432 chapter eight globe. The “flourishing of sentient non-human life on this planet requires an end to human population growth” (A. Taylor, “Animal” 264). To minimize interference, humans need to quit breeding with such indifference to the larger world. We need to commit to a no- growth policy. The greatest harm a human being can do is to have a child, espe- cially in capitalistic, resource-consuming Western countries. North American children use a tremendous amount of resources in com- parison with youngsters in most other countries. From abundant school supplies to extensive medical care, from double-packaged foods to fast-moving vehicles, Americans are megaconsumers. Humans everywhere take a heavy toll on the environment, but humans in the West are the most environmentally destructive animals on earth. Has any other animal in the last few million years had such a negative impact on water, air, forests, soil, or ozone layer—the environment in general—as we have in the past century? If any other species caused as much trouble as we do, human beings would engage in mass killing to reduce the numbers of such a dangerous and bother- some lot. Humans are the bane of the earth and capitalism a primary vice because of its dependence on unlimited, unsustainable growth. Resources are finite and the biosphere has a limited ability to sup- port human expansion and our concurrent destructive activities. Unlimited growth is the ideology of the cancer cell, which ultimately destroys its habitat, the host body. In this way humans have become a cancer, degrading and obliterating the habitats of nearly every other life-form and enslaving or killing previous occupants. The mil- lions of other species gain nothing from our economic pursuits, but they suffer the consequences. The Minimize Harm Maxim includes a moral imperative to min- imize consumption, regardless of the effects on economic growth. Ongoing and extensive ecological degradation are the result of “a conflict between our moralities (and religions) and our visible and immediate economic interests” ( Jamieson, “Moral” 9). We must become motivated by the common good—common to all life-forms— rather than personal greed. We must use restraint and reduce demand. If we are to respect the lives of these many other entities we must reduce consumption. At this point, not only the lives of other species are at risk, but our own lives as well. minimize harm maxim 433 Some might argue that human conatus includes bearing children, that we are permitted to be the animals that we are just as surely as other animals are permitted to fulfill their own biological urges. But statistics do not support this assumption. Statistics show that edu- cated women, women who have other options, choose to have fewer or no children. No one can reasonably argue that women who choose not to have children are bereft of conatus. Statistics suggest that childbearing is not fundamental to human beings; indeed, it is prov- ing to be an optional activity. Humans, like all creatures, have urges which lead to reproduction. Our biological urge is to have sex, not to make babies. Our “instinct to breed” is the same as a squirrel’s instinct to plant trees: the urge is to store food, trees are a natural result. If sex is an urge to pro- create, then hunger’s an urge to defecate. Culturally induced desires can be so strong that they seem to be biological, but no evolutionary mechanism for an instinct to breed exists. Why do we stop breeding after we’ve had as many as we want? (“Biology”) If we choose to breed, the Minimize Harm Maxim requires that human beings limit reproduction. “‘Stop at two’ may have been a radical proclamation when Zero Population Growth was founded in 1968, but it was barely adequate even then. So-called replacement level fertility wouldn’t bring about true zero population growth until the middle of this century, due to momentum. Today the mes- sage is only slightly revised: ‘Consider having none or one, and be sure to stop after two’” (“Biology”). (If an individual remarries, she or he ought not to have another child with a new spouse, even if each has only one child.) The Minimize Harm Maxim asserts that it is morally preferable not to have children due to current human population problems. [I]n terms of energy consumption, when we stop at two it’s about the same as an average East Indian couple stopping at 60, or an Ethiopian couple stopping at one thousand Two is better than four, and one is twice as good as two, but to purposely set out to create even one more of us today is the moral equivalent of selling berths on a sinking ship. Regardless of how many progeny we have or haven’t produced, rather than stop at two, we must stop at once. (“Biology”) The human species is not expected to dwindle and disappear off the face of the earth any time soon (though this might well bring about the greatest good to the greatest number of living entities!). “Youth 434 chapter eight is a wonderful phase of life, whether it’s people, panda, or panther. It’s sad to imagine there being no more of any of them. A baby condor may not be as cute as a baby human, but we must choose to forego one if the others are to survive” (“Biology”). The Minimize Harm Maxim requires minimal human harm—an end to popula- tion growth and rabid consumption—and requires that we reverse our population explosion, reuse, and recycle. 