47. IMF, Country Report No. 07/258 (Washington, D.C., 2007), 5, 20. 48. Michel Cahen, “Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique,” in Einar Braathen, Morten Bøås, and Gjermund Sæther (eds.), Ethnicity Kills? The Poli- tics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa (New York, 2000), 163–187; David Stavasage, “Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Mozambique in Transi- tion,”in Alan Doig and Robin Theobald (eds.), Corruption and Democratisation (Port- land, 2000), 65–97, 65–66. 49. Stavasage, “Causes and Consequences,” 70–75. See also Marcelo Mosse, Cor- ruption and Reform in the Customs in Mozambique (Vancouver, 2007), available at www.tiri.org/images/stories/NIR%20Countries%20%20Researches/Mozambique/ Mozambique%20Customs%20Case%20Study.pdf (accessed 30 September 2008). 50. Nuvunga and Mosse, Reconstruction, 22–23. 51. Ibid., 24, 33–81. 52. Jael Humphrey researched this section, including interviews in December 2007 and January 2008. International Crisis Group, “Burundi: Finalising Peace With the FNL,” Africa Report 131 (Brussels, 2007). 53. Romana Schweiger,“Late Justice for Burundi,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, LV (2006), 653, 654; Matthias Goldmann,“Does Peace Follow Justice or Vice Versa? Plans for Postconflict Justice in Burundi,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, XXX (2006), 137; Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa, and Burundi (Cape Town, 2005), 32–43. 54. Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition After a Decade Of War?” African Affairs, CV (2006), 117–135. 55. United States Institute for Peace,“Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi,” Protocol II, Article 10 (2000), available at www.usip.org/library/pa/ burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_pr2ch1.html (accessed 30 September 2008). 56. Interview between Jael Humphrey and Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, founding president, Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (APRODH), in Bujumbura, Burundi (18 December 2007); Inter- view between Jael Humphrey and five of the twelve members of the executive com- mittee including Gabriel Rufyiri, president, Observatoire de Lutte Contre la Corrup- tion el les Malversation Economique (OLUCOME), in Bujumbura, Burundi (18 December 2007). 57. Interview between Jael Humphrey and Terrance Nahimana, president, Cercle d’initiative pour une vision commune (CIVIC), in Bujumbura, Burundi (18 Decem- ber 2007). 58. OLUCOME interview (18 December 2007). 59. International Alert Gradis, Le Phénomène de la Corruption au Burundi: Revolte Silencieuse et Resignation (Bujumbura, 2007), 26. 60. Not all Tutsi shared equally. A group of Tutsi from one clan maintained a vir- tual monopoly over military and political power. International Crisis Group, “A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi,” Africa Report 57 (Brussels, 2003), 6. Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict 93 04 0328-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3:46 PM Page 93 61. Janvier D. Nkurunziza and Floribert Ngaruko, “Why Has Burundi Grown So Slowly? The Political Economy of Redistribution,” in J. Ndulu Benno and others (eds.), The Political Economy, 51–85. 62. Bentley and Southall, An African Peace Process, 179–180. 63. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko,“Why Has Burundi Grown So Slowly?”75. Interview between Jael Humphrey and a senior UN Human Rights official, in Bujumbura, Burundi (21 December 2007). 64. OLUCOME interview (18 December 2007). 65. UN Human Rights official interview (21 December 2007). 66. Nahimana interview (18 December 2007). 67. USAID, Fighting Corruption and Restoring Accountability in Burundi (Arling- ton, 2006), 3. 68. Bentley and Southall, An African Peace Process, 50. 69. Ibid., 7, quoting Rubin Lund and Hara Lund,“Learning from Burundi’s Failed Democratic Transition, 1993–1996,”in Council on Foreign Relations (ed.), Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action (Washington, D.C., 1998), 68, 80. 70. Bentley and Southall, An African Peace Process, 82, 116. 71. International Alert Gradis, Le Phénomène, 7, 26. 72. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi 2006 (Washington, D.C., 2007) [hereinafter Burundi], available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78722.htm (accessed 30 September 2008). 73. The minister of good governance, the highest official in charge of combating corruption, has changed twice this year. Ndayimirije and UN Human Rights official interviews (21 December 2007). 74. Ndayimirije interview (18 December 2007). 75. Ibid. 76. Gabriel Rufyiri, president of OLUCOME, was detained for four months in 2006 on defamation charges after he denounced government corruption. He was eventually released and acquitted (U. S. Department of State, Burundi). 