Understandings of corruption that are advanced by academic theorists capture important pieces of the idea of corruption. Public corruption gener- ally involves, in the predominant understandings, the violation of law, the breach of prescribed duties, the subversion of the public interest, and the vio- lation of other broad normative standards. Corruption may also involve—in a more particularized sense—betrayal, secrecy, inequality, and private rent- seeking by public actors. However, as useful as these understandings are, something is missing. All such understandings fail to capture what is the deeply emotive quality and loathsomeness of corruption’s core. Corruption, in its popular conception, is more than the breaking of rules or even self- seeking by public actors to the detriment of others. It is an expressly moral notion that challenges belief in a shared moral fabric. It expresses the trans- gression of some deeply held and asserted universal norm. When one attempts to understand the phenomenon of corruption, and the public response to it, the power of this popular conception must be recog- nized. It must be recognized because it is a critical part of public attitudes toward corruption, and because it reminds theorists and practitioners that corruption often has deeper moral foundations. This view tells us that until we come to grips with the moral dimensions of this problem, our prescrip- tions for attacking this phenomenon will miss the essence of what popular attitudes may correctly recognize as the underlying problem, and the com- position of the distinctly “corrupt” core. Notes 1. The effects of cultural practices on corruption norms are discussed in several chapters in this volume. See, for example, Sarah Dix and Emmanuel Pok, “Combat- ing Corruption in Traditional Societies: Papua New Guinea,” chapter 9 in this volume; Robert Legvold, “Corruption, the Criminalized State, and Post-Soviet Transitions,” chapter 8 in this volume; Daniel Jordan Smith, “The Paradoxes of Popular Participa- tion in Corruption in Nigeria,” chapter 11 in this volume. 2. John T. Noonan, Bribes (New York, 1984), 702. For cultural studies that have drawn similar conclusions, see, for example, Dix and Pok,“Combating Corruption in Traditional Societies,” in this volume and Legvold, “Corruption, the Criminalized State,”in this volume. At times, the cultural complexities involved in corrupt and non- corrupt distinctions are difficult for the external observer to fathom. For instance, Smith observes that the Nigerian people, who often simultaneously engage in con- demning corruption, even while participating in it, are “increasingly caught up in corruption.” See Smith, “The Paradoxes of Popular Participation,” 288. 3. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), 3. 42 Laura S. Underkuffler 02 0328-0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 42 4. See, for example, John Gardiner, “Defining Corruption,” in Maurice Punch, Emile Kolthoff, Kees van der Vijver, and Bram van Vliet (eds.), Coping with Corrup- tion in a Borderless World: Proceedings of the Fifth International Anti-Corruption Con- ference (Deventer, 1993), 21, 26. See also Michael Johnston, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Monterey, 1982), 8. 5. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, 5. 6. See David H. Bayley, “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York, 1978), 521, 522; Arnold J. Heidenheimer,“The Context of Analysis,” in his Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 3, 4; Joseph S. Nye, “Corrup- tion and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), 417, 419. 7. For the idea that corruption involves “self-seeking,”“personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt,” see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (New York, 1999), 14, 9. For the view that corruption involves “private gain by dishonest dealings,” see Gunnar Myrdal, “Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 229, 232. “Political corruption is a general term covering all illegal or unethical use of governmental authority as a result of considerations of personal or political gain.” See George C.S. Benson, Steven A. Maaranen, and Alan Heslop, Political Corruption in America (Lexington, 1978), xiii. As Bunn suggests in this volume, this breach-of-duty approach can be extended to include activities by private citizens that constitute a breach of public trust. See Matthew Bunn,“Corruption and Nuclear Proliferation,” chapter 6 in this volume. 8. See Nye,“Corruption and Political Development,” 417; Colin Leys,“What Is the Problem About Corruption?” Journal of Modern African Studies, III (1965), 215–217. 9. See Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Alder- shot, 1991), 2; Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, 1988), 24; Mark Philp,“Contextualizing Political Corruption,”in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (New Brunswick, 2002) (3rd edition), 41, 42. 10. H. A. Brasz, “The Sociology of Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 41, 42. 