THE CHANGING ROLES OF VIETNAMESE MASS ORGANIZATIONS: STRATEGIES OF LEGITIMACYBUILDING DIEGO FOSSATI BA Public Relations, IULM Free University Milan MA European Studies, Istitut d’Etudes Politiques Paris A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE Acknowledgements My staying in Singapore has been a fruitful period of professional and personal growth. During these two and a half years, my research interests have substantially changed, my decision to pursue the academic career has been consolidating, and my personal life has presented unprecedented challenges. This thesis and the training I have received at NUS have been an important part of such a stage in my life. Studying for the first time in a political science department in Asia, I have had the precious opportunity to learn from outstanding scholars and to draw inspiration and motivation from their achievements. A few people deserve my gratitude for having been of great help throughout the process of conceiving and writing this thesis. First and foremost, this thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and advice of my supervisor, Dr. Jamie Davidson. He has been a patient and committed presence during the writing of the thesis. His support, which has stretched well beyond technical assistance, has been an invaluable source of encouragement. The NUS community has also been in many ways supportive of my projects. This applies in particular to Dr. Peter Li, whose assistance in preparing my PhD applications was crucial, and to Dr. Stan Tan, who has al- i ways been a helpful adviser throughout these months. I also want to mention with gratitude Drs. Kyaw, Kammen, Nichols, and Prof. Buchanan for their support and encouragement for my career plans. Finally, I express my gratefulness to the people I have interviewed in Hanoi, who have spared no effort in trying to be of help despite their busy schedules: without the interesting conversations I had with them, my weeks in Vietnam would not have been as productive and revealing as they were. Looking back to these beautiful, rich months in Southeast Asia, I see that extraordinary friends have surrounded me. I thank them all deeply for having been close to me, for having had the kindness and care of being there when I needed their company. Among these companions, my girlfriend Eleine has been my constant source of affection and relief in times of strain. I cannot express with words how much this means to me. Singapore, 23/06/2009 ii Table of Contents Summary ........................................................................................................................v List of Figures ...............................................................................................................vi Chapter One: Introduction..............................................................................................1 1.1 Thinking about democratic transitions ...........................................................2 1.2 Change and continuity in Vietnam ...............................................................6 1.2.1 Socio-economic development ................................................................7 1.2.2 Social and political liberalization ...........................................................9 1.2.3 Studying Vietnam .................................................................................10 1.3 State-society relations in Vietnam ................................................................15 1.3.1 Politics of legitimacy ...........................................................................15 1.3.2 A model of institutional change and continuity ...................................17 1.3.3 Mass organizations ...............................................................................20 1.4 The research project .....................................................................................22 1.4.1 Research question.................................................................................22 1.4.2 Research hypotheses ............................................................................23 1.4.3 Research design ....................................................................................26 1.4.4 Contents of the study ............................................................................28 Chapter Two: Vietnam’s renovation .............................................................................30 2.1 Economy ......................................................................................................30 2.2 Society ..........................................................................................................34 2.3 Politics ..........................................................................................................37 Chapter Three: Legitimacy in Vietnam ........................................................................41 3.1 Tracking political legitimacy ........................................................................41 3.2 Political legitimacy and institutional change................................................45 3.3 Legitimacy in Vietnam .................................................................................47 3.3.1 The Socialist revolution........................................................................48 3.3.2 The nationalist struggle ........................................................................49 3.3.3 Performance..........................................................................................50 3.3.4 Legitimacy crisis and reform................................................................51 Chapter Four: State and Society in Vietnam ................................................................55 4.1 An introduction to state-society relations in Vietnam...................................56 4.1.1 Studying the state and society ..............................................................56 4.1.2 Vietnam: A strong or a weak state? ......................................................60 iii 4.2 Socialist Vietnam and Mobilizational corporatism.......................................65 4.2.1 Mass mobilization in Socialist countries..............................................65 4.2.2 The Vietnamese case.............................................................................67 4.2.3 Mass organizations, doi moi and corporatism ......................................70 4.3 Is there a civil society in Vietnam?...............................................................73 4.3.1 Civil society and international aid........................................................74 4.3.2 The prospects for civil society in Vietnam ...........................................77 Chapter Five: Mass Organizations between Change and Continuity ...........................80 5.1 Mass organizations as civil society actors ....................................................81 5.1.1 Welfare service providers .....................................................................81 5.1.2 An inclusive model of governance .......................................................84 5.1.3 A comparative advantage......................................................................86 5.2 Mass organizations as government agencies ................................................89 5.2.1 Bureaucratic features ............................................................................90 5.2.2 Social monitoring..................................................................................91 5.2.3 Party dependence..................................................................................93 Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks ...............................................................................96 References ..................................................................................................................103 iv Summary This thesis is a study of current trends in state-society relations in Vietnam, in particular as far as questions of legitimacy and institutional change are concerned. It departs from the observation that Vietnam today features the coexistence of old and new elements in the economic, social and political arenas. Focussing on the political realm, it argues that Vietnamese mass organizations (MOs) are one of the key elements of the Vietnamese state’s strategy to constrain political opposition, suggesting that they are hybrid organizations featuring both characteristics of civil society and of the state. On one hand, MOs have abandoned their main role of conveying ideological propaganda to the masses to become social welfare agencies providing a wide range of services to their members. On the other hand, they have substantially maintained their subordinate position to the Communist Party and their function of social control over their members on behalf of the political elites. This has resulted in a double benefit for the state. The first is that the empowerment of MOs and their ability to attract foreign funding has successfully eased the social tensions arising from increasing inequalities. The second is that the communication and social control structures at its disposal have been modernized at little cost and without granting significant concessions in terms of political rights. The paper concludes by assessing the significance of these findings for the debate on the nexus between development and democratization, advocating the need to contextualize this relationship in a broader historical, political and social environment. v List of Figures Figure 1.........................................................................................................................16 vi Chapter One: Introduction This is a study of change and continuity in Vietnam, of the process through which a socialist country of eighty million people has become one of the fastest growing market economies in the world without changing its Leninist political system, and of how the old and the new have amalgamated into a unique political and social reality. More specifically, it is a study of how Vietnamese mass organizations (MOs) fit into this dialectic of innovation and persistence. The first section of this chapter introduces the two broad approaches towards institutional change that predominate in the literature, putting particular emphasis on the so-called Fourth Wave (post-1989) of democratization. Section two positions Vietnam within this academic debate, offering an overview of recent developments in the country’s economy, society and politics and assessing some examples of theories of institutional change as applied to Vietnam. Section three introduces the model of institutional change that will guide this analysis and develops its main theoretical concepts, while the last section presents the research question and hypotheses, concluding with an outline of the research design and the plan of the following chapters of this thesis. 1 1.1 Thinking about democratic transitions The debate on the emergence of democratic regimes in developing countries has engaged social scientists for decades. Political scientists have provided an array of explanations of democracy and authoritarianism in the world. Such an extensive and diverse literature would require an extended review, but a brief synthesis of two general types of explanations is indispensable to introduce the case of Vietnam. Following the structure and agency dichotomy, Doorenspleet (2005:2-8) groups explanations of post-1989 democratic transitions in two broad categories, structural and actor-oriented approaches.1 Structural approaches explain the emergence of democratic regimes through overarching structural forces that supposedly shape political dynamics and institutional change. Examples of such factors include indicators of economic and social development, economic growth, political culture, the international strategic environment, and historical legacies. This is a diverse paradigm and it has evolved significantly over time, but what unites these studies is the belief that such structural variables are more important than the specific actions of single individuals or groups. Two subsets in particular have emerged as leading frameworks to account for transitions to democracy from a structural perspective, namely modernization theory 2 and structural-historical approaches. Modernization theory dates back to American political science of the 1950s, and it has since then represented a popular account to explain democratization. This theory ar- 1 Note that the two categories should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Several studies combine elements of both approaches, and the model developed in § 3.2 features both structural and actor-oriented factors. 2 It is perhaps more accurate to use the plural form “modernization theories” considering the diversity and extent of this literature, but this simplification should be suitable to the introductory purpose of this section. 2 gues that indicators of socio-economic development like per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and levels of industrialization, urbanization and education are strong predictors of the likelihood of a specific country to democratize. Observing large sets of case studies, early modernization scholars pointed out the high correlation between socio-economic development and democracy, and concluded that a causal mechanism between the two could be established. A country will democratize when a set of social and economic requisites is met, because these factors are the premise for the emergence of democratic values among common people, which in turn leads to the establishment of democratic institutions.3 This approach posited a universal and linear causal relationship between development and democracy, one in which there is a succession of development stages leading to democratic polities. modernization theory today has evolved in several respects compared to earlier versions, especially in reconsidering its ambition to provide a universal and mono-causal model to explain democracy, 4 but the debate on the predominance of socio-economic development over other factors in explaining democratization is far from being concluded.5 Some researchers, however, while accepting the general conclusion that the socioeconomic development of a country can affect the likelihood of its democratization, have criticized modernization theory on the grounds that it cannot explain when and how a democratic transition takes place. They argue that to understand institutional change the specific historical configuration of “power structures” and their evolution 3 Some authors have actually proposed alternative causal mechanisms to explain the correlation, but the one identifying democratic values as the crucial intervening factor is probably the most common version of modernization theory. 4 see Diamond (1992) for an example of how modernization theory claims have been qualified in important ways. 5 In a recent article for instance, Epstein et al. (2006) elaborate new evidence to support the causal link between economic development and democracy. 3 over time must be considered. For example Moore (1966) elaborates on the Marxist framework in identifying class relations as the key factor for the emergence of democracy, which in his analysis is linked to the presence of a strong and independent bourgeoisie. Since then, the emphasis on the role of the middle class as the spearhead of democracy has been the leitmotiv of countless studies in comparative politics. Class relations has not been the only structural feature analyzed from this perspective: many scholars have tried to explain democratization and institutional change by focusing on the changing relations between the state and selected social actors, on the role of the state in the international system,6 or on a combination of different factors.7 Similarly, some scholars work from a structural perspective that they identify as the “political economy approach” to explain the timing and the terms of democratic transitions. Although they acknowledge the importance of the strategic interaction among political players, their approach “focuses on the effects of economic conditions on the preferences, resources, and strategies of key political actors in the transition ‘game’” (Haggard & Kaufman 1999:76).8 The second paradigm identified by Doorenspleet also features a long academic tradition that many trace back to a seminal article by Rustow (1970) that advocated the need to focus on the study of agency to explain democratic transitions. From this perspective, examining structural factors is at best insufficient, because the actions of individuals and social groups are neglected. Proponents of this approach argue that that 6 In this respect, dependency theories can also be counted among structural-historical approaches since they identify international economic relations (more specifically the global development of capitalism) as the source of national institutional settings. 7 For example, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) complement their class structure analysis with the study of transnational power relations. 8 Note that this path of research is different from economic theories of democratization that offer formal models of the strategic interaction among political players. 4 even under similar structural constraints, the institutional outcomes of transition can vary significantly. This is due to the role of agents like social groups and political leaders. For these analysts, no account of democratization is complete without reference to the strategic interaction among this plurality of players, who are seen as an element more independent and powerful than structural perspectives suggest. In this category, two main analytical frameworks can also be distinguished. The first thread focuses on the bargaining among political elites in periods of political transitions. The emergence of democratic institutions is not to trace back to socioeconomic development or democratic values as modernization theory argues, but only to the different configuration of power relations between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime.9 For example, a popular model developed by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and expressed formally by Przeworski (1991) argues that interactions among four groups of actors, namely hard-liners and soft-liners both in the elites supporting and opposing the authoritarian regime. The most favorable configuration of power for the establishment of democracies, they argue, is that of a substantial power balance between supporters and opponents, which encourages a compromise between moderates of both sides. So democratization succeeds if the moderate wings manage to find an agreement on future institutional arrangements, which often entails the marginalization of radicals on both sides.10 A second perspective contends that the role of mass mobilization is critical in the explanation of institutional outcomes. Interactions among elites are often the source of 9 So from this point of view, democracies can be established even in the absence of genuine democrats among the political elites. 10 This conclusion has been challenged by McFaul (2002) with empirical data from post-communist countries. 5 democratic transitions, but these cannot be understood if one does not acknowledge the ability of the masses to influence and constrain elite behavior. Furthermore, the negative role attributed to radical agents in elite bargaining theories is also challenged. Bermeo (1997, 2003), for instance, mentions several cases in support of her argument that mass mobilization, even if usually associated with radical demands of political change, can have a decisive and positive role in establishing democratic regimes. The discussion of the role of mass mobilization in democratic transitions is often associated with the study of the emergence of “civil society,” a realm of political action independent from the state and able to counterbalance and challenge authoritarian regimes. The recent work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also falls into this second group of actor-oriented theories of democratization: it elaborates a simple game theoretic model of democratic transition, neglecting intra-elite dynamics in favor of a contraposition between pro-status quo elites and masses favoring democratic change. 1.2 Change and continuity in Vietnam The case of Vietnam has also been studied from some of these perspectives. Since the first measures of an extensive economic reform program known as doi moi (renovation) were introduced in 1986, several transformations have occurred in this country, while many other aspects of Vietnamese economic, social and political life have not. This section provides a brief overview of recent developments in Vietnam’s economy, society and political system and discusses these changes in the light of the theoretical frameworks introduced above.11 11 A more throughout analysis of doi moi policies and their consequences in various fields is developed in chapter two. 6 1.2.1 Socio-economic development Since the late 1980s Vietnam has been one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. After the dramatic years of the economic crises of the mid-1980s that severely affected most countries of the Soviet bloc, Vietnam started growing at a sustained pace. While the Vietnamese economy expanded at a modest average yearly rate of 2.0% in the years 1985-198812, the figure increased to 7.7% in 1990-1995 and 7.0% during 1996-2001.13 Recent statistics show an even more rapid economic advancement, with the per capita GDP rising in the last five years at an average annual rate of 8.0%.14 The structure of the economy has changed significantly during the last decade, moving Vietnam towards industrialization and a growing service sector.15 Structural economic reform has been crucially combined with a progressive integration of Vietnam into the international financial and trade systems, as the exponential growth of foreign direct investment since the 1990s 16 and the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007 illustrate. In the next chapter this thesis assesses the actual extent of doi moi reform, but it is interesting to remark at this stage that structural economic renovation came together with sweeping change to income distribution and class formation. According to most analyses, Vietnam has been a successful case of poverty reduction. Poverty has fallen 12 Data relating to the growth of GDP per capita at 1994 prices, published by the Vietnamese General Statistical Office. Reported in Glewwe (2004:5). 13 This author’s elaboration of World Bank World Economic Indicators, available online at http://www.worldbank.org. 14 Ibid. 15 According to Asian Development Bank (2008) data, the GDP share of the primary sector (agriculture and fisheries) has decreased in the last years from 24.5% in 2000 to 20.2% in 2007. 16 The FDI flow increased dramatically from a figure of US$ 363 million in the period 1988-91 to US$ 1953 for year 2000 alone. Source: Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment, reported in Quan (2006:61). 7 sharply from 58% in 1993 to 24.1% in 2004,17 and there has been a radical advancement in a series of social indicators especially in the areas of education and healthcare. To be sure, after decades of socialist experiments and forced income equality the country has experienced a significant rise in inequality. However, if this increase is compared with that of countries experiencing similar growth rates evidence shows that Vietnam’s inequality has increased only moderately.18 Unlike in many other developing countries, in Vietnam the income polarization often associated with rapid economic growth has been largely contained. While the new business elite has been the major beneficiary of growth, a large middle class of small entrepreneurs and urban salaried professionals have seized a considerable share of the benefits of the booming economy (The Economist 2008). It is important to stress that Vietnam’s economic system today still maintains some features of the pre-reform era. In particular, the state continues to play a major role throughout the economic transition and still holds control of strategic economic sectors.19 On one hand, the economic liberalization process has not involved the whole economy, and the pace and extent of the introduction of liberalization policies seems to have been gradual and closely controlled by the state. On the other hand, although foreign direct investment has probably been crucial for economic growth,20 the state has been the other main player in this success story thanks to the role of state- 17 Asian Development Bank (2008) 18 See Malesky (2008) for a comparison with China, including a discussion of Gini coefficients of the two countries. 19 For an example of how the state maintained sizeable control of economic activity, see Gainsborough’s (2007) study of local authorities in two Vietnamese provinces. 20 See Quan (2006), chapter three. 8 owned enterprises in supporting industrialization and its strong administrative control of external trade, bank lending activities and interest rates (Quan 2000:302-7). 1.2.2 Social and political liberalization The radical reorganization of the economic system has paved the way for important innovations in social and political arenas. Besides a revolution of class structure, perhaps the most striking development in the last two decades is the burgeoning of various forms of associations throughout the country. According to many accounts, the beginning of Vietnamese associational life as it is known today dates back to the very first years of doi moi, when the restructuring of the state led to the partial reduction of the provision of some key social services. Many local associations, often limiting the scope of their activities to the village or the neighborhood, were established by people (in spite of the absence of a legal framework that allowed it) to compensate the failure of local authorities to provide sufficient levels of social welfare (Kerkvliet 2003:3). Since this timid beginning, the number of local NGOs has increased exponentially. It now includes hundreds of organizations active both at the local and national level in virtually every field,21 giving rise to a lively and still unresolved academic debate on the existence of an independent civil society in Vietnam.22 According to most observers, a crucial element in the development of associational life has been the booming presence of international NGOs and donors since the early 1990s 23 in development projects, projects often carried out in close cooperation with MOs and local authori21 It is not easy to provide a reliable estimate of the actual number of Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) since they are often not registered as legal entities. Attempts at creating a census of the VNGOs world include Wischermann’s (2003) study that identified 706 civic organizations in the urban areas of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City alone in year 2000. 