77. Ndayimirije interview (18 December 2007). 78. Michael Masabo, Country Review of Legal and Practical Challenges to the Domes- tication of the Anti-Corruption Conventions in Burundi (Bujumbura, 2006). 79. This section was informed by research help from Dastid Pallaska, Yale Univer- sity Law School. More details are in Rose-Ackerman “Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building,” 428–439. 80. Richard Sannerholm, “Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post- Conflict Situations: Beyond the Rule of Law Template,” Journal of Conflict and Secu- rity Law, XII (2007), 65–94, 70–71. 81. Comprehensive Plan for the Kosovo Status Settlement S/2007/168/Add, avail- able at www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf (accessed 30 September 2008), 52–60. 94 Susan Rose-Ackerman 04 0328-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3:46 PM Page 94 82. United Nations Development Programme, “Kosovo Early Warning Report 17, April–June 2007” (New York, 2007), 30. 83. Ibid. 84. The American Bar Association (ABA) Rule of Law Initiative, The Legal Profes- sion Reform Index for Kosovo (Washington, D.C., 2007), 3–8. 85. European Agency for Reconstruction “From Reconstruction to Reform, Euro- pean Commission Support to the Energy Sector” (2006), available at www.ear. europa.eu/sectors/main/sec-energy.htm (accessed 30 September 2008). 86. In 2003, one of KEK’s top managers, a UN-appointed official, was convicted in his native Germany of misappropriating €3.9 million from the KEK budget. Kosovar Stability Initiative,“Reconstruction Survey” (Prishtinë, 2007), 31. 87. ABA Rule of Law Initiative, The Legal Profession Reform Index, 3; UNMIK Reg- ulations 2005/52, “On the Establishment of the Kosovo Judicial Council” (New York, 2005); UNMIK Administrative Instruction 2006/18,“Implementing UNMIK Regula- tion 2006/25 on a Regulatory Framework for the Justice System in Kosovo” (New York, 2006); Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex IV Justice System, Article 3. Administrative Direction 2006/15 “On the Establishment of the Kosovo Special Prosecutors Office” (New York, 2006); U.S. Department of State, 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Kosovo (Washington, D.C., 2007), avail- able at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78837.htm (accessed 30 September 2008). 88. Mentor Borovci,“Challenges to Implementation of Anti-Corruption Activities in Kosovo: Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency” (powerpoint presentation), available at http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/parac/show/2785BD56-F203-1EE9-B79AD DA8D8DE4B1D (accessed 30 September 2008). 89. The planned transfer is being delayed by Russian and Serbian objections in the UN. “Kosovo’s Future: Divided Rule,” Economist (29 May 2008), 55. On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a Declaration of Independence. Countries that have recognized Kosovo’s declaration are available at www.kosovothanksyou.com (accessed 30 September 2008). 90. Madalene O’Donnell,“Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda,” in Agnès Hurwitz and Reyko Huang (eds.), Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development, Human Rights (Boulder, 2006), 225–260. 91. Ibid. 92. Mick Moore,“Death without Taxes: Democracy,State Capacity and Aid Depen- dence in the Fourth World,”in Mark Robinson and Gordon Whites (eds.), The Demo- cratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design (New York, 1998), 84–121. 93. Lorenzo Delesgues and Yama Torabi, Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey Afghanistan 2007 (Tiri, 2007), 17. 94. O’Donnell,“Corruption,” 249. 95. Le Billon,“Buying Peace or Fueling War,”423. Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict 95 04 0328-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3:46 PM Page 95 96 On 23 April 2008, United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey offered a stark and foreboding assessment of the rising threat from interna- tional organized crime, asserting that the new global criminals are “more sophisticated, they are richer, they have greater influence over government and political institutions worldwide . . . and [they] are far more involved in our everyday lives than many people appreciate [Consequently],we can’t ignore criminal syndicates in other countries on the naïve assumption that they are a danger only in their homeland, whether it is located in Eurasia, Africa, or anywhere else.” 1 Mukasey’s troubling portents echo a growing chorus of prognostications regarding the unprecedented (and transnational) dangers associated with criminality today. 