19: 331–331 Wilson, T D., and R E Nisbett 1978 “The Accuracy of Verbal Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior.” Social Psychology http://psycnet.apa.org/ psycinfo/1980–24471–001 Wolf, S 1980 “Asymmetrical Freedom.” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (3): 151–166 1981 “The Importance of Free Will.” Mind 90 (359): 386–405 1990 Freedom within Reason Oxford University Press This page intentionally left blank Index affect: biases 199; and cognition 9, 163; intuitions 155; normative judgments 155; positive and negative affect 123, 178, 179, 180; well-being 174 affective defect 81, 86n14 Aharoni, E 81 akrasia (weakness of will) 137; Huckleberry Finn 136–7; inverse akrasia 137 altruism: aversive-arousal hypothesis vs empathy-altruism hypothesis 40, 41, 42; egoism and 40, 205; empathyaltruism hypothesis 40, 70; evolution 39, 44n5; impartial 183; parochial 182; psychological 36; reciprocal 23; universal 183 amoralists: psychopaths and the debate between moral judgment internalism and externalism 79–83, 84, 86n13 anger 71, 72, 77, 91, 93, 157 Anscombe, Elizabeth 48, 64n3 anti-Humean 47, 48, 56–60, 67, 114 Antony, Louise: “Nature and Norms” 218n6 Aristotle 11, 15; eudaimonists 175; function argument 109–10, 175; hybrid theory of emotion 85n5; virtue ethics 34, 109, 110, 115, 118, 119, 124, 176, 205; wise person 122 armchair philosophy 6, 37, 42 Arpaly, Nomy: anorexia and its implications for moral psychology 147n7; consequentialism 44n1; endorsement 136, 138; inverse akrasia 137; Unprincipled Virtue 137 ataraxia (tranquility) 171 attitudes 26, 93, 115, 143, 175; of approval 91; believing 113; blaming 131; desiring 113; evaluative 18, 20, 22; high-order 136; objective 131, 132; politics 142; pro- 57, 60, 61, 62, 65n9; reactive 131, 132, 133, 146, 147n3, 156, 166n3; second-order 90, 91, 92, 94–5; subjective 176 Austen, Jane 111–12; Emma 114 authenticity 185n3 authority/subversion 23 aversive arousal hypothesis 40, 41 Batson, Daniel: aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis 40, 41; empathy-altruism hypothesis 40–2, 43, 70 Baumeister, R F 181 beliefs 7, 9–10, 14n4, 47, 157, 210; cannot motivate 63; cognitivism 72, 73; Davidson 65n9; and directions of fit 111; desire 48, 62, 111, 113,134; intentional content 85n2; intuitionists 197; Little 113; means-end 54; moral 20, 21, 27n5, 89; motivating reasons 55, 56, 63, 64n7, 103, 143; Smith 64n7; values 153; virtue 113, 114 Bentham, Jeremy 171 Berker, Selim 195 Berridge, Kent 65n10 besire 113 bias 100, 192, 199; emotional 208; negativity 190, 200 Big Five personality traits 119–20 Blackburn, Simon 92 brain scans 161–2 bypassing, 155–6 care/harm 23 Castro, Fidel 115 Categorical Imperative 96, 208 categorical imperatives 20, 33 categorical reasons 47, 60, 61, 62 causal determinism 17, 149 character traits 109, 144; cross-situational reliability 115, 116, 119, 121, 124; 236 Index and density distributions 120–1; robust 115, 116, 118, 119; and situationism challenge 116, 120, 123; see also virtue Churchland, Patricia 182 Clueless 114 cognition 74; controlled 195; necessary to label emotions 73 compatibilism 12, 149, 150–2, 153, 154, 156, 159, 165; arguments against 157, 164; arguments for 204; Garden of Forking Paths Argument 152, 157, 164; Manipulation Argument 