4. Harm Low on the Food Chain This section proposes a diet that minimizes harm, consistent with the Minimize Harm Maxim, and consistent with morality regarding the preservation and protection of human life. We are permitted to harm other human beings in order to sur- vive. Ethics regarding the protection and preservation of human life admit of a gray area, an unspoken acceptance that if one must eat other people to survive, one will not be prosecuted. Cannibalism is rare. Nonetheless, there are two famous instances of cannibalism in the last 150 years. In the winter of 1846–1847, the ill-fated Donner party was trapped in the Sierra Nevada not far from Lake Tahoe. Starvation reduced friends and families to eating one another. Only forty-seven survived of the eighty-seven original members (“Donner Party”). In 1972 in Chile, a plane went down, stranding a handful of individuals for sev- enty days in the Andes Mountains. Most of the passengers were young men, members of an Uruguayan soccer team. Though extremely fit, and young, only sixteen individuals survived; they survived by consuming the flesh of their less fortunate traveling companions (“Cannibalism”). In neither instance did the individuals involved willingly select other humans as their dietary preference. In both instances those who survived did so because they ate human flesh. These cases were of course controversial because no one can be sure whether those who were eaten were murdered. Still, no one was prosecuted. Few would prosecute, blame, or even complain, about starving people eating one another rather than perishing. If placed in a situation where death is otherwise imminent, history reveals that cannibalism is an acceptable option. Under these conditions it is not legal to kill other people to eat them, but morality permits the consumption of those who are already dead in desperate situations. minimize harm maxim 435 Ethics regarding the preservation and protection of human life permit people to eat other human beings who are already dead when there are no other options available. Consistent with this high standard regarding human life, the Minimize Harm Maxim does not permit human beings to kill and eat anymals. It is only permissible to eat anymals if one is starving, and if the anymal is already dead. Consistent with human ethics, in a pinch, one might kill and eat an anymal and not be convicted. The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that we minimize harm— harm less rather than more. To harm less rather than more requires us to avoid harm where possible and reduce harm when harm cannot be avoided. Fruitarian diets most effectively minimize harm. Fruitarians take fruit from other living entities, but do not kill plants or harm any living entity’s conatus. The only harm that results from a fruitarian diet is the destruction of potential plants—by eating fruits and nuts. There is no moral imperative among human beings to protect poten- tial human life. Subpoint Two: We May Use Other Life-Forms Only with Consent “From the ninth to the nineteenth century we have innumerable written accounts of criminal prosecution and capital punishment of animals . . . pigs, dogs, wolves, locusts, rats, termites, cows, horses and doves” (Linzey, Animal Gospel 22). Indeed, into the nineteenth cen- tury anymals were tried in human courts for behaviors that human beings thought “wrong.” Anymals were excommunicated or executed according to human ethics, human faith, human law, and human judgment. Today we recognize that anymals that do not use human language or participate in human ethics and law are not legitimate subjects for trials, or for corporal or capital punishment. Our behav- ior was unjust. We no longer put anymals on trial, but we continue to subject anymals to unjust “punishment” based on human assessments of what ought to be done. Whether we execute, confine, medicate, or experiment on anymals, we necessarily do so unjustly, for selfish rea- sons, and without regard for the anymals we exploit for our pur- poses. When we “use” anymals for science, or in the food, clothing, or entertainment industries, we do so necessarily without their consent. Who would consent to the sorts of terrible experiments, unnatural 436 chapter eight behaviors, and forced confinement that we bring upon anymals? Current Western ethics do not permit exploitation of other human beings against their will. Under contemporary law we risk harass- ment or stalking charges if we even persist in the presence of those who do not choose our company. But with consent we may share company, or even use others for certain types of research, child-rear- ing purposes, labor, financial gain, or artistic productions. Morally and legally, as with emergency medical personnel and the treatment of the wounded, consent is critical. In some instances, such as when one individual holds consider- able power over another, even consent is not legally sufficient to permit exploitation of another human being. Just because a fifteen- year-old gives consent for sexual relations does not mean such inter- actions are legal or morally acceptable. They are not. Young people are vulnerable to the power of those who are older. Therefore, con- sent does not necessarily demonstrate a young person’s genuine wish to go along with a given plan or procedure. Humans hold tremendous power over anymals—more often than not, we determine their lives and their deaths. In this sense other species are similar to minors: they are dependent and vulnerable; they are at our mercy. Even if they could definitively consent to exploitation, their consent would not be sufficient to warrant exploita- tion any more so than for children and other unequal dependents. What of cases where little children are trained to be gymnasts or pianists before they are old enough to decide if they prefer such a life? If these children can be so trained, why not anymals? To some extent, the nature of parenting requires that adults make important decisions for their offspring. While adults are responsible for pro- ducing the next generation of human beings—whatever they may be—we are not responsible for producing greyhounds or thorough- breds that are of the right temperament and body build to run around tracks at record speeds for the entertainment