time, thus partaking in a tradition stretching back to Parmenides and Zeno, who held the appearance of temporal change to be an illusion. In opposition to the ‘static’ view stands the ‘dynamic’ view of time, traceable back to Aristotle and before him to Heraclitus. By this account the future lacks the reality of the past and present, and indeed reality is continually being added to as time passes. The objection mentioned earlier is not difficult to overcome, since even the theory of relativity acknowledges that some events are past and others future, no matter which frame of reference is selected, and these may be said to lie in the absolute past or future. The relativ- ity of simultaneity only requires us to revise our conception of the present, allowing it to embrace all events not causally connectable to us by a physical signal. A more serious challenge to the dynamic view of time comes from an argu- ment of J. M. E. McTaggart, who claimed that the notion of temporal becoming (bound up with the *A-series of past, present, and future) leads to contradiction. But it seems fair to protest that McTaggart’s argument demonstrates not so much the absurdity of the notion of temporal becoming as the incoherence of his representation of that phenomenon. According to McTaggart, the phenomenon supposedly consists in future events ‘becoming present’ and then ‘receding into the past’, whence it apparently follows, absurdly, that all events are past, present, and future. But the lesson is just that we should not think of ‘the present’ as somehow ‘moving’ along the sequence of events from past to future. In denying the reality of the future, we may appeal to the fact that not all future-tensed statements appear to be determinately true or false. The asymmetry of time is perhaps its most striking fea- ture and the most difficult to explain. The fundamental laws of physics are time-reversible, and yet complex macroscopic processes like the growth of a tree or the breaking of a glass could not happen in reverse save by a miracle. This is often supposed to be explicable by refer- ence to the second law of thermodynamics, which implies that closed systems tend to evolve from conditions of less to greater disorder, or ‘entropy’. But why should the uni- verse have been created in a particularly low state of entropy—or was this just an accident without which time might have been isotropic? And how does the asymmetry of time as we know it relate to the apparent non-existence of phenomena involving *‘backwards’ causation, such as *time-travel? These are problems which are still very little understood by either metaphysicians or physicists. e.j.l. *endurance and perdurance; persistance through time; presentism; space-time; specious present; tense. P. Horwich, Asymmetries in Time (Cambridge, Mass., 1987). J. R. Lucas, The Future (Oxford, 1989). R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time (Oxford, 1993). time preference. We are often prepared to opt for a good thing now even if we know that a better thing can be obtained later with at least as much probability. This sort of attitude is known by decision theorists as time prefer- ence, and the question of its rationality is much debated. Some suggest that time preference is a biologically evolved strategy to discount future goods—a sensible enough one for creatures for whom the calculation of future probabilities would be too difficult or a waste of cognitive resources. e.j.l. *decision theory. R. Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ, 1993). time’s arrow. Time has, it seems, both a ‘forward’ and a ‘backward’ direction, unlike any of the dimensions of space. But is this a feature internal to *time itself? Is it related to *causal asymmetry? If an event e is earlier than another event d, then, unless time is circular, d is not also earlier than e. But in virtue of what is one event or moment of time earlier, rather than later, than another? Some philosophers attribute time’s ‘arrow’ or directional- ity to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which says, in effect, that complex systems become increasingly dis- ordered over time: glass vases frequently break into frag- ments, but fragments of glass never reassemble themselves into intact glass vases. However, the funda- mental laws of physics appear to be time-symmetric, which makes the Second Law appear to be a contingent consequence of the fact that the physical universe came into existence at the Big Bang in a highly ordered state. Why, though, should we say that the Big Bang was at the beginning, as opposed to the end, of time? e.j.l. S. F. Savitt (ed.), Time’s Arrow Today (Cambridge, 1995). time-travel. The philosophy of time-travel is a serious subject with a burgeoning literature. Early objections to the logical possibility of time-travel have now been answered. For instance, there is no contradiction is saying that the time-traveller has gone back 100 years in time but become a day older in the process, provided we distin- guish between ‘external’ or ‘historical’ time and the ‘per- sonal’ time of the traveller. Again, it is no objection to say that if time-travel were possible the time-traveller could murder his own grandparents and thus prevent his own birth: for time-travel is not a licence to change the past, but at most to affect it—and, given that the time-traveller was born, no effect he has on the past can alter that. The philosophical value of imagining cases of time- travel lies in what such *thought experiments reveal about our concepts of time, *causality, *personal identity, and the like. e.j.l. P. Horwich, Asymmetries in Time (Cambridge, Mass., 1987). ‘to be’, the verb. Russell declared that it was ‘a disgrace to the human race’ that it used the same word in such differ- ent contexts as the following: ‘John is bald’, ‘There is a robin on the lawn’, ‘A dolphin is a mammal’ and ‘The square of three is nine’. These uses of ‘be’ have been called respectively the copulative, the existential, the class-inclusion, and the identity use of ‘be’. Aristotle too had affirmed that the Greek equivalent of ‘be’ was used in more than 920 time one way (Metaphysics v. 7), although his list of the different ways is not the same as Russell’s. Medieval philosophers were divided on the matter, Aquinas following Aristotle and maintaining that being was ‘analogical’, i.e. had differ- ent though connected senses, and others such as Duns Scotus insisting on the univocity of being, i.e. that ‘be’ had only one sense. Arguably all these senses can be reduced to two, the copulative and the existential sense. In its exis- tential sense ‘be’ seems to be doing work otherwise done by ‘some’: ‘There are blue buttercups’ means ‘Some butt- ercups are blue’. In its copulative sense ‘be’ seems to have the purely syntactic function of converting a non-verbal expression into the equivalent of a verb: ‘is a smoker’ is an alternative to ‘smokes’. These two uses seem to have little to do with each other, and it is tempting to regard the verb as used in these two ways as purely equivocal, i.e. as hav- ing two unconnected senses. But this plurality of senses is a phenomenon which occurs in practically all languages (see John M. W. Verhaar (ed.), The Verb ‘Be’ and its Synonyms (Dordrecht, 1967–72)), so it is difficult to regard it as accidental. For one attempt to explain it, see C. J. F. Williams, What