151, 152, 164, 166n4; Pereboom 166n4 competent 141–6 conceptual analysis consequentialism 32, 35, 181, 196; anti199, 200; argument 44n1; judgments 195, 208 considered judgments 133, 192, 197, 199, 202n8, 204–5 contingency (of moral reasons): as relevant to debate between Humeans and Kantians 59–60 construct validity 6, 13 constructivism 21–2, 197 contractualism 21; Scanlon 33–4 control 9, 17; guidance 138–9, 140, 152, 159; rational 220; regulative 138–9, 152; wisdom 122 conventional norms 80, 81, 92, 106n6 Dancy, Jonathan 55 Daniels, Norman 147n4, 201n1 data, 159 Deci, Edward 179 Dennett, Daniel 160, 166n3 density distributions 120–1 Descartes, René 85n5 desire 10; altruistic 38–9; and direction of fit 48, 49, 57, 65n12, 111; instrumental vs ultimate intrinsic 38–9, 40, 41, 43, 59, 63, 64n1, 214; necessary for action 56, 57, 59, 60, 62; and reductive metaethical theories 211, 217; and reward-based learning mechanism 58, 59, 62, 63, 65n11; second-order 135, 136, 145, 146, 151, 153, 163 desires and reason 46–66; background distinctions 47–51; see also reasons desire satisfaction 173–4, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 186n6 determinism 130, 156, 162, 164; causal 17, 149, 155; and free will 149–52, 157, 166n2, 166n5; hard 150, 164; moral responsibility 17, 149, 155; Strawson, P F 132 Dime in a Phone Booth study 117–18 directions of fit 48, 49, 57, 62, 64n3, 65n12, 111, 113, 124 disgust 10, 27n7, 89, 207; Haidt 78; moral judgment 77; and sanctity foundation 23, 25 Doris, J M 42; cheating 144; virtue 115–16, 118–19, 125n5 Dual Process Theory 107n10, 200; Greene 194, 195 Dugan, Brian 161–2 dumbfounding (moral dumbfounding) 98, 101, 102, 107n11 egoism 11, 43, 205; and empirical research 38–42; and non-egoism 36–7, 42 Ekman, Paul 85n3 Emma 111–13, 114 emotions 67, 84, 85n2, 194–5, 219; bias 208; cognition and feeling 74; cognitive theories of 9–10, 72, 73; defined 70–4; facial expressions 85n3; hybrid theories 75–6, 77, 78, 85n5, 219; and moral judgment 10, 23, 74–83, 155; moral motivation 8, 12, 62, 88, 90, 100; moral responsibility 131, 157; perceptual theories of epicureanism 171 empathy 40–1, 44n7; -altruism hypothesis 40, 42, 70; lack of 80 empirical questions 4, 8, 13, 14n3, 42, 49, 82, 158, 178; defined 14n2 error theory 27n4 eudaimonism 173, 175–6, 177, 179, 182, 183, 184, 186n5 evolution: debunking arguments 20, 26; and moral realism 16, 18–20, 217 experience machine 172, 173, 189, 216, 217; Nozick 204 experimental philosophy: and free will 13; intuitions 153–6, 165 expressivism 92 facts: moral 18–22, 25, 26, 27n1, 27n5, 197, 206–7, 213; ordinary 76, 204, 210, 211 fairness/cheating 23 fart spray 77, 207 fictionalism 20, 27n4 Fischer, John Martin: guidance control and regulative control 138–40, 145, 150, 152 Fleeson, William, 120, 125n6 fMRI 195 Index Foot, Philippa 65n13 Footbridge 193–6, 199–200 Footbridge Switch 193–6, 199–200 framing effect 189–90, 192 Frankfurt, Harry: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” 135–6, 137, 138, 146, 147n4, 147n6 Fred and Barney 153–4, 166n5 free will 147n8, 149–66; and determinism 149–52, 157, 166n2, 166n5; experimental philosophy 13; Kane 158; libertarianism 156–7; moral responsibility 135, 150, 152, 154, 156, 162, 164, 166n3 functionalism 9, 10 fundamental