22 Chapter four discusses this literature extensively. 23 The VUFO-NGO Resource Center Vietnam lists in its 2007 NGOs directory 367 international NGOs registered to work in Vietnam. 9 ties. These new actors are reputed to have created opportunities for locals to establish associations, and introduced a model of how common citizens can engage policymakers and improve the life of their own community. However, it should be reminded that this indisputable extension of civil liberties has taken place in an environment where the state still places heavy constraints on the freedom of association and expression of its citizens, especially in the case of political dissent and sensitive areas like ethnicity and religion (Freedom House 2008). The political realm has also witnessed some changes since the beginning of economic reform, but it is safe to say that, perhaps not surprisingly, this is a field where Vietnamese authorities have been particularly wary of change. Marginal institutional reforms towards increased government accountability have been introduced (often in an attempt to curb overwhelming corruption), for example, in the experimentation of more participatory modes of local governance and in the strengthening of the role of the National Assembly vis-à-vis the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Nevertheless, political stability and continuity with the pre-reform regime in the management of power relations have been the major political features during these times of turbulent change (Koh 2004). Most importantly, the transition to a multi-party polity has been so far mostly excluded from the public debate in spite of some signs of embryonic developments in this direction (Thayer 2008). 1.2.3 Studying Vietnam The picture of Vietnam emerging from the last paragraphs is that of a country that has undergone dramatic economic and social changes without letting these transformations disrupt its political stability and authoritarian polity. Are the theories outlined in section one of any help in accounting for this discrepancy? Explaining Vietnam’s lack 10 of democratization is a goal too ambitious for the scope of this paper, since for a satisfactory answer we would arguably need to look at a host of factors in comparative perspective, perhaps with reference to the experience of other countries. The format of this work is instead more suitable for a focus on a single case study, and while this may compromise the possibility of a full account of the persistence of authoritarianism in Vietnam, it has the potential to produce a revealing analysis of how this coexistence of old and new has come into being. However, the larger question is still worth asking, because it is an ineludible step to relate the analysis elaborated in this paper to a broader academic debate. Vietnam is perhaps a rather straightforward case for modernization theory. As was already noted, the impressive advancement in pace and extent of a number of socioeconomic indicators, not to mention the available wealth, has not led to democratic institutions. Nevertheless, modernization theorist may contend that with a per capita gross national income of US$ 690 in 2006 (Asian Development Bank 2008) Vietnam has still a long way to go before reaching the critical income level where democratization becomes probable,24 and that democratic values have not yet developed precisely for this reason. However, even though the fact that Vietnam is apparently not an outlier in the relationship between socio-economic development and democracy, there is no guarantee that it will follow modernization theory patterns in the near future. Empirical evidence of cases that do not fit this paradigm abounds (Przeworski & Limongi 1997), and Vietnam may be one as well. In other words, the power of modernization theory to analyze social and political change in countries where the levels of both de- 24 Przeworski & Limongi (1997) for example discuss the validity of the critical per capita income level of US$ 4,115. 11 velopment and democracy are comparatively low is arguably weak, since such countries fall into an area about which this model cannot say much. Fforde and De Vylder (1996) offer a much more detailed account of how such rapid socio-economic development has come about. They have studied the institutional changes in doi moi applying a political economy perspective, remarking that economic and institutional renovation is to be understood as a bottom-up process originating in the independent economic activities of a number of actors rather than from a state initiative (Fforde and De Vylder 1996:3-10). From this angle, the patterns of economic rents and resource appropriation are identified as the source of major shifts in economic policy and other areas (Fforde 2002). While this line of research is a rich and interesting account of the evolution of economic incentives of individual actors, it tends to portray a misleading picture of a passive and weak state that merely reacts to economic change, a view that contrasts markedly with the opinion of most analysts of today’s Vietnam. Gainsborough (2002) has attempted to go beyond an analysis of socio-cultural development, and following the tradition of Moore (1966) and Ruetschemeyer et al. (1992), has performed a class analysis to explain the lack of democratization in Vietnam. In particular, he focuses on the role of the middle class as an active force of democratization, and observes that the lack of an independent bourgeoisie from the state is key. Although this perspective appears to be more illuminating than modernization theory, it does not offer persuasive reasons why the middle class, if it became more independent from the state (or perhaps simply bigger), would push for democratic changes. Some may observe that since reform policies of late have greatly benefited the middle 12 class, the incentives to engage in conflict with ruling elites over regime change would be remote since the marginal benefits are limited. Other authors have departed from class analysis to examine more broadly the relations between the state and social groups, believing that this is the key to account for the current institutional outlook in Vietnam. Kerkvliet (2001:242-5) identifies three approaches. According to the dominant state approach, the party-state is a powerful and pervasive institution able to control and shape Vietnamese society from the national center to the village level, thus preventing the formation of critical and truly autonomous social organizations. The mobilizational corporatism approach acknowledges the possibility of social forces to influence policy making, but only within existing institutions dominated by the state, an interaction that in fact perpetuates the authoritarian political system. Finally, the dialogue perspective offers a less unitary and mighty view of the state, emphasizing regional variations in state-society relations and the fact that independent centers of power exist and have had the ability to influence political elites outside traditional institutional channels. As far as the actor-oriented approaches of elite bargaining and civil society are concerned, the scholarship on Vietnam has not developed significantly. On one hand, the country is largely absent from the literature on the fourth wave of post-Soviet democratization, where theories of elite bargaining have been applied with particular zeal.25 This is not surprising since a vocal anti-regime elite has not yet materialized, and genuine political liberalization measures have not been taken into serious consideration by the current elites. On the other hand, mass mobilization as a challenge to the political status quo has not taken place either. There have been indeed several episodes 25 See for example Przeworski (1991). 13 of popular unrest in rural areas throughout the country,26 but to this author’s knowledge in none of them demands of systematic political change have arisen. Protesters have mostly targeted individual corrupt officials and their abuse of power in fields such as land rights, without questioning the monopoly of the political power of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). We thus witness a situation where not only the middle class is not challenging the state for political change, but other social strata that the literature identifies as having an interest in democratization (like rural masses and the working class) are not doing it either. Why? This paper departs from the observation that the high level of legitimacy enjoyed by the VCP is a central element to understand the absence of organized open opposition in Vietnam.27 It tries to go beyond the generic claim that such a widespread legitimacy can be explained through the good performance of the Vietnamese authorities in securing economic growth and distributing its benefits with equity. In an attempt to provide a more detailed analysis, it calls for the need to look at how the state has been actually dealing with old and new actors introduced by economic and social liberalization. Although a “dominant state” perspective would point at the repressive capacity of the state to account for the lack of pro-democracy movements, this paper suggests that a more convincing explanation can be found in the way in which political elites have been crafting consensus around their exclusive political leadership, and it contends that MOs have been a crucial factor in the state’s attempt to secure political continuity in times of sweeping economic and social change. 26 The rural uprisings in Thai Binh and Lam Dong provinces in 1997 (Salemink 2003:18) are examples of such episodes. 27 The assumption that the VCP enjoys high levels of legitimacy is actually a controversial one. The paper will analyze this issue in chapter three, to substantiate this claim making reference both to available empirical surveys on public opinion and to academic studies on the subject. 14 1.3 State-society relations in Vietnam This section defines the theoretical framework of this study. Before outlining detailed research hypotheses and a research design, three steps are necessary. The first identifies legitimacy as a central feature of the persistence and change of political systems, and explains why such a path is more promising than only looking at the state’s capacity to coerce. The second is to provide a model of state-society relations in Vietnam that illustrates the role of both structural changes and of legitimacy in shaping relations among social actors and the state. The third is to support the choice of the mobilizational corporatism approach to analyze political legitimacy in Vietnam today and to introduce MOs as the object of this study. 1.3.1 Politics of legitimacy One can understand political legitimacy as the “belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because citizens believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990:11). For state-society relations analysis, legitimacy is of central importance because it is closely linked to political outcomes and the behavior of both individuals and social groups. This relationship basically works through two channels (Suchman 1995:575-7). First, legitimacy affects the behaviors of individuals: they are more likely to supply resources and contribute to the persistence or growth of an institution they perceive as legitimate. The second is that it influences how people understand an institution, and therefore it impacts the extent of the criticism and opposition towards an institution. For this reason, the gen- 15 eration of consensus is arguably as important as coercion in explaining why an authoritarian polity persists, changes or democratizes. In Vietnam the legitimacy of the Socialist Republic has primarily ideological roots, in the tradition of both nationalism and communism. On one hand, the party had a crucial leadership role in the fight against the French colonial administration during the First Indochina War, and has since then enjoyed credit for securing the independence and sovereignty of the nation (Vasavakul 1995:261-3), a position strengthened after victorious wars against the USA, Cambodia and China. On the other hand, as in all socialist systems, the legitimacy of the states stems directly from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the party as the leader of the proletarian revolution, a privileged status that is legalized in constitutions that grant the party the role of exclusive representative of the population. However, another basis of legitimacy does not rest upon symbolic values but on a more pragmatic dimension of performance. A political system, to be perceived as legitimate, needs to make a proper use of power to provide concrete outcomes in terms of goods and services that its citizens see as desirable. In socialist systems like Vietnam, where such benefits have not included political and civil rights (or actually rights of any kind), social and economic performance has been crucial for the legitimacy of the political system.28 In particular the state, besides enforcing the communist imperative of social equality, granted to its citizens a wide range of social welfare services at no monetary cost, according to a paternalistic model that distributed to each according to their own needs. 28 White (1986), in his analysis of communist legitimacy, refers to this feature of socialist systems as “social eudaemonic legitimation” 16 1.3.2 A model of institutional change and continuity Above I have argued that legitimacy is a key factor to explain institutional change and have discussed the sources of legitimacy in the Vietnamese case. The next step is to clarify how legitimacy is related to other variables and institutional change, and outline the process that leads to such an evolution through variations in the level of legitimacy. Figure 1 illustrates the variables at play and the relations among them. State-Society
Relations Structural
Factors Institutional
Performance Legitimacy Institutional



 Change Figure 1 This model sees structural factors as the primary source of institutional change, but instead of establishing a direct link between the two it represents the process of change taking place through the decisive intervening role of legitimacy and the interaction between social and state actors.29 Such external structural forces as changes in the international economic system or technological advancement affect virtually all nation states and their ability to secure the welfare of their citizens. So, for example, the economic crises of the mid-1980s, which came after years of decreasing economic growth in the Soviet bloc, severely affected the ability of the Vietnamese state to de- 29 This means that, even in presence of similar structural dynamics (like for instance a system change from the socialist economic model) outcomes in terms of institutional setting can be very dissimilar. 17 liver high levels of social welfare. The term “performance” in the model refers precisely to the ability of institutions to deliver a broad spectrum of outcomes that their citizens perceive as valuable, ranging from political rights, to a functioning judiciary, healthcare, education and so forth. Institutions’ ability to perform affects the legitimacy they enjoy among social actors: the better the performance, the higher the level of legitimacy.30 Along these lines, many observers reported a “legitimacy crisis” in socialist countries in the second half of the 1980s.31 Furhtermore, the level of legitimacy is also crucial for the functioning of institutions themselves, since it affects the commitment of individuals and social groups to make them work.32 The model’s crucial link is between legitimacy and institutional change. It assumes that in the long run institutions can only persist if they are legitimate. The concept of “legitimacy crises” is therefore of central importance in this process. A legitimacy crisis can be defined as a situation in which the foundations of authority are under such a severe strain that either substantial changes are introduced in the institutional system or it will face a serious threat of collapsing. Following the observations outlined in § 3.1, such a threat of collapse can happen following two paths. First, citizens may simply cease contributing to the functioning of institutions or even actively undermine 30 This is an important simplification of the model. The theory of legitimacy outlined in § 3.1 stated that legitimacy depends not only on institutional performance, but also on a symbolic sphere of values. For this reason, the level of legitimacy of a state can also change following a significant shift in the value system of its citizens. The model thus simplifies the dynamics of legitimacy by treating its symbolic dimension as a constant. This choice does not intend to cast doubts on the significance of value change for legitimacy, but it is just an assumption that the gap in value orientations between society and the state has so far not reached a critical point in Vietnam. Indeed, values arguably change much more slowly than institutional performance and may therefore be considered constant in a study like this where the time frame of the observations is shorter than two decades. 31 It has particularly been the case of studies explaining the breakdown of socialist rule in Eastern Europe. 32 As Gilley notes, models recurring to legitimacy as an explanatory factor treat institutional performance and institutions endogenously, “where they are both a consequence and a cause of legitimacy” (2008:260). 18 their performance. As Scott (1985) has shown using empirical cases from Malaysia, this can also happen in an authoritarian polity where open opposition is repressed. Second, the citizens may conclude that they have the opportunity to challenge the state directly,33 giving rise to mass opposition movements that demand radical change as in the case of many Eastern European countries in the late 1980s.34 It is thus possible to remark that this model identifies state-society relations as the area where future institutional outcomes are defined, and in legitimacy the key discourse that both the state and social actors use to engage one another in order to achieve their preferred outcomes. This is the area where agency is possible, where a number of social actors have the possibility to influence institutional outcomes through their own strategic action. This begs the question: what can a state do to neutralize the threat to its existence posed by a legitimacy crisis? Gilley (2008) identifies three possible state responses. The first is a substitution of legitimacy with increased coercion or inducement for specific groups, a costly strategy that “usually prefigures the deterioration of the regime” (2008:274). A second response is the reconfiguration of the basis of legitimacy, which typically results in an attempt to support new values and discourses that are more congruent with the current regime performance. The third acknowledges the performance crisis and addresses social demands for reform, thus improving the actual performance 33 In Acemoglu & Robinson’s terms, they may acquire “de facto” political power that enables them to demand more radical redistributive policies. 34 The extensive literature about social movements, for example, studies precisely this second kind of outcomes. 19 of the institutional system.35 This third option is represented in Figure 1 with the backwards arrow linking institutional change to institutional performance. Regarding early doi moi, Vietnamese authorities chose in that circumstance the third kind of response, creating the premises for prolonged and sustained economic growth (improved performance). However, the introduction of market mechanisms in socialist systems has eroded their institutional performance in two ways. On one hand their ability to ensure equality, one of the basis of legitimacy in socialist systems, is seriously compromised by unavoidable income polarization and class formation. On the other hand, the welfare system gradually becomes subject to market laws, and the “from cradle to grave” socialist model has to come to terms with the restructuring and retreat of the state, or, to express it in the terms of the Vietnamese nomenclature, to “socialization”. How have the Vietnamese political elites responded to this second challenge? 1.3.3 Mass organizations This paper finds a partial explanation of the limited institutional change in doi moi in how some existing institutions have evolved during the reform era, namely those same organizations that have been regulating state-society relations in pre-reform Vietnam. These institutions are generally referred to as mass organizations (MOs), large partyled associations of members belonging to one specific social group like women, farmers and youth. The analysis developed in the next chapters36 will show that MOs have been a crucial element in the strategy of the VCP of maintaining high levels of popular 35 Note that institutional reform does not necessarily mean democratization. States have a plurality of concessions that they can make to their citizens, civil and politcal rights being only a part of them. What exactly the concessions made are, as the model suggests and as this paper argues in the next section, is a matter of how state-society relations evolve, or in other words of the strategies pursued by political actors. 36 Chapter four will offer a more detailed analysis of MOs. 20 legitimacy without compromising its monopoly of political power. The renovation of MOs has improved their institutional performance, thereby providing a new source of legitimacy to compensate for growing social tensions, and it has done so within the well-defined boundaries of the one-party political system. In choosing to focus on structures established and run by the state to channel its relations with key social sectors, this paper makes the controversial choice of ignoring a highly debated area of state-society relations in Vietnam, namely, the development of a civil society independent of the state. I do so for three reasons. The first is that nonstate associational life in Vietnam is not yet anything comparable to Western-style civil society in terms of its ability to engage the state critically and influence its major policies. Vietnamese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are actually capable of influencing policy-making at any level are more the exception than the rule, and even formally independent organizations often have close ties with the state as in the case of the research centers that have been proliferating of late (Gray 1999). Second, unlike local NGOs, MOs are large and powerful organizations that are a crucial and valued source of feedback from social sectors for the political elites, a privileged status that grants them exclusive access to policy makers and ability to influence their decisions, also in virtue of their special institutional status. Finally, MOs have been playing a major role in the politics of rural development, an area of particular interest because the potential of open confrontation with the regime is perhaps higher due to the presence of several international actors pursuing a democratic agenda and the persistence of a growing urban-rural divide. 21 1.4 The research project This final section develops the research question at the core of this paper, and some research hypotheses that the analysis put forward in the next chapters aims to verify. It will then illustrate how this study is structured and how its results are presented to the reader. 1.4.1 Research question To understand how Vietnam has managed to become a largely market-driven economy without abandoning its Leninist political system, it is not enough to look at structural developments or social forces independent from the realm of state and party bureaucracies. Some major developments that explain these dynamics of limited institutional change have actually been taking place within structures that predate the economic renovation policies of the second half of the 1980s, namely, in MOs. It is now possible to formulate the main research question of this paper as follows: what has been the role of MOs in the doi moi process of continuity and change, and what is its significance for the persistence of an authoritarian polity in Vietnam? This study argues that MOs have undergone a substantial institutional restructuring under doi moi, which has transformed them into hybrid organizations sharing features of both state structures and civil society associations. In particular, while there is substantial novelty in some of the functions they perform for their members and the relations they entertain with other actors like foreign donors and NGOs, they have also maintained some important features of pre-reform Vietnam. On one hand, MOs have abandoned their main role of conveying ideological propaganda to the masses to become social welfare agencies that provide a wide range of services to their members 22 (with staff at the lower levels working on a voluntary basis) and a forum where feedback and criticism of government policies can be expressed without fear. On the other hand, they have maintained their subordinate role to the VCP and strengthened their function of social control over their members on behalf of the political elites. This has benefited the state in two ways. The first is that the empowerment of MOs and their ability to attract foreign funding has successfully balanced the social tensions arising from increasing inequalities due to economic restructuring. The second is that the communication and social control structures at the state’s disposal have been modernized at little cost and without granting significant concessions in terms of political rights. In other words, MOs have contributed to an important improvement of institutional performance, thus increasing their own level of legitimacy among their members and the population in general in times of potential legitimacy crisis.37 Vietnamese political elites were therefore able to respond to a potential threat with limited institutional reform that improved performance in the provision of social and economic services (and to a good extent in civil liberties as well), thereby avoiding a broader reform of the political system and the extension of political rights.38 1.4.2 Research hypotheses This study looks at institutional changes and continuities in MOs to argue that they have in some respects been an example of reform, and in some others of a rejection of political renovation. In this context, given the high discrepancy between official poli- 37 Also, increasing to the willingness of the people to contribute to their effective functioning. 