sensory items rather than physical things. He describes himself as a nominalist and The Structure of Appearance as formulated in nominalistic terms. Goodman’s *nominal- ism is sometimes described as a rejection of classes, but may best be summed up in his words: ‘the nominalist rec- ognizes no distinction of entities without a distinction of content’. According to Goodman, then, the class whose members are the counties of Utah is not to be distin- guished from the class of acres of Utah or from the single individual, the state of Utah. This view has been described as a ‘simple materialism’ based on the ‘crude principle’ that the entities supposed unintelligible (classes as distinct from their members) are those things we cannot point at or hold in our hands. In Fact, Fiction, and Forecast Goodman proposed his ‘new riddle of induction’. Hume had seen that we make predictions based on regularities in experience, while arguing that there was no rational basis for this. But not all observed regularities form the basis for predictions: though all examined emeralds are *grue we do not imagine that all emeralds are. Goodman was an art collector, and this interest was also reflected in his philosophical writings. In Languages of Art (1968) he discusses such topics as representation, expression, and authenticity from the perspective of what he calls ‘a general theory of symbols’. m.c. *aesthetics, history of; aesthetics, problems of. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1983). —— Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, 1978). R. Rudner and I. Scheffler (eds.), Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman (Indianapolis, 1972). good will. Moral agents, on a Kantian view, can be held accountable for the orientation of their will, as they can not for their physical and psychological make-up. The will has to be seen as free—initiating action because duty calls for it, or else assenting—also freely—to action out of inclin- ation. Thus, distinctive or ‘genuine’ moral worth lies not simply in the mere performance of right acts, but in doing them from a motive of duty—that is, from a good will, steadily aligned to whatever duty requires. Such a view is of course compatible with a concern about the conse- quences of action—but only so long as the supreme value of the good will itself is not lost from sight. Moral theorists dispute whether this account warps and narrows the range of moral appraisal, by undervaluing spontaneous goodness and goodness of character. But it is hard not to agree that my good will is morally appraisable in a distinct- ive and strong sense. It monitors, endorses, rejects, and modifies the components of my temperament and charac- ter for whose existence I am not in the same thorough- going way responsible. What I choose to make of these components or do with them is indeed morally apprais- able, and is a matter of attention and will. r.w.h. *consequentialism. H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London, 1948). Gorgias (5th century bc). The most celebrated rhetorician of the century. From Leontini in Sicily, he was a prom- inent figure in the sophistic movement in Athens in the last quarter of the century. (*Sophists.) He also had philosoph- ical interests, and was reputedly a pupil of Empedocles. The surviving portions of his works not only attest his florid rhetorical style, but also touch on some substantial issues, including responsibility (in his Defence of Helen). The curious essay On What Is Not is an application (of dubi- ous seriousness) of Eleatic argumentative techniques to establish a variety of sceptical and nihilistic conclusions. He figures prominently in Plato’s Gorgias. c.c.w.t. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, iii (Cambridge, 1969), ch. 11.2. grace. That which is granted by the will of God. Divine assistance, especially that conducive to sanctification and salvation. It is argued, for example by Augustine, Luther, and Calvin (following Romans 9: 11–26), that the grace of God does not depend on merit. Augustine distinguishes grace necessary for action (adiutorium sine quo non fit) from grace sufficient for action (adiutorium quo fit). Aquinas calls the inspiring presence of God in the soul ‘habitual grace’ or ‘sanctifying grace’, and divine intervention causing a good human act ‘actual’ grace. The ability to not act sin- fully since the Fall, the salvation of the soul, and the pos- session of Christian faith itself are arguably by the grace of God. The sacraments are symbols or instruments for the reception of grace, but grace may be bestowed without them. s.p. Augustine, De Corruptione et Gratia xii. 34. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae q. 110 a.1. Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans (1515–16). Jean Calvin, Institutes iii xxi 1, 5. grammar. A formal system for describing the structure of natural languages. The term is used, in one sense, to mean traditional grammar, and in another, more theoretical sense, to mean generative grammar. Traditional gram- mar at best describes ideals of practice offering prescrip- tive rules that tell us how others would like us to use our language. It is alleged that it can provide philosophical insight into the presuppositions harboured in ordinary language, and that correct attention to it resolves philo- sophical misunderstanding. Grammar in the more technical sense, given precision by Chomsky’s notion of a generative grammar, is a system of rules or principles from which can be derived all and only the grammatical *sentences