of human beings. Furthermore, while it is possible for children to suffer because their parents make such choices for them, little ones who lack talent or athletic ability are never considered expendable; those who do not make the cut are never cast aside or destroyed. For this reason the exploitation of young athletes and artists is not equivalent to current exploitation of, for example, horses or dogs for racing, pulling, or appeasing the human eye. Also unlike human children, animals remain dependents throughout their lives and can never determine minimize harm maxim 437 for themselves, over and against human interests, what will happen with their lives. Because anymals in our care remain dependents throughout their lives, and because we cannot definitively gain their consent, Minimize Harm Maxim does not permit exploitation of other species for our ends. The Minimize Harm Maxim is an extension of morality regard- ing the protection and preservation of human life. We cannot definitively ascertain whether or not other living entities consent to what we do to them; even if they could give consent, such consent would be no more acceptable than that of children due to their comparative powerlessness. We therefore cannot use other living enti- ties for our purposes any more than we can exploit little children. While there are cases where one might reasonably argue that chil- dren are exploited to fulfill the dreams of adults, such exploitation, however well intentioned, is not permitted across species. Such instances are the unfortunate result of parental responsibility for shap- ing the lives of children, a responsibility that we do not and cannot have for other species. Subpoint Three: Intentions Matter Many of us are familiar with the adage “good intentions are not good enough,” but intentions are critical where moral matters are concerned. Intentions are an important factor in assessing personal morality, and the importance of intent is reflected in our legal system. Even when good intentions have bad outcomes, the Western legal system indicates that motivation is important in assessing guilt and assigning punishment. For instance, if Jex’s very old great aunt drowns while Jex is bathing her in a large bathtub, Jex is not guilty of mur- der. She may be guilty of negligence, but not murder. If Jex throws her aunt in a tub and intentionally drowns her, Jex is guilty of mur- der. Intentions do not necessarily affect outcomes—Jex’s aunt is dead either way—but intentions affect moral assessments. Sometimes we make mistakes—even in the tending of beloved anymals or children—and we are not held accountable for a bad outcome if we have good intentions, so long as we have not been negligent. Intentions are oftentimes the only difference, in a court of law, between murder and accidental death, between stealing and borrowing, between bla- tant cruelty and harm through ignorance. 438 chapter eight In the Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with human morality, intentions matter. If one turns over a stone and crushes a pollywog out of ignorance, she or he is not morally culpable. But if one turns over a stone in order to crush a pollywog, that individual is morally culpable. Similarly, if one plants a pea vine to harvest peas and in the process steps on a garden spider, one is not morally culpable for the life lost. However, if one sees a harmless goldenrod spider climbing toward a pea vine and purposefully extinguishes her life, one is morally culpable because a living entity has been purpose- fully and unnecessarily harmed. Similarly, if one kills a small child, by accident (not through negligence), one is not immoral, while if one purposefully kills a small child the deed is morally reprehensible. It is not the act itself—but one’s intentions—that ultimately determine the moral legitimacy of a deed in the Minimize Harm Maxim. Good intentions are linked with virtues. One who fosters such virtues as benevolence and empathy is much more likely to live a life rooted in good intentions than one who fosters the vices of greed and arrogance. Responding to an overintellectual, reason-based approach to ethics, Richard Solomon notes that what allows the cir- cle of ethics to expand to include other people, or other species, is not reason (in the technical sense of calculation on the basis of abstract principles) but rather knowledge and understanding in the sense of coming to appreciate the situations and the circumstances in which other people and creatures find themselves. This requires what many theorists now call “empathy” or “feeling with” . . . and it requires care and concern, the emotional sense that what happens to others matters. According to this “moral sentiment” view, there is no “line” to be drawn between ethics and benevolence, no place in our experi- ence where affect and affection leave off and some new faculty called “reason” kicks in and takes over. Rather, our emotions get more and more expansive and better educated and new perspectives join with the old to enlarge our world and embrace new populations in it. This should be recognized as the vital force in ethics. (Solomon 75) According to L. Johnson, if we each act with goodwill toward other living entities, we would probably behave in a morally exemplary manner (200). Generally, one who fosters virtues will have benevo- lent intentions and will choose a different course of action from one who is moved by self-interest; intentions have a tremendous effect on the overall impact of a life lived. An individual who sincerely intends to be gentle and benevolent toward all living entities will not minimize harm maxim 439 live as most of us live. Because we cannot avoid harming other liv- ing entities, harm itself is not morally reprehensible, but intentions are critical for assessing which harms are