attribution error 115 Garden of Forking Paths argument 152, 157, 164 Gibbard, Allan: guilt 186n7; near-moral concepts 92; second-order attitudes 90–1 Glaucon’s challenge 169, 178, 182, 183 goal-directed behavior 49, 58 goals 65n12, 110; Smith 64n5; see also desire Golden Rule 99 Goldie, Peter 71 Good Samaritan experiment 117, 142 Greene, Joshua 202; emotional basis for deontological judgments in trolley cases 208; moral intuitions 193–6, 199–200 groupishness 181, 183 guidance control 138–40, 152, 159 Haidt, Jonathan: disgust 78; dumbfounding 98; “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail” 97; empirical challenge to rationalism 97–101; groupishness 181–2; hypnotizing 78; moral intuitions 193; moral judgments 97, 99–100, 106n2, 107n11; “Moral Foundations Theory” 23–5; Reason 98; reasoning compared to Kantians 99–100; Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) 23 happiness 32, 34, 35, 38, 43, 58, 170, 171, 211, 216; eudaimonia 175; Lyubomirsky 179–80; promote long-term 188; Sumner 185n2; Utilitarianism 188; virtues 124 hard determinism 150, 164 hard incompatibilism 157, 162 Harman, Gilbert 115 hedonism 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 180, 183, 204 Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan 36, 182–3 Hobbes’ Foole 182–3 237 Huckleberry Finn 136–7 human nature 175–6, 184; and Aristotelian virtue ethics; flourishing 206, 212; Hobbes 183; Hume 183; normative theory 218n5; Nussbaum 218n5; and reductive theories of ethics 211–2 Human Nature Approach 211–2 Human Rights Watch 129–30 Humean Theory of Motivation 11, 47–8, 49–51, 54–62, 63, 64n2, 64n6, 65n13, 67, 95, 96, 103, 106; Kantians 62, 96, 103 Humean Theory of Reasons 11 Hume, David: actions 137; and compatibilism 157; hybrid theory of emotion 75–6, 77, 78, 85n5, 219; Knave 183; moral judgment 79, 82, 89, 93, 170, 183; reasons 209; sentimentalism 93; Treatise of Human Nature 75; and virtue 118, 121 Hursthouse, Rosalind 109, 110 hypnosis 134, 156 impartiality 93 incompatibilism 150, 154, 155, 156; hard 157, 162; see also hard determinism intentional content 9, 14n4, 70, 85n2 internalism and externalism: moral judgment 79–83; Reasons Existence 50–1 intuitions: biases and trolley-ology 189–96; and experimental philosophy 153–6 intuitionism 196–100 inverted commas 86n13 is/ought gap 204–13; and the need for bridging theory 195, 205, 210–1, 213 Jayawickreme, Eranda 125n6 Joyce, Richard 20 justification (of moral judgments) 69, 70, 80, 90, 92, 100, 101; Kantian 208; rationalist 94, 95 Kamakawiwo‘ole, Israel: “Somewhere Over the Rainbow” 48 Kamtekar, Rachana 118–19 Kane, Robert 157–60, 164 Kant, Immanuel 94, 100, 218n2; compatibilism 151; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 106n8; inconsistency 96; maxims 95; moral judgment 101; moral motivation 11, 32–3, 108; moral reasons 53; motive of duty 57, 60; normative ethics 107n12; rationalism 104; reasons 209 238 Index Kantianism: actions 34; Categorical Imperative 96, 208; challenge to sophisticated sentimentalism 94–6; contingency as relevant to debate between with Humeans 59–60; Humean Theory of Motivation 62, 96, 103; justification 208; maxims 95, 96, 100; metaethics 207; and the moral law 57, 96; moral judgment 104; moral motivation 33, 43, 44n3; moral theory 32–3, 95; motive of duty 32–3, 57, 62, 108; rationalism 108, 114; reasoning 99–100; sophisticated sentimentalism 94–6, 105, 208; universalization 99 Kennett, J.: “Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?” 