38 This is not to suggest that the improved performance of MOs operations translates directly into increased legitimacy for local party cadres and authorities instead of just increasing MOs legitimacy. This paper will actually show that local communities seem to demarcate clearly between MOs and local authorities and party structures, where MOs are perceived as more effective and trustworthy institutions compared with other state bureaucracies. However, the “legitimacy surplus” produced by MOs renovation is still channeled into an organization organic to the one-party political system. 23 cies and their implementation, an institutional analysis that focused solely on regulatory statements and official governance documents would be of little use. A more accurate approach would take into consideration what in fact involves MOs action, especially in the areas of the functions that MOs perform for their members and of the relations between them and other institutional actors (including local authorities, the VCP, international NGOs and donors and local communities). In particular, when we look at MO agency, it is possible to differentiate between some features of MOs that are quite similar to NGO actorness in other parts of the world (and can therefore be considered an element of novelty in an authoritarian polity), and some others that do not seem to set MOs apart from other state organs, and can therefore be viewed as elements of continuity with the party-led political system. We thus use the presence (or absence) of “civil society”39 agency features as a benchmark to assess the level of institutional innovation (or continuity) in Vietnamese MOs. The formulation of more detailed research hypotheses from this perspective requires two steps. The first one is to review the literature on civil society to identify what the main features of NGOs or non-state organizations are vis-a-vis the state. This is done in section 4.3.1, with particular reference to the roles that NGOs (and international NGOs more specifically) are supposed to play in the politics of development. Secondly, this theoretical framework must be juxtaposed with the empirical reality of MOs in Vietnam. This can be achieved through a preliminary review of both the current literature on post-doi moi Vietnamese MOs and the author’s own fieldwork in Hanoi.40 Following this logical basis, this thesis attempts to verify six research hy39 This concept will be elaborated later. For the moment, we can consider civil society a synonym of non-governmental, non-business agency. 40 Chapter four is a literature review on state-society relations in Vietnam, where section 4.2 deals precisely with the literature on MOs. My fieldwork is presented in chapter five. 24 potheses. Among the following six propositions, hypotheses H1-H3 highlight discontinuities from the past, while statements H4-H6 suggest that fundamental variables have remained constants in times of change: H1 – The main role of MOs has shifted from a political to a social one, from a focus on mass mobilization and ideological propaganda to problem-solving and the provision of services to individual members. H2 – MOs have been working under an inclusive model of project management, a broad partnership with a host of such actors as foreign donors and NGOs, local communities, local NGOs, local administrations and party cadres. In addition, they have fostered the inclusion of marginalized groups into the public debate. H3 – MOs have been developing a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the state in development projects. They are now perceived as more efficient, effective, transparent and committed than state structures and are therefore a precious instrument to attract foreign assistance in a period where new social needs are arising. H4 – Similarly to a state bureaucracy, MOs are large and hierarchical organizations with several levels of governance. MOs are state-funded and their staff has the status of civil servants. H5 – MOs have maintained the ability to monitor their members to the grassroots level, showing an outstanding level of knowledge of the territory and its people, which makes them exceptional agents of social control for the state. The role of MOs as policy implementers and public communicators is still crucial. 25 H6 – Despite their de facto operational independence vis-à-vis the VCP in development projects, MOs are still dependent on the state; they follow a logic of allegiance to party cadres that prevents them from articulating a critique of state actors. 1.4.3 Research design This thesis studies the evolution of MOs during the doi moi period.41 However, the reader should be warned that this is not an attempt to give a full account of the agency of MOs in Vietnam. It will become clear later in this paper that MOs constitute an important part of the Vietnamese political system. Such organizations are very large and present a significant degree of diversity in many respects. It is plausible to believe, for example, that their relationships with local authorities or their own constituencies might differ across different regions and provinces. Judging from to the fieldwork material I have gathered, it is often the case that the patterns of state-society relations we observe vary according to MO, development project, personal relationships among the main actors involved, previous professional experience, institutional capacity of single MO chapters, and so forth. In this respect, the conclusions I will draw from the development projects analyzed and the interviews carried out are not generalizable to the reality of the whole country. The research design I illustrate in the next paragraph does not offer a sufficient empirical basis to extend the research findings to other contexts I am less familiar with. Rather, this work is better understood as a further step in explaining the outcomes of Vietnam’s transition towards a market-based Socialist system, a contribution to understand how a process of radical economic restructuring has taken place within a frame of high political stability. 41 More precisely, this paper accepts the convention of considering 1986 as the year marking the beginning of substantial economic reform in Vietnam. A study of the impact of economic, social and political change on MOs could therefore focus on a period including roughly the last two decades (1986-2006). 26 With this caveat in mind, the specific limitations of the research design pertain both to the bibliographical-archival research and to the interviews carried out during the fieldwork. As far as the literature reviewed is concerned, I do not use material written in Vietnamese. This is due to my insufficient language skills, which do not allow me to access academic and other kinds of Vietnamese sources. The material I have reviewed has been written in English, German and Italian, mostly by foreign scholars and professionals of the development community in Vietnam. The development projects analyzed come from a database maintained by the United Nations Office in Hanoi. Within the database, I have selected the development projects for which a detailed report was available,42 and among those I have chosen those reports explicitly mentioning the role of one or more MOs in the project. This totaled to about twenty reports of projects carried out from the early 1990s to 2006, upon the initiative of various international organizations and NGOs, in partnership with different local actors. Most of the projects have been carried out in various provinces in northern Vietnam, and the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU) has been involved more frequently than other MOs. I carried out field research in Hanoi from July to August 2008.43 Besides the aforementioned archival research, I have conducted ten semi-structured, qualitative interviews. I have chosen not to interview the final users and beneficiaries of the development projects themselves. This is undoubtedly a major shortcoming of the research design, and my choice is motivated by several factors such as time and resources limitations of my research project, the geographical remoteness of this target group, lan42 Either online or in the archives of various International organizations in Hanoi, such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the NGO Resource Center. 43 The project received a grant from the National University of Singapore’s Graduate Research Support Scheme. 27 guage skills and so forth. I have therefore chosen to limit my sample to MO staff and their counterpart in international organizations and NGO, who, I reasoned, are able to provide sound information on MOs activity due to their first-hand experience. Interviewees were chosen with a snowball-sampling method and included three officials of the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU), two academic experts on Vietnamese society, and five officials of foreign NGOs with multiple years of professional experience in development projects carried out throughout the country in partnership with MOs and the VWU in particular. The development projects they have taken part to include virtually all areas of development politics, such as healthcare, children and youth development, education, disabled development, women rights, professional training. Most of the interviewees were foreigners (eight Europeans and two Vietnamese). 1.4.4 Contents of the study After this introductory chapter, the second section of the thesis is based on secondary sources and aims to develop in detail two issues that have been introduced above. Chapter two analyzes Vietnam’s recent economic, social and political renovation, offering a more detailed picture of the processes outlined in 1.2.1-2. The aim of such an analysis is to clarify the crucial developments that shaped public life in Vietnam in recent years. The third chapter discusses the central concept of the model of institutional change in 1.3.2, namely legitimacy. After formulating a more articulate definition of this concept, it highlights its relevance in the study of political and institutional change; it then relates the debate on legitimacy to Socialist systems, their collapse and reform, and the Vietnamese experience in particular. Chapter four reviews the existing literature on state-society relations in Vietnam, aiming to position the research project of this thesis within the academic debate about re28 cent developments in Vietnamese state-society relations. In particular, an introduction of the leading approaches in studying the state and society in Vietnam prepares the discussion of two key issues of high relevance to this research. The first one pertains to the role of MOs and mass mobilization in the Vietnamese political systems, which is linked to the discussion on corporatism in doi moi Vietnam. The second is the emergence of civil society in Vietnam and its potential as a critical counterbalance to the state. Chapter five is the core of the analysis, where the theoretical model illustrated in figure one will be applied to empirical material to test the six hypotheses above. This part of the analysis is based on both primary and secondary research. The chapter is structured into two parts, the first one analyzing hypotheses relating to changes in MOs, and the second one focusing on continuities. The concluding chapter will discuss the significance of the results presented in chapter four for the current academic debate on democratic transitions and state-society relations in Vietnam. 29 Chapter Two: Vietnam’s renovation This chapter explores the economic, social and political transformation that has characterized Vietnam in the last two decades. A portrait of contemporary Vietnam as the outcome of diverging pressures, some of them propelling various kinds of change, others pushing to maintain the status quo. The result of this tension has brought about the coexistence of both elements of innovation and continuity with pre-reform Vietnam in key areas. The Vietnamese economy has radically changed since the late 1980s, and equally important transformations have marked the country’s social and political life. The below section outlines changes and continuities in Vietnam’s doi moi, focusing first on economic change, followed by social development and associational life, and finally the political system. 2.1 Economy As mentioned in the first chapter, doi moi has been characterized as a period of prolonged and sustained expansion of all aspects of the Vietnamese economy. Enhanced economic performance has been due to the gradual introduction of a series of marketbased measures that replaced centralized economic planning. During the 1970s and the early 1980s the powerful State Planning Committee (SPC) was in charge of the 30 allocation of virtually all economic resources and of determining production targets for economic units and sectors. However, the limits of this system were already discernible in the late 1970s. The increasing technological and financial complexity of most economic operations, for example, made it nearly impossible for a single understaffed body to produce plans for the entire economy, and the proliferation of norms related to the planning process often resulted in the production of goods unsuitable for the intended users. Melanie Beresford (1999) reports that illegal “fence-breaking” activities were common under the centrally planned system to overcome plan distortions. Usually an initiative of single economic units, such activities allowed a limited accumulation of capital to overcome the recurring shortage of production factors, or to convert production if the prescribed items were impossible to produce. Vietnamese authorities gradually realized that fence-breaking activities met concrete market demands they had not been able to anticipate, and often resulted in more efficient economic organization than central plans did. The abolition towards the end of the 1980s of all output targets and fixed prices “was but the final step in the erosion of the old planning system” (Beresford 1999:18). The late 1980s is indeed the period identified by many observers as the watershed between the old planning system and the current one based on a market economy. A crucial event for the design of future economic policies was the 1986 6th Party Congress, an assembly that “recognized the existence and essential role of a multi-ownership structure in Vietnam’s economy” (Vo and Pham 2004:65). Less than three years later, the approval of a comprehensive and radical reform package steered decisively the Vietnamese economy towards a more open and competitive system. In addition to price liberalization and the dismissal of production targets, the 1989 reforms package 31 included a large devaluation and the unification of the exchange rate, a reduction in subsides for SOEs, increased interest rates, incentives to private investment and FDI, the removal of some trade barriers, and a reform of the agricultural sector that basically replaced the cooperative systems with a new one where households were the basic production unit. Few would dispute that these new economic policies provided the regulatory framework without which the recent economic success would not have been possible. However, this should not lead to the conclusion that change was exclusively initiated by state policies, or that the transition to the market started only after 1989. Fencebreaking activities within the planned economy and the way Vietnamese authorities dealt with it suggest in fact a different pattern of institutional change. In the early 1980s, for instance, an increasing number of production units were deliberately contravening SPC directives, creating a de facto “hybrid transitional model” where prices, costs and markets were playing an increasing important role (Fforde & De Vylder 1996:13). From this angle, the attitude of authorities towards such new processes seems to have been more reactionary than proactive, since it often consisted in a mix of concessions to new emerging realities they could no longer control and attempts to restate the Leninist principles of the plan economy 44. For this reason, the transition to the market that is such a pivotal element in doi moi is probably better understood as a largely bottom-up process propelled by the emergence of new economic actors rather than a top-down government reform program. Adam Fforde (2002) has shown how this gradual introduction of market mechanisms, related to new property regimes, 44 As examples of such attempts to recentralize the economic systems, Fforde and De Vylder mention the clampdown on the free market in Ho Chi Minh City and the campaign in favour of agricultural collectivization in the Mekong Delta. 32 have led to the formation and consolidation of a new bourgeoisie that has reaped most of the benefits of the reform process. In spite of such radical transformations, an important thread of continuity runs through doi moi. While the state has allowed the private sector to play a crucial role in recent economic growth, several analyses suggest that this does not imply either a genuine acceptance of the virtues of the private sector, a passive role of the state or an increasingly subordinate position to private interests. For one, Leung and Riedel observe that, despite awareness of the importance of private initiative for economic performance, among political elites “there is great political ambivalence about the private sector” (2001:2). Negative ideological attitudes towards the market are due to the belief that the rise of non-state economic actors may bring about potential political instability, and often economic policy is aimed not only at the development of the private sector, but also to its containment, as the slowing pace of economic reforms in the 1990s shows. Gainsborough’s (2007) study of transnational trade in a northern border region also suggests that the state retains a position of great influence on economic activities45. Other such scholars as Masina (2006:153-56) have argued that a new pattern of state-business relations is emerging, where business groups have easy and relatively influential access to policy-makers, but the state maintains a preeminent position similar to East Asian experiences of developmental states. Finally, some authors have used the term “market socialism” to refer to Vietnam’s hybrid economic model, one that juxtaposes market elements with a strong state presence in several economic sectors and a solid commitment by policy makers to redistributive policies. 45 His study on the dependency of private capital on the state (2002) seems to point to a similar direction. 33 2.2 Society The economic revolution outlined above has been closely intertwined with a number of transformations in Vietnamese society that are of central importance to understand the evolution of state-society relations in the last few years. One of the most significant is that the quality of life for many Vietnamese, especially of the vast majority living in rural areas, has improved substantially in several key areas such as education and healthcare. Considering what is regarded by most accounts as a solid success in poverty reduction, it would seem that at least some of the benefits of the sustained economic growth have trickled down to the most disadvantaged. According to a government study published in 2004 only 23.17% of the Vietnamese were living below the poverty line46, a staggering contrast with the figure of the same study carried out in 2003 (58%) and of an estimated 70% in the mid 1980s.47 However, such official statistics based on government poverty thresholds suggest a partially misleading picture of development in Vietnam. For instance, the fact that in 2003 a UNDP study showed that 63.7% of the population was living on less than two US dollars a day 48 is a good indicator that, despite impressive improvements, Vietnam remains a largely poor country as it was in the past. The good performance in poverty reduction and similar advancements in a host of socioeconomic indicators suggest that even the most vulnerable strata of the population have benefited substantially from the economic boom. However, as Philip Taylor (2004:25) writes in an introduction to an edited volume on this subject, there is plenty 46 Source: General Statistic Office of Vietnam (2004). Figures referring to government poverty standard at 2004 prices. 47 Reported in Masina (2006:133-4). 48 Reported in Taylor (2004:25). 34 of evidence that the gap between the haves and the have-nots in Vietnam is not only persisting, but widening rapidly. Social inequalities are rising along several dimensions, including the gap between the rich and the poor, women and men, Kinh people and ethnic minorities, urban and rural areas, northern and southern regions. While Vietnam has done better than other formerly Socialist countries in assuaging the income inequality arising during the transition to the market,49 several indicators show that prosperity has also brought about increasing income disparities.50 Regional inequalities are widening significantly, and the territorially uneven growth has led to staggering differences in income levels and development indicators across regions.51 Ethnic minorites also shoulder a highly disproportionate share of the social and economic backwardness when compared with members of the Kinh ethnic majority.52 These figures and comparable others point to the emergence of a growing number of areas where social tensions could lead to various forms of instability if not adequately addressed. A different line of research reveals the existence of an ongoing process of values change in the population. As explained in the first chapter, one of the basic tenets of modernization theory is that socio-economic development favors the spread of a set of 49 Malesky (2008), for instance, compares economic inequality in Vietnam with China, finding that China shows higher levels of inequality throughout the liberalization process. A comparison with Russia would also support the claim that Vietnam was able to keep income inequality at lower levels compared with other ex-Socialist experiences. 50 Examples include the Gini coefficient, which increased from .33 in 1993 to .37 in 2002, and the disparity between the top and bottom ten per cent of households, which in 2002 was 12.5 times compared with 10.6 times in 1996. See Taylor (2004:7). 51 For instance, the regional breakdown of poverty rates reported by Scott and Chuyen (2004:105-6) shows that poverty incidence varies greatly across the country, ranging from a value of 10.6% in the Southeast to 68% in the mountainous Northwest. Also, inequality values differ significantly, with the prosperous Southeast leading the ranking for inequality index and less developed regions showing greater equality. 52 “While the 53 ethnic minority groups comprise 14 per cent of the population of Vietnam, they make up a disproportionate 29 per cent of the poor, up from 19 per cent in 1992-93” (Scott and Chuyen 2004:109). 35 values conducive to democracy. However, the same introduction also remarked that Vietnam is still an underdeveloped country and we should therefore expect such values to be consolidated only in a minority of the population. As a matter of fact, only a small portion of the population in a largely rural country like Vietnam follows a lifestyle comparable with that of an advanced industrial country, while most Vietnamese people still follow traditional ways of life. According to some authors, available surveys suggest that important changes may be occurring, for example in the areas of economic values (Pham & Pham), or even as far as attitudes toward democracy are concerned53 . However, methodological issues cast serious doubts on the appropriateness of inter-survey comparisons, and available studies do not allow systematic longitudinal studies across various population groups. Moreover, even in segments where new values seem to be more consolidated, evidence that such new attitudes are likely to develop into some form of political awareness is limited.54 Another remarkable feature of Vietnamese society under economic renovation is the booming of its associational life. Starting from the late 1980s, Vietnamese citizens have benefited from the changes brought about by the new economic order, which allowed them unprecedented opportunities to engage in activities independent from the state. On one hand, the increasing inequalities arising from economic liberalization and the restructuring of the state have often generated new welfare needs that state agencies have not always been able to address, thus creating opportunities for citizens to set up small non-profit associations and fill this lack of social services. On the other hand, increased international openness has also allowed several foreign NGOs to enter 53 The 2001 World Values Survey for Vietnam is often mentioned in this respect. See for instance Ong (2004). 54 At als. this regard, see King et al. (2008) for a study of cultural change in Vietnamese young profession- 36 the country, providing locals with opportunities to cooperate with them in development projects. Associational life in Vietnam also consolidated following some new regulatory provisions that set up a legal framework for the establishment and the management of nonprofit private organizations.55 The first legal steps in this direction date back to 198990, when the setting up of popular organizations was officially allowed,56 and a number of decrees and directives followed in an attempt by the Vietnamese authorities to control tightly a potentially destabilizing phenomenon. However, as we remarked for the transition to a market-based economy, it would be a mistake to conclude that major change is a consequence of innovation in official policies. In this field as well, evidence suggests that the “illegal” establishment of private organizations without the approval of government official has been commonplace, and that officials have often decided to adjust “rules and regulations in order to catch up with changes already happening on the ground” (Kerkvliet 2003:3). 