11. Vladimer Orlando Key, Jr., The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States (Chicago, 1936), 387. 12. See Daniel Lowenstein,“Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Pol- itics,” University of California Los Angeles Law Review, XXXII (1985), 784, 830. 13. Robert Williams,“Corruption: New Concepts for Old?” Third World Quarterly, XX (1999), 503, 510. 14. See,for example, Denis Osborne,“Corruption as Counter-Culture: Attitudes to Bribery in Local and Global Society,” in Barry Rider (ed.), Corruption: The Enemy Within (Boston, 1997), 9, 28; Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, “Corruption—A General Review Defining Corruption 43 02 0328-0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 43 with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank,” in Rider (ed.), Corruption: The Enemy Within, 255, 260. 15. Williams,“Corruption: New Concepts for Old?” 505. See also Robert C. Brooks, “Apologies for Political Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 501, 507. 16. See Carl J. Friedrich, “Political Pathology,” Political Quarterly, XXXVII (1966), 70, 74; Barry Hildress, “Good Government and Corruption,” in Peter Larmour and Nick Wolanin (eds.), Corruption and Anti-Corruption (Canberra, 2001), 1, 5. 17. Heidenheimer,“The Context of Analysis,” 6 (emphasis added). 18. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), 61; Bayley, “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,” 528–529; Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 510, 516. 19. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, 3–4. 20. See Bruce L. Benson, “A Note on Corruption by Public Officials: The Black Market for Property Rights,” Journal of Libertarian Studies, V (1981), 305; Bruce L. Benson and John Baden, “The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government,” Journal of Legal Studies, XIV (1985), 391. 21. Benson and Baden,“The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption,”393. 22. Robert O. Tilman, “Black-Market Bureaucracy,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Politi- cal Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 62. 23. See Benson and Baden,“The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption,” 393–395. 24. Ibid.,392–393; Bayley,“The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,”528; Leff,“Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” 510. 25. Most contemporary scholars agree that these theories seriously underestimate corruption’s other costs—particularly the costs involved in damage to the accountabil- ity and transparency of government. See, for example, Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues,”Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV (1997), 1320, 1327–1330; Paolo Mauro, “The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure,” in Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 339; Paul D. Hutchcroft, “The Politics of Privilege: Rents and Corruption in Asia,” in Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 489, 493–495; Alice Sindzingre, “A Comparative Analysis of African and East African Corruption,” in Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 379, 444–447. See also Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy, (New York, 2005), 18. Such routine problems are in addition to those problems that corrupt states pose to international security and global welfare. See Legvold,“Corruption, the Criminalized State,” chapter 8 in this volume. 26. See Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 2–5; Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, 19–23. 44 Laura S. Underkuffler 02 0328-0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 44 27. See Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 2, 9. 28. Ibid., 3. 29. Ibid., 22–23. 30. Philp, “Contextualizing Political Corruption,” 42 (emphasis added). 31. For interesting analyses of these classical understandings see, for example, Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics: Violence, Betrayal, Corruption, Secrecy, and Pro- paganda (New York, 1972), 130–131; J. Peter Euben, “Corruption,” in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (New York, 1989), 220, 223–242. 32. See, for example, Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics, 127–141; Maryvonne Génaux, “Early Modern Corruption in English and French Fields of Vision,” in Hei- denheimer and Johnston (eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 107–117. 33. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1826), 154. 34. Williams,“Corruption: New Concepts for Old?” 504. 35. See, for example, Heidenheimer, “The Context of Analysis,” 4; Wilmer Parker III, “Every Person Has a Price?” in Rider (ed.), Corruption: The Enemy Within, 87. 36. See, for example, Shihata,“Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank,” 262; Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Func- tions, 13; Walter Lippmann, “A Theory about Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 294, 295; Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Countries (New York, 1964), 11–13; Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics, 28. 