of a language. The task in constructing grammars for particular languages is to design a formal system that will account for most of the facts with the fewest number of independent principles and posits. Such a grammar is generative in the formal sense that it makes it explicit how all of the permissible sequences of words follow from a finite set of principles and a finite stock of vocabulary (lexical) items. The theory of grammar studies linguistic competence, not performance; i.e. it accounts for what speakers know 350 Goodman, Nelson about their language, not all the uses they make of it. This is because performance may be full of slips of the tongue, inattention, false starts, mistakes speakers would like to correct on reflection, etc. A theory of performance would have to include not just a theory of linguistic mastery but also psychological theories of memory, perception, atten- tion, and motor functioning which all contribute to actual language use. This means that the data for theories of gram- mar will always be indirect. In addition to verbal behaviour, linguists elicit judgements from speakers (misleadingly called intuitions) about which strings of words are gram- matical, or belong to their language. For example, ‘George drank the wine’ and even the semantically anomalous ‘The wine drank George’ are grammatical; whereas ‘George wine drank the’ is not. To use it to say what the first sentence says is not to be speaking English. Judgements about what is grammatical, however, are not always reliable; they simply provide the best available evidence of which sentences are well formed (i.e. grammatical) in the speaker’s language. Speakers may find some sentences ungrammatical at first due to parsing problems. Well-known examples are centre-embedded constructions such as ‘The girl the cat the dog bit scratched cried’ (cf. ‘The boy the dog bit cried’), and garden-path sentences such as ‘The horse raced past the barn fell’. Difficulties with these are due to processing and memory limitations. Hence even the mentalist hypothesis that grammar is a cognitive state has to distin- guish grammars as bodies of knowledge, from parsers as systems of processing rules for producing and compre- hending strings. A grammar that generates all and only the grammatical sentences of a speaker’s language is said to be observation- ally adequate. A grammar is said to be descriptively adequate when it also assigns structural descriptions to those strings. Grammar is really the theory of syntactic struc- tures rather than word strings, since it must account for grammatical relations between sentences and explain why certain structures are ruled out. To do this it must postulate real, though hidden, levels of syntactic represen- tation. (*Structure, deep and surface.) For example, the sentences ‘John is easy to please’ and ‘John is eager to please’ look on the surface like similar arrangements of words of the same grammatical category. But the first can be transformed into the sentence ‘It is easy to please John’, whereas the second has no related form ‘It is eager to please John’. This is because ‘John’ is the object of ‘to please’ in the first structure, but the subject in the second. (Chomsky argues that these subject and object positions should be marked in the syntax by empty categories.) Sen- tences are hierarchical, not linear, arrangements of con- stituents, where constituent structures are units of syntax larger than the word and smaller than the sentence. All sentences contain groupings like noun phrase and verb phrase which mark major constituent boundaries. These phrase structures can be represented by tree diagrams, or labelled and bracketed strings; e.g. [ S [ NP The horse raced past the barn] [ VP fell]]. A theory of grammar is said to be explanatorily adequate if it is the descriptive grammar which records the knowledge of language speakers have actually acquired and the structural descriptions they assign to their sentences, i.e. if it is psychologically real. b.c.s. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). J. Katz (ed.), The Philosophy of Linguistics (Oxford, 1985). P. Sells, Lectures on Contemporary Syntactic Theories (Stanford, Calif., 1985). grammar, autonomy of. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that language is answerable to the essential nature of reality. The logical syntax of simple names (their com- binatorial possibilities) must mirror the metaphysical combinatorial possibilities of the simple objects that are their meanings. Names are connected with the objects in reality which are their meanings by word–world correl- ations. Similarly, the use of the negation sign must reflect the essence of the operation of negation, etc. In Philosophical Grammar, chapters ii and x, he repudi- ated this view. He ceased to employ the term ‘logical syn- tax’, no longer believing that there is a philosophically significant distinction between syntactical (formation) rules and semantical rules ‘connecting language with real- ity’ (e.g. by means of ostensive definitions). Ostensive definitions appear to connect words with objects and properties in reality, but this appearance is deceptive. The object pointed at in an ostensive definition of a colour- word, for example, is being used as a sample, and a sample is part of the means of representation, not an object repre- sented (described) by the ostensive definition. This is evi- dent from the fact that instead of the description ‘A is red’ one may say ‘A is this ↑ colour [pointing at a sample]’, sub- stituting a sample, deictic