107n9 Kiehl, K A 81 Kitcher, P 44n5 Knobe, Joshua 154, 155 Korsgaard, Christine 95, 96, 99, 101, 207, 209 Kraut, Richard 175, 176, 206 Lazarus, Richard 72 Leary, M R 181 legal permissibility 161–2; and brain scans 161–2 libertarianism 156–60 Libet, Benjamin 159–60, 166n6 life satisfaction 172, 173, 178, 180, 184 Little, Margaret 113 loyalty/betrayal 23 Luther, Martin 140–1 Lyubomirsky, Sonia: The How of Happiness 179–80 Madoff, Bernie 129–30, 131, 133, 134, 138, 140, 162, 169 Manipulation Argument 151, 152, 164, 166n4 Matson, Wallace 151 McDowell, John 122 Mele, Al 159 mental processing 17, 97, 107n10 Merritt, Maria 121, 122 metaethics/metaethical questions 6, 8, 27n4, 85n1, 101, 210, 213, 217, 219; distinguished from normative ethics 7, 13, 14n3, 107n12, 206; empirical research 207; expressivism 92; sophisticated sentimentalism 94; virtue ethics 125n1 methodology 12, 13, 133–4, 152, 184, 188, 196 Milgram, Stanley 116, 117 Milgram experiments 116, 117, 121, 125n2, 142, 144 Miller, Christian 121 Monty Python: The Meaning of Life 170–1 moral absolutism 50 moral action 8, 11, 31, 35, 47, 97, 98, 170, 180 moral agents 33; or blobs of flesh? 16–17 moral facts 18–19, 20–1, 22, 25, 26, 27n1, 27n5, 206, 207, 213 moral intuition 188, 189, 191,192–3, 196–8, 200, 201; Berker 195; Greene 193; see also Dual Process Theory moral judgment 107; emotions 10, 23, 74–83, 155; internalism and externalism 70, 79–83, 88; rationalism about 12, 88–90, 97–105; sentimentalism about 25, 70, 78, 79, 90–4, 105 moral knowledge 187–202 moral law 57, 96 moral motivation: consequentialism and 35; contractualism and 33, 34; distinctive form of 108; emotions 8, 12, 62, 88, 90, 100; Kantianism and 33, 43, 44n3; virtue ethics and 34, 43, moral norms 24, 80, 106n6 moral philosophy: defined 4–5, 13; distinguishing the questions 4–8; three kinds of questions 8, 13 moral psychology 3–14; defined 4, 13; and moral knowledge 187–202; and moral philosophy 22–5 moral realism 27n5, 206; and the challenge from evolution 18–19, 20, 217; defined 27n1; independent 197, 198, 199; responses to the challenge 19–22 moral requirements: absolute or contingent 49–50; scope 93 moral responsibility: emotions 131, 157; free will 135, 150, 152, 154, 156, 162, 164, 166n3; free will and determinism 149–52, 157, 166n2, 166n5 moral theory 5, 47, 62, 67, 170, 187–8, 196, 198; default method 201n5; Kantian 32–3, 95; and moral motivation 31–6; Rawls 201n5; Scanlon 33; science 216 moral worth 127; vs moral rightness 35, 110 Morris, Stephen 154 motivating reasons 5, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64n6 Nadelhoffer, Thomas 154 Nagel, T 64n8 Index Nahmias, Eddy 147n8, 153, 154, 155, 166n1, 166n5 naturalism 21 needs, basic human 179, 181 negativity bias 190, 200 neo-sentimentalism see sentimentalism neurolaw 161, 162 neuroscience: and the challenge from libertarianism 156–60 Nichols, Shaun 81–2, 92, 97, 154, 155 Nisbett, Richard E.: “Telling More Than We Can Know” 147n10 normative competence 132, 138–41, 145, 147n8, 163 normative judgments 155 normative questions 4, 5, 7,14n3, 16, 26, 103, 