2.3 Politics Although political elites have been much more concerned with economic than political experimentation, the country’s political system has been evolving during the economic reform years. Beresford and Phong (1998) offer a detailed review of the Vietnamese political system before doi moi. The key feature during the period 1955-1986 55 This does not mean that associational life independent from the state was a completely new phenomenon in Vietnam. In the precolonial period, civic associations had to face a repressive environment where the imperial court was intolerant of organizations operating outside the sphere of the court’s bureaucracy, and public spaces were more often used as private venues (Nguyen P. A. 2005). Nevertheless, Popkin (1979:97-7) reports a long tradition of civic life, especially in rural areas where associations for insurance and mutual aid were operating. At this regard, see also Jamieson (1993:35-7). Woodside (1971) argues that a resilient associational activity continued during the repressive regime of the colonial period, as the case of urban social association shows. 56 See Vasavakul (2004:33) 37 was the “partification” of the state, aimed at the implementation of the VCP’s project of a Socialist society. This involved “not only direct Party rule (the Party-state), but establishment of central planning and expanding ownership and control of the means of production” (1998:33). In such a polity, the contiguity between the state and the party machineries was crucial. In theory Party and state were discernible57 , but in fact the two systems were interposed and overlapping, since the Party maintained its own network within the state apparatus, and top civil servants were also serving as high ranking party members (Beresford & Phong 1998:46-49). Another important aspect regards the legislative power, which is markedly different from democratic systems. While nominally the National Assembly and sub-national legislative bodies were in charge of passing laws, Party resolutions and directives and government decrees were in fact the source of legislation. The National Assembly met infrequently to approve unanimously executive measures whose content was often secret. According to Turley (1993b), since the beginning of the reform process some factions of the VCP have been aware that the new economic and social reality required a more open political system. Such a new system would still follow the exclusive political leadership of the Party, but would be based on the rule of law and grant some basic civil rights to Vietnamese citizens. In the following years, gradual changes in the direction of a more inclusive political system were introduced, generally falling under two broad categories. The first was the attempt to involve a large number of people in the renovation process. With this purpose, limited reforms were implemented in institutions such as local councils and mass organizations, whose members were given a greater say in the choice of their representatives, easier access to policy information 57 According to the principle that the Party leads, the state manages and the people are the masters. 38 and greater openness in the public debate and the media. Secondly, the functions of elective bodies both at the national and the local level (the National Assembly and the local People’s Councils) were strengthened in the late 1980s vis-à-vis the role of party cadres and appointed state officials. Election procedures for such institutions were made more competitive and open, with the aim of changing the condition of subordination of popular representatives to non-elected officials58. However, the clearer demarcation between Party and state bodies and the liberalization of the political system have taken place at a slow pace and to a very limited extent if compared with economic renovation. Vietnam largely retains the features of an authoritarian one-party system that suppresses harshly any serious attempt to question the monopolistic management of power by the VCP 59. Not only are political parties banned, but the innovations introduced into the electoral systems have increased its competitiveness only marginally. The VCP still holds absolute discretion in the selection of candidates60 (often only a few more than the available seats), and several electoral positions are also subject to party vetting procedures. Government programs of so called “grassroots democracy”, despite increasing formal participation of citizens in local politics, are still a practice very far from developing a discourse of democracy 61. 58 Various evidence since 1993 suggests that the trends towards (at least formally) more participatory forms of governance and relatively stronger legislative institutions are consolidating, especially at the local level. See for example McElwee et al. (2006). 59 A leadership role that was restated by the 1992 constitution: “The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the force leading the State and society”. (Art. 4). 60 At the national level for example, only 43 of the 493 seats were won by non-party members in the last elections in 2007, and the total number of candidates nationwide was only of 875. Most importantly though, only 30 candidates were “self-nominated” (without affiliation to or endorsement by the party or party-related bodies), and of them only 1 won a seat. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007). 61 See for instance Tran (2004) for an analysis of elections in a local community that casts doubts on the actual power of voters. 39 Finally, even in the case of the extended civil liberties presented in the previous section, freedom of press and association is only allowed to the extent that it does not touch upon political issues, and social actors working in sensitive areas such as gender, religion and ethnicity often face severe constraints. Vietnam has also undertaken several initiatives to renovate its lackluster bureaucracy, attempting to channel some of the additional revenues coming from economic growth into programs to strengthen government capacity and modernize governance (Quan 2000b). In particular, major policies have tried to reinforce the rule of law and to establish new regulatory agencies for the infant market economy, to simplify bureaucratic procedures, to rationalize the organization of the state and to downsize and train the workforce. However, despite such recent efforts to reinvigorate state agencies, Vietnam retains a backward state apparatus, plagued with poorly trained personnel and rampant corruption. Transparency International ranks Vietnam as a highly corrupt country 62, and several anti-corruption campaigns have not eradicated this deep-rooted practice, a problem particularly felt at the local level and fueled by the very low salaries received by civil servants. 62 Vietnam’s 2007 Corruption Perception Index ranks 123rd out of 179 countries. It received a score of 2.6 on a 10 points scale where 10 is awarded to a country with no perceived corruption. 40 Chapter Three: Legitimacy in Vietnam This chapter elaborates on the concept of legitimacy and its relevance for political change in Vietnam. A brief discussion of this notion will introduce an analysis of the relevance of legitimacy for political change. In the third section of the chapter, Vietnam is studied as an example of the coexistence of various legitimation modes, and the implications of socioeconomic renovation for legitimacy are explored. 3.1 Tracking political legitimacy The first chapter recalled Rodney Barker’s definition of legitimacy 63, one that stressed the centrality of concepts like “belief”, “rightfulness” and “moral authority”. In the words of another author (Gilley 2006:500), we can say that “a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power”. These and comparable definitions of the concept that political theorists have discussed show that the central issue related to legitimacy is a normative one, pertaining to some core values about the organization of society as a whole. From this perspective, studying political legitimacy would simply require a focus on the value ori- 63 The “belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because citizens believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990:11). 41 entations and attitudes towards the state of a certain population. However, the concept is much more complex and difficult to delineate when a more detailed analysis of the origins and evolution of legitimacy over time is attempted, and when the role of legitimacy in political phenomena is assessed. In fact, legitimacy not only entails norms and values, but also issues of legality, institutional performance, political behavior, historical heritage, and so forth. To understand such a complex and multidimensional concept let us disaggregate it into its different elements. According to Beetham (1991:15-19), three major dimensions of legitimacy can be identified. The first is the legal dimension of legitimacy and concerns the existence of a set of rules to which power has to conform to be deemed legitimate. Every society has both written and unwritten customs and practices that regulate the acquisition and exertion of power, for example, periodical competitive elections in democracies. However, what is legal is not necessarily perceived as right. The rules of power require some sort of justification to be perceived as legitimate, and it is only possible to justify them recurring to “beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate” (1991:17). The second dimension thus pertains to the identification of a host of common values, of a general interest that justifies the existence of the rules. The third dimension is behavioral, or more precisely the “demonstrable expression of consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved” (1991:18). Beetham argues that such manifest acts of consent (for example, the participation in an election) contribute to legitimacy in two fundamental ways. On one hand, they create a “normative commitment” for both the subordinate and the dominant, and, on the other hand, the symbolic force of such actions rein- 42 forces and confirms the legitimacy of the power relation to third parties not involved in the relationship. The sources of political legitimacy vary across societies and political systems. For the purposes of this study we can classify the bases of political legitimacy in three categories.64 Traditional legitimacy is based on the specific historic and cultural heritage of a society, a background that provides the moral justification of authority. So, for example, in a theocratic system, traditional religious principles provide the normative source of legitimation of the state; the word of God is the basis to assess what is right and what is wrong and the foundation of the legal system, while many political leaders are recruited among the clergy. Value-rational legitimacy is based on the ability of a state to create an economic, social and institutional environment consistent with some over-arching normative goals. For instance, a Socialist system will strive to create a classless society, grounded in perfect economic equality and a command mode of production. The actual way in which normative values in value-rational systems are translated into political regimes can either rest on political goals or on legal procedures65. In value-rational systems based on goals the emphasis is on attaining policy outcomes consistent with values shared by both elites and masses. In contrast, in value-rational systems based on law like Western democracies the crucial feature for the justification of authority is respecting a set of “rules of the game” that create 64 This is only one of the possible typologies of sources (or “types”, or “modes”) of legitimacy and legitimation, and leaves out some categories that have been proposed by other scholars. The reason for this exclusion is that other legitimacy sources are transitory and arguably cannot sustain a political regime in the long term if they do not transform into one of the three above. Weber’s (1968) famous distinction of three ideal types of legitimacy for example also included charisma, which stems from the personality and the exceptional qualities of the leader. Holmes (1993:17-18) identifies seven legitimacy modes, including the three above. 65 Most students of legitimacy distinguish these alternatives as two separate sources of legitimation, one often called “goal-rational” and the other “legal-rational”. However, both goals and rules are closely linked to a normative dimension of values and visions of the world. Both sources of legitimation strive to implement a political and social project different from a traditional society, and are therefore grouped into the same category. 43 the common standard to formulate evaluations on matters such as fairness, justice and desirability. Performance66 is the third source of legitimacy, and it is here understood as the ability of the state to deliver concrete benefits in some key areas such as internal and external security, economic growth, administrative services and social welfare. The measurement of a multidimensional and elusive concept such as political legitimacy has been a major challenge for social scientists. The difficulty of tracking it has led some skeptics to dismiss legitimacy as “a mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid”. 67 Most agree that political legitimacy is not a binary category, but a continuous variable whose level varies across time and space. However, there is no concord on how to measure it, and since it involves the measurement of attitudes, the comparative study of legitimacy presents significant methodological challenges, especially in authoritarian countries were public opinion research is usually a sensitive issue. Holmes’ solution (1993:9) to this problem provides an example of how the measurement of legitimacy can be achieved through a substitutive concept. He argues that the “observable and observed” phenomenon of corruption is closely related to legitimacy and thus a good proxy for it.68 Focussing his analysis on Socialist systems, Holmes also contends that, in absence of overt manifestations of political dissent, a legitimacy crisis (see 3.2) can be detected by tracking public statements of political elites. Bruce Gilley (2006) instead adopts Beetham’s definition of legitimacy as a 66 This last mode is often referred to as eudaemonic legitimacy. Its inclusion in this list may be controversial since many would argue that performance alone as a source of legitimacy is not sustainable in the long term, since for instance it is virtually impossible for a state to avoid all sorts of economic crises. However, as the next paragraphs show, performance has played a particularly important role in the legitimation of Socialist systems, and should therefore be considered in this study as a major source of legitimacy. 67 Huntington (1991:46), reported in Gilley (2006:500). 68 “For our purposes, explicit references to crisis by leaders or others considered “authoritative” living in a country are accepted as evidence that some important political actors perceive the possibility or actual existence of crisis” (1993:35). 44 three-dimensional concept, identifying both attitudes and actions as indicators for the three dimensions of legitimacy. So, for example, he follows the convention of adopting perceived corruption levels and views about the civil service as one of the attitudebased legitimacy indicators, while the actions he monitors include issues such as social movements, internal insurgencies, and election turnout. The aggregation of the single indicators is then conducted to produce a legitimacy score on a scale ranging from zero to ten. 3.2 Political legitimacy and institutional change For political science, the study of legitimacy is of primary importance because the normative dimension of power relations is closely connected to political behavior. This is actually a controversial statement that not all students of political phenomena would assent. Some, for instance, would argue that values and norms are a weak explanatory factor of political behavior compared with self-interested decision making or with the resources that a state is able to mobilize to assure compliance. However, Beetham (1991:27) observes that people “relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as self-interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legitimacy as well as for reasons of prudence and advantage”. This means that, as outlined in the introduction, the degree of legitimacy in an institution has a direct impact on the quality of the compliance of its subordinates, a relationship that works through two channels (Suchman 1995:575-7). On one hand, individuals are more likely to supply resources and contribute to the performance of an institution they perceive as legitimate. On the other hand, legitimacy influences how people understand an institution, and therefore it impacts the extent of the criticism and opposition it has to face. The 45 generation of consensus is thus arguably as important as coercion in explaining why an authoritarian polity persists, changes or democratizes. Most analyses of legitimacy attempt to highlight the nexus between legitimacy and institutional change focusing on what happens to specific institutions when the power they exert loses legitimacy. Following Barrington Moore (1978), we can think of a “social contract” as the basis of legitimate authority, whereby rulers and subordinates must adhere to obligations they have contracted towards each other. From the perspective of the ruled, political power becomes illegitimate when the rulers do not fulfill to such obligations, 69 thus laying the grounds of unrest and regime change. Similarly, in more recent literature, the notion of “legitimacy crisis” is often applied to account for a diverse range of phenomena such as poor institutional performance, institutional reform programs or regime breakdowns in several regions of the world. Alagappa (1995b:59) defines a legitimacy crisis as a “situation in which the basis on which authority has been claimed or acknowledged is under such severe stress that there is strong possibility of destruction or transformation”. However, the erosion of legitimacy can take less severe forms than such a dire meltdown, leading to a situation in which institutions face some sort of “legitimacy gap”, “strain” or “deficit” that undermines their functioning without posing a threat to their existence. This study refers to either occurrence (existence of a threat to institutional persistence and legitimacy strain) as to legitimacy crises of varying intensity. Following the typology of legitimacy sources outlined, there are three possible ways in which a state can lose its legitimacy. The first relates to a thorough values change 69 As far as the nature of these responsibilities towards the subordinates, according to Moore (1978: 2022) they can be understood as three different kinds of security, namely protection (against external enemies), public order and peace, and material security. 46 among the population, which creates a gap between the values preserved and fostered by the state and those acknowledged by its citizens. For example, social and economic modernization may pose a serious threat to the authority of a traditional regime, since they often come together with secularization processes. The second threat to legitimacy is what Habermas (1976) calls a “rationality crisis”. It occurs when a state implements policies that are in open contrast with the values it claims to believe in and leads to an erosion of its authority among the population. Habermas’ example is the behavior of the state during economic crises in capitalist systems, when its increased intervention in the economy contradicts its ideology based on the virtues of the market economy. The third way is a performance crisis, meaning that the state fails to provide basic standards of security and welfare to its citizens, due for example to severe limits in state capacity or the inability to contain economic crises. 3.3 Legitimacy in Vietnam Throughout the history of Vietnam, legitimation modes have been changing together with specific political and social circumstances. However, an analysis of legitimacy in pre-Socialist Vietnam goes beyond the scope of this thesis and we will therefore limit the analysis of legitimacy in Vietnam to the Socialist era and the reform period. We can identify three main modes of legitimation that have prevailed in post- WWII Vietnam. The first two are different forms of value-rational legitimation based on goals, one goal being the Socialist revolution and the other national independence. The third source of legitimacy stems from institutional performance, a crucial element in Socialist systems. The conclusion of this chapter in 3.3.4 shows that all three sources of legitimacy may face decisive challenges in times of radical social and economic change. 47 3.3.1 The Socialist revolution The sources of legitimacy in Socialist Vietnam are to a good extent comparable to those of other Socialist countries. One prominent comparativist of Communism, T. H. Rigby, characterized Socialist systems as mono-organizational, meaning that “nearly all social activities are run by hierarchies of appointed officials under the direction of a single overall command” (1990:82). In such systems, legitimacy stems directly from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which sees the Communist party as the leader of the proletarian revolution and the ultimate depository of power in the name of the people. Socialist Vietnam is no exception to this rule, since its constitution explicitly identifies the VCP as the sole legitimate depository of authority and power, granting it a leading role in every aspect of public life.70 This guarantees the party the privileged status of exclusive representative of the population. Moreover, in support of their monopoly political power, Communist parties often adopt mass mobilizing tactics involving large numbers of people in the implementation of their policy goals. In Vietnam as in other countries, mass mobilization was crucial for the success of armed revolution, and later became an instrument to consolidate the legitimacy of party-rule through propaganda and the concession of limited forms of popular participation.71 In this respect Socialist systems follow the patterns of value-rational legitimation, where perhaps the most compelling super ordinate value is that of social equality. The party-state is legitimate because it implements the project of a Communist society, an endless struggle for Communism. As far as Vietnam is concerned, Beresford remarks 70 See 2.3. 71 The MOs this thesis studies, as the Women’s Union and the Youth Association, have served a number of purposes including for instance the recruitment of military and civilian workforce, and the implementation of various policies formulated by the VCP (Porter 1993:87-8). MOs are analyzed in greater detail in 4.2. 48 that policies proving the egalitarian commitment of the VCP such as the land reform implemented in 1954-56 encountered wide popular support (Beresford 2001:208).72 More precisely, Rigby argues that Socialist systems are “goal-rational” systems.73 He observes that “the higher legitimacy of task-achievement criteria over rule-compliance in official evaluation of performance is apparent in every facet of these societies” (1990:167). In Vietnam, the role of the SPC in setting detailed production targets for each economic unit can be recalled as an example of the preeminence of goals over rules. Moreover, the overlapping between state and party structures often led to a confused definition of the responsibilities and procedures in executive agencies, a haziness that often resulted in high discretionary power of state and party officials. 3.3.2 The nationalist struggle Not everybody agrees that Socialist values have been the primary source of legitimation of the VCP. Indeed, many accounts of Vietnamese history from the anti-colonial struggle to the reunification of the country portray the picture of what we have defined as a value-rational system based on goals. However, such goals included not only the Communist revolution, but also the fight for national liberation. Since the proclamation of the DRV in 1946 by Ho Chi Minh, the VCP managed to establish itself as the most trustworthy advocate and implementer of national liberation ideals, a position of supremacy consolidated through successful wars against a series of foreign powers both before (France, Japan, the USA) and after (Cambodia, China) reunification in 1975. Vasavakul (1995:260) remarks that diverging interpretations exist of the importance of Communist vis-à-vis nationalist discourses in explaining popular support to 72 This is not the case, however, of more radical policies such as the collectivization program that followed this land reform. 73 In our terminology, value-rational systems based on goals. 49 the VCP from the late colonial years to 1975. While some scholars argue that the predominant normative goals that underpinned the political system were actually rooted in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and in the Socialist policies supported by the VCP, some others contend that the emphasis on the struggle for national liberation and reunification was the key strategic choice that granted the party high levels of political support. While plenty of empirical material can be collected in support of either thesis, it is important to understand that the implementation of the Socialist project and the struggle for national liberation were combined by Vietnamese political elites in a single and successful political discourse against French colonialism first and American interventionism later. 