2 But, how fundamentally new and different is “organized crime”in today’s increasingly globalized world? 3 How extensive are the osten- sibly expanding links between international organized crime and domestic, state-based corruption? How significant a threat do such links pose, and under what conditions? Finally, why—since, as the conventional wisdom suggests, corruption and criminality are most likely to thrive where governance is weak- est—are the majority of the world’s significant transnational criminal net- works actually based in more highly functioning states? Even today, the connections between international criminal organizations, and between them and their host governments, in the post–Cold War period remain poorly understood. A decade and a half ago Williams suggested that 5 Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the Marriage of Politics and Illicit Profits kelly m. greenhill The author thanks Peter Andreas, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corbin Lyday, Ben Oppenheim, Robert Rotberg, and participants at a pair of workshops, sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter. The author also thanks Jarrod Niebloom for research assistance. 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 96 the difficulties facing analysts were two-fold. First, there were little reliable data upon which to draw. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the rele- vant connections and relationships were developing and mutating so rapidly that they were outstripping observers’ abilities to identify and explain them. Second, there were few extant models upon which to draw in conceptualizing the nature of these illicit linkages. 4 This chapter does not claim to have solved the data problem. 5 However, by drawing upon a cross-national sample of scholars’ and practitioners’ insights and observations regarding the world’s most significant transnational criminal organizations and their domestic and international alliances, this theory-building chapter offers a new model that aims to sharpen our understanding of the nature of the aforementioned con- nections and their implications. 6 Specifically, this chapter posits that the available, albeit case-specific, evi- dence suggests that the nature of the changes we have witnessed in the post–Cold War world are more quantitative than qualitative. In the aggregate, the problem of international organized crime (and associated corruption) is likely bigger and more threatening. But the nature of international organized crime is not fundamentally new or different. 7 Moreover, while the links between transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and corruption are real and substantial, their effects across countries are highly variable, both in degree and in consequence. In the most egregious cases, the relationships between criminals and corrupt officials may assume an advanced form of what this author terms “kleptocratic interdependence”—namely, a set of profit- and power-driven, self-reinforcing domestic and international rela- tionships between criminal groups and government officials. In its most basic form, criminals provide financial succor to receptive (would-be) political leaders, who, once in power, in turn strive to protect those providing their largesse. These activities concomitantly serve to strengthen and enrich both the criminals and the corrupt politicians, helping them to consolidate their power while heightening their mutual dependency. 8 In more advanced forms, TCOs may actually share the functions of sovereignty with the state. It is these relationships and their consequences upon which this chapter focuses. These symbiotic and strategic interrelationships are likewise not new. How- ever,in our new so-called “flattened”world, they unfortunately provide TCOs with novel economic and political opportunities to exploit as well as with a prominence that allows them to threaten both national and international security in myriad ways. 9 Again, this is not to say that the threat that TCOs pose, and, by extension, what is needed to combat them, is novel or unique. This statement may strike an informed reader as self-evident. Yet it is a point worth reiterating because there is a persistent, if misguided, tendency to treat Kleptocratic Interdependence 97 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 97 transnational crime as a kind of monolithic global conspiracy. Doing so can be “particularly appealing because it suggests—implicitly at least—that a threat to international security may be emerging that is a worthy successor to the challenge posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 10 When this threat is coupled with claims about the “unprecedented dangers” posed by ter- rorism, it can be particularly alluring, if equally misguided. This chapter, therefore, also differentiates between the nature and gravity of the threats that these relationships pose to weak and transitional states and those that they pose to more highly functioning democracies—the headquarters of choice for many prominent international criminal organizations. The Origins of Kleptocratic Interdependence Though organized crime has existed for centuries, the perception that it rep- resents a security threat, and particularly an international threat, is a rela- tively new phenomenon. Instead, organized crime has traditionally been seen as a domestic problem that afflicted a relatively small number of states such as Italy, the United States, and Japan. 