The PNG Way? Why are the recommendations and findings of the three main anti-corruption institutions unenforceable? Why does the political system get away with it? As this next section elucidates, the subversion of traditional culture by political leaders is to blame for this “unexpected” outcome. Yet only a restatement of (modernly interpreted) traditional culture, not its annihilation, offers a work- able and sustainable response to these outcomes. Although the PNG public sector has clear rules and standards for behav- ior, public officials face competing demands from kinship groups to share the benefits and wealth that are under their control. 25 Indeed, many Papua New Guinean leaders advance culture or tradition (specifically, its modern interpretations) as a justification for corrupt behavior.An obvious solution to this apparent conflict between ethical behavior and custom is to legalize cul- turally acceptable practices and remove or reduce opportunities for officials to exercise discretionary authority. 26 At the same time, however,the authors of this chapter suggest that such an undertaking must be done in a way that recognizes and draws on traditional concepts or symbols such as sharing, transparency, community assets, wan- tok, and big men.At the national level, one could identify and strengthen cul- turally sensitive checks and balances that are able to replicate what, in the past, occurred at the local level in PNG: control over the behavior of leaders. Otherwise, those within kinship networks will quickly find ways to get around the rules by connecting officials whose sole authority has been removed, but who can regain power by an elaborate system of exchange with others. The ineffectiveness of more than thirty constitutional reforms in the last thirty years is testimony to Western institutions’ lack of legitimacy in the eyes of tra- ditional society. Simply stated, these institutions are not embedded in PNG society, as they have failed to find a place in the cultural framework in which this society operates. The traditional Melanesian big man managed community assets and made decisions in consultation with elders. He bestowed pigs and feasts to members of his community and exchanged gifts of shells with others in his kinship network. Because he lived in the community, his assets were fairly transpar- ent and he was trusted. This was not, of course, a flawless system, as oppor- tunities were plenty for big men to exploit the power delegated to them. But they were trustees more than authoritative leaders, and the power could be taken back. 27 In general, they took care not to accumulate excessive wealth or otherwise abuse their power, at the risk of being driven out or shamed before 246 Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 246 the community in which they lived. The big man would participate in rituals of gift giving and exchange with his wantok or kin around him. In the absence of modern state institutions, the stability of the wantok required husbandry by big men and, in turn, the welfare of big men depended on their ability to cement the stability of their wantok. Today, the wantok and big men traditions manifest themselves in PNG’s political arena as a system by which elected leaders and bureaucrats use pub- lic office as an opportunity to accumulate wealth and therefore status, and by which these officials’ wantoks expect the spoils of office to confer direct ben- efits. There are important regional differences; abuse of the system for per- sonal gain is more culturally acceptable in the Highlands and less so in the Sepik region, for example, where anyone who has wealth is suspect. In any case, framing their power in culturally acceptable terms such as feasts and exchanges may lend legitimacy to contemporary leaders who seek to aug- ment their power by wealth, patronage, and an electoral support base. Yet, unlike in the villages where the system of governance had as a coun- terpart some checks and balances—above all, the close scrutiny of a local big man’s actions by his wantok—today there seem to be few constraints for national big men. Such leaders are living far from the direct scrutiny of a vil- lage, in Port Moresby, but can use important state resources to sustain their positions in their villages. Corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement, in general, are likely consequences of this imbalance. The Big Man Big men are leaders in the political units that they represent. In traditional PNG society, big man status was gained through inheritance (pre-colonial) or earned from deeds (colonial). To be a big man in the past century in the PNG Highlands, for example, one had to have a lot of wealth, in the form of pigs, land, and wives. This system meant that men had to work hard to produce their wealth, to gain people’s trust, and the favor of would-be wives and their families. There are anecdotal accounts of corruption where a big man took a pig or another item of value from a community member and never paid the per- son back. But this was not common as political units were small, and what a big man did was seen and heard by others in the village. 