is Existence? (Oxford, 1981), chapters 1 and 12. c.j.f.w. *being; existence. token. Contrasted with ‘type’, originally in semiotics, and nowadays in the formulation of identity theses in philoso- phy of mind. A ‘token’ was said by Peirce to be a ‘replica of a symbol’. Tokens, then, are particular meaningful items, which belong to the same type (or replicate the same symbol) if and only if (very roughly) they have the same significance. Following Peirce it can be said, for example, that there are three tokens of the word ‘the’ (that type) in the previous sentence, and that the actual book you’re now reading is a token of the type Oxford Companion to Philosophy. In recent philosophical usage of ‘type’ and ‘token’, dif- ferent kinds of abstraction from that which concerned Peirce are thought to relate tokens (particulars) to types (abstract things). It is said, for instance, that the event which is your now reading is a token of the type reading, and that the event which is Jane’s believing that p is a token of the type belief that p. j.horn. Colin McGinn, ‘Anomalous Monism and Kripke’s Cartesian Intu- itions’, Analysis (1977). C. S. Peirce, ‘On the Algebra of Logic’, in Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass., 1931–5), iii. Toland, John (1670–1722). A radical thinker, born a Roman Catholic in the north of Ireland, who, after aban- doning Catholicism at 15—by ‘his own reason and such as made use of theirs’—moved from latitudinarianism, to *deism, and finally to a materialistic form of *pantheism, coining the word ‘pantheist’ in 1705. Toland’s deism is most evident in his Christianity not Mysterious (1696), a seminal work in both free thought and Irish philosophy. His pantheism is developed esoterically in Letters to Serena (1704)—which contains an acute attack on Spinoza’s the- ory of matter—and more openly in Pantheisticon (1720). He was a prolific controversialist and scholar. His Tetrady- mus (1720) contains the first published essay on the eso- teric–exoteric distinction, a distinction important for understanding his own views as well as those of his fellow free thinkers, such as Anthony Collins. d.ber. R. E. Sullivan, John Toland and the Deist Controversy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). tolerance, principle of: see Carnap. toleration. Requires people to coexist peacefully with others who have fundamentally different beliefs or values. Within Western political philosophy, toleration was first discussed during the Wars of Religion between Catholics and Protestants. When the attempt to impose a single reli- gion failed, the assumption that political stability required a common religion was replaced by the principle of toler- ation. This principle has now been extended to other areas of moral disagreement, including sexual orientation and political belief. Why should we tolerate those whom we see as mistaken, or as heretics? Arguments for toleration include the fallibility of our beliefs, the impossibility of coercing genuine religious belief, respect for autonomy, the danger of civil strife, and the value of diversity. These parallel the arguments for liberalism. Theorists of toler- ation include Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire, and Mill; critics include Rousseau and Comte. w.k. Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (New York, 1989). tone. Used by philosophers to translate Frege’s Beleuch- tung and Farbung. Followers of Frege and J. L. Austin dis- tinguish three ways in which a word or construction can have *meaning: by determining what the speaker says; by indicating whether the utterance is a statement, order, promise, or what not; and (thanks, perhaps, to its sound or associations) by making the utterance more or less apt to affect the state of mind of someone who understands what is said—to illuminate or confuse, to arouse or quiet a feel- ing. This last is its contribution to tone. w.c. W. Charlton, ‘Beyond the Literal Meaning’, British Journal of Aes- thetics (1985). M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London, 1973), ch. 5. topic-neutral. The term was introduced by Ryle for expressions that indicate nothing about the subject- matter, for example, ‘inside’ indicates place, and so is not topic-neutral, but ‘of ’ is topic-neutral. Smart introduced a much more specific sense in which a topic-neutral analysis of a property term entails neither that the property is phys- ical nor that it is non-physical. He gave topic-neutral analyses of mental terms which were the first functionalist identity-claims. Further, he argued that anyone who accepts an empirical physicalist or functionalist identity topic-neutral 921 thesis (e.g. pain = c-fibre stimulation, or pain = such-and- such a computational state) should also accept a topic- neutral (functionalist) conceptual analysis of mental-state terms. Suppose S 17 is a brain state or a functional state and that the claim that pain = S 17 is offered as an empirical identity-claim. Then the terms flanking the ‘=’ must pick out the common referent via different modes of presenta- tion. The mode of presentation of ‘pain’, however, pre- sumably will be something mental, even something phenomenal, requiring the empirical identity theorist to claim that the mode of presentation is also a physical– functional state, say, S 18 . A regress can be avoided only by accepting an a priori identity, and the only candidate is a topic-neutral analysis of mental-state terms in terms of the states’ normal causes and effects. (Only in an a priori iden- tity will the terms flanking the ‘=’ refer via the same mode of presentation.) Thus, according to Smart’s argument, empirical identity-claims engender topic-neutral analyses. n.b. *identity theory; functionalism. Stephen White, ‘Curse of the Qualia’, Synthese (1986). tradition. Customary sets of belief, or ways of behaving of uncertain origin, which are accepted by those belonging to the tradition as persuasive or even authoritative and which are transmitted by unreflective example and imitation. It is a conceptual joke for a school to announce that as from June it will be a tradition that . . . The nature of trad- itions is such that they cannot (logically) be willed; rather they have grown up. Traditions exist in all areas of life— literature, religion, legal institutions, and so on—but the term is of particular interest in political philosophy. For those political philosophers hostile to the idea of tradition it is perceived as representing entrenched privileges hold- ing back political and social progress, and it is to be con- trasted with a vision of human beings controlling their own destinies with rational decisions and asserting ratio- nally based rights. This latter was the position of revolu- tionary political thinkers such as Rousseau, Tom Paine, and Richard Price. Their position was opposed by thinkers such as Edmund Burke, who had less faith in reason. For traditionalists like Burke social life is kept going not mainly by rational decision-making but by feeling, habit, emotional attachments, and conventions. r.s.d. *conservatism; revolution; reform. Charles Parkin, The Moral Basis of Burke’s Thought (Cambridge, 1956). tragedy. Philosophical reflection on tragic drama is as old as tragedy itself. Plato found tragedy antithetical to philoso- phy, claiming that it nourishes an irrational part of the soul