11 This recent perceptual shift may be largely attributed to the increased scale and scope of illicit activities perpe- trated by TCOs. TCOs’ growth and expansion are widely argued to be a con- sequence of their successful acquisition of the means and systems historically monopolized by nation-states, but deregulated by globalization, de-territori- alized by the rise of free trade areas in Europe and North America, and democ- ratized by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Broadly defined, TCOs comprise “structured groups that exist for an extended period of time, the members of which act in concert with the aim of earning profits or controlling markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation or corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and in order to infiltrate the legitimate economy.” 12 TCOs can be found in a wide variety of countries and may manifest themselves in myriad disparate guises. 13 From the infamous and rigidly hierarchical Italian and American mafias to lesser-known groups that have arisen in post-Soviet republics and other transitional states, TCOs differ greatly in structure and functionality,as well as in the various economic, political, and social conditions under which they develop. Nevertheless, virtually all tangible objects, commodities, and services in TCO transactions are likely to have significant economic value. 14 Illicit activities commonly attributed to TCOs include the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, illegal weapons transfers, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, vehicle theft and smuggling, organ trafficking, money 98 Kelly M. Greenhill 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 98 laundering, and tax evasion—in short, an array of illegal commercial activi- ties that fall well outside the legitimate economy. 15 Yet TCOs cannot operate in a vacuum, nor can they operate exclusively in the illicit realm. TCOs, particularly those involved in illicit trafficking, require the assistance, or at least the tacit acquiescence, of actors within legitimate governmental and economic systems in order to function effectively and effi- ciently (e.g., to avoid detection of cross-border illicit and illegal flows; to fore- stall arrests and undermine legal cases, when apprehensions do occur; to laun- der profits so that they can be transferred into the licit economy and invested; and to legitimate their activities). Moreover, even that which composes the “illegal market” within a country can materially affect a criminal group’s secu- rity and profitability. 16 Consequently, to minimize risk and simultaneously maximize profit, corruption is an invaluable tool for TCOs. 17 The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for pri- vate gain,” which translates into “charging an illicit price for a service of using the power of office to further illicit aims.” 18 However, public office can be abused for private benefit even if no bribery occurs through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state resources. Regard- less of corruption’s specific nature, it effectively “blurs the line”between states and TCOs. Corruption offers criminal groups the means to penetrate markets with relatively low transaction costs and then to exploit those markets largely unregulated, while presenting public officials with compelling inducements to further TCOs’ illicit aims. 19 Transnational trade- or trafficking-related corruption tends to manifest itself in two distinct forms: 1) as a failure to control illicit trade; and 2) as direct participation in this trade. In its simplest form, a failure to control is a crime of omission, in which state officials neglect to fulfill their supervisory duties. This type of corruption may be found at three different levels of law enforcement: the police or military, the judicial, and the penal. At the police or military level, “consent” is granted to the organization freely to carry out its illicit activities; in some cases, traffickers will pay officials to abandon their borders, posts, and