3.3.3 Performance Stephen White (1985) agrees that Socialist systems differ from Western democracies in that they are not based of the enforcement of legal rules. However, he does not identify the value-rational mode of legitimation based on outcomes as the preeminent mode of legitimation of such systems, and argues instead that the claim to rule is based upon other grounds. While traditional and charismatic sources may play a limited role, socioeconomic performance, or the “social eudaemonic” mode of legitimation, is the crucial justification of authority in Socialist countries. White observed that “communist regimes do generally provide a high level of social welfare” (1985:463). Vietnam fits this picture of a country granting generous welfare provisions to its citizens. Beresford (2001), for instance, highlights how such a comprehensive welfare state is closely connected to Socialist egalitarian ideals and to the centrally planned economic system based on the cooperative as a basic production unit. She describes cooperatives as “highly egalitarian, because minimum supplies of food and security of 50 land tenure were guaranteed, and health, education and other welfare facilities (such as child care) were also provided to all members” (2001:211). 3.3.4 Legitimacy crisis and reform After 1975, the two ideological pillars that underpinned the political legitimacy of the Socialist republic began to wane (Vasavakul 1995:271-4). On one hand, the country had successfully defeated all its external enemies and achieved its goal of national reunification. On the other, the fragmentation of the international communist movement and the deradicalization of political elites in Vietnam shed uncertainty on the tenets of the previously unquestionable official ideology. For this reason, both the Socialist and the nationalist value-rational modes of legitimation based on goals started to come under scrutiny, or to be more precise to experience the beginning of a “value change” legitimacy crisis. The third source of legitimacy, performance, also has to face a problematic outlook after reunification. In the early 1980s, it was already becoming clear in the Soviet bloc that the countries of the Socialist bloc were experiencing a slowdown in economic growth and that the brilliant performance of the industrialization years was a thing of the past. The increasing incorporation of Socialist economies in the global capitalist system made them more vulnerable to oscillations of global economic performance, and the competitive pressures of international markets highlighted the limits and the imbalances of Socialist economies (White 1986). In Vietnam, the economic slowdown took a particularly severe turn due to country-specific circumstances. Most importantly, the incorporation of the market economy of southern Vietnam into the centrally planned Socialist system proved to be highly problematic, not least because of the end 51 of international aid to the South, high social resistance to Socialist policies and the failure of collectivization projects in the newly acquired territories. Furthermore, state capacity was too limited to promote a comprehensive project of institutional development aimed to expand the state apparatus in Southern provinces. Vietnamese political elites were thus compelled to find a solution to a multi-faceted legitimacy crisis encompassing both normative and eudaemonic elements. What was their response? With reference to the national liberation struggle, historical events led the county to fight two major international wars in the late 1970s with Cambodia and China. The victorious outcomes of these conflicts strengthened the reputation of the party as the ultimate keeper of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation, reinforcing the prestige of the VCP and the army after reunification. However, after the end of the military occupation of Cambodia, Vietnam has normalized its diplomatic relations with former enemies and has adhered, together with all other Indochinese countries, to the project of regional integration of Association of Southast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This will arguably lead to a new international scenario where the dangers of military conflicts are minimized, and the nationalist discourse may thus loose most of its significance in supporting the legitimacy of VCP rule. As far as the Socialist doctrine is concerned, the VCP seems to have adopted a less orthodox official ideology. For example, the necessity of the Marxist-Leninist political system was justified with references to Ho Chi Minh’s political thought an with a greater emphasis on his charismatic figure as the founder of the Socialist Republic rather than recurring to ideological grounds.74 The criticism formulated by intellectuals also included con- 74 See Vasavakul (1995:277). 52 cerns about the transparency and the representativeness of the system, issues that were partially addressed with the political reforms outlined in 3.1.3. If, as White argues, performance is such a pivotal touchstone for legitimate rule in Socialist societies, then we should expect those systems to address a performance crisis undertaking substantial reform to satisfy the socio-economic expectations of their citizens, or to run the risk of collapsing if they do not. The performance crisis in Vietnam was successfully addressed with the gradual introduction of the market-based measures analyzed in chapter two, a reform program that led to sustained economic growth especially after its comprehensive adoption in 1986. However, while the introduction of market mechanisms certainly boosted economic performance and thus eudaemonic legitimacy, it also laid the foundation for another kind of legitimacy crisis, namely Habermas’ crisis of rationality. In the post-reform era, the ability to ensure social equality is seriously compromised by unavoidable income polarization and class formation that follow the introduction of private property rights. Moreover, the welfare system gradually becomes subject to market laws and to the need to restructure the state, a process whereby the performance-based legitimacy deriving from high levels of social security may start to wane due to increasingly difficult access to social services by the poorer strata of the population. The extent of the economic, social and political transformation brought about by doi moi is such that it is plausible to suppose important implications in terms of legitimacy itself. The state, already strained by the erosion of the nationalist and Socialist foundation of its authority, becomes vulnerable to both a crisis of rationality and a significant erosion of the results achieved in terms of performance-based legitimacy. Holmes (1997) has identified a new development in the politics of legitimacy in Viet53 nam, arguing that legitimation is currently shifting from a value-rational mode based on outcomes to a value-rational one based on law. In particular, he sees the attempt of the party to build a modern bureaucracy and to govern less by direct management and more through legislative regulation as a proof that such a transition is slowly taking place. To some extent, the shift prospected by Holmes is an ineludible step to ensure political stability and legitimacy to the one-party system. While, as we argued, nationalist and Socialist ideals may be vulnerable to erosion in the near future, legitimacy can certainly not rest on performance alone, since it is virtually impossible to avert all kinds of performance crises. The VCP therefore needs a new source of legitimacy, and it is trying to find it in legal procedures that encounter popular support without granting significant political freedoms. However, this transition process is far from complete: ideology and performance are still important sources of legitimation, as they once were in the pre-reform period. Chapter five will address this issue by showing how MOs have played a crucial role in containing rationality and performance crises during doi moi. 54 Chapter Four: State and Society in Vietnam Since the proclamation of the DRV, and in particular after the end of the First Indochina War, Vietnam has drawn the attention of scholars studying the relationship between states and social groups in Socialist systems. While in the past the DRV was portrayed as a typical example of Socialist social organization, many scholars would agree that the patterns prevailing today are very different from those of the recent past. This chapter analyzes the current literature on state-society relations in Vietnam. In the first part, the main issues shaping the academic discussion on the relations between the state and society in Vietnam are introduced, with particular emphasis on the debate about state capacity vis-à-vis social groups and the coexistence of competing perspectives on state-society relations. Following this, two main issues in the Vietnam state-society relations scholarship are studied. Section 4.2 is an introduction to MOs that contextualizes chapter five’s analysis within the Socialist tradition of mass mobilization and Socialist Vietnam’s own historical legacy. It also covers the debate on the emergence of a mobilizational-corporatist model of state-society relations during doi moi. The last part of this chapter reviews the academic literature addressing the ques- 55 tion of the potential development of civil society in Vietnam, including the debate on the role of international actors in the politics of development. 4.1 An introduction to state-society relations in Vietnam While the next two sections of this chapter focus on selected specific issues concerning state-society relations in Vietnam, this part aims to be an overview of the different approaches that have been applied to study the state and society in this country. While the easier access to Vietnam in recent years has contributed to a growth of academic research in the social sciences, a considerable degree of discord still exist about the actual relationship between the state and society. After a brief discussion of the basic concepts that inform the study of state-society relations, an account of different perspectives on the Vietnamese case is attempted. 4.1.1 Studying the state and society Chapter one has presented a host of different approaches to the study of institutional change and the transition to democratic political systems in developing countries. It argued that studying the patterns of the relations between state and society actors is crucial to understand variations in institutional settings. In particular, this perspective is one that can shed light onto the role of legitimacy in the persistence and change of political systems. Before proceeding according to this line of thought, some elaboration of key assumptions and concepts in this field is needed.75 75 The identification of a “state-society” field or approach should not induce the reader to understand the study of state-society relations as a homogeneous field of research in political science. On the contrary, several diverging approaches (like some of those outlined in 1.1) include the study of social forces and their relations to the state for different reasons and to different extents. The purpose of this section, however, is to clarify some notions rather than to survey comprehensively the academic literature on comparative state-society relations in the developing world. 56 First of all, definitions of “state” and “society” must be put forward. The debate on the state, its authority, capacity, and autonomy from society in particular has engaged political science scholars for decades. According to a first perspective, “an organization, composed by numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way” (Migdal 1988:19). It is clear that this definition portrays an ideal-type of the state, while the states we see in reality may adhere to this model to different degrees. For example, the capacity of a state to coordinate the action of its agencies, to formulate and implement consistent governance rules may vary greatly across countries, time or state institutions.76 Therefore, it is often useful to disaggregate the state into its various departments, agencies and levels rather than considering it as a monolithic entity.77 Similarly, society is not to be understood as a single cohesive body with unitary goals, strategies and tactics, but rather as a multitude of potentially highly diverse social groups ranging from civic associations to economic interests, criminal organizations, ethnic clans and religious orders. For this reason, even within the same country differ- 76 As far as Vietnam is concerned, section 2.2 has already suggested that significant variation may exist in state capacity across the country. For example, inequalities such as the rural-urban and the northsouth divides and high levels of corruption may be a source of uneven implementation of state policies. 77 Note that this is very important for the issue of political legitimacy too. Different levels of governance, within the state apparatus, can differ significantly in the level of popular legitimacy they enjoy. The work of Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung on Myanmar (2004), for instance, shows that local government can be more legitimate than the national level in some areas, while in some others the opposite is true. This is due to various factors, among which the quality of local implementation of national policies (in her analysis, agricultural policies) is crucial. 57 ent patterns of state-society relations may exist, according for instance to the policy area or the region we consider.78 Other perspectives offer a more critical view of the state and specifically of the demarcation of its boundaries. In his critique of statist approaches, Mitchell (1991) argues that the main conceptual pitfall of such perspectives is a “subjective” conception of the state, which posits the state as a unitary entity that pursues its policy preferences. Such a view accepts (without demonstrating it) a clear distinction between state and society, and takes for granted the state as an actor with its own policy agenda, to a significant extent autonomous and insulated from social forces. Mitchell challenges this idea of the state as an independent cause of events on the grounds that the statesociety separation is not universal, but an effect of specific historical processes. He argues that we can find different patterns of state-society dynamics according to the “realm of practice” (1991:90) we analyze,79 and that state-society demarcation lines are not to be conceived as a differentiation between the state and an external entity, but as variable lines drawn within such realms. This perspective suggest a more fluid demarcation between state and society, and as we will see later in this thesis it is a framework that offers better theoretical foundations to account for MO in Vietnam.80 78 For an example concerning Vietnam, Wischermann (2003) has found that issue-oriented organizations report a different relationship with state and party authorities according to their region. Members of organizations operating in the North (Hanoi) were much more likely to describe their relationship with authorities as “problematic” than their colleagues in southern (Ho Chi Minh City based) organizations. 79 Examples of such realms are foreign policy, schooling and education, the financial sector, healthcare, and so forth. 80 Migdal himself in his later work (2001, 2002) seems to recognize the importance of overcoming a rigid state-society dichotomy. He elaborates a framework he calls “state-in-society” model, portraying society as a melange of diverse organizations, of which the state is one. Such organizations are in constant interaction with one another, a process that leads to a continuous renegotiation and redefinition of their boundaries. 58 Opinions differ as to whether the relations between the state and society are inherently conflictual or potentially cooperative. The literature on social capital, for example, supports a positive relationship between political participation and institutional performance: the more citizens engage in civic activities and take part in the policy making process, the better state institutions will manage to implement good governance measures.81 The same is true as far as studies of the positive role of civil society and mass mobilization in democratic transitions are concerned.82 Other accounts instead see the state as an organization in constant conflict with other social organizations in a struggle for “social control” (Migdal 1988), which is the capability to foist the preferred “rules of the game” on other social actors.83 From this perspective, the implementation of good policies and the achievement of economic development can only occur when social control is solidly concentrated in the hands of the state. When authority is dispersed among a plurality of actors pursuing different political agendas state capacity is seriously compromised. It is important to remark that academic work from either of the perspectives outlined above identifies legitimacy as a critical factor in state-society relations. From one angle, the perception of a legitimate state is a necessary condition for state institutions to work, since it is hard to imagine thriving civic life and genuine political participation in the absence of political legitimacy. From another point of view, legitimacy is viewed as the “most potent factor in determining the strength of the state” (Migdal 81 See for instance Putnam (1994). 82 See actor-oriented approaches in 1.1 83 Some other authors like Olson (1982) see distributional issues rather than social control as the core of state-society conflicts, but offer a similarly antagonistic view of the relations between state and society. 59 2001:52), a symbolic dimension that ties citizens to the state in a much more inclusive way than simple compliance does. 4.1.2 Vietnam: A strong or a weak state? Vietnam scholars have studied state-society relations patterns from both perspectives outlined above. For example, some studies of social capital in the last years have highlighted a thriving associational life, both independent from and initiated by the state.84 However, most of the Vietnam state-society relations literature analyzes Vietnamese state and society through the lens of a paradigm reminiscent of Migdal’s “social control” model, where various state agencies are in competition with a host of social groups to achieve policy outcomes in accordance with their preferences. Within this broad thread of research, diverging opinions can be identified on the issue of the position and relative strength of state institutions vis-à-vis society: is Vietnam classifiable as a strong or a weak state?85 Migdal himself mentions Socialist Vietnam as an example of strong state, ranking it (1988:269) “among the highest in state capabilities” in Asia, but other analyses point to the failure of the state to overcome social opposition in several areas. According to Kerkvliet (2001), three schools of thought are discernible in the literature on state-society relations in Vietnam, each offering a different picture of the role of state and social actors. The “bureaucratic socialism” (Porter 1993) view argues that the state dominates the process of policy-making and implementation, and that the ability of social actors to influence this processes is very limited. In this respect, even if after doi moi power relations have begun to shift in favor of an increasingly important role of social 84 See for example Dalton et al. (2002), and Dalton and Ong (forthcoming). 85 Koh (2001) for example frames his research on local politics in Hanoi within this debate on state capacity in Vietnam. 60 groups, today’s Vietnam is not substantially different from the “mono-organizational” systems described by Rigby for two reasons. The first is that the state still has the capacity to penetrate and monitor society from the national to the grassroots level, exerting a high degree of social control through its numerous agencies, which aim to regulate virtually every aspect of Vietnamese social life. Such agencies, according to this point of view, operate with a fair degree of consistency and coordination. Secondly, policy decisions are made within the party-state without significant influence from social inputs, and the occasional debates on contrasting policy alternatives are better understood as intra-party discussion rather than state-society conflicts. The only extraparty forces able to influence policy-making are international factors like economic crises. However, this line of reasoning has been attacked from two directions. Firstly, the validity of this model to account for state-society relations in Vietnam has been questioned even with regard to the pre-reform era. Kerkvliet (2005), for example, has shown that even in a crucial policy area for a Socialist country like land allocation, peasants have managed to oppose successfully the collectivization efforts of the regime although avoiding direct confrontation with state authorities. Moreover, some scholars have argued that Vietnamese Socialism has often been more responsive to social forces compared with other Marxist-Leninist systems.86 Secondly, as the next paragraphs of this section show, in recent years evidence has been mounting that social actors, co-opted by or independent from the state, do sometimes have the ability to influence public policies. A second view, the mobilizational-corporatist approach, acknowledges that social actors have the ability to influence political decisions to a considerable extent, some86 Brantly Womack (1987), even acknowledging the authoritarianism of the Socialist regime, describes this attitude as “mass regarding”. 61 times even in decisive ways, but that they are only able to do so within rigid boundaries set up by the party-state itself. Most scholars see such constraints as embodied by party-led MOs such as the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) and the Vietnamese Women Union (VWU), and argue that within these institutions the state enjoys a position of “structural dominance”. This means that while a certain extent of feedback and criticism on specific policies is allowed through “lawful channels”, the leadership role of the party in the political system is never questioned. A crucial implication of this model is the marginality of any associational life without the boundaries of statesanctioned institutions. The disparity of resources between MOs and non-state organizations is such that the latter are not comparable with the former as far as their ability to influence politics in Vietnam is concerned. The pre-eminence of MOs over nonstate actorness in the politics of development in rural Vietnam is indeed one of the premises that underpin our choice to focus this study on party-led institutions rather than supposedly independent actors.87 From a third point of view, the predominance of the state is not as consolidated as the first two perspectives suggest. Rather than characterized by the subordination of social actors to the political power of the party-state, state-society relations are viewed as “marked by tolerance, responsiveness, and mutual influence” (Koh 2006:3). Most crucially, the picture of state-society relations suggested by official statements and legislation does not fit with reality, where an “accommodating state” allows substantial maneuvering space for state officials and social groups in the implementation of state policies, and the possibility of non-state actors of influencing policy formulation is 87 See section 4.2.3 for a review of the debate on recent developments of the mobilizational-corporatist model. 62 acknowledged.88 Regardless of what may be decided by political elites at the national level, local officials often have high discretionary power in implementing regulations and directives. This leads to high variation in policy implementation across regions, levels of government and policy areas. Furthermore, chapter two outlined that Vietnamese citizens have often engaged in fence-breaking activities in clear breach of official regulations. In most cases, the response of state authorities has been accommodating rather than repressive, treating such violations of the law as social experiments rather than criminal offences. In contrast with the first two perspectives, the “accommodating state” approach portrays a picture of relatively low antagonism between the state and society. Policy divergences between political elites and social groups do occur, but a good degree of intra-party democracy and responsiveness to social pressures ensure that policy outcomes are often a compromise between various interests.89 Such a bargaining process usually takes place in a non-adversarial manner, where state institutions treat social actors as partners whose role is to assist the state in formulating and implementing policies rather than criticizing them. Finally, a few authors reject the idea that open confrontation with the state is a marginal phenomenon in contemporary Vietnam. While it is true that the state has created a highly repressive environment towards groups that challenge explicitly the political leadership of the VCP, dissident groups have voiced aspirations for a more open political system. In his review of political dissent in Vietnam, Abuza (2001) argues that threats to political stability have arisen mainly from within the party, as in the case of 88 One example of this approach is Fforde’s the work on the economic dimension of the doi moi mentioned in 2.1.1. He argues that economic renovation was not intentionally planned by the regime, but that it was a process engendered by the political pressures of some economic actors already present before the reform process began. 89 Unanimity is still often the rule rather than the exception for decision-making in many state bodies. 63 the Club of Former Resistance Fighters (CFRF) in the late 1980s.90 However, while this source of resistance has advocated only moderate changes to the political system and has come from well-known party officials and intellectuals,91 recent developments show that confrontational challenges to the state may come from without the party and articulate more radical critiques of the party-state. 