37. Stephen Hutcheon, “Eighteen to Face Court Charges Over $3 Billion Beijing Fraud,” Sydney Morning Herald (4 April 1996), 10. 38. Edward A. Georgian, “Corruption’s Many Tentacles Are Choking India’s Growth,” New York Times (10 November 1992), A1. 39. John Hall, “Oiling a Sleezy Machine,” Cincinnati Post (9 January 2006), A10. 40. Smith,“The Paradoxes of Popular Participation,” chapter 11 in this volume. 41. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, 23. 42. Colin Leys, “New States and the Concept of Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 216 and 341. 43. See, for example, Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York,1958), 83–101; Jeremy Boissevain, “Patronage in Sicily,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 138, 139.Robert Legvold describes a corrupt state as one in which “state activity has been ‘privatized’: that is, where either those in power or those with leverage over those in power use state agency to advance their private interests at the expense of the broader public good.” See Legvold,“Corruption, the Criminalized State,” 197. 44. See Smith,“The Paradoxes of Popular Participation,” chapter 11 in this volume. 45. Ibid. Defining Corruption 45 02 0328-0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 45 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., quoting J. P. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” Journal of Modern African Studies, XXXVII (1999), 25, 29. 48. See James Brooke,“Venezuela Still Edgy: Will There Be Coup No. 3?” New York Times (3 December 1992), A3. 49. Ibid. 50. See, for example, Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 2, 7, 9, 19, 22, and 26; Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 68, 87; Klitgaard, Controlling Corrup- tion, 52–97; World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 (Washington, D.C., 2000), 54–66. The efficacy of these prescriptions is contested. See, for example, Jomo K. S.,“Good Governance, Anti-Corruption, and Economic Development,” chapter 18 in this volume. 51. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 2. 52. For case studies exploring the role of foundational moral values in corruption prevention, see, for example, David Stasavage,“Causes and Consequences of Corrup- tion: Mozambique in Transition,” in Alan Doig and Robin Theobald (eds.), Corrup- tion and Democratisation (London, 2000),85–86; Susan Rose-Ackerman,“Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict,” chapter 4 in this volume. 53. Because of its ability to invoke moral certainty and an acute sense of urgency, the idea of corruption has been used to express a variety of evils, such as the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the violation of human rights. See Matthew Bunn,“Cor- ruption and Nuclear Proliferation,” chapter 6 in this volume; Lucy Koechlin and Mag- dalena Sepúlveda Carmona,“Corruption and Human Rights: Exploring the Connec- tion,” chapter 12 in this volume. 54. Robert C. Brooks,“The Nature of Political Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, 56. 55. See Jomo K.S., “Good Governance, Anti-Corruption and Economic Develop- ment,” chapter 18 in this volume. 46 Laura S. Underkuffler 02 0328-0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 46 47 The importance in measuring corruption, and by extension, good governance (one of its antidotes), is not simply an esoteric academic debate left to development economists, political theoreticians, and statisticians. It has become, rather, a central issue to the broader field of good governance and anti-corruption reform, as a country’s performance in such reforms has become increasingly linked to foreign aid flows. While former World Bank President James Wolfensohn’s famous 1996 “cancer of corruption” speech marked a watershed in acknowledging cor- ruption as a central development issue, the challenge of measuring corruption and anti-corruption performance leapt to the forefront during the “Monter- rey process.” Major multilateral development organizations and governments met in 2002 at Monterrey, Mexico, to agree on practical steps for implement- ing the Millennium Development Goals: high-level objectives aimed at reduc- ing poverty and accelerating development by 2015 in the world’s poorest countries. The basic bargain agreed on at Monterrey moved corruption meas- urement to the front and center of the debate: if developing countries per- formed well on anti-corruption and good governance assessments, they would be rewarded with increased aid from the developed donor countries. 1 This decision implied that the international community now needed con- sistently to measure corruption levels and countries’ anti-corruption and good governance performance to determine those countries that would respond to the carrot of increased aid. The establishment of the U.S. Millennium 3 Defining and Measuring Corruption: Where Have We Come From, Where Are We Now, and What Matters For the Future? nathaniel heller The author wishes to thank a number of colleagues at Global Integrity for their insight and feedback on this chapter, including Julia Burke, Marianne Camerer, Raymond June, Stephen Roblin, and Jonathan Werve. 