which takes pleasure in empathizing with fierce emotions. Indeed, only by opposing tragedy’s pre-eminence, and its claim to provide a comprehensive ethical education, could Plato establish philosophy’s claim to be uniquely concerned with truth and the good. Aristotle, in response, saw tragedy as a representation of universal truths which engages our pity and fear in a beneficial way. Of later views, Nietzsche’s is the most well known. For him, tragedy unites a terrifying insight into the destructibility of the individual (associated with Dionysus) with the beauti- ful dream-image (associated with Apollo), producing a uniquely powerful form of art. Tragedy continues to fasci- nate philosophers interested in aesthetics and moral psy- chology. c.j. Aristotle, Poetics. transcendence. Existence beyond; independent exist- ence. For example, God, numbers, and universals are sometimes held to exist beyond space, time, the physical world, or experience (in some non-spatial sense of ‘beyond’). In theology, the transcendence of God is con- trasted with his immanence or pervasion of the world. In medieval philosophy, the transcendentals are notions that are too fundamental to be accommodated in Aristotle’s ten categories: for example, unity, truth, goodness, and being. In Kant’s critical philosophy, ‘transcendent’ know- ledge of non-spatio-temporal reality that cannot be subsumed under the *categories is impossible; ‘transcen- dental’ knowledge, *a priori knowledge of how know- ledge is possible, is possible and is the content of the critical philosophy. One of the most fundamental and persistent divisions within philosophy is between philosophers who think there is a transcendental reality and those who do not. Indeed, the history of philosophy can be understood as the recurrent advocacy and repudiation of transcendence. A clue to understanding belief in metaphysical reality lies in taking the world with which we are acquainted as only part of a greater whole. The known arguably depends upon the unknown, because metaphysical questions can be raised within and about the empirical world but cannot be answered by any further empirical inspection: Why is there a universe? Why is a particular person oneself? Why is it now, now? What is being? Is there life after death? s.p. Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, tr. Timothy McDermott (Oxford, 1993), 51ff. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1978). transcendental analytic. This is Kant’s title for the portion of the Critique of Pure Reason dealing with the nature and function of the understanding. Kant argues that the understanding is equipped with a set of *a priori concepts or *categories, including substance and causal- ity, which are required for the knowledge of an object or an objective realm. From this he concludes that all objects of possible experience must conform to these categories. h.e.a. H. J. Paton, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience (New York, 1936). transcendental arguments. Anti-sceptical arguments of the form: There is experience; the truth of some 922 topic-neutral proposition p is a conceptually necessary condition of the possibility of experience; therefore p. Kant, with whom transcendental arguments are mainly associated, regarded them as only capable of providing *synthetic a priori knowledge of the world as it appears rather than as it is in itself. q.c. I. Kant, ‘The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Proofs’, in Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1929). R. Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (Oxford, 1999). transcendental deduction. Kant’s name in the Critique of Pure Reason for the reasoning which simultaneously justi- fies both the applicability of the pure concepts of the understanding (*categories) to objects of experience and the objectivity of experience itself. The term ‘deduction’ here is borrowed from contemporary jurisprudence regarding the need to address matters of right as well as of fact. Starting from the fact that all my representations are grasped together in one consciousness (the unity of apper- ception), the argument asserts that such unity is possible only because synthesized according to the rules contained in the pure concepts. a.h. H. E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven, Conn., 1983), ch. 7. transcendental idealism is Kant’s name for his overarch- ing metaphysical doctrine. Some commentators confine the name to Kant’s own version of the doctrine, while some extend it to other self-proclaimed versions, notably Schopenhauer’s, and even to positions, like S ´ an . kara’s, that anticipated Kant’s. Transcendental idealism maintains, in Kant’s version, that the world as known to creatures like ourselves, who rely on perceptual experience and conceptual understanding, is not the world of *things-in- themselves—of things as they are independently of cogni- tion— but of ‘appearances’. We have knowledge only of *phenomena (things in the sensible realm), and not of the *noumena which are knowable only by a being, like God, capable of a non-sensory ‘intellectual intuition’. For example, we experience the world as spatio-temporal, even though space and time are ‘forms of (our) sensibil- ity’, not features of reality-in-itself. Kant favourably con- trasts his transcendental idealism with transcendental realism and empirical idealism, which respectively hold that our knowledge extends to things-in-themselves, and that objects of experience are not grounded in extra-men- tal reality. Schopenhauer criticized Kant for overlooking a non-representational mode of knowledge whereby we are acquainted, albeit imperfectly, with reality-in-itself as *will. d.e.c. H. E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven, Conn., 1983). A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, 3rd edn. (London, 1974). transcendentalism. The word ‘transcendentalism’ can be applied either to something large, shapeless, and generic or, more straightforwardly, to something historically and geographically distinctive, which willingly accepted the name. In the larger sense transcendentalism is belief in the existence of things that transcend sense-experience or, more reflectively, belief in the possibility of transcendent metaphysics, that is to say, philosophical reasoning which aims to establish beliefs about transcendent entities. *God might seem an obvious example of a transcendent, but those who accept religious or mystical experience as a source of knowledge might resist that. The *Forms or Ideas of Plato, which are not in space and time and not encountered in the world of the senses, are more incon- testably transcendent. Some have said, or, like Berkeley, implied, that Locke and representationalists generally, who take our beliefs in the existence of material things to be causal inferences from our sense-experiences, are tran- scendent metaphysicians. Many philosophers of science, along similar lines, have said the same about belief in the literal existence of such theoretical entities as atoms and subatomic particles. Transcendent metaphysics has been attacked in two main ways. In the first place it can be argued that there can be no rational warrant for the inferences that transcenden- tal metaphysicians make from experience to what tran- scends it. Secondly, it has been argued by positivists of