gesture and indexical for the word ‘red’. Here the *ostensive definition is visibly func- tioning as a substitution rule. So ostensive definition remains within language and does not connect language and reality. *Grammar, he now suggested, is constituted by all the linguistic rules that determine the sense of an expression. Here he diverged from the customary use of ‘grammar’ (which excludes explanations of word-meaning, and admits as grammatical sequences of words that lack sense). But he denied that there are two different kinds of grammar, ordin- ary grammar and philosophical grammar. Rather there are two different kinds of interest in the rules of language, the grammarian’s and the philosopher’s. The latter’s interest is guided by the purpose of resolving philosoph- ical problems. Wittgenstein now argued, contrary to his earlier view, that grammar is ‘arbitrary’ or autonomous, i.e. that it is not answerable to the nature of things. The idea that grammar can be justified by reference to reality in the sense in which an empirical proposition is justified by ref- erence to what makes it true is incoherent. The rules for the use of names, e.g. ‘red’, do not mirror the metaphys- ical nature of the colour, but constitute it. Similarly, the rules for the use of the negation sign do not reflect the grammar, autonomy of 351 nature of negation, but determine it. ‘Grammatical prop- ositions’, e.g. ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’, are in effect rules, not descriptions of reality. What appear to be metaphysical necessities are in effect no more than the shadows cast upon the world by our methods of represen- tation, our rules for the use of expressions. Concepts are not ‘correct’, let alone justifiable as true, but only more or less useful for our purposes. Alternative grammars are conceivable. They are constrained, but not made more or less correct, by our nature (e.g. by our perceptual and intellectual capacities) and by the contingencies of the world. p.m.s.h. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1986), 179–92. grammatical proposition. Term of art used by the later Wittgenstein to signify a proposition which appears to state truths about the nature of things, but whose actual role is to give a rule for the use of its constituent expres- sions. ‘Red is a colour’, ‘Nothing can be red and green all over simultaneously’, ‘Red is darker than pink’ look as if they state necessary truths about the nature of colours. Actually they specify rules for the use of colour words, namely that if something is red, it can also be said to be coloured; if something is red all over, it cannot also be said to be green all over; if A is red and B pink, then the infer- ence that A is darker than B is licit. Wittgenstein argued that what appear to be necessary metaphysical truths are at best grammatical propositions. p.m.s.h. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, ii: Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Oxford, 1985), 269–73. Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937). Born in Sardinia, Gramsci was a founder-member and the principal ideologist of the Italian Communist Party, which he briefly led prior to his imprisonment by Mussolini. Whilst in jail, where he remained until his death, he wrote the Prison Notebooks. These are generally regarded as amongst the founding documents of Western Marxism. Drawing on the writings of Croce, Gramsci modified orthodox historical material- ism so as to give an independent role to human conscious- ness and hence to the superstructure relative to the economic base. He used this insight to develop the con- cept of hegemony, or ideological power, to explain the resilience of liberal democracy in the advanced industrial nations of the West. He argued that in order to overthrow the state in such countries, revolutionary parties must first overcome the sources of hegemonic power within civil society, such as churches, schools, and the media. r.p.b. *dialectical materialism. Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, Gramsci and the Italian State (Manchester, 1993). greatest happiness principle. This is one name for the leading principle of *utilitarianism, and one which Ben- tham specifically gave to his central principle towards the end of his life. The main reason for the change was that he thought that ‘happiness’ was a clearer designation than *‘utility’ for the right end of action; the happiness to be considered was of everyone affected by a proposed action or state of affairs. r.h. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legis- lation, 2nd edn. (1823), ch.1, sect.1, n. great man theory of history. An expression used to refer to the claim that the course of the historical process is basic- ally governed by the actions of outstanding individuals, a contention encapsulated in Carlyle’s famous dictum that history is ‘the biography of great men’. Its nineteenth- century opponents, who included Engels, Tolstoy, and Herbert Spencer, argued instead that history was ulti- mately determined by such general factors as economic or social relations, the individuals wielding power being themselves the products or instruments of society. Despite the intrinsic interest of problems concerning the role of the individual in history, debates on this score have tended to be vitiated by uncritically monistic conceptions of historical causation, failures to distinguish between the necessary and sufficient conditions of events, and diver- gences in the criteria employed for estimating the nature and extent of