03 0328-0 ch3.qxd:Rotberg 7/16/09 4:42 PM Page 47 Table 3-1. Select Timeline of Major Corruption and Governance Metrics Index Name Origin Economic Intelligence Unit’s Index on Democracy Early 1970s Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World Survey 1972 Polity Country Reports 1974 Transparency International’s National Integrity Systems studies (NIS) 1994 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 1995 World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 1996 Afrobarometer 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 1999–2000 International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)’s Media 2000 Sustainability Index (MSI) World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators 2003 Global Integrity’s Integrity Indicators 2004 Open Budget Index (a project of the International Budget Project) 2006 Index of African Governance 2007 48 Nathaniel Heller 03 0328-0 ch3.qxd:Rotberg 7/16/09 4:42 PM Page 48 Defining and Measuring Corruption 49 Description The index provides a snapshot of the current state of democracy for 165 states and 2 territories and includes 5 categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Data are drawn from third-party surveys and assessments. The Freedom in the World survey evaluates the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals in countries. The survey measures freedom according to two categories: political rights and civil liberties. Centralized scoring committees outside of the country generate the scores for each country. The Polity project examines the characteristics of governing institutions in countries, envisioning a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed authority regimes to full democracies. Coding of countries is performed by trained researchers outside of the country. The NIS applies a holistic approach by assessing the key institutions, laws, and practices that contribute to integrity, transparency, and accountability. The NIS offers analysis on the extent and causes of corruption in a given national context as well as the adequacy and effectiveness of national anti-corruption efforts. Local experts are employed to generate the qualitative analysis. The CPI ranks 180 countries according to their perceived levels of corruption. The rankings are determined by aggregating third-party expert assessments and opinion surveys. The WGI report governance indicators for more than 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2007 across 6 dimensions of governance, including control of corruption. Data are generated by aggregating third-party surveys and expert assessments in a similar fashion as the CPI. The Afrobarometer measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. Original household surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. BEEPS surveys more than 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries on a wide range of interactions between firms and the state. The MSI analyzes the state of independent media in 76 countries across Africa, Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. It assesses how media systems change over time and across borders. Local experts are employed to score countries. Doing Business assesses the ease of doing business across 178 economies through expert assessments performed by local in-country lawyers. Among other data generated, it assesses the time and cost to meet requirements to start a business, business operations, taxation, and closure of a business. An Integrity Indicators scorecard assesses the existence, effectiveness, and citizen access to key governance and anti-corruption mechanisms through more than 300 discrete indicators. It examines issues such as transparency of the public procurement process, media freedom, asset disclosure requirements, and conflicts of interest regulations. Scorecards take into account both existing legal measures on the books and de facto realities of practical imple- mentation in each country. Indicators are scored and blindly reviewed by in-country experts. The index rates countries on how open their budgets are to the public and is intended to provide citizens, civil society, and legislators with the information needed to gauge a government’s commitment to budget transparency. Local teams of in-country experts score each country’s indicators. The Index of African Governance ranks sub-Saharan African nations according to governance quality (focusing on governance “outputs”) and assesses national progress in five areas: safety and security; rule of law, transparency and corruption; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. Data are currently aggregated from third-party surveys and assessments and collected in-country by index researchers. 