bases. On both the judicial and penal levels, actors are rewarded for downgrading, undermining, or dismissing criminal cases, as well as for forestalling or discouraging legislation and regulation that might interfere with trafficking activities such as the prosecution and punishment of traffickers and those in their employ. Of greater interest in this chapter, however, are the cases of direct partici- pation in corruption. In contrast to crimes of omission, in cases of direct par- ticipation, compromised state officials engage in crimes of commission, Kleptocratic Interdependence 99 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 99 whereby the corrupted both collaborate with, and are intimately tied to, crim- inal organizations. For example, in both Colombia and Tajikistan, govern- ment officials have been closely linked to drug smuggling, in Afghanistan the former anti-corruption chief was imprisoned for heroin distribution. 20 Cor- ruption by direct participation is related to, but not synonymous with, what Green and Ward call “corruption as an organizational goal,” whereby “illicit gain becomes in [and of] itself a goal of a state agency and the pursuit of profit determines the agency’s decisions.” 21 Accordingly, direct participation in corruption is often characterized by the involvement of state officials in some coordinating capacity with TCOs (e.g., officials operate “hand-in-glove” with TCOs and may even hold leadership roles within these organizations). In such situations, corruption will actually tend to determine state goals by shaping the rules or policies that state agencies enact or implement. Some observers employ the term “state capture”to refer to corruption that “rather than purchasing discretionary administrative decisions such as the award of a particular contract, induces legislators or judges to change the legal ‘rules of the game.’” 22 By extension, cases of “total state capture” refer to the “fusion of private or party-owned or associated firms with elements of state structure.” 23 Within the context of the TCO–governmental relationships discussed herein, not only is there a fusion of the public and private, but there is also some measure of fusion between the licit and the illicit. Such situations can be found in both—what Legvold calls elsewhere in this volume—“crim- inal” and “criminalized” states. 24 Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa charac- terized the Mexican political system under the Partido Revolucionario Insti- tucional (PRI), for instance, as “criminal activity [that] occurred because there was no way to stop it or even much desire to do so, at least among the elites, so corrupt practices ensured that criminal activities flourished for those in and out of government.” 25 Corruption by direct participation is of special concern, because public officials compromised in this way maintain a dual ability to control and to direct (quasi-) state institutions and the illegal entities such institutions are the- oretically meant to combat. The ability of those involved in these relationships to maintain and to extend corruption to the rest of the state is much greater. 26 As a parliamentary deputy in Kyrgystan complained: “only the bureaucrats live well—giving no material benefit to the country but keeping tight controls over all state mechanisms.” 27 In the more distant past, James Madison likewise observed,“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” 28 This is not to suggest that corruption by omission is unimportant, only that the 100 Kelly M. Greenhill 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 100 potential scope, if not the scale, of the consequences of such crimes may be more circumscribed than those of commission. 29 Moreover, the perception that corruption by direct participation is perva- sive tends to have the added negative effect of undermining public faith in institutions as well as public willingness to combat corruption. As Neild notes, in the realm of corruption, transparency cuts two ways. “It is helpful if the media and public is critical of corruption and able to call effectively for reform; it is unhelpful if it causes the behavior of a rotten ruler or rulers to be imitated by the people of the country so that corruption and cynicism spreads.” 30 Consider, for instance, the damaging effects of the public cyni- cism associated with the quip, “Don’t steal! The government does not like competition”—which one can find on posters plastered throughout the noto- riously, deeply, and chronically corrupt country of Guatemala. 31 As suggested at the outset, what makes corruption by direct participation particularly problematic is that it can give rise to the phenomenon I call “klep- tocratic interdependence.” In contrast to Godson’s principally, internally focused “political-criminal nexus (PCN),” kleptocratically interdependent relationships may be domestic or international in nature—or both simulta- neously. 