social influence or importance. p.l.g. *superman. S. Hook, The Hero in History (New York, 1943). great-souled man. Greatness of soul (Greek megalop- sukhia, rendered into Latin as magnanimitas) is a self- referential evaluative disposition characteristic of Aristotle’s virtuous agent, consisting in a proper sense of his own worth, manifesting itself in the desire to be honoured for his virtues by his equals (coupled with indif- ference to the opinion of inferiors) and in self-conscious dignity of demeanour (verging on pomposity to the mod- ern eye). Despite the etymological connection, it is nearer to pride than to magnanimity; while the great-souled man appears magnanimous, e.g. in forgiving injuries, he does so not from generosity of spirit, but because nursing grudges is beneath him. c.c.w.t. *superman. W. F. R. Hardie, ‘“Magnanimity” in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Phronesis (1978). Greek philosophy: see ancient philosophy; Greek philoso- phy, modern. Greek philosophy, modern. What point of origin one selects for modern Greek philosophy is to a certain extent an arbitrary matter. For, on the one hand, intellectual phe- nomena never fall neatly into line with the facts of history, while, on the other, modern Greek philosophy has its roots deep in antiquity, being the prolongation of the clas- sical and Christian spirit during Byzantine rule and the Turkish occupation. 352 grammar, autonomy of With this caveat, one can usefully think of ‘early mod- ern Greek philosophy’ as lasting from the year 1453 (the Fall of Constantinople) to the year 1821 (the start of the struggle for national independence). This whole period has certain distinctive features: its attachment to ideals, its Graeco-Christian values, and its unremitting efforts to inform and awaken Hellenic consciousness. ‘Later modern Greek philosophy’ (and it is with this that the pre- sent article is chiefly concerned) emerges from the revolu- tion of 1821. Greece breaks free from the Ottoman Empire, and organizes herself into a nation state. Decisively influenced by the new freedom of thought and action, modern Greek philosophy manifests a number of tendencies. 1. Ancient authors are published, annotated, trans- lated, and interpreted. Thinkers turn to the great philoso- phers of the past—in particular Plato and Aristotle—for inspiration. A halt is called to the conflict between Platon- ists and Aristotelians that had prevailed in Byzantium and throughout early modern Greek philosophy. Though a majority of intellectuals opt for *Platonism, they take proper account of Aristotle, a large number of whose doc- trines win acceptance. Simultaneously there develops a sort of *scholasticism: the idea that faithfully copying the language of the ancient Greeks is the means whereby to advance spiritual culture. 2. Christian authors are published, and commentaries on them are written. This is because those engaged in phil- osophy are also theologians, with a lively faith in the power of Christianity to mould the individual, especially from the perspective of the Greek Orthodox religion. (The second tendency is not seldom at loggerheads with the first; but both are in agreement as regards the need for a ‘learned’ language.) 3. A majority of philosophers attempt a synthesis of Greek and Christian values in the light of the applied sci- ences now under cultivation in western Europe. The major figure in the nineteenth century is Peter Vraïlas- Armenis (1812–84). Vraïlas-Armenis accepts Plato’s the- ory of *innate ideas. His ontology is based on Aristotle’s method in the Categories, whereas his argument for a provident deity is derived from the Christian creed. Parallel with this, he endeavours to assimilate the scientific findings of his time and to synthesize them into a unified theory of the cosmos and humankind. This trend towards synthesis had a new lease of life in the twentieth century, in response to various stimuli: *Kantian ethics, the work of the Baden and Marburg Schools, Hegel’s system, and Herbart and Wundt’s philosophy. No one school is dominant: instead, an eclectic spirit makes itself felt. The specificity of the cultural sciences is recognized. In the search for a more convincing theory of values, new methodological criteria are adopted. Outstanding figures in this movement include Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), President of the Greek Republic, the politician and Prime Minister Panayotis Kanellopoulos (1902–86), Theophilos Voreas (1873–1954), John Theodorakopoulos (1900–81), Christos Androutsos (1869–1935), and Alexan- der Tsirintanis (1903–77). 4. From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, there is a radically different philosophical move- ment which questions traditional solutions and looks for alternatives in *positivism and in a mechanistic account of life and the universe. A considerable number of its adher- ents embrace *materialism and follow the *Marxist view of man and society. Three very representative figures in this movement are George Skliros (1877–1919), Demetrios Glinos (1882–1943), and Avrotelis Eleft- heropoulos (1869–1964). 