92 This fourth approach to statesociety relations in Vietnam resonates with the academic debate on the emergence of civil society in the developing world, which is analyzed later in this chapter. Following this review of the literature, two considerations merit particular emphasis for the study of state and society relations in Vietnam. The first is the need to disaggregate the state when studying its relationship with social actors. The state in Vietnam is a complex apparatus whose functioning depends on the overlapping of organizational hierarchies, party lines and inter-personal networks. This organizational complexity and the great discretionary power of state officials suggest that significant variations exist in how politics is conducted by state and non-state actors across the country. Secondly, Kerkvliet’s (2001) characterization of Vietnam’s politics as a cluster of “multiple arenas” is equally relevant. Such arenas can be understood as specific policy areas or issues, controversies, social groups or sectors, each with its own distinctive players, rules of the game and patterns of state-society relations. Both considerations point to the need to look at “low-key politics” and local realities rather than official statements and national policy-making, and suggest that generalizing the find- 90 Founded in 1986 by Ret. Gen. Nguyen Ho, the CFRF expressed strong criticism of the policies for the integration of the South after the reunification and of economic policy. While not calling for the transition to a democratic system, the group advocated greater transparency within the Party, genuine accountability to the National Assembly and greater press freedom. Abuza (2000). 91 Abuza 92 (2000) uses the term “loyal opposition” (2000) to label this kind of dissident activities. See Thayer (2008) for a review of such developments, in particular of the Block 8406 group. 64 ings of one specific context to the whole country is highly problematic. Following this reasoning, our research project focuses on a single arena, namely the politics of development, and selects empirical case studies mostly located in northern Vietnam. 4.2 Socialist Vietnam and Mobilizational corporatism The recent history of Vietnam is to a good extent the history of a Socialist country, of the attempt to change a social structure according to the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The next paragraphs analyze MOs in Vietnam to show that state-society relations in this country have been influenced by the Socialist tradition since the establishment of the DRV. After an introduction of Socialist cases and Vietnam in particular, section 4.2.3 addresses the impact of economic and social liberalization on MOs. 4.2.1 Mass mobilization in Socialist countries The involvement of large numbers of people in military and political projects has been a feature of Communist parties across different geographical regions and historical periods. Both before and after the seize of power, Communist political elites have often identified the mobilization of popular masses as a critical factor for their success. The inclination to mass mobilization politics, particularly clear when Communist insurgencies aim to take over a state, stems from both theoretical grounds and historical contingencies. Firstly, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was explicit in designating Communist parties as the leading revolutionary forces against the capitalist system. The success of the Socialist project thus depended to a large extent on the ability of Communist parties to motivate popular masses to take part in the revolutionary struggle. The task of channeling the energy of the masses towards the purposes of the proletarian revolution was interpreted by Lenin and his followers as a mandate to “educate” 65 the population according to Socialist precepts (Turley 1980:174). Secondly, such parties have often suffered, al least in the first stages of their activity, from a substantial lack of economic and political resources compared to their opponents. For this reason, the attempt to involve large crowds can also be understood as a strategy to narrow the power gap by expanding the scope of contentious politics. After the end of the armed revolution, mass mobilization became in many countries one of the cornerstones of the attempt to build a Socialist state. Mass mobilization in Socialist countries is to be primarily understood as a mode of propaganda, “perhaps not too remote from what we mean by ‘public relations’” (Rigby 1990:70). Often, mobilization activities are communication campaigns implemented to achieve some sort of collective goal: for example, the production of a certain amount of an agricultural commodity. On other occasions, they call popular masses to action in the wake of exceptional circumstances like wars or particularly ambitious policy programs. However, not only the mass media, but also a range of other bodies and processes were designed to mobilize popular masses, for instance “workplace and other meetings, and the pseudo-democratic processes of elections, meeting of soviets, party conferences and congresses” (Rigby 1990:70). Large party-led associations of people such as MOs, as we will see in the next section, are to be included in this list as well. Since the successful implementation of Socialist policies cannot be achieved by coercion alone, such campaigns and activities quickly established themselves as an important element of Socialist political life; at this regard, the relevance of mass mobilization politics to the issues of political legitimacy in Socialist countries discussed above is crucial. 66 Mobilization and public participation in Socialist politics is something substantially different from the political rights enjoyed by citizens in democratic systems. Rigby (1990:70-1) notes one important difference between mass politics in Socialist countries and mass mobilization in Western contentious politics. In the latter, both small and large groups of people are involved in political activities, especially in areas of their immediate concern. While in democratic systems such groups have the ability to influence the policy-making activity and exert political pressure at the time of the discussion and formulation of policies, in Socialist systems citizens are only involved after the relevant decisions have been taken by political elites. The aim of mass mobilization in Socialist countries is thus of creating goodwill towards official policies by informing people of what decisions have been made for them, and of what that means in terms of their new responsibilities, costs and benefits.93 4.2.2 The Vietnamese case Vietnam is an example of a Socialist country where mass mobilization has always been of paramount importance for political leaders.94 Arguably, one of the reasons why the relationship between the party and the masses has been so salient in Vietnam is that the VCP struggle for power took place in a highly competitive political and military environment. In such a context, political elites needed to ensure broad popular support to succeed in their intents, especially in rural areas since the country was 93 This characterization, while perhaps useful to describe popular participation in the heyday of the mono-organizational system in Vietnam, contrasts with many accounts of current state-society relations patterns (see 4.1.2). 94 Turley (1993b:261) argues that one of the most characteristic legacies of the Vietnames revolution is “a political culture which by comparison with the political cultures that have prevailed in most other Leninist systems places great value on popular participation as a means to achieve national and revolutionary ends”. 67 overwhelmingly agrarian. MOs, established shortly after the foundation of the VCP,95 were soon to become the main institutional bodies through which political leaders managed the relationship between the party and the masses. In the first years of their activity, MOs and other “liberation associations” complemented the formal structure of government “to organize functional groups in support of Party objectives” (Turley 1980:180). At the end of the military emergency, each MO was supposed to represent one specific social group in the party-led political system, and it was the only allowed associational form for members belonging to such groups. The four main MOs, for example, are the Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), Vietnam Farmers’ Union (VFU), the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (CYU), and the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). All MOs are grouped under a larger umbrella organization called Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), which has the responsibility to coordinate the action of its members according to policy lines set up by the VCP.96 Other organizations have been set up to represent social sectors such as war veterans, intellectuals, religious and professional groups and solidarity associations.97 The functions of MOs in Vietnam are to a large extent comparable to those of mass mobilization institutions in other Socialist countries. This means that they have been a powerful channel for the VCP to communicate with selected social groups, thereby connecting the masses to the party. Like elsewhere in the Socialist world, mass mobilization has been understood as a way of persuading the population to support party 95 The establishment of the most prominent MOs predates national independence, and it is roughly simultaneous to the official foundation of the VCP. Although their names changed several times from their establishment, most of the largest MOs were formally set up in the early 1930s (Sakata 2006:51). 96 Not only MOs are members of the VFF. The Front also includes the VCP itself, the People’s Army, prominent individuals, and other organizations that do not necessarily have a large membership. 97 The VFF counted in 2004 a membership of 40 associations (reported in Sakata 2006, Annex 1). 68 policies, through the “active involvement in the implementation of the decisions made by the party” (Turley 1995:260).98 Additionally, for a political elite keen on maintaining the legitimacy acquired during the national liberation struggle, MOs where a crucial tool to track popular sentiment and policy attitudes in key social groups (Porter 1993:87). As a matter of fact, MOs were understood as a venue of representation of social groups where, to a limited extent, criticism of local authorities could be voiced. This suggests that MOs were intended to played a role, if a very mild one, of monitoring local government activity, and they have been used by central party cadres as tools to identify inefficient and corrupt local administrators.99 Finally, the VFF has also played an important role in the process of selecting and endorsing candidates for elections at various administrative levels, including those for the National Assembly. Such a broad range of functions of MOs was carried out through various activities like regular meetings of executive committees (including congresses for the selections of officials), sessions where members could learn and enquire about policies concerning their everyday life, and more specific communication campaigns aimed at mass mobilization for specific objectives (Sakata 2006:51-2). As far as the organizational structure of MOs is concerned, they are closely linked to the supervision of the VCP. The party has imposed the requirement that MOs activities abide by the general policy guidelines approved by the VCP, and takes part directly to the management of MOs through two institutional channels (Porter 1993:88). The first 98 In the case of the CYU then, a related and more specific purpose of mass mobilization was the recruitment and training of the future cadres of the VCP. 99 This statement should be qualified in two important ways. Firstly, the extent of criticism allowed has been a very limited one. So for example, during MOs activities and in other popular participation venues participants were allowed to express their complaints towards officials at the lowest administrative level, but not to criticize party decisions or party members at higher hierarchical levels. Secondly, as the next section shows, such mechanisms of control, besides being weak, often did not work as effectively as national party leaders had planned them to do. 69 is the consolidated tradition of appointing high-ranking party members (usually members of the VCP Central Committee) to the positions of president of the largest MOs and the VFF. Secondly, party chapters working under the direct supervision of the central party leadership operate in all MOs. Such party sections have the responsibility to appoint “party groups” within the executive committees of each MOs. Most MOs, especially the largest ones, have a four-layer structure from national to provincial, district and commune level. My fieldwork (see next chapter) has revealed that, in addition to this already extensive network, MOs sometimes have staff responsible for the village level as well, which allows a very comprehensive coverage of the territory until the grassroots level. 4.2.3 Mass organizations, doi moi and corporatism In spite of its crucial role within the Socialist polity, the Vietnamese mobilizational system and the MOs in particular have suffered from recurring crises. Most importantly, this system often failed in achieving its goal of a genuine mass political participation. Turley, for example, notes that while during the anti-colonial struggle public participation was fostered by a “resistance ethic” (1980:181), the VCP encountered serious problems in this sector after 1954, when the military effort of the First Indochina War was over. On one hand, the unresponsiveness of most public officials to citizens’ demands and their indifference to popular input and feedback led to a general disillusionment among popular masses, and a decline in participation in people’s councils.100 On the other hand, MOs lost most of their power due to the tendency of administrative and party organs to monopolize political decisions in all public 100 Turley (1980:181-2). 70 venues.101 In the wake of a new military conflict for the reunification of the country, political elites tried to address this crisis in the attempt of restore the resistance spirit. While in some important ways the scope of popular participation was reduced,102 the VCP launched a mass campaign to criticize party cadres, an important innovation since public criticism was then only allowed among party peers. For our research, two important points should be emphasized with reference to Turley’s analysis of the early relationship between the VCP and Vietnamese masses. The first is that it corroborates the above argument that political elites have always perceived this bond as a crucial one, on which the prospects of their own long-term survival largely depend on. Secondly, the analysis suggests that such a relationship is even more important in times of exceptional challenges, when the party attempts to capitalize on mass mobilization to achieve major political goals. The renovation process started in the mid-1980s is one of such watershed developments. Indeed, at the beginning of this decade MOs were facing a crisis similar to that they experienced twenty years before. Porter (1993:90-1) reports that MOs were widely considered as excessively bureaucratized and undemocratic, their workforce underpaid, lacking motivation and often corrupt. According to many party members, seriously concerned about the derelict state of their mobilizational apparatus, MOs were grossly failing in fulfilling their mandate to transmit the opinion of the masses to the VCP. In times of radical economic and social changes, the rehabilitation of MOs 101 Turley mentions the case of the peasants association (now VFU) to illustrate the decline of MOs during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Shortly after the completion of the land reform, most of the prerogatives once held by the VFU were taken over by the cooperative system, specifically by organs such as production brigades and cooperative management boards. The lack of support for MOs from VCP cadres, fearful of the potentially destabilizing role of continued mass participation in everyday politics, led to the decline or disbandment of such organizations. 102 In particular, several responsibilities of people’s councils were transferred to administrative bodies (Turley1980:185). 71 was thus a priority in the debate on political reform. In particular, a review of the literature reveals that two main guidelines have informed the renewal of MOs in the late 1980s. The first one is the introduction of more democratic electoral processes for the election of MOs officials, with the aim of giving members a greater say in the selection of their representatives.103 This and communication campaigns to encourage debate and feedback from the masses were provisions aimed at making MOs more responsive to their memberships. Secondly, steps were taken to grant MOs a substantial freedom from local administrative apparatuses, although not from the party (Porter 1993:91). This was decided to enable MOs to develop programs closer to the needs of their members, and to reinvigorate and expand their memberships. The commitment of the VCP to revitalize and empower MOs resulted not only in a modified institutional environment within the party-state, but also in a partial redefinition of their roles vis-à-vis their members. In particular, many agree that MOs are now embracing “more practical socio-economic development activities” (Sakata 2006:56), more centered on the needs of their members than on the achievement of ideological goals. 104 Interestingly, a similarly mobilizational model has been extended to some of the new social groups empowered by economic reform. Thayer (1995) argues that doi moi has provided opportunities for a much more lively and varied associational life than the model of mono-organizational Socialism can describe. However, he remarks that “many of the new groups and associations, while not wholly autonomous from the state and therefore not purely popular, are in fact ‘semi-governmental’ if not ‘quasigovernmental’” (Thayer 1995:52). According to some scholars, this trend points to the 103 At this regard, the first congress of the VFU in 1997 and the Sixth Trade Union Congress in 1998 can be mentioned as an example of the renewal introduced by such electoral amendments. See Turley (1993:263) and Porter (1993:92-3). 104 This issue will be examined in depth throughout the next chapter. 72 emergence of a model of state-society relations that presents important similarities to the corporatist experience of many East Asian “developmental states”.105 Stromseth (2003), for example, sees a corporatist model in how state-business relations are managed, while Jeong (1997) argues that corporatist tendencies are consolidating between the state and a number of social sectors. According to this view, “the VCP has deliberately and consistently sought to institutionalize state corporatism since the early stages of economic reform” (Jeong 1997:154). This strategy, of which the restructuring of existing MOs is an important aspect, is favored by political elites also because it is consistent with the successful mobilizational model adopted since the early days of the VCP. My own research, focusing on MOs and their renovation, can also be counted within this thread of research on the emergence of a Vietnamese “mobilizational corporatism”. 4.3 Is there a civil society in Vietnam? The issue of civil society development is highly discussed not only in academic communities worldwide, but also in policy circles and in the popular press. As we show after an introduction on the concept of civil society and its relationship with development initiatives run by international donors and NGOs, Vietnam scholars have been no exception in developing a debate on an emerging Vietnamese civil society. 105 Although different definitions of corporatism exist, we can understand it here as a system of statesociety relations where the state grants a privileged status to some interest groups (often, a monopoly of the representation of their own category’s interests) in exchange for the commitment to abide by certain institutional rules or policies. 73 4.3.1 Civil society and international aid In spite of the popularity of the concept of civil society in the political science community, some scholars have argued that this notion has not been clearly defined.106 Rather than giving a full account of different theoretical perspectives, it will suffice here to consider civil society as that “third sector” of public life including voluntary associations other than state and market actors. 107 More relevant to the purposes of this thesis is to clarify briefly the connection between civil society and institutional change. It is highly problematic to summarize in a couple of sentences such an impressive body of literature, but for the sake of simplicity we can identify two paths through which the beneficial effect of civil society on institutional performance and democratization is supposed to work. First, the literature on social capital and trust argues that associational life favors a process of socialization at the individual level. civil society is thus understood as a “school of democracy” that develops virtues conducive to good government, such as a strong civic culture, tolerance and cooperative behavior. Second, the value of civil society lies in some pivotal functions that NGOs are able to fulfill. 108 Some of them are directly related to democratic and civil advancement, as it is for their functions of channeling social demands, fostering the inclusion of underprivileged groups in the public sphere, serving as “watchdogs” of government activity and critical awareness in the public debate. Some others instead are more related to a matter of “governance” rather than democratization. NGOs are supposed to provide citizens with a wide range of social services that no other actor is 106 See Amory (2004:9-12) for a review of the debate on the definition of the concept of civil society. 107 This definition thus includes non-profit non-state associations and networks of various kinds, such as civic groups, NGOs, and service providers like hospitals and schools. 108 See for example Hannah (2007:7) for an illustration of different civil society roles. 74 willing or able to deliver, in particular for those sectors of the population neglected by state and market logics. Furthermore, their small size, technical knowledge and proximity to target groups of such services constitute a “comparative advantage” allowing them to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency. A good share of the literature on the emergence of civil society in Vietnam delves into the politics of development, especially on projects carried out in partnerships involving international donors and NGOs. In recent years and during the 1990s in particular (the so-called “development decade”) Vietnam has seen a rapid and extraordinary increase of the presence of international NGOs and aid organizations, now active in an impressive number of development projects throughout the country. The aspect of civil society related to democratization processes recalled above, working both through individual socialization and critical social functions, has heavily informed the approach followed by most international donors in their policies for the underdeveloped world. If we look at how international donors have implemented this approach in practice, we find that the commitment to “manufacture civil society from the outside” has followed in recent years three major patterns (Howell and Pearce, 2001:102-11). The first one, institution and capacity building, aims at developing local civil societies with activities like the establishment of research centers, the provision of technical advice and training, and the advocacy for a regulatory framework encouraging non-state agency through various forms of liberalization. A second path involves creating partnerships among the four main actors on the development scene, namely the state, market, civil society and international donors. Coalitions of this kind are set up on the basis that such actors, although often substantially different, share a set of common goals and should be considered as complementary partners rather than 75 antagonistic competitors. A third strategy involves the direct provision of various forms of funding in support of activities carried out by civil society organizations. Financing areas can include, for example, offices and equipment, advocacy activities and campaigning material, or simply the payment of salaries to some NGOs officials. This idea that civil society can be introduced by the concerted efforts of a multitude of international actors, and that it can, in turn, lead to economic development, better governance and democratization has been attacked from several directions. The first line of critique concerns the questionability of the link between civil society and desirable political outcomes.109 Secondly, many view the development of civil society as an endogenous historical process that cannot be achieved through an imposition from the outside of political models worked out in advance.110 For this reason, the intervention of the international community is likely to produce a melange of small organizations of dubious efficiency rather than a large, vigorous and independent civil society able to fulfil the critical roles outlined earlier. Third, evidence from development projects suggests that the partnership model cannot be universally applied. Countless episodes of subtle confrontation or open conflict among economic actors, state institutions and NGOs in developing countries show that the politics of development is often an arena that resembles a zero-sum game rather that a favourable environment for cooperation. Finally, some doubt that civil society is a concept applicable to the analysis of nonWestern societies, which may have very different attitudes from those prevailing in the West about what the relations between the state and society should be. This is also related to the difficult operationalization of civil society, since international donors often 109 See for example Armony (2004). 110 From the same angle, other key goals of international donors and NGOs (most importantly, democratization) are considered equally unattainable. 