32 Kleptocratic interdependence is characterized by four key features: 1) a division of political, functional, and social control between state and non-state actors, i.e., the sharing of some of the sovereignty functions tradi- tionally viewed as residing with the state; 2) a privileging of private gain over public good—although, in cases where states are particularly weak or poorly run, the public may in fact benefit from the existence of such relationships; 3) an absence or dearth of legal and juridical accountability; and 4) some meas- ure of fusion between the licit and illicit economic realms—although what each of these comprise will vary across cases. 33 Such relationships arguably date back at least as far as the golden age of piracy and privateering, when states and sub-state rulers outsourced (domestically and internationally) many of the functions traditionally viewed as residing within the purview of the state, such as the extrajudicial provision of security or military force, in exchange for personal gain. 34 The term kleptocratic interdependence has obvious roots in our under- standing of the nature and conduct of kleptocracies, i.e., governments “char- acterized by rampant greed and corruption,” which privilege the personal wealth and political power of government officials and the ruling class at the expense of the population. 35 However, one might most usefully think of this phenomenon as a malevolent stepchild of Keohane and Nye’s “complex inter- dependence,” which emphasized the significance of the myriad, and growing Kleptocratic Interdependence 101 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 101 number of, complex transnational connections between states and societies. 36 In kleptocratic interdependence, by contrast, the focus is obviously some- what different, although some of the key dynamics are analogous, if far less benign in consequence. One key feature of complex interdependence, for instance, is “the use of multiple channels of action between societies in inter- state, transgovernmental, and transnational relations.” 37 Correspondingly, in kleptocratic interdependence, corrupt officials not only “forge new alliances with traditional ‘thieves-in-law’,” but also, according to Handelman, “co-opt their methods, their organizations, and in some cases their personnel.” 38 Like- wise, in both phenomena, the relative balance of power between the parties to these alliances will shift over time and across issue area. 39 In the most extreme cases, they simply become one—as in cases of state capture or state criminal- ization. As political analyst Piontkovsky noted, it would be misleading to call Russia corrupt. Corruption is what happens “when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today’s Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politi- cians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have privatized the coun- try’s wealth and [have] taken control of its financial flows.” 40 Ultimately, the strength of a criminal group is contingent upon its capac- ity to develop a network of relationships with members of other groups—be they entrepreneurs, politicians, bureaucrats, other criminals, etc. These rela- tionships “may be defined as the chance to obtain illicit advantages in defeat- ing competitors (for example, in the market: securing contracts, and in the political arena: buying votes) and attaining monopoly positions.” 41 The func- tion of the monopoly is to accumulate resources to invest in illicit markets, but also to gain the consent necessary to infiltrate legitimate society. 42 Why do these imperatives often give rise to self-reinforcing, kleptocratically interde- pendent relationships, as opposed to other kinds of alliances, such as tempo- rary marriages of convenience? Why, in other words, in the face of seemingly obvious potential principal-agent problems and incentives to defect, do these relationships arise and then tend to persevere? When and Why Kleptocratic Interdependence Grows and Persists One compelling reason is the straightforward issue of power and what it can buy. Reliable officials in positions of power can be particularly valuable allies of TCOs. Consequently, TCOs have powerful incentives to contribute finan- cial and other support to ensure that their “friends” get elected. Once installed—assuming the relationship is proving beneficial for both parties— TCOs have still more powerful inducements to ensure that their allies remain 102 Kelly M. Greenhill 05 0328-0 ch5.qxd 7/15/09 3:47 PM Page 102 [...]... 