5. After the Second World War, a dialogue develops between modern Greek philosophy and contemporary modes of thought such as *analytic philosophy, *existen- tialism, *philosophy of language, *phenomenology, the *Frankfurt School, *Thomism, personalism. Though the description and analysis of present currents of European thought is carried out by university lecturers and teachers in institutes of philosophy, one cannot make great claims for the existence of any philosophical school. Today’s Greek philosopher continues to be an eclectic cherishing a belief in the regenerative powers of humanism. g.b. *ancient philosophy. C. Cavarnos, Modern Greek Thought (Belmont, Mass., 1969). G. E. Voumvlinopoulos, Bibliographie critique de la philosophie grecque (Athens, 1966). Green, Thomas Hill (1836–82). English idealist philoso- pher and liberal political theorist. His *idealism logically entails that something’s being what it is essentially con- sists in its being related to other things. According to Green, no relations can be detected empirically, but they may be known by the rational self-conscious minds that construct them. Green emphasizes that this idealism is anti-empiricist because it includes the denial that what something is may be known by sense experience. Indeed, Green’s contributions to the edition of Hume’s works he helped to compile are critical of Hume’s empiricism and his naturalism. Green’s *liberalism is the doctrine that a minimal state is justified in so far as it maximizes the freedom of the indi- vidual. Hence the state may intervene to prevent the free- dom of some citizens being curtailed by others. Green’s holistic view of the state owes more to Hegel than to clas- sical English liberalism, despite Green’s endorsement of the principle that each individual’s freedom should be maximized in so far as this is consistent with a similar free- dom for every other individual. s.p. T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford, 1883; new edn. with introduction by D. Brink, Oxford, 2003). Gregory of Rimini (c.1300–58). A member of the Eremite Order of St Augustine, he taught at Paris, Bologna, Padua, and Perugia, and was Prior General of his order from 1357 till his death. He wrote an influential commentary on the Sentences of Peter of Lombard, in which he has a good deal Gregory of Rimini 353 to say about our knowledge of the external world. He accepts the common view that perception of the outer world requires species which emanate from outer objects and strike our receptors, and argues that in the absence of those objects we still know them, though ‘abstractively’, because we have intuitive, that is, immediate knowledge of the species which have lodged in our minds. In the case of our knowledge of outer objects, it is immediate in that though we cannot see such an object without the aid of the species emanating from it, we do not see the species themselves; the causal role they play does not involve their being perceived. To say otherwise would be to deny that we can have intuitive knowledge of external things. a.bro. G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought (Manchester, 1961). Grelling’s paradox. Due to Kurt Grelling (1886–1941), who was killed by the Nazis while trying to escape across the Pyrenees. Grelling defined the adjective ‘hetero- logical’ to mean the same as ‘not self-applicable’. This seems to entail that ‘heterological’ is heterological if and only if it is not heterological, which is impossible. Now whether ‘not self-applicable’ is self-applicable depends entirely on what that phrase means in application to itself. If it means ‘expresses in itself a property it does not instantiate’ then it is not self-applicable (and ‘heterological’ is heterological) because the phrase (the word), in itself, does not express any property. It expresses different properties depending on its application. If it means ‘yields a true sentence when grammatically self-applied’, then ‘“Not self-applicable” is not self-applicable’ is a version of the *liar paradox, and similarly with ‘heterological’. j.c. Kurt Grelling, ‘The Logical Paradoxes’, Mind (1936). —— and L. Nelson, ‘Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxien von Russell und Burali-Forti’, Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule (1907–8). Grice, H. Paul (1913–88). English philosopher best known for his work on meaning, especially the relation between speaker meaning and linguistic meaning. Grice, who was at Oxford until 1967 and at Berkeley thereafter, intro- duced several notions commonly employed by philoso- phers today. These include conversational implicature, what a speaker implies as opposed to what he says or what his words imply, and reflexive intention, a notion central to the idea of speaker meaning (or *communication). Grice maintained that speaker meaning is prior to linguistic meaning, i.e. that *semantics reduces to *propositional attitude psychology. Taken together, his notions have helped linguists as well as philosophers draw the line between semantics and pragmatics. The distinction between meaning and use has squelched such formerly popular philosophical claims as that looking red precludes being red or that believing something precludes knowing it, claims which were based on the fact that it is misleading to make a weaker statement when a stronger one is justified. k.b. Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). —— Aspects of Reason (Oxford, 2001). Griffin, James (1933– ). Moral philosopher best known for work on *well-being, interpersonal comparison of well-being, and consequentialism. His first book was Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism (Oxford, 1964). In Well- Being (Oxford, 1986), Griffin argues for an ‘informed- desire theory’: well-being consists in the possession of those objects one would desire if rational and informed. These are accomplishment, the components of human existence (autonomy, basic capabilities to act, etc.), under- standing, enjoyment, and deep personal relations. The good-making property of these objects is not their fulfill- ing desires, so Griffin is best interpreted as moving beyond a preference-based theory of well-being to an objective account in the tradition of Aristotle, G. E. Moore, and Rashdall. Though Griffin sees promotion of well-being as the animating aim of morality, he is not clearly utilitarian. He stresses the many levels of moral thinking—personal, political, etc.