28 The big man status was treasured, and given the likelihood and consequences of being caught, one did not risk ruining one’s reputation or being socially punished by other means. In contrast, today the big man’s status is often achieved through attainment of elected office, education, money, or other modern, material indicators that are in some cases inherited, but more often than not require entrepreneurship Combating Corruption in Papua New Guinea 247 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 247 in the private or public sectors. In the Highlands tradition, if a man is wealth- ier than others around him, he claims to be a big man. But if he is well- educated and has a good job, these factors also make him a big man. Getting recognized as a big man in one’s social base has driven people to go out of their way to accumulate as much wealth as possible to attain such status. 29 Increas- ingly, as PNG grows nationally integrated, the state has provided opportuni- ties for gaining not only political power but wealth to a degree that largely exceeds that which was previously achievable at the local level. Yet, there is nothing in this national arena to control this behavior, and both the likelihood of being caught and consequences for exploiting one’s power are not great. In the electoral arena, in particular, big man status allows politicians, par- ticularly members of parliament in many provinces, to act essentially unchecked by any national level counterpart. The tradition of wantok provides these politicians with a paralegal network through which they can control their districts (through block voting), and the wantok legitimizes, so to speak, behavior that ultimately diminishes the power and relevance of other tradi- tional institutions. Most district-level institutions and resources are controlled by members of parliament, either directly or indirectly. As a result, members of parliament are expected to represent their constituents, yet their discre- tionary funds are typically not directed to provincial administrations or con- stituents in general, but rather to smaller groups: the members’ wantoks. The Wantok System Although corruption in PNG is similar to corruption in other developing countries with weak states, one might consider the Melanesian wantok system that underlies corruption in PNG to be distinct at the turn of the twenty-first century. Wantok literally means “one talk” or speaking the same language. In practice it refers to tight, reciprocal social networks or what anthropologists call segmentary societies. Segmentary societies have been universal in human history, and are still a strong, stable form of social organization. 30 The larger linguistic groups in PNG have a number of distinct wantok sys- tems within them. 31 The wantok system that existed before modernization and democratic rule is seen today as having helped family relationships pros- per, and as having assisted those in need. Wantok, in short, was a kinship- based, safety-net system that provided traditional people with a sense of iden- tity that predated (and likely still overshadows) any other supra-identity. The concept of wantok has gone beyond its traditional boundaries. Partic- ularly in urban or transnational settings, a wantok may also be a multi- linguistic, multi-ethnic social or professional network. With the modernization 248 Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 248 and nationalization of politics in PNG came the growth of the public sector and capital, and new leaders, as well as their wantoks, quickly exploited the sys- tem to facilitate corruption, especially through nepotism and political patron- age. If a person knows someone who is in a position to influence the hiring and firing of individuals in an organization, it is an opportunity for an unqualified person to be hired, while a qualified person can be fired. Wan- tokism also facilitates the efficient block-purchase of votes and complicity in procurement and public works kickback schemes. Of course, wantokism, as it has been illustrated thus far, is not different from informal networks elsewhere in the world. The difference in PNG, though, lies in the sanctification of these networks’ activities under the veil of tradition, without the existence of any culturally valid mechanism to reveal the trick or to punish the resulting unethical behavior. Traditionally, wantokism was rooted in custom, guided by natural laws, and informally enforced by the village. Principles such as honesty, loyalty, trust, kindness, and helping people in need were at the center of this custom. Wantok was a means to ensure that custom was fulfilled and enforced. In other words, wantokism was an operationalization of custom. Even today, for example, when paying a “bride price” in the village, the bride’s wantok reim- burses the groom’s family for half the cost. In 2009, one sees practices such as nepotism, cronyism, misuse of public facilities, widespread abuse of power, misuse of public properties, and negli- gence of duties and responsibilities being excused under the rubric of custom. In court, although pleas of “custom”are not accepted as a justification for cor- rupt acts themselves, custom is accepted in certain cases as a mitigating fac- tor when the judge hands down a sentence. 32 By appropriating the definition of wantokism to serve their ends, national policymakers have not only undermined the performance of the state—to the extent that some observers are concerned that PNG may be a failed state—but are subverting traditional forms of doing politics at the local level as well. 33 The consequence of the perversion of the big man and wantok traditions are the purchase of voting blocks, the centralization of all districts’ decisions in the hands of a few, nationally controlled cronies, and the slow, but relentless, ero- sion of traditional forms of authority by cash-plenty national politicians. Social Accountability Standard mechanisms of horizontal accountability—an intrastate system of checks and balances—do not effectively control political power in PNG. Combating Corruption in Papua New Guinea 249 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 249 Likewise, the vertical accountability mechanism of elections has not proven to be effective in PNG. 34 A solution to this absence of accountability is col- lective action by citizens to hold the government accountable for enforcing the laws as well as improving public sector performance. 