133 normative reasons 48, 49–53, 55, 60, 61, 62–3, 64n6, 95, 105, 140, 177, 218n6 normative theory 116, 133; distinguished from metaethical theory 14n3 normativity: and moral judgment 5, 22; and reasons 104, 213 Nozick, Robert 172, 204 objective attitudes 131; see Strawson, P F OCEAN see Big Five operationalization 6, 13, 207 ought/is 203–21; reducing ought to is 211–16 “ought” implies can oxytocin 182 pain 217n1; affects survival 39, 40; animal 7, 95; and pleasure 5; see also Milgram experiments perceptual theory 85n4 persons 121, 135–6, 147n5; courageous 34; good 8, 34, 36, 88; honest 115; innocent 142; suffering 42–3; wise 115, 122 Plato: The Republic 169 pleasure 58, 109, 171–6, 184, 217n1; see also hedonism positive affect: relevance to well-being 179, 180 positive psychology 172, 185n1, 206 prescriptive ethical theory 218n2; see also normative theory priming 44n7 Prinz, Jesse 73–4, 81, 85nn4–5, 85n10, 206, 218n4 pro-social behavior 34–5, 70 psychological egoism: conceptual argument for 36–7; empirical arguments for 38–42; see also altruism 239 psychological states: affective 9, 180; cognitive 9; conative 9; distinguishing 8–10 psychopaths 78, 84, 86n14, 98, 161, 163, 166nn7–8, 207; amoralists and the debate between moral judgment internalism and externalism 79–83; Nichols 97; rationalism 97, 107n9 rational capacities see reasoning rationalism: about moral judgment rationalism about 12, 88–90, 97–105; and internalism 70, 79–80, 83, 84, 85n11, 88, 103; empirical critique of 97–104; Kantian 108, 114; rationalization (post hoc) 89–90, 97, 98, 100, 143; and sentimentalism 87–107; and sophisticated sentimentalism 88–94 Ravizza, Mark: guidance control and regulative control 138–40, 145, 150 Rawls, John 197, 201n1, 201n5 reactive attitudes see Strawson, P F real self theories 12, 134–8, 141, 147n8, 150, 163–4 reasoning 5, 47, 55–60, 63, 64n7, 200; conscious 194, 195; instrumental or means-end 54, 59; practical 119, 122, 123, 207; role in moral judgment 76, 88, 90, 94, 96, 97, 99–101, 105, 208; universalization 99 reasons: absolute 54; distinguished from reasoning 5; internalism and externalism 51–4; moral 5, 7, 43, 50–1, 52–3, 59, 60, 62, 63, 83, 114, 140, 146, 166n8, 170, 184, 185n4, 213; motivating 5, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64n6; motivating vs normative 61–2, 67, 104, 163; practical vs theoretical 5, 119, 122, 123; prudential 169–70 Reasons Existence Internalism (RI) 50–1, 52, 53, 60, 61, 64n4 reductionism/reductive metaethical theories 211, 217; Human Nature Approach vs Desire Approach 211–3 reflective endorsement 95, 207 reflective equilibrium 13, 133–4, 146, 152, 153, 154, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201n1, 201n5, 204–5, 209, 216; double wide 202n8; narrow 147n4; wide 147n4, 188, 189, 205 regulative control 138–9, 152 relativism 89 responsibility 129–48; excuse 160–4; holding people responsible 130–2; 240 Index methodology 133–4; normative competence 138–41; real self theories 134–8 reward-based learning mechanism 58, 59, 62, 63, 65n11 Roedder, E 42 Roskies, Adina 81–2, 161–2, 166n6 Ryan, Richard 179 sanctity foundation 25 sanctity/degradation 23 satisfaction: desire 173–4, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 186n6; life 172, 173, 178, 180, 184 Scanlon, T M.: contractualism 21, 33–4; desires 57; moral theory 33; motivation 21; pro-attitudes 57 Schachter, Stanley 72–3, 74 Scherer, Klaus 71, 74 Schroeder, Mark 136, 137, 138; Slaves of the Passions 65n14 Schroeder, Timothy 58–9, 65n10 sentimentalism 12; arguments for 25; Hume 93; and judgment internalism 70, 79–83, 88; moral judgment 25, 70, 78, 79, 90–4, 105; and rationalism 87–107; sophisticated 90, 91–4, 101, 103, 104, 209; sophisticated sentimentalism and Kantianism 94–6, 105, 208; sophisticated sentimentalism and rationalism 88–94; psychopathy as evidence for Shafer-Landau, Russ 27n2; moral intuition 192, 197; self-justifying intuition 197 Singer, Jerome 72–3, 74 Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter 81, 201n2 situationism/situationist: critique of virtue ethics, 120, 123; character traits 116, 120, 123; cross-situational reliability 115, 116, 119, 121, 124 Slater, Lauren 144–5 Smetana, Judith 81 Smith, Michael 107n13; desires 65n12; goals 64n5; Humean Theory of Motivation 54, 55; “practicality requirement” 85n6; pro-attitude 60; reasons internalism 61, 64n5, 64n7; Teleological Argument 54–5, 56–7, 60, 63 Sober, Eliot 38–40 Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (SIM) 23, 97 Soft Determinism see compatibilism Stich, Stephen 39–41, 42 Stocks, Eric 41–2, 44n8 Strawson, P F.: attributions of moral responsibility 133, 155; blaming attitude 131–2; determinism 132; “Freedom and Resentment” 131; reactive 147n3, 156 Street, Sharon 18, 19, 27n2, 206–7; fictionalism 20 Sumner, L W 172, 173, 185n2 Suproxin 72, 73 Switch 190, 193–6,199–200 teleological argument 54–5, 56, 63 theoretical analysis 6, 13 traits see character traits trolley problem: Footbridge; Footbridge Switch; Switch trolley-ology 189, 190, 193, 198, 199, 200, 201n3, 208 truth adjustment 173, 185n3 Turner, Jason 154 Twain, Mark 136–7 Utilitarianism 31–2, 34, 43, 171, 188 universalization 99 value fulfillment theory 174–5, 176, 177, 180, 183, 184 virtue 108–25; and cross-situational consistency; defense of 118–22; empirical challenge 114–18; motivational selfsufficiency; type of state 109–14 virtue ethics 5, 34, 43, 109–16, 23–4, 125n1, 142, 144, 186n9, 205; and Aristotle’s influence 34, 109, 110, 115, 118, 119, 124, 176, 205; defending 118–22 voluntary act 36 Wallace, R Jay 56, 132, 155 wanton 135, 147n6, 163 Weinstein, Netta 179 well-being: morality link 178–82; positive affect relevance to 179, 180; and reasons to be moral 170, 176–8, 180, 182, 183, 184, 206, 217 well-being, theories of 170–8; desire satisfaction 173–4, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 186n6; eudaimonism 173, 175–6, 177, 179, 182, 183, 184, 186n5; hedonism 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 180, 183, 204; life satisfaction 172, 173, 178, 180, 184; mental state theories vs nonmental state theories 171, 172, 173, 174, Index 177, 184; value fulfillment 174–5, 176, 177, 180, 184 Why be moral? 169–86 moral reasons approach 178–82; prudential reasons approach 169–70 will: good or bad 32, 137, 163; weakness of 137; see also free will Wilson, David Sloan 38–40 241 Wilson, Timothy: Strangers in Ourselves 147n10; “Telling More Than We Can Know” 147n10 wisdom, practical, 110, 118, 125n8; virtues 119, 122, 124 Wolf, Susan 140–1, 164 Yes, Prime Minister 191