—and each level has its own characteristic principles. r.cri. *consequentialism. J. Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford, 1986). —— ‘Well-being and its Interpersonal Comparability’, in D. Seanor and N. Fotion (eds.), Hare and Critics (Oxford, 1988). —— Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford, 1996). Grossmann, Reinhardt (1931– ). Born in Berlin; profes- sor at Indiana University, Bloomington, since 1962. Gross- mann’s work is notable for its openness to both contemporary ‘analytical’ philosophy and ‘modern contin- ental philosophy’. For example, he is the author of not only Reflections on Frege’s Philosophy (1969) but also Meinong (1974) and Phenomenology and Existentialism (1984). In his own thinking, Grossmann has developed a neo-Kantian epistemology according to which what passes for reality is determined by an intellectual categor- ial framework. This is apparent in The Structure of Mind (1965) and The Categorial Structure of the World (1983). s.p. *Meinong. Grosseteste, Robert (c.1170–1253). A Suffolk man, he became Chancellor of Oxford University c.1221, Arch- deacon of Leicester in 1229, and was Bishop of Lincoln from 1235 till his death in 1253. He wrote on a wide range of topics in philosophy and theology from an essentially Augustinian perspective. In line with that perspective, which itself is strongly influenced by Platonic and biblical ideas, he placed the concept of light at the centre of his metaphysics, and also at the centre of his epistemology, where he gives an account of human understanding in terms of natural, and ultimately divine, illumination. Grosseteste also composed numerous scientific treatises, being one of a small but growing band who recognized the 354 Gregory of Rimini importance of experiment in the establishment of scientific truth. He was a pioneer in the Christian West as a translator of Aristotle from Greek into Latin. a.bro. J. McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 2002). Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645). Lawyer, poet, and theolo- gian, he mediated classical and medieval political and legal theory to the Enlightenment. While Descartes meditated in army winter quarters, Grotius was a political prisoner planning his masterwork, De Iure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law [and Rights and Wrongs] of War and Peace, 1625). The philosophical concepts he elaborated with juridical learning and creative statesmanship were transposed from late medieval theology. Moral requirements would be valid even if one granted (etiamsi daremus) God’s non- existence. Natural moral law identifies acts as morally necessary or base (and divinely commanded or forbidden) because ‘conformable (or disconformable) with rational and social nature’. *Rights are powers or liberties; political society is for safeguarding individual moral rights. Hume’s celebrated ‘is–ought’ paragraph targets his eva- sive natural law theory, Rousseau’s Social Contract his social contract theory. j.m.f. Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Develop- ment (Cambridge, 1979). —— Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge, 1993). grue. Imagine a time t—say midnight on 1 January 2020. Define ‘x is grue’ to mean ‘x is examined before t and is green or x is examined after t and is blue’. If generaliza- tions are confirmed by their instances, then the fact that all emeralds so far examined are green confirms the general- ization that all emeralds are grue as well as the generaliza- tion that all emeralds are green: but the consequences of the two generalizations are different and the former seems quite bizarre. This is Goodman’s ‘new riddle of *induc- tion’. Goodman introduced the idea of the entrenchment of a predicate (or more properly its extension) in an attempt to distinguish those generalizations which are genuinely confirmed by their instances. m.c. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th edn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1983). Grünbaum, Adolf (1923– ). A prolific philosopher of sci- ence, he has made many contributions to both philosophy of physics and philosophy of psychiatry. Perhaps the most striking claim argued for in his Philosophical Problems of Space and Time (1963; expanded edn. 1973) is the thesis that physical geometry and chronometry are, in part, matters of convention because continuous physical space and time are metrically amorphous. His influential The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984) contains a critique of the scientific cre- dentials of Freudian psychoanalytic theory; it argues that there are methodological and epistemological reasons to think that some central Freudian doctrines are not well sup- ported by empirical evidence. Grünbaum’s more recent studies in the philosophy of psychoanalysis treat in detail such topics as the psychoanalytic theory of transference, the viability of the single-subject case-study method, the placebo concept, and the dream theory. p.l.q. *psychoanalysis, philosophical problems of. A. Grünbaum, Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis (Madison, Conn., 1993). guilt. The state imputed to a person who has done moral or legal wrong. It is distinguishable from having a sense, or feelings, of guilt, since a guilty person may not experience such feelings, and an innocent person may be burdened by unwarranted feelings of guilt. The crux is the question: Was avoidable wrong done by this responsible moral agent? Full acceptance and realization of guilt involves remorse and desire to expiate the wrong done. Ill- managed or excessive guilt can be morally crippling: but equally damaging to moral seriousness is the attempt to disown real guilt—as pathological or as never more than the effect of external conditioning. Mature commitment to moral obligations deeply affects a person’s conception of his own identity, and entails a strong sense of guilty fail- ure on being disloyal to them. Yet guilt is not simply self- reproach: it is inseparable from awareness of the harm, or neglect, brought about to the others affected by one’s action or inaction. The neighbouring concept of shame both overlaps and diverges interestingly from the logical behaviour of guilt. A sense of shame is a sensitivity to the moral criticism of others—especially when one is tempted to fall short of basic standards of decency or integrity. To be ashamed is not only to acknowledge one’s objective guilt, but also to be painfully and depressedly aware of moral failure, of lost esteem and self-esteem, prompting withdrawal from others’ gaze. To be shameless (compare guiltless!) is to lack such sensitivity: when I am guilty, I ought to be ashamed of myself. r.w.h. *forgiveness. R. Spaemann, Basic Moral Concepts (London, 1989), chs. 6 and 7. guru. The Sanskrit word means ‘weighty’. A guru is a pre- ceptor who had the weighty role of preserving the oral wisdom called Veda. Veda is supposed to have been taught originally by God, who is the primordial guru. In ancient times pupils staying at a guru’s home for twelve years had to learn Vedic hymns and rituals, along with phonetics, grammar, astronomy, metrics, rhetoric, logic, and metaphysics. A worshipful attitude towards a guru is inherent in Indian culture—whence the perverted West- ern use of the term for a cult-leader. In the tradition of *Tantra, the word is broken up into gu meaning ‘darkness’ and rumeaning ‘light’, signifying the role of a spiritual eye- opener. Buddhism, which denies the knowledge-yielding capacity of testimony, recommends reliance on one’s own reason rather than on a guru. a.c *Veda¯nta; Indian philosophy. ‘Guru’, in S. Schumacher and G. Woerner (eds.), Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion, tr. Michael H. Kohn et al. (Boston, 1989). guru 355 Habermas, Jürgen (1929– ). A second-generation mem- ber of the *Frankfurt School whose work has ranged widely over issues in epistemology, philosophy of lan- guage, political and constitutional theory, ethics, and aes- thetics. In the late twentieth century the most eminent (as well as controversial) figure in German socio-cultural debate, chiefly because he engaged with these issues not only at a specialist or academic level but also through regu- lar interventions in the broader public sphere. Indeed, it is among his leading claims that this kind of two-way flow between ‘expert’ discourses and matters of shared com- munal concern is vital to preserving the values of an open participant democracy. Hence Habermas’s many journal- istic writings about the post-war West German constitu- tion, about developments in the wake of unification, about asylum-seekers, global justice, and the issue of national identity vis-à-vis the prospects for a federal Europe conceived in terms of a ‘cosmopolitical’ (post- nationalist) agenda. His earlier contribution to the so-called Historikerstreit—the debate about right-wing revisionist accounts of the Holocaust—is one striking instance of Habermas’s role as a public intellectual in the wider context of ethico-political discussion. Most recently he has carried this thinking forward to take account of the drastically changed world situation since the events of 11 September 2001 and the emergence of a US foreign policy with thinly veiled global geo-strategic aims. Perhaps the most impressive feature of Habermas’s work is the way that these interests link up with his other, more ‘purely’ philosophical concerns. Influenced by, but also taking issue with, his teacher, Adorno, Habermas has devoted great energy to defending and reclaiming the val- ues of Enlightenment critique, or what he calls the ‘philo- sophical discourse of modernity’. In early texts, such as Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), he adopts a broadly Kantian but also Marxist-inflected approach, one that seeks to reconstruct the genealogy of the modern natural and human sciences by inquiring back into their social, historical, and epistemological conditions of emergence. What this reveals is a process of increasing specialization in the various spheres of knowledge-constitutive interest, leading to a point where there seems little hope of an informed critical dialogue between them. Thus thought gives way to a naïve or unreflecting (positivist) conception of scientific method, on the one hand, and on the other— in philosophy and the humanistic disciplines—to various forms of subjectivist, relativist, or downright irrationalist belief. Habermas’s aim is to offer an alternative account of this history that draws out both its symptomatic blind spots of prejudice, ideological investment, etc., and those critical or emancipatory resources