35 In this chapter, the authors argue that there is a need, if PNG is to improve accountability, to develop social-control mechanisms. Although the wantok system has created strong social capital, one might say that it has discouraged collective action. 36 Social control would not only serve to sanction politicians and bureaucrats, it also has the potential to activate and give teeth to the inef- fective horizontal mechanisms such as the judiciary or parliamentary com- missions. 37 For example, citizen score cards or participatory tracking and monitoring systems could serve to enhance government performance. This could also build public confidence, which could enhance the institutions’ credibility, and in turn, its effectiveness. Above all, the authors of this chapter see a role for social accountability to remedy the lack of an effective, legitimate, and therefore enforceable check on corruption at the national level. With a parliament that is dominated by the executive, who can check the prime minister? And who can check members of parliament, some of whom have achieved an impressive 100 percent non- compliance with financial reporting regulations in 2007, but still managed to get another year of slush funds at a higher amount in 2008? To the extent that there are, as of early 2009, effective anti-corruption mechanisms in place, they are only at the local or provincial levels. Take, for example, village courts and alternative dispute mechanisms. If one bears in mind that these institutions may be subject to the same problems that plague other institutions in PNG, then these courts should be better resourced, devel- oped, and expanded so that they can be more effective. But two critical points come out of this example. First, the community-based courts and other local mechanisms are not equipped to control the member of parliament who is their provincial governor, the member of parliament who represents the dif- ferent districts within each province, or the member of parliament from another province whose semi-private graft reduces the pool of resources that should be available to all provinces. Second, the underfunding of informal and formal subnational institutions has been exacerbated by the profound 1995 so-called “indigenous”reform that caused a power shift from the subnational to national government. 38 Although the village courts faced challenges prior to the reform, the reform effectively dried up funding and other resources to provinces, which explains why village courts were significantly constrained until funding began to increase in 2005. 39 250 Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 250 To revive the village courts, one must address the underlying national–sub- national dynamics that squeezed the courts in the first place. Indeed, the trend is toward continuing the centralization of power and funds. In 2008, parliament voted to increase the amount of discretionary funds (so-called slush funds) allocated each year to each member of parlia- ment. The equivalent in the United States would be for members of the House of Representatives to control, collectively, more than 10 percent of the national budget, with each representative receiving the same amount of money, irre- spective of the needs of the district that he or she represents. Furthermore, while the idea in PNG is for the member of parliament to use those funds to benefit his or her constituents, in effect few members of par- liament use them to contribute to province-wide expenditures, concentrating instead on cementing their power in the district that they represent. This focus on the local district is a catch-22 in that members of parliament argue that the funds should be under their control because provincial administra- tions are not capable of handling them, but the very lack of funds leaves these administrations without the resources to offer reasonable compensation, build capacity, and provide needed services. Anti-Corruption Reform Efforts As of 2009, anti-corruption reform is afoot in PNG, but policies and action plans have yet to address the underlying power structures that perpetuate the status quo, in this case, corruption. Anti-corruption advocates have reviewed PNG’s integrity pillars and are familiarizing themselves with a lengthy menu of international practices through workshops and meetings. 40 Discussions favor a holistic and coordinated inter-agency approach to strengthening these existing pillars. At a 2008 round-table discussion with a handful of elected leaders that are interested in fighting corruption, the sentiment was that leaders create or per- vert the systems. 