various kinds that since the terms that figure in the utter- ances of transcendent metaphysicians have no criteria of empirical application, those utterances are devoid of mean- ing. The philosophy of Kant contains elements of both approaches. He does not deny meaning to the theses that the world is infinite in size or has a first cause (and their opposites), but he holds them to be undecidable or unknowable for the reason that the concepts employed in them are being used outside the sphere of their legitimate application, which is within experience. To make things more complicated he also holds that there are transcendent things-in-themselves, noumenal objects or selves, indeed, perhaps, that these are the only truly real things that there are. With a final turn of the screw he describes his own inquiries and their results as transcendental, meaning by this not that they are concerned with the transcendent, but that they are concerned with the possibility of knowledge. More definite in outline, if not in content, is *New Eng- land Transcendentalism. This was the body of ideas elab- orated by Emerson and a group of associates—among them Thoreau, George Riley, Orestes Brownson, and Bronson Alcott—who lived in or met at Concord, Massa- chusetts between about 1830 and 1860. It was a very diluted variety of philosophical thought. Plato and Plot- inus, Coleridge and Carlyle, Eastern scriptures, German mystics like Boehme and the Romantic German idealists, all contributed to a doctrine which stressed the spiritual unity of the world (thus interpreting God in an untran- scendentally pantheistic way) and the superiority of intu- ition as a source of knowledge as opposed to logical reasoning and sense-experience. They relied heavily on the distinction of true reason from the merely analytic understanding, the doctrinal cornerstone of *philosoph- ical Romanticism. It supplied a foundation for the transcendentalism 923 ‘spiritual religion’ they upheld against the natural religion of the Enlightenment and the revealed religion of Calvinism. As important deliverances of intuition they affirmed the natural goodness of man and his freedom, in oppos- ition to the emphasis of *Calvinism on original sin and pre- destination. Many of the Transcendentalists had started out as Unitarians. Rejecting the Calvinist orthodoxy of their time and place, they were equally hostile to scientific materialism, the conception of the world formed by the mere understanding. New England Transcendentalism was more a social movement than a philosophical school. It expressed itself in the formation of ideal communities such as Brook Farm—the inspiration of Hawthorne’s Blithedale Romance. Its adherents took progressive positions on the emancipa- tion of women and the abolition of slavery. a.q. O. B. Frothingham, Transcendentalism in New England (New York, 1876). Perry Miller (ed.), The Transcendentalists (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London, 1963), ch. 3. transcendental unity of apperception: see apperception. transitive relation. A binary, i.e. two-term, *relation is transitive when if anything x has it to anything y, and y to anything z, then x has it to z (in symbols, R is transitive if and only if ∀x∀y∀z((Rxy Ryz) → Rxz)); for example, being older than. ‘Intransitive’ means: if anything x has it to anything y, and y to anything z, then x does not have it to z; for example, being twice as old as. ‘Non-transitive’ may mean either ‘not transitive’ or ‘neither transitive nor intransitive’. c.a.k. W. Hodges, Logic (Harmondsworth, 1977). translation, indeterminacy of. W. V. Quine argued that there are no uniquely correct translations between lan- guages. This is not the banal point that languages contain words with no precise equivalents in others, but the extra- ordinary claim that there is no such thing, ever, as a uniquely correct translation of a word. It forms part of Quine’s argu- ment that ‘there is no objective matter to be right or wrong about’ where the *meaning of words is concerned (Word and Object, 73), and it has implications in the philoso- phy of mind: if words have no meaning, then beliefs and other *propositional attitudes do not exist. Quine sees this as an acceptable result of behaviourist psychology; the apparatus of stimulus and response will not vindicate common-sense views about meaning, and ‘the very ques- tion of conditions for identity of propositions presents not so much an unsolved problem as a mistaken ideal’ (Word and Object, 206). The doctrine arises from Quine’s dissatisfaction with the Logical Positivists’ version of the distinction between *analytic and synthetic statements, which requires the meanings of words to be explained in terms of the experi- ences appropriate or inappropriate to their use. Quine retorts that single words cannot be paired with experi- ences, since they confront experience in clusters. His cele- brated illustration involves an imaginary community who say ‘gavagai’ when confronted by a rabbit. Other things being equal, it is natural to translate the word as ‘rabbit’. But why not translate it as, say, ‘undetached rabbit-part’? For any experience which makes the use of ‘rabbit’ appro- priate would also make that of ‘undetached rabbit-part’ appropriate. One reply is that we should discover what their word for ‘same’ is (let us say ‘emas’) and then point to different parts of a rabbit and see if the community’s members keep agreeing that this is the ‘emas gavagai’. One would expect them to dissent at some point if this phrase trans- lates ‘same undetached rabbit-part’. However, how are we to obtain the translation of ‘emas’? It seems that this awaits translation of words like ‘gavagai’. For if this trans- lates as ‘rabbit’, then their failure to dissent from ‘emas gavagai’ indicates that the latter may translate as ‘same rabbit’. But if ‘gavagai’ translates as ‘undetached rabbit- part’, then their failure to dissent indicates that ‘emas gav- agai’ should translate as, say, ‘part of the same group of undetached rabbit-parts’. We are trapped in a circle, and Quine contends that this always happens if we try to trans- late ‘gavagai’ by translating other words first. Since experience is not enough to tie down individual words, there is no initial point on which to base a uniquely correct translation. A different reply is that finding out more about the brains and nervous systems of the members of the com- munity would indicate which translation is correct. But Quine argues that the indeterminacy thesis holds even given all facts about the world (past, present, and future) that could be stated in terms of physics. The situation here is delicate: on the one hand, Quine’s critics accuse him of unfairly restricting the range of facts relevant to transla- tion, while he on the other replies that such critics beg the question by smuggling in assumptions about meaning and translation. The imaginary community is only a metaphor. If there is nothing to choose between linguist A’s translation of ‘gavagai’ as ‘rabbit’, and linguist B’s translation of it as ‘undetached rabbit-part’, then why should not B translate A’s uses of ‘rabbit’ as ‘undetached rabbit-part’? Hence, if the argument works, it works within a single language. Responses tend to involve attacks on Quine’s *behav- iourism. But this is not the best approach to his nihilism about meaning, given the currency