[...]... simple beings, Aquinas believed that all finite beings are composed in their very beings Only God is an absolutely simple Being, and there can be only one such Being (God) However, there can be other kinds of beings, namely, composed beings Beings can differ in their very being because there can be different kinds of beings (Aquinas, ST, la.4.1, 3) God, for example, is an infinite kind of Being; all... causing, since it is admitted that causing is occurring Yet in an infinite series every cause is being caused, for if one were not being caused, then we have arrived at an Uncaused Cause (which scientists desire to avoid) One cause must be uncaused, for if every cause in an infinite series is being caused and at least one cause is causing, then that cause is self-caused However, a self-caused being... existence) in different kinds of beings What is being? Being is that which is How many beings are there? Being can be either simple (Pure Actuality—God) or complex (both actuality and potentiality) There cannot be two absolutely simple beings, since there is nothing in a pure Being by which it could differ from another pure Being Of course, a simple Being can (indeed, must) differ from complex beings, since... admitting that things differ by nonbeing, he argued that nonbeing in some way exists, even though it is “other” than being That is, differentiation is by negation: One being is distinct from another not by what it is but by what it is not—different not by being but by non-being In other words, the differentiating factor is not within being but is outside of being—it is not real or actual But nothing... supernatural.) Finally, the evidence has mounted for a unique beginning of the space-time universe (see chapter 2) If this is so, then the beginning of the universe would be a prime example of a miracle, for what else should we call something coming into existence from nothing? Additionally, concluding that the universe had a beginning provides a devastating blow to Spinoza’s concept of God, calling into question... are different kinds of beings Parmenides was wrong because he assumed that “being” is always understood univocally (the same way) Aquinas, on the other hand, saw that being is analogous (see chapter 9), being understood in similar but different ways All beings are the same in that they are all actual; however, finite beings differ from an infinite Being in that they have differing potentialities that... only a finite number of moments before today (i.e., a beginning of time) And everything with a beginning had a Beginner Therefore, the temporal world had a Beginner (Cause) The scientific evidence for the world having a beginning comes from the so-called Big Bang view held by most contemporary astronomers There are several converging lines of evidence that the space-time universe had a beginning First,... anything is only possible where there is a difference But in such a being as God there is no difference From this it follows necessarily that in everything else, except in this one unique existence, its existence must be one thing and its essence another In this way Aquinas provided an answer to the age-old predicament posed by monism Things do differ in their being because there are different kinds... conjoined with potency is limited, such as is found in contingent beings (which exist but have the possibility not to exist) Further, in order to differ, one being would have to lack some characteristic that the other one had But any being that lacked some characteristic of existence would not be an unlimited perfect existence In other words, two infinite Beings cannot differ in their potentiality, since... be,” but “what kind of being?” For Thomas Aquinas things differ from one another by the kind of being or actuality they are Being is not predicated of things univocally, for then all would be one Nor is it predicated of things equivocally,9 for then all would be totally different and isolated Rather, being is predicated of things analogically—each essence has being in its own distinct way and is related . kinds of beings, namely, composed beings. Beings can differ in their very being because there can be different kinds of beings (Aquinas, ST, la.4.1, 3). God, for example, is an infinite kind. being is analogous (see chapter 9), being understood in similar but different ways. All beings are the same in that they are all actual; however, finite beings differ from an infinite Being in. evangelical theology must defend philosophical (or ontological) pluralism against monism. Since theism affirms there is at least one finite being that exists along with only one infinite Being, it