41 As the government’s leaders pointed out, good leadership makes a difference, as seen in the province of Madang. And as the opposition leaders noted, bad leadership aggravates corruption, as seen in Southern Highlands province. According to both sides, the solution requires better and more moral leadership, and enforcement of existing (Western) laws, without much consideration for changing the underlying incentives for corruption. Several key documents have emerged. One such document is the draft anti-corruption strategy for 2007–2012, developed by the current director of NACA while he was working within the prime minister’s office. This strategy Combating Corruption in Papua New Guinea 251 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 251 prioritizes political, legislative, and administrative reforms. Another docu- ment is the National Law and Justice Policy and Plan of Action, which has been implemented as of late 2008. This policy plan “recognizes the limitations of the state institutions and promotes the expansion of crime prevention and restorative justice approaches based upon the culture and traditions of PNG communities. It promotes initiatives such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution, village courts, and crime prevention strategies.” 42 Along these lines, a new bill on community courts has been drafted. 43 A third key document that is being followed up on by the Fraud Squad is the result of a 2005 review by the Justice Advisory Group for the law and justice sector’s National Coordinating Mechanism. This report’s overarching recom- mendation is to implement a national plan of reform. Similar to the plan of action above, this reform plan suggests strengthening village courts and pro- viding support to existing civil society groups that advocate against corruption. In other sectors, anti-corruption reforms have been attempted but not institutionalized. For example, there was a much-praised anti-corruption reform in the fishery sector. However, a 2008 audit by a Big Four accounting firm illustrates that this reform has not been sustained over time. Historical experience suggests that while change is possible in PNG at the sectoral level, reforms risk being undermined when information on their performance and compliance is not readily available to the public. As is argued in the next sec- tion, institutionalization of reform in PNG fundamentally requires the devel- opment of a “thick” civil society able to inform, monitor, and challenge the government when necessary. The Power of Civil Society Social control can enable civil society and the media to hold governments accountable by making multiple demands of the rule of law and due processes. Strengthening civil society has become a common mantra for those eager to see governments held accountable in developing countries. Not sur- prisingly, the 2005 Justice Advisory Group Report in PNG emphasized the need to support civil society organizations that are fighting corruption. Like- wise, the Australian aid agency, which provides and monitors close to one quarter of PNG’s national budget, recognizes its importance in the fight against corruption and provides significant funding to various civil society initiatives in PNG, including those that do research and raise awareness. External aid has primarily supported existing organizations by providing funds for civic education, advocacy campaigns, or public awareness-raising. But in addition to being informed, citizens need to actively participate in 252 Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 252 public decision-making and demand services from the government. 44 Strengthening the political clout of the poor in civil society has the potential to make reforms more effective. 45 Moreover, the authors of this chapter argue that the state, the private sec- tor, as well as donors and likeminded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may explicitly facilitate the “thickening” of civil society. This action includes, but is more than, building leadership or other capacities of estab- lished NGOs in the governance sector. To do so requires policies and programs that create incentives for leaders and systematically remove obstacles to the establishment and growth of a wide variety of sustainable organizations that can complement and perhaps compete with the predominantly Port Moresby– based NGOs. In a country with an estimated 57 percent adult literacy rate and only 55 percent of children enrolled in primary school, where an entire generation in the autonomous province of Bougainville has been left out of school alto- gether, a critical building block to an informed and engaged civil society is long-term investment in formal and informal education. 46 Such investment must encompass strategies that build a common language and social link- ages across and beyond wantoks, promote citizens who are more critical and informed consumers, and enable communities directly to engage in govern- ment processes and advocate for themselves. Simultaneously, the development of civil society requires the explicit facil- itation of the growth and proliferation of organized groups: grassroots women’s groups, faith-based groups, self-help groups, lending and savings groups, umbrella groups, and others that bring people together with a com- mon purpose. National NGOs have proven to be a critical actor in generating debate, communicating information to citizens, serving as watchdogs, encour- aging citizens to bring legal claims or complaints against the state, and draft- ing legislative proposals. But at the provincial and grassroots levels, there is also a need for community-based organizations to coordinate and present claims against the state and obtain feedback from citizens on more local issues. PNG’s Transparency International chapter (TI–PNG), the Institute for National Affairs, and the Media Council are perhaps the most communicative and developed organizations that are contributing to the fight against cor- ruption, and more broadly, bringing about better governance. 