03 0328-0 ch3.qxd:Rotberg 7/16/09 4:42 PM Page 49 50 Nathaniel Heller Challenge Corporation (MCC), which explicitly links major aid packages (upward of $500 to $700 million) to country performance on a range of quan- titative metrics, including anti-corruption performance, is the most ambi- tious effort to do so in the wake of Monterrey. However, the field of corruption measurement has not moved nearly as quickly as the advent of the “aid-for-good governance” bargain that Monter- rey helped to launch. While the demand for rigorous data and information on corruption has increased dramatically from the late-1990s, much of the field remains unchanged from its early days. The potential for misleading diag- nostics, ill-informed aid decisions, and disillusionment with the anti-cor- ruption movement looms large should this situation remain unaltered. This chapter traces the history of the corruption measurement field in broad brushstrokes from its earliest days to present day efforts. In so doing, this chapter draws out lessons learned that can inform next-generation meas- urement efforts to avoid the negative outcomes suggested above. The Early Days Although the academic literature on corruption dates back several decades, the specific topic of how to measure corruption, anti-corruption performance, and good governance came into focus in the late-1970s through the work of some of the modern-day pillars in the field, including Klitgaard, Johnston, and Rose-Ackerman. 2 Their early work provided to “corruption” a definitional and conceptual clarity, by applying to it a political-economy analysis. Cor- ruption was viewed as fundamentally rational rent-seeking behavior more likely to occur where transparency and oversight were low, discretion was high, and accountability mechanisms weak. This framework not only made intuitive sense but could be applied to a variety of sectors, countries, and cul- tures. It largely remains the foundation of much of the ongoing analytic and programmatic work in the anti-corruption community. Despite this conceptual clarity, the early work struggled to gain traction on how systematically to track corruption as a measurable phenomenon. As Johnston and his colleague Heidenheimer would later write in their third edi- tion of Political Corruption: For some groups of scholars, the global corruption landscape has come to be even more radically transformed. This is exemplified by the obser- vation that where, in the 1980s, most transnational corruption com- parisons were largely impressionistic, the 1990s saw the dispersion of 03 0328-0 ch3.qxd:Rotberg 7/16/09 4:42 PM Page 50 methodology which seems to allow objective quantification of corrup- tion incidence and perception in various national settings. But these breakthroughs were accomplished in the face of bypassing crucial con- ceptual hurdles, such as the definition of basic terms. Moreover, they reflected a range of interests and outlooks that, while bringing new energy to the study of corruption, also tended to “flatten out” the vari- ations among cases, rather than probing more subtle historical, cul- tural, and linguistic issues. In a way the dominant measurement efforts become focused on examining the extent to which various test tubes were more or less full than others, while ignoring variations in their shapes, and in what they contained. 3 This prescience of the conceptual gap in the corruption measurement field––that methodologies were being developed without a clear sense of what they were actually measuring––would continue to haunt practitioners and academics in the coming years and come into sharper focus in the post- Monterrey era. The “dispersion of methodologies” that Johnston and Heidenheimer flagged referred primarily to Transparency International’s well-known Cor- ruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and, later, to the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). In the mid-1990s, development economists began to leverage business firm surveys and other opinion polls as proxies for corruption measurement to explore correlations and causality between corruption and various dependent variables such as economic growth and foreign direct investment. Such results seemed to suggest that lower lev- els of corruption were linked to greater growth and investment levels. 4 The creators of the CPI, and later the WGI, tried to capture as many third- party “voices” as possible—as many proxies and signals of corruption that, when aggregated, pointed toward countries or sectors of the economy more or less likely to experience corruption. The WGI was particularly explicit in its use of the unobserved components model as an intellectual basis for aggre- gating as many similar surveys, polls, and expert opinions of corruption-like questions as possible. Since corruption cannot easily be seen directly or observed empirically, the authors argued that the WGI must rely instead on indirect observations that, when aggregated, can suggest the value of the desired variable. 