'Ndrangheta Neapolitan Camorra; and Sacra Corona Unita of Apulia 33 156 (Warning) (Moderate) Cartels Columbia Mafia Major Group Name PRC; HK; T (Triads) Albania Home Country China a NA 147 36 .86 108 158 (Low) 3. 52 17 (Alert) Nigeria 28 1 43 NAh 106 67 (High) 5.02 Tied at 62 (Warning) Mafia Russia 27 Tied at 64 59.82 57 84 (Medium) 5.70 93 (Warning) the Turks Turkey Table 5-1 Comparative Indicators for... Organized Crime: The Global Reach of an American Concept,” in Adam Edwards and Peter Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security (London, 20 03) , 13 20 In fact, U.S Senator John Kerry was quoted as saying that “organized crime is the new communism, the new monolithic threat,” in R T Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New ‘National Security Threat,” Transnational... Economy of Organized Crime.” 89 See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters; Stewart Patrick, Kleptocratic Interdependence 1 23 “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” Washington Quarterly, XXIX (2006), 27– 53 90 Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats,” 38 39 91 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict, and Instability,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela... Amos Tversky,“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk,” Econometrica, IIIL (1979), 31 3 32 7 50 Green and Ward, State Crime, 13 51 McMillan and Zoido, “How to Subvert Democracy,” 72 52 Elaine Shannon, Desperados, Latin Drug Lords, U.S Lawmakers, and the War America Can’t Win (New York, 1988), 21 53 The United States reportedly also allied with French Corsican gangsters to disrupt Communist... Bureau of Investigation, Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S Senate, ‘Eurasian, Italian, and Balkan Organized Crime’” (30 October 20 03) , available at www.fbi.gov/congress/congress 03/ ashley1 030 03 htm (accessed 5 August 2008); Terry Frieden, “FBI: Albanian mobsters ‘new Mafia,’” CNN.com (18 August 2004), available at www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/18/albanians mob/index.html... tapes, which his former security guard disclosed.” 39 See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence 40 Andrei Piontkovsky, “Putinism: Highest Stage of Robber Capitalism,” Russia Journal, issue 47 (2000) 41 Armao, “Why is Organized Crime So Successful?” 29 42 Ibid 43 See Olson, Power and Prosperity, 1 03 104 44 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security, ” in John Arguilla... Development in Africa: Rule of Law and Protection of the Most Vulnerable (Vienna, 2005) 92 Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats,” 39 93 See also Kimberley Thachuk,“Corruption: The International Security Dimension,” available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Corruption_The_Inter national _Security_ Dimension.html#chuck8 (accessed 4 November 2008) 94 Please contact this author for the list of sources... (Santa Monica, 1997), 33 1 45 Cited in Letizia Paoli, “Broken Bonds: Mafia and Politics in Sicily,” in Godson, ed., Menace to Society, 40 46 Robert J Kelley, “An American Way of Crime and Corruption, in Godson, ed., Menace to Society, 109 47 Robinson, “The Paradox of Liberalization,” 2 48 Somrüdee Nicro, “Thailand’s NIC Democracy: Studying from General Elections,” Pacific Affairs, LXVI (19 93) , 176 49 On the... 1–179; 1 is best j Scores are 1 39 ; 1 is best Bribe Payers Index (2007)j World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” Indexe Infrastructure Index NA (2001)f Corruption Perceptions 104 Index (2007)i UN Human Development Index (2005)d Economist Democracy Index (2007)c 111 PRC Tied (Warning) at 62 (Warning) 5.91 PRC (2.97); HK (6. 03) ; T (7.82) 68 81 (High) (Medium); HK (21-High) 136 83 Failed States Index (2007)b... context Green and Ward, State Crime, 13 Kleptocratic Interdependence 121 57 U.S Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: Democracy at Risk (1996), v, vii, 104–147; John McCullough Martin and Anne T Romano, Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drugs and Arms Trafficking (New York, 1992), 135 58 Cited in Paoli, “Broken Bonds,” 33 59 McMillan and Zoido, “How to . (High) HK (21-High) World Bank’s “Ease of 136 83 66 44 12 53 108 106 57 3 Doing Business”Index e Infrastructure Index NA (PRC) 34 .19; 58.64 NA NA g 52.98 36 .86 NA h 59.82 81.01 (2001) f Others NA Corruption. to Burundi,” Africa Report 57 (Brussels, 20 03) , 6. Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict 93 04 032 8-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3: 46 PM Page 93 61. Janvier D. Nkurunziza and Floribert Ngaruko,. Le Billon,“Buying Peace or Fueling War,”4 23. Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict 95 04 032 8-0 ch4.qxd 7/15/09 3: 46 PM Page 95 96 On 23 April 2008, United States Attorney General