of nihilism in philoso- phy of mind (and critical theory). The root of the trouble lies in attempts to give ‘scientific’ accounts of language and thought, and Quine’s outlook is more typical of its time than some treatments indicate. g.w.m cc. C. Hookway, Quine (Cambridge, 1988), pt. iii. R. Kirk, Translation Determined (Oxford, 1986). W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), ch. 2. transparency: see opacity and transparency. ∨ 924 transcendentalism transposition (also known as *contraposition). The rule in classical logic whereby we derive ‘If not-q then not-p’ from ‘If p then q’. While admitting its occasional accept- ability, many find transposition (‘an antiquated notion’: Dudman) deeply suspect. Difficult cases include ‘There’s cake if you want it’, and Prior’s ‘If God exists, go to church’. Transposition is the sentential-logic analogue of the argument form *modus tollens, and of traditional logic’s contraposition (whereby from a given sentence we infer another whose subject is the contradictory of the ori- ginal’s predicate). j.j.m. V. H. Dudman, ‘Parsing “If”-Sentences’, Analysis (1984). transvaluation of values (or revaluation of values). Nietzsche’s project of reassessing the worth of things commonly valued positively or negatively. He proposed and undertook to revalue them in terms of their ‘value for life’, i.e. the extent to which they are conducive or detri- mental to the preservation and enhancement of various types of human beings and of human life more generally. This is neither to devalue nor to reverse all prevailing *value-determinations, but rather to revise them in a nat- uralistic manner sensitive to the varying requirements of human flourishing. (See e.g. Beyond Good and Evil, sect. 4; Genealogy of Morals, preface; The Antichrist, sects. 1–7.) r.s. George Morgan, What Nietzsche Means (New York, 1965), ch. 5. traversal of the infinite. An argument for the finitude of the world’s past which originated with Philoponus (490?–575?). An infinite series cannot be completed (the infinite cannot be traversed). But if the world were infinite in past time, then ‘up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed’ (Kant) and thus an infinite sequence would have been completed. Therefore the world is finite in past time. This argument has been offered by, among others, al-Ghaza¯lı¯, St Bonaventure, and Kant. It was, however, decisively refuted by Aquinas and, somewhat more sub- tly, by Ockham. Aquinas pointed out that traversal requires two termini: a beginning and an end. But any past time which could count as a beginning is only a finite time ago. Consequently we do not, in the required sense, have a traversed infinity. j.j.m. *infinity. Norman Kretzmann, ‘Ockham and the Creation of the Begin- ningless World’, Franciscan Studies (1985). triangulation. Davidson invokes this puzzling notion while arguing that thought is an essentially social phe- nomenon. The content of our thoughts, he contends, is determined by their causes. Yet, when you see, and think, there is a table before you, many causal factors contribute to your having this thought. What makes it a thought about the table as opposed to some other link in the causal chain (e.g. your retinal image)? Davidson maintains that this question cannot be answered if we consider you in isol- ation. Once we introduce another person, it becomes evi- dent that communication is possible only on the assump- tion that your respective thoughts converge on public objects of a shared world. The ‘triangle’ <person-person- object> is essential to the determination of the mental content and thus, as Davidson puts it, there can be no first person without a second person. d.bak. Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford, 2001). trolley problem. Suppose you are driving a trolley whose brakes have failed. Ahead of you five people are standing on the track. But here the track forks, and on the alterna- tive path one person stands. Is it morally permissible, or even required, to divert the trolley to save the five from death, at the cost of one? Most people’s intuition is that this is at least morally permissible. Why, then, do we not think it permissible for a surgeon, in urgent need of five different organs to save five patients, to kill a healthy patient to procure them? s.d.r. *acts and omissions. Philippa Foot, ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Dou- ble Effect’, reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford, 1978, 2002). Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Trolley Problem’, reprinted in her Rights, Restitution and Risk (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). trope. The term ‘trope’ was introduced into philosophy by D. C. Williams to mean a particular unrepeatable prop- erty, like the particular blueness of a blue patch that can- not be shared by any other patch, not even a patch that exactly matches the blue patch in colour. Other patches may nevertheless share the same shade of blue by virtue of the fact that their particular bluenesses resemble one another. Tropes are to be contrasted with *universals, which are repeatable properties, like a specific shade of blue that can be shared by many different patches. A par- ticular property may be thought to be a complex of a par- ticular (a patch) and a universal (a shade of blue). By contrast, trope theory claims, a trope is not complex but simple. f.m acb. *properties, individual; universals. Donald C. Williams, ‘On the Elements of Being: I’, in D. H. Mel- lor and A. D. Oliver (eds.), Properties (Oxford, 1997). Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940), real name Lev Davidovich Bronstein. The most famous of the Bolshevik leaders after Lenin, Trotsky played a prominent role in the 1917 Revo- lution and its aftermath, only to be subsequently exiled and murdered by Stalin. Although less interested in phil- osophy than most of his fellow Bolsheviks, Trotsky did address himself to these matters on two occasions. First in the 1920s he became interested in the philosophy of sci- ence. He defended the heterogeneity of the sciences, argued against those who assimilated the method of social science to that of natural science, and refused to claim that dialectical materialism was integral to the creativeness of science. Trotsky displayed the same approach in psychology through his continued preference for the Trotsky, Leon 925 imagination and enterprise of Freud over the plodding behaviouralism of Pavlov. Towards the very end of his life, however, Trotsky dealt more systematically with philosophical questions— but with regrettable results. Prompted by the attack on Marxist philosophy by his hitherto loyal lieutenants Burn- ham and Shachtman, Trotsky wrote In Defence of Marxism which consisted in a dogmatic insistence on the essential- ity of *dialectical materialism to Marxism. For Trotsky here, the politics and economics of Marxism had to be ensconced within the framework of a consistent and well- defined philosophical outlook. Anyone who divorced sociology from dialectical materialism and politics from sociology would, in the end, lose any capacity for political activity. d.m cl. B. Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Oxford, 1978). true for me: see relativism, epistemological. trust. Whether one trusts a specific other commonly depends on whether one thinks the other is trustworthy in the relevant circumstances. This depends on what know- ledge one has of the other’s future commitments to behave as one trusts. Some writers treat trust as a matter of rational assessment and rational choice on the parts of both the truster and the trusted. Perhaps because of its relation to trustworthiness, some theorists treat trust as inherently normative—even to the point of assigning an obligation of trustworthiness to one who is trusted. John Locke thought trust central to consensual government. Contrary to the purely rational-choice vision, many theorists suppose that only a normative commitment to some degree of trust- worthiness can explain the success of many institutions and organizations in serving their clienteles. r.har. *consent; testimony; loyalty. Diego Gambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (New York, 1988). truth. The term ‘truth’ seems to denote a property, one which is also expressed by the truth-predicate ‘is true’. But if so, of what is truth a property? What are the primary ‘bearers’ of truth, and of its counterpart, falsity? (Whether truth and falsity are indeed polar opposites, as the princi- ple of *bivalence implies, is itself a disputed issue.) At least three candidates can be put forward: sentences, *state- ments, and *propositions. Loosely, a sentence is a linguistic token or type, such as the string of written words ‘This is red’. A statement is the assertoric use of a sentence by a speaker on a particular occasion. A proposition is what is asserted when a statement is made—its ‘content’. Thus two different speakers, or the same speaker on two differ- ent occasions, may assert the same proposition by making two different statements, perhaps using sentences of two different languages. And the same sentence (conceived of as a linguistic type) may be used in two different state- ments to assert two different propositions. In addition to speaking of sentences, statements, and propositions being true or false, we also speak of beliefs (and other *propositional attitudes) being true or false. So is the notion of truth ambiguous, or is there a primary notion which attaches to just one of these classes of items? Opinions differ, but a broad division can be drawn amongst theories of truth between those that regard truth as being a property of linguistic or mental representations of some sort—such as primarily sentences, statements, and beliefs—and those that regard truth as primarily a prop- erty of propositions, conceived as items that are represented or expressed in thought or speech, but exist independently of mind and language. Disputes between theorists of truth are sometimes confused by a failure to discern this division. The best-known theory of truth is the *correspondence theory. On this view, a candidate for truth is true if and only if it ‘corresponds to a fact’. Some objectors complain that the notion of a *fact is itself only to be explained in terms of truth (for instance, as being the worldly correlate of a true sentence or proposition), so that the theory is viti- ated by circularity. Others complain that the notion of ‘correspondence’ is either vacuous or unintelligible. It is hard to say which philosophers have really held this the- ory. Aristotle is sometimes said to intimate allegiance to it in his remark that ‘to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true’. Wittgenstein’s ‘picture’ theory of the Tractatus is often cited as exemplifying it. Even Tarski’s *semantic theory of truth has been described as a version of it. But in modern times its clearest advocate has perhaps been J. L. Austin. The theory is often thought to be vulner- able to devastating criticism in the form of the so-called *slingshot argument. This argument seems to show that, given any two truths p and q, the expressions ‘the fact that p’ and ‘the fact that q’ must have the same reference, the implication being that there cannot be more than one fact—sometimes ironically called ‘the Great Fact’. The problem is that correspondence theorists typically main- tain that distinct truths correspond to different facts, but it now appears that these supposed differences between facts inevitably collapse. Very arguably, however, the proper lesson to draw is not that there is something wrong with the correspondence conception of truth as such, but rather that not just its enemies but even some of its friends have unnecessarily embroiled it in bad metaphysics. Almost equally well known is the *coherence theory, whose proponents are usually led to it by the perceived difficulties of the correspondence theory. Accepting that truth cannot consist in a relation between truth-bearers and items which are not themselves truth-bearers (such as ‘facts’), these theorists propose instead that it consists in a relation which truth-bearers have to one another—such as a relation of mutual support amongst the beliefs of an individual or a community. Opponents object that this leads to an unacceptable *relativism about truth, since many different and mutually incompatible systems of belief could be internally consistent and self-supporting. They also sometimes complain that advocates of the 926 Trotsky, Leon theory are guilty of a confusion between stating a criterion of truth—that is, a rule for the evaluation of a belief as being true—and stating what truth consists in. In order to overcome the objection of relativism, some advocates of the coherence theory suggest that the notion of truth is a regulative ideal, which could only be fully real- ized in a unified and completed science far in advance of the fragmented and partial belief systems of any human community that actually exists or is ever likely to. In this guise, the theory overlaps with some versions of the so- called *pragmatic theory of truth, associated with the American philosophers Peirce, James, and Dewey. The latter theory—particularly in the hands of James—urges a connection between what is true and what is useful, point- ing out, for instance, that one mark of a successful scien- tific theory is that it enables us, through associated developments in technology, to manipulate nature to our advantage in ways hitherto unavailable to us. Detractors protest that this (alleged) conflation of truth with utility is pernicious, because the ethics of belief require us to pur- sue the truth with honesty even if its consequences should prove detrimental to our material well-being. All the theories of truth so far mentioned may be called substantive or robust, as opposed to *deflationary, in the sense that they all take truth to be a real and important property of the items—whatever they are—that the theor- ies take to be the primary bearers of truth. But in recent times deflationary theories of truth have become quite popular, the earliest example being the *redundancy the- ory (a later variant of this being the so-called prosentential theory of truth). This theory, building on the apparent equivalence between asserting a proposition p and assert- ing that p is true, holds that the truth-predicate ‘is true’ exists only in order to enable economy of expression, and that what is said with its aid could in principle be said with- out it. A closely related view is that the truth-predicate plays a performative role, enabling speakers to express their approval or endorsement of the assertions of other speakers. Serious-minded philosophers will deplore such views for taking truth to be so flimsy. Some theorists in the pragmatic tradition, such as Stephen Stich, now urge that truth as such has no cogni- tive value—that we literally should not care whether our beliefs are true or false, but only whether they enable us to achieve more substantive goals such as happiness and well-being. However, *Sophists were urging much the same in the time of Plato and—fortunately!