76 have difficulties in identifying what organizations constitute civil society in social and cultural context they are hardly familiar with. 4.3.2 The prospects for civil society in Vietnam Studies of civil society in Vietnam have focused in particular on the attribution to contemporary Vietnamese associational life of the two crucial civil society features outlined above. The first one is related to the critical role that civil society is supposed to play vis-à-vis the government, and asks whether civil society in Vietnam is genuinely autonomous from the state. From this perspective, the independence from party and state organs is a constituting and necessary element of civil society. As Heng (2004) observes, this issue parallels the discussion on the “strength” of the Vietnamese state detailed in 4.1.2. The prevailing view at this regard is that “the obvious reality of the continuing dominance of the Communist Party” (Lux & Straussman 2004) in the social realm cannot be denied. For this reason, Vietnam is experiencing a “state-led civil society” more similar to the Chinese model (Frolic 1997) than to patterns prevailing in the West. However, this is not to imply that the thriving associational life described in the above sections, not being classifiable as an ideal-type of civil society, should be belittled. In fact, even if the scope of action for VNGOs is restricted, studies suggest their incipient ability to influence policy-makers in some areas. For example, Gray (2004) illustrates the case of the Vietnamese NGO Towards Ethnic Women to argue that such organizations have acquired the ability to lobby government officials at different levels, providing reliable information and consultancy. Wischermann’s (2003:880-2) study of issue-oriented organizations also shows that several VNGOs consider themselves to a good extent autonomous from the state. Moreover, some authors criticize the focus of these studies on development-related VNGO, arguing 77 that civil society challenges to the state are already emerging in Vietnam in different forms, such as rural unrest (Luong 2005), religious associations (Abuza 2001, chapter 6) or even open political contestation (Thayer 2008). A different thread of research is more concerned with what we have called “governance” activities rather than with VNGOs autonomy from the state. From this angle, the key development involving VNGOs in authoritarian countries is not only their contribution to democratization processes, but also their role in promoting a more efficient and effective governance, especially for the most deprived sectors of the population. For example, Hannah (2007) advocates the adoption of a less restrictive notion of civil society to account for non-Western environments. In non-Western cultures civil society could assume different institutional settings but provide similar services to their members. This is the case of Vietnam, where mobilizational-corporatist organizations and government-inspired VNGOs, although not independent from the state, can successfully fulfill some of the functions of civil society in Western context, especially the provision of welfare services. However, the choice of what aspects and activities should be considered as the core of civil society, and what others instead could change according to the socio-cultural context is not addressed exhaustively. Salemink (2003) shows with the analysis of a Vietnamese example of an INGO development project that this aspect of civil society (the “governance” functions) can be in contrast with the role of civil society as a harbinger of democracy. In the politics of development, he argues, the welfare goals of international donors can often be achieved without the presence of an independent and vibrant civil society, since the work of existing quasi-governmental associations in partnership with INGOs is often successful. Moreover, the presence of INGOs itself has the ironic effect of inhibiting 78 the development of a critical awareness among local civil society organizations, since such international actors already fulfill similarly critical functions. 79 Chapter Five: Mass Organizations between Change and Continuity In the previous chapters, this thesis has reviewed the theoretical frameworks and the historical developments necessary to contextualize our research project. It is now possible to go through the empirical material we have gathered in support of our main argument, and more specifically to test the six research hypotheses introduced in 1.4.2. As outlined earlier, this thesis argues that the restructuring of MOs is a crucial aspect of the dynamics of change and continuity in Vietnam, and of the evolution of political legitimacy over the doi moi period. In particular, MOs have been revitalized so that they could maintain their role as the privileged channel for the management of state-society relations. We argue that the reform of MOs analyzed in chapter four has transformed them into hybrid institutions, not readily classifiable as civil society or state organizations. Before studying the implications of this transformation for the academic debates introduced throughout this thesis in chapter six, this chapter shows how exactly MOs can be understood both as civil society actors and state agencies, as the incarnation of both socio-political liberalization and contiguity with an authoritarian regime. While the first section of this chapter focuses on the new roles of MOs, to 80 a large extent comparable those of civil society actorness, the second part studies other features more reminiscent of MOs’ past roles as party-controlled organs. 5.1 Mass organizations as civil society actors MOs have changed substantially since the beginning of economic reform. Our hypotheses claim that this change is recognizable in three main dimensions. First, the intent of the VCP to turn MOs into agencies closer to the needs of their constituencies has transformed them in providers of welfare services. The targets of such services are those disadvantaged sectors of the population increasingly neglected both by market and state actors. Secondly, MOs, especially active in the politics of rural development, have been operating with an approach closely reminiscent of the “partnership model” adopted by international NGOs and donors. Another aspect of this inclusive model of action is the function of MOs as venues for discussion, especially for population groups previously excluded from the public debate. Thirdly, the “comparative advantage” that NGOs are supposed to have compared with state actors is manifested by MOs in a number of their features, such as their proximity to and knowledge of the target groups of welfare services, their increased technical expertise following the cooperation with foreign actors, the employment of motivated volunteer staff, and a higher degree of transparency as compared with state bureaucracies. 5.1.1 Welfare service providers The fact that MOs are currently much more involved in development activities than they were in the past is rather uncontroversial. The above literature review has shown that MOs’ reform has involved a redefinition of their tasks aimed to achieve a closer fit between MOs’ action and the needs of their constituencies. My interviews in Hanoi 81 have revealed that MOs are involved in exactly the same policy areas where INGOs and international donors are operating. Such areas include all sort of poverty alleviation programs and projects aimed at improving social conditions in rural Vietnam. One of my interviewees,111 for example, is a project manager in a special unit of the VWU established in 2002, called Center for Women Development (CWD), in charge of designing and implementing projects in various areas, ranging from vocational training to human trafficking. Among the activities they are carrying out some are tackling abuse on women, a sensitive issue in Vietnamese society, and innovative measure such as shelters, hotlines, and counseling groups for abused women are being implemented. Other MOs’ welfare activities mentioned in the interviews carried out include virtually all issues in rural development, such as income generation, healthcare, childcare, illiteracy, professional training and entrepreneurship development, environmental preservation, disabilities, gender, distance adoptions and so forth. Despite the consensus on the new welfare roles of MOs, little has been written about their specific contribution to each of the stages of development projects.112 According to my respondents, MOs are playing a very active role in most steps of such projects.113 During the pre-feasibility stage, when a problem is identified and some preliminary analyses are carried out, MOs work together with INGOs and donors to define the scope of the project. Sometimes, MOs themselves contact such foreign actors with project proposals, and on other occasions they are contacted by INGOs and 111 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 22/07/08 112 In designing my interview guide, I have distinguished among six stages of project management: identification of the problem, design-preparation, financing, implementation, monitoring-evaluation, and dissemination of results. 113 Interviewees from MOs were asked to comment on the role their organization or unit played in each stage of the project management, while INGOs officials were asked to assess MOs’ contribution to such stages. 82 donors for advice about the selection of the project site. In the project formulation phase, MOs are crucial in identifying the actual beneficiaries of the project, which is made possible thanks to their superior knowledge of their members and of the population in general. Moreover, MOs also contribute in estimating the resources needed to achieve the project goals, although some of the interviewees remarked that costs estimates are often inflated and need therefore to be reassessed. Financing, or the securing of the economic resources needed for the project, is usually a responsibility of donors and INGOs. A partial exception is the already mentioned CDW of the VWU, which funds a limited extent of its development projects through the revenues of a small hospitality management activity in Hanoi. The implementation of the project is the stage where the contribution of MOs is, in the view of all interviewees, indispensable. This is due to the far-reaching structure of MOs,114 essential to target population groups who often live in dispersedly populated rural areas. MOs staff is in charge of implementing most of the development projects, even though many lament the need of comprehensive training for all staff levels (especially the lower ones) before the beginning of each project. During and after implementation, processes of monitoring and evaluation are also needed. However, INGOs and donors rarely trust MOs with such responsibilities. The first reason for this is that many fear that MOs’ staff may have vested interests in evaluating their own work, especially as far as the deployment of financial resources is concerned. Secondly, the expertise needed to carry out final evaluations and monitoring is often not available among MOs’ staff. Finally, the dissemination of the projects results is another area where MOs are active. This is especially the case for informing the rural population 114 See 5.2.1. 83 about the results to create awareness of the benefits introduced by the project. MOs are thus emerging as the main providers of welfare services in rural Vietnam, and like NGOs elsewhere in the world they are addressing the need of those sectors of the population neglected by both market and state actors.115 5.1.2 An inclusive model of governance MOs fit well into the cooperative, non-adversarial model of governance that international donors and NGOs are promoting for their projects in developing countries. All the respondents interviewed stated that their projects are never carried out by a single agency, but rather formulated and implemented by a constellation of actors. These include international donors, INGOs, MOs (most frequently, the VWU, the WFU, the CYU, and occasionally associations of teachers and veterans members of the VFF), Vietnamese NGOs such as research centers, and local offices of national agencies such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development. All projects also involve, if only to a limited extent, local authorities of the state and the party, most notably People’s Committees. This does not imply that the cooperation among such a plurality of actors is always smooth and that all parties involved share the same vision and goals. Some of the INGOs officials I have interviewed report that, despite an overall fruitful working partnership, minor issues of conflict exist in their cooperation with MOs-for example about compensation matters or the introduction of practices MOs are not accustomed to. As the next section argues, diver- 115 Some could contest that the poor in rural areas are being neglected by the state in Vietnam. Indeed, reducing the “development gap” between urban and rural areas has been repeatedly announced as a policy priority by the VCP elites during the last years. However, funds for rural development often include infrastructural and economic projects that do not benefit the whole population proportionally. Moreover, as shown in 5.1.3, government programs specifically targeted at the provision of welfare services for the most disadvantaged strata of the population often present low levels of effectiveness and inclusiveness. 84 gences between INGOs and local authorities can be more substantial and more difficult to reconcile. Interestingly, cooperation among MOs can be problematic as well. Some of our interviewees for instance argue that the lack of coordination among MOs has been an important limitation in some projects. The example of a microcredit project in Quang Ngai province, funded by an INGOs and implemented by the VWU, illustrates this point clearly (CARE International 2001). The evaluation report of this project found continued and strong support by the VWU, with the exception of one district where the local branch of the VWU was only recently established and thus institutionally weak. However, the same report reads that the CYU “at no time was supportive of the project implementation aim”, because it had “an alternative project with strong economic benefits for the [Youth] Brigade and probably for the Commune” (CARE International 2001:7). This suggests not only that the institutional environment can differ markedly according to the district chosen for project implementation, but also that MOs may not always qualify as a suitable partner for development projects. The inclusiveness of the approach followed by MOs is not limited to the cooperation among several actors, but also lies in their role of providing a venue for political participation for their members. According to the experience of my interviewees, in MOs meetings members feel free to speak up and express their opinion on a range of issues that affect their daily lives. In rural areas, such venues are often the only opportunity where citizens, especially those belonging to underrepresented groups, can participate to the management of their community. This dimension of MOs agency is particularly evident in some gender projects implemented by INGOs in Vietnam, in which the VWU has been the main partner. The project called “A Women Caravan” by the Ital85 ian NGO GVC is one of such examples.116 This project targeted a particularly disadvantaged group, ethnic minority women in a northern province, aiming to give them the opportunity to discuss issues of gender and equality, such as the allocation of household duties, domestic violence, and even civil rights. The VWU implemented this project in several villages, organizing workshops where minority women could share their experiences and propose solutions to the problems they face in everyday life. This example shows that MOs can also fulfill one important function of civil society associations, which is fostering the participation of marginal groups in civic life.117 5.1.3 A comparative advantage The interviews I have carried out suggest that MOs are usually able to deliver more effective welfare services in comparison with state actors. This is reminiscent of the “comparative advantage” that civil society organizations enjoy in some governance activities. A clear differentiation between MOs and other state bodies emerges not only from the opinion expressed by INGOs officials about their own working experience,118 but also about their perception of the attitudes of the population towards MOs. More precisely, it is possible to identify four reasons that explain higher levels of MOs 116 Information regarding this project was collected during two interviews in Hanoi with GVC officials, carried out on 21/08/08. A short filmed report with a description of the projects and its main achievements is available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bW4RimOS6N8. 117 An interviewee of an INGOs with decades of experience in development in Vietnam has highlighted that, occasionally, MOs may tend to exclude non-members from the provision of services. This is due to the attitudes of some cadres of the organization, who interpret their mandate rather conservatively. However, such a problem can relatively easily be solved since MOs have been quite flexible when asked to change their modus operandi. Interview carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08. 118 All but one of the interviewees agreed on this point. Contrary to the opinion of his colleagues I have interviewed, an official of an INGO working on disabled rehabilitation projects in Vietnam claimed that no meaningful distinction between MOs and other state agencies is possible. This is not only because of their dependence from the VCP, an issue developed in 5.2.2, but also because their performance is not dissimilar from state actors in development projects. When working with MOs, the official said, you should expect to face the same difficulties you encounter in other state bodies, including corruption, wasteful resource management and lack of flexibility. 86 performance in development projects. The first one, described by an official of an American NGO working on childcare issues,119 is that MOs staff has a moral drive impossible to find elsewhere in the Vietnamese public administration. He explains that MOs officials have a commitment to their job and a sense of mission that clearly distinguish them from the personnel in other state bodies, where indifference to development projects is often the rule. For example, similarly to what happens in civil society associations, staff at the lowest level in MOs is often made up by volunteers. The officials of the Italian NGO GVC subscribe to this view, claiming that this is one of the reasons why they consider only MOs as full partners of their initiatives. It is a very different relationship from the one they have with local authorities: the most helpful thing that the government is able to do, they argue, is providing the necessary authorizations and refraining from misconduct. Secondly, MOs are often perceived as having fewer vested interests than other partystate institutions. MOs are operating under the constraints of limited budgets, and, unlike local authorities, they do not usually take part in activities where substantial economic interests are at stake. For this reason, even when specific government programs are available, MOs are often able to provide similar ones closer to the needs of the majority of the population. State-run microfinance programs are a good example of the limitations of government action. On one hand, microcredit offered within government programs is not financially sustainable. This is because, being often perceived as charity rather than credit, they apply unsustainably low interest rates and are plagued with high default rates. On the other hand, loans offered by the government sometimes tend to exclude important groups. For example, some sectors of the popu- 119 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 13/08/08. 87 lation may find it much more difficult than others to provide the guarantees necessary to qualify for credit.120 Moreover, citizens with stronger links to the local party hierarchies may be unfairly privileged.121 Secondly, in spite of the persisting capacity constraints, MOs are generally perceived to have a higher degree of technical expertise than other state counterparts in development projects. Several INGOs respondents we have asked mention the fact that MOs are more competent than local authorities in development projects as one of the main reasons why they choose them as partners for their initiatives. Often, previous working experience with MOs staff has revealed a much more flexible approach than the one found with government bodies. Most importantly though, it is precisely the interaction between MOs and international actors that has contributed to a dramatic increase in MOs capacity in the last years. Most development projects formulated by international NGOs and donors include a training process to enable MOs officials to carry out the tasks required, thus contributing to the development of a know-how that remains at the MOs’ disposal after the conclusion of the project. This differentiation between MOs and other government bodies is also confirmed by the fact that occasionally MOs require their international partners an exclusive relationship, fearing that the involvement of inefficient government institutions could harm the prestige of the organization.122 Finally, the function of including marginalized sectors of the population in the public debate is also crucial to explain why MOs activities are evaluated as more effective by 120 See for instance Flyers and Vu (2002) on the difficulty experienced by female-headed households to access public credit. 121 According to a report (Caseley 2000), for example, this is the case of the People’s Committee credit groups run in several communes in Lai Chau Province. 122 Reported by an official of an international NGO in an interview carried out on 21/08/08. 88 INGOs officials. More generally, the attitudes of the population towards MOs are different from those held towards other state officials. A local expert of Vietnamese society, for example, argues that there is much more goodwill towards MOs than other state institutions.123 This is due to several reasons, among which the egalitarian structure of MOs at the grassroots level is of primary importance. At the lowest hierarchical level, MOs are a sort of forum where members identify MOs official as their peers, and feel therefore free to express their opinions on any issues. A relationship of trust between MOs staff and members develops in an environment much different from other government venues, where the demarcation between state (or party) and people is much clearer and mutual suspicion between officials and people higher. Greater trust and accessibility increase the legitimacy of MOs, and therefore the commitment of local populations to the success of development projects implemented by them. 5.2 Mass organizations as government agencies MOs have not only been an example of the social liberalization and welfare achievements of doi moi, but also an effective tool in the hands of the VCP to reinforce its control of Vietnamese society. From this angle, far from articulating civil society critical discourses, MOs have contributed to the persistence of an authoritarian polity in Vietnam. Our hypotheses identify three dimensions where MOs are more easily comparable with government agencies than civil society actors. First, MOs still retain the feature of a government bureaucracy. They are large and hierarchical organizations funded by the state and legally acknowledged as a part of the civil service. Second, MOs are still carrying out a function of social control on behalf of the party-state. In particular, their involvement in the monitoring of state policies’ implementation and in 123 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 19/08/08. 89 election processes is important aspects at this regard. Finally, MOs are in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the VCP, despite the considerable operational autonomy they enjoy. The party’s control of MOs is arguably as tight as it was before recent MOs institutional amendments. 5.2.1 Bureaucratic features Even after the reform measures introduced during doi moi, MOs still retain some features that differentiate them from civil society associations. The first of such characteristics is their large size and hierarchical structure. Although it has not been possible to estimate the total workforce employed by each organization, MOs do not feature the nimble and flexible structure typical of most NGOs. MOs, especially the larger ones like the CYU and the VWU, usually have an extraordinary number of offices throughout the country, including all provinces and virtually all of the districts and the communes.124 Moreover, the case studies analyzed show that often MOs are present with informal structures even at the village level, where the staff is typically employed on a voluntary basis. Some of the people I have interviewed identify this feature as the main asset of MOs in development projects. When asked about the reasons for choosing MOs as partners, a recurring answer of INGOs officials is that working with them is the only possible way to reach their target groups. This is due precisely to the overarching network at the disposal of MOs, a structure that enables them to get in contact with their millions of members. Moreover, Sakata (2006) reports that the legal status of MOs staff is also equivalent to that of state bureaucracies. The cadres of MOs, from the national to the commune level, have the status of civil servants. This means, for example, that “they receive salary from the National Treasury at the same level as ad124 For a summary of organizational features of MOs and their presence on the territory, see Do (1996). 90 ministrative officials” (2006:55). Indeed, most of the budget of MOs is funded by the state.125 5.2.2 Social monitoring The analysis of the historical functions of MOs carried out in 4.2.2 has shown that MOs have had a crucial role in allowing the VCP to monitor key social groups, and in implementing the policies decided by the central government. This role of social control on behalf of the political elites has not weakened following institutional reform. On the contrary, MOs are now in a stronger position to monitor social life and compliance with party policies than before, thanks to their increased institutional capacity and a higher legitimacy among their members. An INGO official, asked to provide an illustration of how MOs are still agents of control on behalf of the state, mentioned the role of the VWU as implementers and enforcers of family planning policies.126 Local cadres of the VWU are regularly involved in family planning campaigns in cooperation with the Demographic Agency.127 Thanks to its control of the territory, the VWU is the only institution able to know what families comply with state regulations. When a breach of the law is detected, the VWU typically reports it to local authorities and calls for restrictive action. In other cases, non-complying households are excluded from the provision of social services delivered by the VWU. The already mentioned microcredit project in Quang Ngai province is another instance of MOs acting as state agents. The INGO involved in the project concluded that the local CYU branch was nothing but “the umbrella body for service teams to sedentarize minorities” though 125 MOs do levy membership fees, but they are usually minimal, especially in less developed areas, and they only manage to cover a small share of MOs actiities (Sakata 2006:55). 