immoral. For instance, harms that result from one’s attempt to survive are morally acceptable. However, the same harms brought about for one’s pleasure are immoral. As in the case of Jex bathing her aunt, the outcome is the same but the intent differs. Intentions do not always make a difference in how one behaves; one might steal, kill, or lie with either good or bad intentions. In fact, morally speaking, “crimes” are sometimes the best possible actions, particularly when they are rooted in good intentions. For instance, if Maggie lives in a society that punishes theft with death and yet that same society offers no aid to the poor and needy, and if Maggie has no wealth of her own, she might be considered a moral exemplar if she steals to feed the needy. Though, from the point of view of the rich she brings them harm, her intent is to feed the poor, not to harm the rich. Maggie would, presumably, do the same for the wealthy, should they come into hard times, and they would no doubt see things differently. Her interest is in helping the most desperate to survive. Maggie’s act would most likely be con- sidered morally exemplary because her choice involves self-sacrifice for others—good intentions. In this case the thief is concerned with aiding the needy rather than obeying property rights or protecting herself from possible arrest. Because her intent is to preserve life, to feed the hungry, and because most of us consider her cause just, the action (though illegal) is likely to be viewed as ultimately good. Many—if not most—would argue that she does what she ought if she steals from the wealthy for the specific intent of feeding the needy. Though intentions are critical, they are epistemologically prob- lematic; one cannot definitively know the intentions of another indi- vidual; our own intentions are sometimes obscure even to us. Perhaps Maggie only steals from the rich because she likes to steal, or because she hates the rich. Still, consistent with current Western ethics and law, intentions are critical. Though they cannot be definitively known or quantified by a jury, we acknowledge the importance of inten- tions under such terms as “manslaughter” (unintentional, reckless killing) as compared with “murder” (intentional slaying) both distinct from “self-defense” (intentional, purposeful, but justified killing). 440 chapter eight Assessing the morality of a given action also rests on intent in the Minimize Harm Maxim. In many ways morality is a personal endeavor. When an act is done specifically to cause harm, it is immoral; an act that has a benevo- lent intent but brings about the same harm is not immoral. If one has the capacity to learn and fails to guard against repeating a moral error, then one becomes morally culpable for an act that was once innocent of blame. Ultimately, the acting agent is most likely to under- stand motivation and will be the best judge of the morality of any given act. Consistent with Western morality with regard to human beings, intentions are critical in assessing moral culpability in the Minimize Harm Maxim. As with morality among human beings, reasons, moti- vation, and intent help determine whether or not an act is moral. Subpoint Four: Self-Defense Is Morally Permissible Consistent with morality among human beings, one can harm in self-defense. As in the case of innocent human life, we cannot morally justify the forced, intentional infliction of pain, death, or other forms of suffering on other people except to protect our immediate and direct survival. Consistent with morality regarding the protection and preservation of human life, we may harm any other living entity that poses a direct physical threat. Bacteria, humans, and polar bears can all pose direct physical threats to our lives, and we are not morally culpable if we choose to defend ourselves, even if we harm or destroy dangerous others. But it is morally obligatory to try to avoid dangerous encounters and to avoid such harm when possible. We should not kill the insane attacker, be he human or canine, if instead he can be trapped without great risk, nor should we cause hostages to die if we can secure their release without endangering other innocents. Moral agents who reflect on these matters generally agree about the necessity of seeking alternatives when humans are involved, but are frequently far less concerned when nonhuman animals are the potential victims. (Pluhar 281–82) The Minimize Harm Maxim, consistent with morality and law regard- ing the protection of human life, requires that we take precautions to minimize conflicts and, in the event of conflict, use the least harm- minimize harm maxim 441 ful means of dealing with threats. Finally, if we must harm, we ought only to cause harm in relative proportions. 1. Minimize Conflict The Minimize Harm Maxim requires moral agents to minimize the likelihood of conflict and the need for self-defense. For instance, if Molly lives in a society without laws or law enforcement and depends on pumpkins for survival, she is not wrong to frighten, threaten, or even harm another person to defend her food source—even if she inadvertently plants her produce in a predator’s thoroughfare. Self- defense is acceptable if one’s subsistence, and therefore one’s exis- tence, is threatened. Intent also matters. If Molly chooses to plant her pumpkins in an unprotected place knowing that planting her crop in a different loca- tion would work just as well and would avoid confrontation, she is morally culpable for any harm done to entities that come to feed on her pumpkins. In fact, under the Minimize Harm Maxim, she may not harm such entities because Molly is morally culpable; she has not intended to reduce conflicts, the need for self-defense, or harm caused. Similarly, if we know that intensive planting of crops is apt to cause “infestations,” then we ought to avoid planting intensive crops rather than kill insects and rodents that come to share the bounty. In like manner, in order to minimize conflicts with insects that we find to be annoying or dangerous, we ought to wear long sleeves and use window screens. Minimizing harm in this manner is neither novel nor prohibitively difficult (and is included in Taylor’s theory of Respect for Nature (Respect 268)). Down through history people have often adapted prac- tices to avoid conflicts with other species: “While the Europeans killed wildlife in number and without mercy, the Bantu built a struc- ture that attempted to minimize association between humans and wildlife” (Burnett 157). It is now simply too easy for us to kill, and given contemporary Western humanity’s lack of regard for life-forms that are not human, we kill at will. But most “pests” might easily be avoided rather than eliminated. The Minimize Harm Maxim requires that we change our behavior whenever possible to avoid harm- ful conflicts. The Minimize Harm Maxim is consistent with general Western moral ideals regarding the protection and preservation of human life. [...]... fluids and body parts Agribusinesses use massive quantities of fossil fuels, pesticides, and fertilizers in the process of growing feed for cattle Consuming anymal parts is inefficient and environmentally damaging: [Ninety] percent of the protein, 99 percent of the carbohydrate, and 100 percent of the fiber value of grain is wasted by cycling it through livestock, and currently 64 percent of the U S grain... continue this particular breed of human It is considered immoral to control and manipulate human breeding Casuistry requires similar treatment for similar cases; philosophical consistency and impartiality demand the same response to other dwindling species Rather than captive breeding, a long-standing ethic of minimizing interference and minimizing harm would likely have assured the continuance of the... undergo the painful process of debeaking and then begin a miserable life crowded in small cages Hens raised to produce eggs for human consumption cannot fulfill their natural instincts of dusting, flying, roosting, or even rearing young Members of Compassion Over Killing, who engaged in an undercover investigation of the lives of hens in the egg industry, reported that it is “impossible to imagine what life... worked for, that mistreatment of animals is a standard part of training and is thought to be a “necessary” part of exhibiting them I have seen chimps locked in small cages constantly when not performing; elephants chained continuously; and even animals being beaten during performances There is no way that an animal can even begin to fulfill a decent life while traveling on the road with the circus... capture die within 90 days The average life span of a dolphin in the wild is 45 years; yet half of all captured dolphins die within their first two years of captivity The survivors last an average of only 5 years in captivity Every seven years, half of all dolphins in captivity die from capture shock, pneumonia, intestinal disease, ulcers, chlorine poisoning, and other stress-related illnesses (Finney) These... breeding and caging “problem” wildlife While one might argue that captive breeding is well intentioned, a closer look reveals that captive breeding fails to show good intent toward individuals involved Captive breeding stems from human interest in maintaining genetic diversity Such breeding is not done for those individuals who are bred, nor on behalf of the species we strive to save Captive breeding... bodies against the sun and the cold, we must minimize harm in securing our needs Killing low on the food chain minimizes harm Most specifically, by utilizing plants rather than anymals we avoid the harm of pain, as well as increased harm to the environment This will be discussed in detail in the next section because clothing choice parallels food choice in many ways In both instances, the Minimize Harm... bones, and 2 million of them die during transport each year In 199 4 some 7 billion of these animals were in the United States, 4 billion in Europe, and 7 19 million in the United Kingdom (Orlans 255) Buying eggs is not only harmful to hens but also to habitat—the environment As with cattle, birds in cages must be fed Hens and turkeys are fed grains produced through the same harmful process as grains fed... early in 2004 noted most frequent violations entailed ineffective stunning of anymals prior to slaughter The third most common offense was the slaughter of animals that were fully conscious Violations were witnessed in nearly one-third of U.S slaughterhouses Violations include “dragging sick and/ or disabled animals, excessive use of electric prods, improper stunning and the shackling and processing of conscious... who will draw a new crowd of customers Since the public would not tolerate the animals simply being killed by the zoo, they are sold to dealers, who in turn often sell them to research laboratories, roadside petting zoos, and canned hunts (“Canned” 6) Anymals are used in zoos and circuses, on television, and in local fairs for the entertainment and “education” of human beings and then discarded when . that mistreatment of animals is a standard part of training and is thought to be a “necessary” part of exhibiting them. I have seen chimps locked in small cages constantly when not performing; elephants chained. eating one another. Only forty-seven survived of the eighty-seven original members (“Donner Party”). In 197 2 in Chile, a plane went down, stranding a handful of individuals for sev- enty days in. distinctions between all human beings (including the six human beings in the cases presented previously) and other forms of life, for the sake of philosophic con- sistency and impartiality, using