—it seems unlikely that philosophers will ever entirely give up asking ‘What is truth?’ and assuming that the answer is some- thing of importance. Quite apart from anything else, giv- ing up the question of truth would deprive them of the endless enjoyment to be derived from attempting to solve the various paradoxes, such as the *liar paradox, which the notion of truth throws up. In recent years, metaphysicians have been emphasizing again the connection between *realism and truth that seems to have inspired many advocates of the correspond- ence theory. This attitude often finds expression in some version of the so-called truth-maker principle—the prin- ciple that every truth (or, at least, every contingent truth) must be made true by the existence of something in reality. Some advocates of the principle, such as David Arm- strong, maintain that truth-makers are states of affairs, others that they are particularized *properties, or tropes. So, for example, on the former view it is Mars’s being red that makes true the proposition that Mars is red, while on the latter it is Mars’s redness that makes this true. Both approaches contend that the world contains a multiplicity of truth-makers, but neither insists, as some versions of the correspondence theory do, that there is a one-to-one correlation between truths and truth-makers. Indeed, truth-maker realism is not committed to the claim that truth consists in, or is definable in terms of, any independ- ently specifiable relation between truth-bearers and other entities of any specific kind. For this reason, it is not vulnerable to many of the objections traditionally raised against the correspondence theory of truth, while at the same time inheriting the attractive realist and anti- relativist implications of that view. e.j.l. *true for me; art and truth. D. M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge, 1997). S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Truth (Oxford, 1999). S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge, 1978). P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1998). R. L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, Mass., 1992). R. L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox (Oxford, 1984). S. P. Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). truth, coherence theory of: see coherence theory of truth. truth, correspondence theory of: see correspondence theory of truth. truth, deflationary theories of: see deflationary theories of truth. truth, double: see double truth. truth, logical: see logical truth. truth, pragmatic theory of: see pragmatic theory of truth. truth, redundancy theory of: see redundancy theory of truth. truth, semantic theory of: see semantic theory of truth. truth, subjective: see subjective truth. truth and truthfulness. The assumptions that one is truthful when speaking truly, and that truthfulness is a virtue, because truth is valuable, are both questionable. True statements can be intentionally misleading (e.g. ‘Someone stole your book’, said by the culprit), and a would-be liar may, through ignorance, inadvertently say something true. In neither case would we describe the truth and truthfulness 927 speaker as being truthful. In The Gay Science (§344), Nietz- sche denies that truthfulness is admired because it helps disseminate truth, for ‘truth at any price’ may be ‘inimical to life’. Rather, we admire truthfulness, irrespective of practical benefits, on the ‘moral ground’ that ‘I will not deceive, even myself’. The virtue of truthfulness is there- fore relatively independent of the value of truth. d.e.c. B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Prince- ton, NJ, 2002). truth-conditions. Usually short for ‘truth- and falsity- conditions’. The truth-conditions of an indicative sentence are the conditions under which it would be true, or false: e.g. ‘I’m exheredated’ is true if the speaker is at the time of speaking exheredated, and false otherwise. The truth- conditions of a word or phrase are its contribution to the conditions under which an indicative sentence con- taining it would be true, or false: e.g. (for the word ‘exheredated’) any sentence ‘a is exheredated’ is true if ‘a’ in it refers to something exheredated, and false otherwise. (These are very simple examples; even so, it is not implied that they are necessarily accurate, especially over falsity.) c.a.k. D. K. Lewis, ‘General Semantics’, in Philosophical Papers, i (New York, 1983). truth-function. A proposition is a truth-function if its truth-value is determined by the truth-value of its components (or arguments). In the standard *propos- itional calculus (PC), propositions have truth-values True or False exclusively. The logical constants ~, ∨, ·, ⊃, ≡ (in one standard notation), which approximate to the English ‘not’, ‘or (inclusive)’, ‘and’, a use of ‘if’, and ‘if and only if’, respectively, are so defined that a *well- formed formula of PC which is a proposition is a truth-function. For example, where φ and ψ are propositions, ~φ is true if and only if φ is false, (φ ∨ ψ) is true if and only if φ is true or ψ is true or both are true, and so on as given in the *truth-tables for the logical con- stants. There is therefore an effective procedure for determin- ing the truth-value of any PC proposition given the truth- value of its basic (atomic) propositional components. r.b.m. B. Mates, Elementary Logic (Oxford, 1972). truth-table. In the *propositional calculus, if φ and ψ are propositions, then the truth-value True or False of the truth-functions ~φ , (φ ∨ ψ), (φ · ψ), (φ ⊃ ψ), (φ ≡ ψ) may be determined from the following matrices: φ ~φ TF FT φψ(φ ∨ ψ)(φ · ψ)(φ ⊃ ψ)(φ ≡ ψ) TT T T T T TF T F F F FT T F T F FF F F T T where ‘~’, ‘∨’, ‘·’, ‘⊃’, ‘≡’ may be translated as ‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘if . . . then – – –’, and ‘ . . . if and only if – – –’ respect- ively. The truth-value of truth-functions constructed out of n basic (atomic) propositions can be determined from a truth-table of 2 n lines by systematic application of the matrices. For example, if p and q are basic or atomic propositions, then the truth-table for ((p · q) ⊃ p) may be given as follows. pq((p · q) ⊃ p) TT TT TF FT FTFT FF FT and translated as: If p and q, then p. r.b.m. B. Mates, Elementary Logic (Oxford, 1972). E. L. Post, ‘Introduction to the Theory of Elementary Propos- itions’, American Journal of Mathematics (1921). truth-value. The truth (T or 1) or falsity (F or 0) of a proposition is its truth-value. In *propositional calculus, propositions are regarded primarily as the bearers of these two values: the *truth-table method is used to calculate the value of compound expressions. Systems using more than two such values have been developed by some modern logicians, e.g. Łukasiewicz. c.w. A. N. Prior, Formal Logic, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1962), pt. iii, sect. 