47 These organ- izations certainly deserve further support. TI–PNG has set up a network of community groups across the country that effectively disseminate informa- tion through the media. TI–PNG has also proposed an initiative to provide low-cost cell phones to rural teachers so that they can easily report what is Combating Corruption in Papua New Guinea 253 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 253 happening at the local level to journalists, government, and non-profit watch- dogs. Given the significant challenges of linking people in this country who speak more than 800 distinct languages, greater access to low-cost communi- cation would significantly facilitate citizen access to information and their ability to organize and demand better governance. Civil society need not be organized directly around only anti-corruption efforts for it to have an impact on corruption. For example, church groups are common throughout PNG, and the National Council of Churches’ organiz- ing framework for these groups includes not only spiritual activities but also community, social, and economic activities. The council has found that women who are hesitant to take leave from family duties to organize collec- tively do come together for bible study and then find the capacity, within this group, to discuss domestic violence or HIV/AIDS. In time these discussions, with a church leader’s support, could encourage members to seek information and access to government services and share information with their commu- nity about this access and the government’s performance. As the experiences of Latin America (and particularly of Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s) illustrate, the pressure of these small groups is often necessary, if not sufficient, for the liberalization of a political arena that was previously dominated by less-than-democratic governments. 48 In addition to faith-based groups, the environmental movement is fairly active in PNG. Some organizations have made a direct connection between environmental issues and corruption. For example, the Environmental Law Centre facilitates rural landowners’ legal claims and also galvanizes support for national anti-corruption reforms. One organization’s involvement in a neighborhood campaign to increase safety in a Port Moresby slum could lead to a drive to register children for school and could activate group mem- bers to decide to take literacy classes or to be more engaged in the govern- mental processes around them. 49 At the very least, this engagement would be likely to provide mechanisms of social accountability, and thus would allow individual citizens or members of organized civil society to participate in monitoring, budgeting, or other activities from which they were previously alienated. Many of these “thousand flowers” could (or would wish to) make a differ- ence in corruption. More likely than not, citizens, acting individually, would produce inefficient mechanisms for promoting better service delivery. Nev- ertheless, citizens’ collective presence would facilitate collective action, and thus provide what PNG is in 2009 painfully lacking: an entity able effectively to contest the government’s otherwise unilateral policy imposition. 254 Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 254 Conclusion The post-colonial system of democratic governance has eroded the strength of pre-colonial and colonial “traditional” systems of control over those in power. Yet, at the same time, it has given contemporary leaders new forms and arenas of power to exploit, and more resources to embed these leaders in the new system, without the parallel development of culturally accepted checks. Some examples of traditional checks on governors were credible threats to violators and use of shaming or even sorcery, such as casting spells on trans- gressors who believed in these spells’ powers. While such checks would have contained the scale and incidence of bad governance at the local level in the past, with the modernization and nationalization of PNG politics, these mechanisms have been unable to cope with the influx of wealth, urban migration, and evan- gelism. There is nobody at the national level, other than transplanted and poorly integrated Western institutions, to control the behavior of the powerful. This constraint-free environment has allowed big men the discretion not only to act as uncontested predators at the national level, but it has provided these men with resources to weaken traditional checks and balances at the local level as well. Examples of such modifications are the 1995 reform that shifted power from provinces to the center, and effectively debilitated local administration and village courts, with only a few exceptions; current efforts to meddle with local elections; and the attempts to abolish provincial gov- ernment altogether. If corruption is to be controlled, new control mechanisms are needed that are able to confront the leaders and force them to operate within socially acceptable and beneficial boundaries. Yet, such reform requires, paradoxi- cally, re-casting existing national institutions in terms that are acceptable to the 800-plus traditional societies within PNG. Such a reform also requires the expansion of contextually derived, social accountability mechanisms, along with other checks, that function nationally and subnationally in the way that other controlling features did in previous periods, at the village level. An unexploited feedback mechanism exists between the needs of a tradi- tional society that is at risk of being defined, at the village level, by the will of national big men, and the needs of national formal institutions that are attempting to gain legitimacy and popular support to limit what is, as of 2009, an unconstrained executive. To take advantage of this feedback mechanism, these institutions need to do, with modern, formal means, what traditional institutions informally attempted: control the behavior of big men who, unconstrained, would otherwise tear apart the fabric of society. Combating Corruption in Papua New Guinea 255 09 0328-0 ch9.qxd 7/15/09 3:49 PM Page 255 [...]