5 Both indices remain the standard bearers for aggregate rankings of corrup- tion or governance and utilize third-party surveys that are related to the “bas- ket” of corruption issues. Their primary attraction is their near-global coverage. Defining and Measuring Corruption 51 03 0328-0 ch3.qxd:Rotberg 7/16/09 4:42 PM Page 51 [...]... (20 03 est.) 70 (20 01 est.) 68 (20 02 est.) 37 (20 07 est.) Gini 55.1 (20 07) n.a 47.3 (20 02) 42. 4 (1998) 30 (20 05 /20 06) Main Exports Agricultural products Oil, diamonds Agricultural products, aluminum Agricultural products Mining, metal, and leather products Date of Independence and Colonial or Dominant Power 1 821 Spain 1975 Portugal 1975 Portugal 19 62 Belgium 20 08* Serbia Date of Peace Accords 1996 20 02. .. Kosovo .2 Table 4-1 Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict 69 Table 4-1 Summary Information on Case Study Countries Guatemala Angola Mozambique Burundi Kosovo Population (million) 13.0 (7/08 est.) 12. 5 (7/08 est.) 21 .3 (7/08 est.) 8.7 (7/08 est.) 2. 1 (20 07 est.) GDP ($bill PPP, 20 07 est.) 67.45 80.95 17. 82 6.39 4.0 GDP/pc ($PPP) (20 07 est.) 5,400 6,500 900 800 1,800 % poor 56 .2 (20 04 est.)... forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries assessed in 20 08 See Robert I Rotberg and Rachel M Gisselquist, Strengthening African Governance: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Results and Rankings 20 08 (Cambridge, MA, 20 08), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/ 52/ intrastate_conflict_program.html?page _id =22 3 (accessed 20 April 20 09) 15 Kaufmann and Kraay, “Governance Indicators,”... and Contexts (New Brunswick, 20 02) , xii 4 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Measures,” Economics and Politics, XII (1995), 20 7 22 7; Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX (1995), 681–7 12; and later: Stephen Knack (ed.), Democracy, Governance, and Growth (Ann Arbor, 20 03) 5 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart... documents the high level of “unexplained” expenditures from 1997 to 20 02, which totaled $4 .22 billion over the period or about 9 .25 percent of GDP each year .26 The state-owned oil enterprise, Sonangol, appears to be at the center of the corruption involving extra-budgetary operations, especially through its off-the-books borrowing practices .27 After the end of the fighting, with no military threat present,... in the 20 08 Index of African Governance .22 Because of the rise in oil prices, its GDP growth rate was 14 percent in 20 06, but it has a highly unequal distribution of income and wealth .23 Although corruption in Guatemala facilitates the drug trade and provides impunity to the wealthy and powerful, in Angola corruption diverts the stream of petroleum rents into private bank accounts A report in 20 03,... Corruption (Oslo, 20 08) 10 Goran Hyden, “The Challenges of Making Governance Assessments Nationally Owned,” paper presented at the 20 07 Bergen Seminar on “Governance Assessments Defining and Measuring Corruption 65 and the Paris Declaration,” organized by the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre and the Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, 24 25 September 11 Arndt and Oman, Uses and Abuses, 72 12 Hyden, “Challenges... No 3968 (Washington, D.C., 20 06), 1–64; Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrannk, “Growth and Governance: Models, Measures and Mechanisms,” Journal of Politics, LXIX (20 07), 538–554 8 Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, “Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?” World Bank Research Observer, XXIII (20 08), 1–43 9 Much of this discussion draws on the volume UNDP and Global Integrity, A Users’... the anti-corruption and good governance agendas Notes 1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55 /2 III–13, United Nations Millennium Declaration (20 00) 2 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, 1988); Michael Johnston, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Monterey, 19 82) ; Michael Johnston, “The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,” Comparative Politics,... Mining, metal, and leather products Date of Independence and Colonial or Dominant Power 1 821 Spain 1975 Portugal 1975 Portugal 19 62 Belgium 20 08* Serbia Date of Peace Accords 1996 20 02 19 92 2000 1999 Conflict Duration (yrs.) 36 27 15 38 4 (intermittent) Parties to Conflict Government of Guatemala, URNG MPLA (ruling party), UNITA FRELIMO (ruling party), RENAMO Tutsi (former rulers), Hutu Kosovar Albanians . Page 44 27 . See Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 2, 9. 28 . Ibid., 3. 29 . Ibid., 22 23 . 30. Philp, “Contextualizing Political Corruption, 42 (emphasis. Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (New York, 1989), 22 0, 22 3 24 2. 32. See, for example, Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics, 127 –141; Maryvonne Génaux, “Early Modern Corruption in English. Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, 19 72) , 3. 42 Laura S. Underkuffler 02 0 328 -0 ch2.qxd 7/15/09 3:43 PM Page 42 4. See, for example, John Gardiner, “Defining Corruption, in Maurice Punch, Emile