A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AYODELE-OJA OLALEKAN RAFIU B.A. (Hons.), O.A.U., M.A. UNILAG A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2007 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First of all I thank my supervisor, Dr. Michael Pelczar, without whose support this thesis would have been very different from its present shape. I appreciate your critical and encouraging suggestions throughout the course of writing this thesis. I am equally grateful to you for reading through the many drafts of the arguments in this thesis. I also thank the duo of Drs. John Holbo and Mark D’Cruz – who together with my supervisor, make up my thesis committee – for their support and confidence in my ability to pull this project off. To the faculty, especially, Profs Ten Chin Liew, Alan Chan; Assoc. Profs Saranindranath Tagore, Tan Sor Hoon (HOD), Cecilia Lim and Anh Tuan Nuyen; and staff, of the Department of philosophy I am grateful for the scholarly and moral stimuli they have provided for my self-development. I thank the Department of Philosophy and National University of Singapore (NUS) for the financial support I enjoyed throughout the length of my study without which I could not have accomplished this task; for the overseas conference grants; and in general, for nurturing an efficient system, which has made learning and research not only fruitful, but also exciting. I have benefited in various ways from colleagues in the Department. I am grateful to Jonathan for his insightful questions during the seminar I presented to the Department. To Lishan for the stimulating discussions we had, and to Kim and Edward for their concern for me and my family, I say thanks. To Jason, Bendick, Kevin, and Pei-En my appreciation for all the wonderful time we spent together; and for all the challenging i questions that kept me cognitively intimate with the subject of my research. Above all, I am grateful to everyone for the hearty laughs and the cheerful moments we had together. It is tough enough to be an international student; but a family of international students, as a friend and colleague once put it, is an “impossible family”! But fortunately, we – wife, daughters and I – have been able to pull through the last four years or so together. I have NUS to thank for standing as guarantors for my wife for immigration purposes, and some of my friends and colleagues, Jude, Weng Hong and Leon, for sponsoring my daughters at different times. Your kind gestures have ensured that they have relevant approvals to pursue their own studies. I am happy to report that they are all doing quite well. I have also enjoyed good relationships with many people outside the department, in and outside the university. To my neighbours at West Coast Green RC, for their warmth and hospitality; to the teaching staff of Philosophy department at Raffles Institution where I had a relief teaching stint, for their care and concern; to my compatriots, especially, Adekunle, Adodo, Raphael, Wilson and Moshood (C/E), for their support, the fun and worries shared; and to everyone who has ever asked me: ‘How is your thesis getting on?’ I give my gratitude. Of course, Adepeju, my dear wife, deserves a special mention for being my pillar of support and for persevering with me in the course of this research. I will always love you. I thank my lovely daughters, Temidayo and Olasubomi, for your patience and understanding; and for joining in on the countdown to the eventful completion of what you both cheerfully consider the longest “homework” ever to be undertaken by any student. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements i Table of Contents iii Summary v Abbreviations of Works by Wittgenstein vii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE I. A language whose words only its speaker can possibly understand II. A language whose words refer to the inner experiences of its speaker 13 III. A language only its speaker can possibly know to exist 30 CHAPTER THREE: THE EXEGESIS OF ‘PRIVATE LANGUAGE’ 36 I.1. Alternative readings of PI §§ 243-245 36 I.2. Alternative readings of PI §§ 256ff 54 CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT 61 I. The impossibility of using a language in private 67 II. Alternative interpretations of the PLA 81 iii CHAPTER FIVE: ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE 104 I. An argument for the physical character of phenomenal consciousness (APCP) 105 II. Evidence of Wittgenstein’s awareness of and interest in the mind/body debate 121 III. Justification for attributing the APCP to Wittgenstein 127 IV. Some alternative interpretations of the importance of the impossibility of a private language 132 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 139 BIBLIOGRAPHY 144 iv SUMMARY I will examine Wittgenstein’s argument for the impossibility of a private language. The question, according to Wittgenstein, is this: is it logically possible for someone to use a language to refer to his inner experiences that only he can understand? There are three aspects of this question. The first is what the nature of a private language might be if it were possible. The second is how the nature of a private language bears on its logical possibility. The third is what implication the impossibility of a private language might have for other areas of philosophy. The first question is about the problem of logical incomprehensibility as it arises for both the putative private linguist and the putative hearer in a private language scenario. That is, what facts about a supposed private language logically constrain its comprehensibility to a would-be hearer, and its teachability by the would-be speaker? My answer to this question is that a private language is a language only its speaker can know to exist. The question of the impossibility of a private language, as I see it, is about the task of a putative private linguist, namely: what task is logically impossible for a private linguist to perform? There are two relevant interpretations of this question. The first is whether someone can use a language in private. The second is whether someone can invent (in the thesis, I use the word ‘invent’, interchangeably with ‘set up‘) a supposedly private language. Wittgenstein is usually interpreted to favour the second; the alternative language interpretation. But this thesis defends the first interpretation, which is about the v mode of use. That is, this thesis argues that it is logically impossible to use a language in private (i.e., use a private language). Lastly, how might the impossibility of a private language impact other areas of philosophy? This thesis contends that the impossibility of a private language throws light on the mind/body debate. It implies that a certain dualist thesis – dualism about sensation – is false. vi ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN BT The Big Typescript, TS. 213 (2005) PI Philosophical Investigations (1953/2001), Reprinted in 2003. PO Philosophical occasions, 1912-1951 (1993) RPP Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980) OC On Certainty (1979) PR Philosophical Remarks (1975) PG Philosophical Grammar (1974) LPE ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”.’ (1968) Z Zettel (1967) BB The Blue and the Brown Books (1958) References to works by Wittgenstein are given in the text by citing the initial letters of the titles followed by section or page numbers. Other works are referenced in the foot notes. vii Chapter One: Introduction At §243 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises for discussion the question whether it is possible for there to be a language whose individual words refer to the sensations of its speaker, such that no one else but the speaker can understand it. His response to the question is that such a language is not possible. In the subsequent sections, Wittgenstein offers his argument for that claim. This is what philosophers refer to as the Private Language Argument (PLA). Presumably Wittgenstein does not ask whether a private language is possible just for the sake of answering that it is not. The question therefore arises what the overall goal of the PLA is supposed to be. Here opinions diverge. But that is not unexpected given that there is considerable disagreement even over what is meant by “private language”. This thesis is going to give an interpretation of a private language in order to argue, in agreement with Wittgenstein, that a private language (properly construed) is not possible. So much has been churned out in this respect in the literature that looking at it again, it appears, may be far from a much worthwhile venture. However, I am persuaded that the PLA is more consequential than the current literature suggests. My motivation is that there is a plausible connection between the PLA and a traditional debate in the philosophy of mind. This thesis argues that the private language argument is part of a larger effort to show that conscious experience is broadly physical in character. I argue that Wittgenstein’s arguments in sections 234-317 of the Philosophical Investigations support some form of materialism or physicalism. Thus, reflecting on the PLA seems to me to provide an insight into the mind/body problem. The purpose of this thesis is to spell out this connection; i.e., lay out the PLA and the overall implications of the argument for the mind-body problem. The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter Two addresses the first task of this thesis, which is to understand the nature of a private language. The question posed here is what a private language might look like if it were possible. It seems that interpreting the private language argument, namely, explaining why and how a private language is logically impossible, depends on whether and how we understand the nature of such a language. In other words, this chapter answers the prior question of the nature of a private language. The answer to this question builds on what Wittgenstein says about the language: a private language is a language only its speaker can understand, whose words describe the inner experiences of the speaker. This chapter argues that any language that satisfies these conditions is a language only its speaker can know to exist. That is, a language that a speaker uses to describe his inner experiences, but which someone else besides the speaker cannot understand, is a language that someone else besides the speaker cannot know to exist. This seems to follow from the idea that possession of a private language is inconsistent with the conjunction of the following two possibilities: the possibility that someone distinct from me can have the evidence that I use a private language, and the possibility that I can have a public language. 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Wuketits, F. “Consciousness Explained—or Explained away?” Acta Analytica (1994): 55-64. 159 [...]... that the person cannot have knowledge of the important features of the sensations that the words of my language refer to This objection will be attended to Some philosophers believe that speaking a private language is inconsistent with speaking a public language 1 The last part of this chapter argues that possession of a private language is compatible with possession of a public language It is logically... question about a putative user of the language with its meaning intact We can ask, for instance, whether it is possible for someone to have or use a private language In that event, the question whether a private language is possible can be rephrased in the following way: whether a putative private linguist can accomplish his task But the question is what the task of a putative private linguist is This chapter... use the language to make different kinds of speech acts The chapter also discusses alternative interpretations of the task of a private linguist Chapter Five is where the overall implication of the impossibility of a private language is argued The chapter connects the impossibility of a private language to the mind/body debate; i.e., it argues that phenomenal consciousness is physical It begins with an... an argument to the conclusion that conscious states are physical In that argument, the impossibility of a private language is then used as a counter-objection to a dualist attack against physicalism However, the goal in this chapter is not only to establish a connection between the impossibility of a private language and the idea that conscious states are physical; but also to attribute that view about... will argue, in agreement with Wittgenstein, that the private linguist faces the task of using a language in private Wittgenstein is often interpreted as holding that the private linguist faces the task of setting up the language I will argue that a language only its speaker can know to exist is impossible given that the speaker cannot use the language to say anything to himself That is, the person cannot... reader with exegetical matters It therefore raises the question whether the nature of a private language that this thesis defends is supported by the text Chapter Three brings to the fore a discussion of the relevant passages – to the idea of the nature of a private language set out in Chapter Two – from the Philosophical Investigations by engaging some scholars on the interpretations of those relevant... nature of a private language is In this chapter, I do not intend to discuss the private language argument itself, but to step back from it to ask: What is a private language ? My answer to this question is based primarily on Wittgenstein’s remarks in §243-§317 of the Philosophical Investigations There are two main features of a private language, as Wittgenstein understands it The first is that only the. .. cause, similar effect Given that the brakes systems of car x and car y are of a common origin, and that the mechanical fault in car x is caused by one of the brakes systems in car x, it is reasonable to infer that the system in car y will cause a similar mechanical fault Similar blokes will produce similar brake systems, and similar brakes systems will cause similar mechanical faults In the same way,... private use?—Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? —But that is not what I mean The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations So another person cannot understand the language (PI §243) Here Wittgenstein describes a private language as one that has the following features: (a) only the person speaking the. .. is theoretically possible, if we grant both the speaker and the audience a shared public language Suppose the speaker has a sensation, and he says in the words of L, “I have a so-and-so sensation” which, supposedly, the audience cannot understand Suppose the audience knows a language is being used by observing some correlating public features of the speaker The speaker can then use his public language . of using a language in private 67 II. Alternative interpretations of the PLA 81 iii CHAPTER FIVE: ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE 104 I. An argument for the physical character. (i.e., use a private language) . Lastly, how might the impossibility of a private language impact other areas of philosophy? This thesis contends that the impossibility of a private language throws. individual speaker and any language, L, these three statements are inconsistent: (A) The speaker can have a public language. (B) There is a language, L, that only the speaker can understand.