... 2007), 51– 96 56 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, sec 15, schedule 2 (Part I), item 60 57 National Political Reform Conference (NPRC), Report of the Anti-Corruption Reforms Committee (Abuja, 2005), 41–42, 46, 60 58 ICPC, Progress Report, 120 59 Ibid., 50 60 Osita Nwajah,“Economic and Financial Crimes Commission: Frequently Asked Questions,” The Guardian (18 September 2007), 17 61 “The... score improved from 1 .6 in 1999 to 2.7 in 2008 Its ranking on the index also improved from 98th out of 99 countries in 1999 to 121st out of 180 in 2008 Similarly, Nigeria’s overall global public integrity index improved from “weak” in 2004 to “moderate” in 20 06 See Transparency International, CPI reports, 19 96 2008, available at www.transparency.org (accessed 26 January 2009); Global Integrity, “Nigeria,”... December 20 06) , available at http://ngrguardainnews.com (accessed 4 September 2008) 15 Lilian Ekeanyanwu, Shina Loremikan, and John Ikubaje, National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report Nigeria 2004 (Berlin, 2004), 16 16 See Akanimo Sampson, “Halliburton: How Government Officials Were Bribed With $182m,” The Nation (6 September 2008), available at www.thenationonlineng com (accessed 6 September... (21 November 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7105582.stm (accessed 6 September 2008); Musikilu Mojeed, “Why We Re-engaged Siemens-FG,” Punch (22 August 2008), available at www.punchng.com (accessed 22 August 2008) 17 See Global Integrity 20 06 Country Report Nigeria (Washington, D.C., 20 06) , 6 18 Ibid 19 Anza Philips, “The Other Side of Abuja Land Grab Story,” Newswatch (12 May... Nation (18 May 2008), available at www.thenationonlineng.com (accessed 18 May 2008) 22 Global Integrity 20 06, 4–5 23 Ibid., 5 24 “Nigeria Speaker Goes in Graft Row,” BBC News (30 October 2007), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7 069 654.stm (accessed 21 September 2008) 25 Oko, “Subverting the Scourge,” 471–472 26 See Godwin Ijediogor, “Farida Waziri: Challenge of Sustaining Anti-Graft Momentum,”... Political Will,” in Global Corruption Report 2007 (New York, 2007), 263 – 266 24 See Albert Ayius and Ronald May (eds.), Corruption in Papua New Guinea: Towards an Understanding of Issues (Port Moresby, 2007) Also see Henry Okole and David Kavanamur, “Political Corruption in Papua New Guinea: Some Causes and Policy Lessons,” South Pacific Journal of Philosophy and Culture, VII (2003), 7– 36; Justice Sector... salary and allowances worth $3 76, 000, which “w[ere] nearly half the total amount allocated for the wages and allowances of Khana’s 325 health-sector workers”; the allocation in 20 06 to the chair of Tai’s local government of a security vote of $300,000, which exceeded the council’s total capital budgets for either health or education; and the illegal awarding during 2005–20 06 by the chairman of Opobo Nkoro’s... www.newswatchngr.com/editorial/allaccess/special/10311115157.htm (accessed 21 September 2008) 32 Senan Murray, “Fears Over Nigeria Emergency Rule,” BBC News (19 October 20 06) , available at htttp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/Africa /60 657 06. stm (accessed 11 September 2008) 33 Dayo Aiyetan, “Allegations of Corruption Against Ex-Governor James Ibori,” Tell (23 November 2007), available at www.waado.org/nigerdelta/delta_state_govt/... evidences of graft and financial misappropriations 46 Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine, 32, 36, 56 47 Oscarline Onwuemenyi, “Tackling Corruption in Local Councils,” Punch (31 August 2008), available at www.punchng.com (accessed 31 August 2008) 48 Ibid 49 Larry Diamond, “Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic,” African Affairs, LXXXVI (1987), 2 16 50 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission... (Port Moresby, 2007), 27–38 6 This conflict is discussed in Sinclair Dinnen, Law & Order in a Weak State: Crime and Politics in Papua New Guinea (Honolulu, 2001) 7 See Global Integrity Report at http://report.globalintegrity.org/Papua %20New%20Guinea/2007/scorecard (accessed 15 January 2009) 8 Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership [Papua New Guinea] ( 16 September 1975), available . International,“Judicial Reform in PNG in Need of Political Will,” in Global Corruption Report 2007 (New York, 2007), 263 – 266 . 24. See Albert Ayius and Ronald May (eds.), Corruption in Papua New. earnings, have been stolen 264 Rotimi T. Suberu 10 0328-0 ch10.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 264 from the country’s coffers since 1 960 . 13 This amount includes the estimated $3 .6 billion that General Sani. Anti-Corruption Crusade 261 10 0328-0 ch10.qxd 7/15/09 3:50 PM Page 261 The Evolution of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Institutions When it obtained its independence from Britain in 1 960 , Nigeria inherited British