126 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 21/08/08. 127 See Pesce (2007) for some examples. 91 measures such as a compulsory cultivation program (CARE International 2001:44). Finally, the participation of MOs to election processes at different levels of government (see 4.2.3) is another example of their contribution in a particularly sensitive area. The VFF is in charge of endorsing candidates independent from the VCP for participation to elections. This can be considered as a sort of cooptation, whereby potential political leaders independent from the party are absorbed in the part-state system. The MOs role as social control agencies is thus closely linked to their function of implementers of state policies, a task for which MOs are now as fundamental as they were before doi moi. According to my respondents, the exceptional contribution that MOs are able to deliver in implementation is mostly due to their outstanding communication network.128 Some interviewees claimed that often there is no other available partner than MOs able to make sure that communication reaches the end users of their services. This is particularly the case of rural areas, where the MOs communication system, centered upon the commune level, is an unmatched channel to communicate with the target groups of development projects. For example, one interviewee129 mentioned that the VWU is able to start a very effective “cascade communication” process, leveraging on the role of women (most of whom are VWU members in rural areas) to access every household. Another INGO official130 reported an episode that illustrates how much more effective communication can be when initiated by MOs rather than by local authorities. The INGOs were working at a project to provide every 128 An example of the importance of MOs as communication agents, reported by a respondent in an interview carried out in Hanoi on 07/08/08, is that the VWU is still Vietnam’s largest publisher. Differently from the past, however, the content of publications now deals with development issues like healthcare rather than on political and ideological matters. 129 Interviewed carried out in Hanoi, 19/08/08. 130 Interviewed carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08. 92 household in a few northern villages with mosquito nets to prevent the spread of malaria. After several months of unsuccessful attempts by Health Ministry officials in one village, the INGOs proposed members of the local Veterans’ Association (a MO affiliated to the VFF) to take part to the project. Old war veterans enjoyed high levels of respect in the village, and when they started to roam the village, speaking personally to members of each family, people listened to them carefully, differently from what they did when government functionaries visited them. Within a couple of weeks, most households in the village were using anti-mosquito nets. This example shows that the Vietnamese state can rely on institutional structures additional to those of fully governmental bodies, and capitalize on the higher legitimacy that such institutions (MOs) enjoy among rural populations. 5.2.3 Party dependence As far as the crucial issue of the relationship between MOs and the VCP is concerned, I have found a high level of agreement among the interviewees. Most INGO officials said that, according to their professional experience, MOs enjoy substantial operational independence from the VCP. To be sure, during the design and the implementation of development projects, members of the local chapters of the party or the People’s Committees are always consulted. However, it is very rare that such actors manage to have some influence on the defining specifications of the project itself, not least because of their low interest and understanding of development activities in general. Some INGOs officials stated that, as long as their operational activities are concerned, MOs are almost completely free from the interference of the party or local authorities.131 Some others, however, qualify their view on the operational dependence 131 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 13/08/08. 93 of MOs by mentioning two cases where a more “hands-on” approach from the partystate may occur. The first case is that of projects including sensitive policy areas such as religion, ethnicity, and human rights. 132 The second circumstance is that of projects whose implementation may interfere with strong economic interests. In such cases, one interviewee argued,133 it is possible that the voice of MOs may be unheard by local authorities. In spite of such operational independence, none of the respondents would describe MOs as institutions fully independent from the state. The autonomy MOs enjoy in formulating and running their development projects takes place within clear boundaries set up by the party. Some of the reasons mentioned by my interviewees have already been analyzed in this thesis. For example, the fact that the government funds most of the budget of MOs allows the state to give general directions on how such organizations should be managed. Some respondents also recall the direct participation of the VCP in executive committees within MOs (see 4.2.2). With regard to development projects specifically, all interviewees agree that, in case of conflicts, MOs officials are not allowed to maintain a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the party-state. This means, for example, that public questioning of the conduct of a state official in the policy area of the project is not possible, even if their behavior is in clear contrast with the interests of the MO constituency. More generally, MOs are not allowed to critique in public existing laws, or to advocate among their members specific changes to current policies or regulations. Not surprisingly, even less tolerated is MOs’ activism in advocating political reform. 132 The example of the Women’s Caravan project, however, suggests that such projects, although more difficult to implement, are still possible if local authorities can be convinced that they will not pose a threat to political stability. 133 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 25/08/08. 94 The limited degree of independence from the party-state that MOs enjoy should not be mistaken as a sign of inability to influence policy-makers. Indeed, some of the interviewees have pointed out that, through methods very different from those employed by pressure groups in democracies,134 MOs have considerable capacity to orientate the action of public authorities. This ability has its roots, perhaps paradoxically, in the very same function of social control agents that the VCP has designed for MOs. MOs monitor Vietnamese society precisely because of their status of privileged “transmission belts” between social sectors and the state. As one INGO official notices, this gives them an extraordinary leverage compared to Vietnamese NGOs.135 For example, they can complain and access party official and local authorities on behalf of their members. They can consult their members about the implementation of policies and report to local authorities any shortcomings or attitudes about possible amendments. These processes are possible not only because of the legal status of MOs, but also because MOs officials entertain personal connections with those in power in state bodies, and dispose of a thorough knowledge of how state and party agencies work. Furthermore, they can access and monitor a wide range of issues, such as conditions at the workplace and household life, which for everybody else are off-limits. This enables them to engage the state, even though in a non-adversarial way, as civil society organizations in Vietnam cannot do. 134 Most importantly, public confrontation (an important element of state-society relations in democratic systems) is absent in MOs-state dynamics. 135 Interview carried out in Hanoi, 21/08/08. 95 Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks This study has elaborated on the theoretical framework of institutional change presented in the introduction, it has contextualized it with reference to contemporary Vietnamese history, and it has reviewed the six research hypotheses formulated. Within the limits of the research design discussed, the development projects analyzed, the fieldwork in Hanoi and the literature review have provided sufficient empirical evidence to corroborate all of them. MOs have been successfully turned into the bridge between state and society that the VCP had envisioned, into a distinctive mélange of genuine political participation and tight authoritarian supervision. As the first chapter argued, this was a winning strategy to rejuvenate the legitimacy of the VCP in a period of potential social and political instability. The empowerment of MOs as welfare service providers and participation forums has dramatically increased their legitimacy among their memberships. MOs chapters are now perceived by their members and foreign actors as markedly different from other local state actors, due to their commitment to the social base they represent and their relatively higher efficiency. However, MOs remain without doubt an organic part of the Vietnamese one-party political system, a polity they contribute to 96 strengthen by addressing needs and demands that other state agencies are neglecting. Such a surplus of legitimacy, rather than being captured by potentially destabilizing actors independent from the party-state, is being channelled within institutions tightly controlled by the party and transferred to the political system as a whole, thus reinforcing the process of its own perpetuation. Section 1.4.3 has already made clear that the limitations of the research design adopted in this study do not allow drawing conclusive generalizations on the topics analyzed. To overcome such limitations, my thesis project should be expanded in several directions. For example, further research is needed to assess the role of MOs that are only marginally present in the politics of development, and whose contribution in other political arenas may point to different patterns of state-society relations (statelabor relations could be a particularly important arena at this regard). Furthermore, a study of legitimacy is not complete without surveying comprehensively the local communities, who are in last analysis the depositor of legitimacy legacies. The “disaggregation of the state” should also be pursued with a more rigorous approach, in order to account for the coexistence of different patterns of legitimacy and statesociety relations. However, despite the limitations of the research plan, the hypotheses confirmed by this study offer valuable insights that can be contextualized within the academic issues introduced throughout this thesis. Some of these debates pertain to Vietnamese politics specifically, such as the discussion about the state capacity in this country. Some others, on the other hand, also belong to overarching questions about the study of state-society relations, legitimacy, development and democratization. The first issue to which our conclusions are relevant is the debate about the capacity of the Vietnamese state vis-à-vis social actors. Is Vietnam a “strong state” or does it 97 have to be “accommodating” due to its limited capacity? The results of our study point to the persistence of a position of dominance of the state over social forces throughout the doi moi period. This applies, at least, to the social groups participating in rural development projects such as those we analyzed, most prominently the poorest strata of the population, women, peasants, and the young. For such sectors of Vietnamese society, doi moi and MOs reform have brought about a significant change in how they relate to the state, giving them unprecedented (if limited) opportunities to take part to political processes and influence state action. However, such an expansion of political participation has taken place within the strict boundaries set out by the party state. Criticism of the monopolistic political power exerted by the VCP is never allowed in public venues, and among the social sectors we have studied such critical demands have not materialized yet. Given the evidence at our disposal, it is fair to conclude that state-society relations in the politics of development have evolved exactly along the lines envisaged by the party state, contributing to the consolidation of its social control in remote areas. For this reason, “accommodating” arrangements are to be considered functional to the VCP strategy of fostering its legitimacy to maintain the fundamental features of the political system unaltered. Secondly, our results allow a few remarks about Vietnam’s mobilizational-corporatist system and its relationship with political legitimacy. The VCP has attempted to strengthen the Vietnamese mobilizational system, identifying it as the cornerstone of its strategy to consolidate the legitimacy of its authoritarian rule. The success of this strategy is important for two reasons. The first one is that the “state-led” model of civil society has been reasserted among rural masses, which have always constituted a key constituency for political elites Socialist Vietnam. An old system, only partially 98 renovated, has proved its effectiveness in regulating state-society relations in times of radical social and economic change. The second is that the VCP’s attempt to extend this system to other social groups such as urban-based business and professional associations is indicative of the potential of corporatism to co-opt new actors in authoritarian regimes. This has important implications for the more general issue of legitimacy in authoritarian polities and its relationship with institutional change. The contained institutional change initiated by the VCP has given a decisive contribution to address a legitimacy crisis that we have defined as both rational and performance-related. The success of the state response to such a crisis, in turn, has reduced the potential for the emergence of social tensions and more radical demands of political change and democratization. Thirdly, the research results can be related to the ongoing debate about the emergence of civil society in Vietnam, and to more general issues of the definition of civil society and its emergence in underdeveloped countries. Our research suggests a rather bleak outlook for the prospects of civil society in Vietnam as understood in the Western political discourse. On one hand, the centrality of the mobilizational system outlined in the above paragraph parallels an overall limited ability of civil society actors independent form the state to have a significant impact on policy making. The disparity between genuine civil society organization and state-led or state-inspired ones in terms of their ability to mobilize political and social resources is impressive. Consequently, local NGOs present much more limited capacity to access and influence government officials as compared with MOs and similar institutions. On the other hand, although existing civil society actors in Vietnam have a remarkable record in delivering effective social services, their role as critical agents of political change is largely 99 disappointing at least in the policy domain we have studied. Critics of Western concepts of civil society may argue that indeed there is no reason why social developments in Western countries should replicate in other cultures. However, a definition of civil society that arbitrarily excludes its crucial role of critical actor vis-à-vis the state is equally problematic. Should MOs be considered as a part (perhaps even the most vital and significant) of Vietnamese civil society? An affirmative answer to this question, considered their subordination to the VCP, would imply an excessive stretch of the concept of civil society as it is used in the current academic debate. However, dismissing their role as mere venues for the stage of a meaningless form of participation would be equally misleading. Other considerations can be made departing from our hypotheses with regard to the study of state-society relations as a paradigm to understand political change. The first is that the process of “disaggregation of the state” advocated by many is an ineludible step to understand the dynamic reality of state-society interactions. Our research confirms that the state in Vietnam is a complex apparatus of a number of agencies that often cannot be treated as a single, homogeneous actor. Such agencies relate to the general population and to specific social groups differently, according to different patterns of interaction and legitimation modes. The higher goodwill that MOs enjoy among the rural population in comparison with other state agencies is a fitting example to this point. 136 The empirical material we have gathered shows that even the issue of MOs autonomy from other state and party actors is more controversial than it may 136 At this regard, Thawnhhmung’s work (2004) comes to mind. Among the Vietnamese, we can observe low levels of legitimacy towards some state organs (most frequently, in the case studies analyzed, this is the case of local authorities and local party chapters). However, the presence of some other agencies (such as MOs) that enjoy greater levels of political legitimacy compensates such legitimacy deficiencies, preventing the escalation of a full-blown legitimacy crisis of the state. This is reminiscent of Thawnhhmung’s argument about the coexistence of different levels of state legitimacy in Myanmar. 100 seem at a first look, and that it is essential to distinguish between different agencies for an accurate analysis. The second consideration touches upon the issue of the demarcation between the state and society. Vietnam’s MOs are a particularly interesting example to illustrate how challenging such a discrimination may be. As shown above, the extent to which the status of “civil society actors” can be attributed to Vietnamese MOs is highly debatable. Rather than a straightforward distinction between state and society, what we see in the politics of development in Vietnam are porous boundaries, and a continuum where hybrid structures mediate among a plurality of interests and demands arising from both state and non-state actors. A picture reminiscent of the critique of statist approaches introduced in chapter four. Finally, we can return to the unresolved, long-standing issue of the nexus between socioeconomic advancement and democratization. The results of this research can offer a partial explanation of how an authoritarian polity can coexist with high levels of economic growth, and more broadly with development. This is possible, we have argued throughout the paper, when the political elites manage to adapt the institutional environment of such a political system to the changing needs arising from social and economic change. Such an evolution is crucial to maintain level of legitimacy sufficient to induce the population to commit to a sufficient extent to the persistence of the authoritarian polity. From this angle, if this institutional adaptation is successful, the constitution of a democratic political system is unnecessary to promote development and socio-political stability. Conversely, the advancement of the social condition of large strata of the population is a process that can take place in the absence of the articulation of a powerful democratic critique of the political status quo. This suggests that a contextualization of the relationship between development and democracy is 101 necessary, and that contingent political, historical and cultural factors are of central significance for this link rather than just marginal phenomena. Furthermore, the development projects we have analyzed are examples of good governance achieved within an environment that by Western standards we could well describe as undemocratic and deprived of civil society actors. This opens a series of pivotal questions about the desirability of democracy and civil society development to attain developmental goals in developing countries. Moreover, the importance socioeconomic development and of a thriving civil society for democratic transitions and good governance practices could equally be reconsidered. This is a crucial aspect where the Vietnamese case could be particularly revealing for the practical approach adopted by foreign donors and NGOs, and specifically for their drive to manufacture civil society (and consequently democracy) from the outside--an ambitious aim, which perhaps is not as crucial as many believe. 102 References Abuza, Z. (2000) Loyal Opposition: The Rise of Vietnamese Dissidents. Harvard Asia Quarterly, 4(2). Abuza, Z. (2001) Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam. Boulder (CO), Lynne Rienner Publishers. Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). Alagappa, M. (1995) The Bases of Legitimacy. In Alagappa, M. (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral authority, pp. 31-53. 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World Politics, 39(4), pp. 479-507. 110 [...]... strengthened after victorious wars against the USA, Cambodia and China On the other hand, as in all socialist systems, the legitimacy of the states stems directly from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the party as the leader of the proletarian revolution, a privileged status that is legalized in constitutions that grant the party the role of exclusive representative of the population However, another... associations throughout the country According to many accounts, the beginning of Vietnamese associational life as it is known today dates back to the very first years of doi moi, when the restructuring of the state led to the partial reduction of the provision of some key social services Many local associations, often limiting the scope of their activities to the village or the neighborhood, were established... criticism of government policies can be expressed without fear On the other hand, they have maintained their subordinate role to the VCP and strengthened their function of social control over their members on behalf of the political elites This has benefited the state in two ways The first is that the empowerment of MOs and their ability to attract foreign funding has successfully balanced the social... focusing on the changing relations between the state and selected social actors, on the role of the state in the international system,6 or on a combination of different factors.7 Similarly, some scholars work from a structural perspective that they identify as the “political economy approach” to explain the timing and the terms of democratic transitions Although they acknowledge the importance of the strategic... Furhtermore, the level of legitimacy is also crucial for the functioning of institutions themselves, since it affects the commitment of individuals and social groups to make them work.32 The model’s crucial link is between legitimacy and institutional change It assumes that in the long run institutions can only persist if they are legitimate The concept of legitimacy crises” is therefore of central... been introduced (often in an attempt to curb overwhelming corruption), for example, in the experimentation of more participatory modes of local governance and in the strengthening of the role of the National Assembly vis-à-vis the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Nevertheless, political stability and continuity with the pre-reform regime in the management of power relations have been the major political... positive role in establishing democratic regimes The discussion of the role of mass mobilization in democratic transitions is often associated with the study of the emergence of “civil society,” a realm of political action independent from the state and able to counterbalance and challenge authoritarian regimes The recent work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also falls into this second group of actor-oriented... elaborates on the Marxist framework in identifying class relations as the key factor for the emergence of democracy, which in his analysis is linked to the presence of a strong and independent bourgeoisie Since then, the emphasis on the role of the middle class as the spearhead of democracy has been the leitmotiv of countless studies in comparative politics Class relations has not been the only structural... functioning of institutions or even actively undermine 30 This is an important simplification of the model The theory of legitimacy outlined in § 3.1 stated that legitimacy depends not only on institutional performance, but also on a symbolic sphere of values For this reason, the level of legitimacy of a state can also change following a significant shift in the value system of its citizens The model... plurality of concessions that they can make to their citizens, civil and politcal rights being only a part of them What exactly the concessions made are, as the model suggests and as this paper argues in the next section, is a matter of how state-society relations evolve, or in other words of the strategies pursued by political actors 36 Chapter four will offer a more detailed analysis of MOs 20 legitimacy ... leadership role that was restated by the 1992 constitution: The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and interests of the. .. doctrine of the party as the leader of the proletarian revolution, a privileged status that is legalized in constitutions that grant the party the role of exclusive representative of the population... and positive role in establishing democratic regimes The discussion of the role of mass mobilization in democratic transitions is often associated with the study of the emergence of “civil society,”