2. trying, or attempting; phenomenon whose relation to *belief, *desire, *intention, is investigated in philosophy of action. Some philosophers accord trying a prominent role in action’s elucidation, believing both that someone who does something intentionally tries to do it, and that trying marks a point where mental and physical concepts meet in their application. A person’s trying to do something is nat- urally thought of as ‘mental’; but an event of a person’s trying to do something is, arguably, usually the same as a ‘physical’ action of hers. j.horn. *volition. Jennifer Hornsby, Actions (London, 1980), ch. 3. Tugendhat, Ernst (1930– ). One of the most important contributors to the re-establishment of *analytic philoso- phy in Germany after the Nazi period, in which almost all 928 truth and truthfulness analytic philosophers had to leave the country. Tugend- hat, born in Brno as a Jew, emigrated to Venezuela, received his BA at Stanford 1949, his Ph.D. in Freiburg 1956, and his Habilitation in Tübingen 1966. He has held professorships in Heidelberg, Starnberg, and Berlin. Trained by Heidegger in the Aristotelian and phenom- enological tradition, he argues in an original way that ana- lytic philosophy of language is the culmination of Aristotle’s ontological project. Throughout Tugendhat’s work the central characteristic of philosophy is ‘the idea of organizing life as a whole in accordance with truth, i.e. the idea of a life of critical responsibility’. Along the same lines, he argues that Wittgenstein’s view of self- knowledge and Heidegger’s account of practical self- understanding are intrinsically connected because consciousness of the self arises only when I ask the ques- tion what kind of human being I aspire to be. This ques- tion also plays a central role in ethics as Tugendhat conceives it: morality can only be justified relative to con- ceptions of good personhood. s.g. E. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, tr. P. A. Gorner (New York, 1982). Turing, Alan (1912–54). English mathematician best known for the *Turing machine and the Turing test, both concerned with the relation between computation and mind. Turing’s work in mathematical logic in the late 1930s systematized ideas of Gödel and Church in the form of an abstract description of what an idealized finite agent could compute. During the Second World War Turing worked on deciphering German codes, and in particular on the computational machinery required. After the war he worked on early digital computers and in 1950 pub- lished ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ in Mind. In this article he proposes a test for thought: a machine can think if its replies to questions are indistinguishable from those of a human. a.m. *computers. Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing (London, 1985). The Essential Turing, ed. B. J. Copeland (Oxford, 2004). Turing machine. A Turing machine is an idealization of an ideal finite calculating agent. It is usually described as if it were a mechanism, but a description as an ideal clerk would also be possible. So a Turing machine has an infin- ite tape (or notepad), a head which reads or writes sym- bols from a finite list to it (or pen), and a finite number of states. A machine-table specifies what, given a state and a symbol, will be overwritten at that point, and the next state. It can calculate anything any digital computer can. Three fundamental facts are (a) the characterization does not depend on details of how many symbols etc. there are; (b) there is a ‘universal’ Turing machine which can mimic the output of any other machine; (c) there is no Turing machine which, given a specification of any arbitrary Tur- ing machine and an input, will halt when that machine halts, given that input. The last, (c), is closely related to Gödel’s theorem. Turing machines can give substance to *functionalism in the philosophy of mind. a.m. *computer; Gödel’s theorem. George Boolos and Richard Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, 3rd edn. (Cambridge, 1990). The Essential Turing, ed. B. J. Copeland (Oxford, 2004). Twardowski, Kazimierz (1866–1938). Polish philosopher who became the father of Polish *analytic philosophy. Twardowski studied in Vienna with Brentano (Ph.D. 1891, Habilitation 1894). In 1895 he was appointed a pro- fessor of philosophy at the University of Lvov. Twar- dowski was a distinguished teacher who trained many Polish philosophers and logicians, including Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbin´ski, Les´niewski, and Łukasiewicz. In his essay Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894) Twardowski introduced a distinction between the con- tent and the object of presentations which completed Brentano’s earlier analysis of psychic phenomena in terms of acts and objects. Twardowski also argues for the thesis that there are no objectless presentations and develops a theory of objects. His Habilitationsschrift considerably influenced Meinong’s ontology and Husserl’s preparatory studies to Logische Untersuchungen. The actions–products distinction is another of Twardowski’s conceptual clarifi- cations which deserves to be mentioned. j.wol. K. Twardowski, On the Content and Object of Presentation, tr. H. Grossmann (The Hague, 1976). twin earth. Imaginary counterpart to earth introduced in thought experiments in philosophy of mind and language. In Putnam’s famous example, on twin earth the stuff which falls from the sky, comes out of taps, and consti- tutes oceans, etc. is XYZ, not H 2 O. Putnam argued that a person’s meaning what she does cannot be ‘in her head’, since twin earth’s inhabitants’ heads are not relevantly dif- ferent from earth’s, but what they mean by ‘water’ is dif- ferent from what earth’s inhabitants mean. j.horn. John Heil, The Nature of True Minds (Cambridge, 1993), ch. 2. two-envelope paradox. Imagine that you are offered a choice between two envelopes, each containing money. One has twice as much money as the other, but you are not told which. Once you have selected an envelope, A, you are offered a further choice. You can either open the envelope or swap it for the other, B. You reason as follows. Let the amount of money in A be x. The other envelope, B, con- tains either 2x or x/2. The two possible outcomes are equally probable. Therefore, the expected value of swapping A for B is (0.5 × 2x) + (0.5 × x/2) = 5/4x. Since the expected value of hang- ing on to A is x (given that it is certain that A contains x), if I want to maximize expected value, I ought to swap A for B. This is paradoxical because, once I have swapped A forB, a similar line of reasoning will show that I ought to swap back—and so on indefinitely. j.ber. *decision theory; paradoxes. two-envelope paradox 929 . example, that there are three tokens of the word the (that type) in the previous sentence, and that the actual book you’re now reading is a token of the type Oxford Companion to Philosophy. In. non-verbal expression into the equivalent of a verb: ‘is a smoker’ is an alternative to ‘smokes’. These two uses seem to have little to do with each other, and it is tempting to regard the verb as used in these. meaning to the theses that the world is infinite in size or has a first cause (and their opposites), but he holds them to be undecidable or unknowable for the reason that the concepts employed in them