which can yet be re- covered through a reading alert to their presence in the texts of that same tradition. Hence his departure from Adorno’s mode of ‘negative dialectics’, a thinking that implacably refused the assurances of system or method, and which held out remorselessly against all ideas of achieved rational consensus. For Habermas, as likewise for Kant, such ideas have an indispensable role in orientat- ing thought toward a regulative notion of truth at the end of inquiry. In his later (post-1970) work Habermas adopts a very different perspective, an account of ‘communicative action’ derived largely from speech-act theory, socio- linguistics, and ideas about conversational implicature developed by thinkers like Paul Grice. One reason for this turn toward language (or *discourse) is no doubt the cur- rently widespread rejection of ‘foundationalist’ argu- ments in whatever shape or form. Another is Habermas’s growing conviction that Enlightenment thinking—or the ‘unfinished project’ of modernity—had run into precisely such criticism through its over-reliance on a subject- centred epistemological paradigm. His aim is therefore to reformulate that project in terms of a ‘transcendental pragmatics’, a theory that retains the basic commitment to values of truth, critique, and rational consensus, but which pins its faith on the regulative precept of an ‘ideal speech situation’, a public sphere of uncoerced participant debate wherein those values might yet achieve their fullest, least impeded, or distorted expression. Only thus can Enlightenment thinking make good its emancipatory claims without falling prey to the objections mounted by wholesale pragmatists (such as Richard Rorty) who carry this linguistic turn to the point of equating truth with whatever is currently and contingently ‘good in the way of belief’. During the past decade Habermas has shown a heightened awareness of developments in Anglo- American philosophy. Of particular interest is his lengthy exchange with Robert Brandom with regard to the latter’s H inferentialist account of epistemic commitment, an account which (as both parties agree) exhibits certain striking points of similarity and contrast with Habermas’s theory of communicative action. He has also—in works like Justification and Application—explored the conse- quences of that theory for debates in ethics, jurisprudence, and other normative discourses. Commentators differ sharply in their views as to how far this project stands up to the objections brought against it from various quarters, e.g. by post-modernists and hermeneutic thinkers in the line of descent from Heidegger and Gadamer. On one point at least there is general agreement: that Habermas has always sought to combine these philosophical interests with an active commitment to promoting informed discussion on issues of urgent socio-political concern. It is an example all the more impressive when compared with the stance adopted by those in the post-modern (counter-Enlightenment) camp who have no time for such old-fashioned ideas as ‘the political responsibility of the intellectuals’. c.n. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (London, 1972). —— The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, 1984 and 1989). —— Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, tr. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass., 1993). —— The Habermas Reader, ed. William Outhwaite (Oxford, 1996). habit memory: see memory. Hacking, Ian (1936– ). Canadian philosopher, long based at the University of Toronto. Insisting upon the importance of the empirical, Hacking argues that philosophers too often over-value theory, and hence he would like to promote a ‘back to Bacon’ movement. Consistently, he accepts a doctrine of *natural kinds, argues for epistemological dif- ferences between the natural and social sciences, and views realism–anti-realism debates which fail to take account of actual scientific practices (both in cosmology and in the microcosm) as empty. He is a noted Leibniz scholar. In The Emergence of Probability (1975) and The Tam- ing of Chance (1990) he has given us ground-breaking accounts of two important periods in the history of *prob- ability. In philosophy of language he has mustered empir- ical evidence against claimed radical mistranslation, and similarly has contrasted actual languages without particu- lars (Wakashan languages such as Nootka and Kwakiutl) to Strawson’s theoretical views. j.j.m. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge, 1983). —— The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). haecceity. A *property is something such that some things have or exemplify it; for example, red objects exem- plify the property being red. A haecceity or individual essence is a property such that exactly one individual thing can have it. Thus, Socrates has the individual property of being Socrates. Some philosophers (e.g. Chisholm) argue, however, that there are no individual essences, only the property of being self-identical and concrete individuals such as Socrates. m.b. *qualities; individual property; essence. A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974). Cf. R. M. Chisholm, On Metaphysics (Minneapolis, 1989). Halevi, Judah (before 1075–c.1141). Hebrew poet and philosopher. Of a cultured family in the early Recon- quista, Halevi travelled widely in Muslim and Christian Spain, winning fame for his poems, the finest in Hebrew since the Bible. As the Almoravid invasion devastated his world, Halevi practised medicine and wrote songs of love, wine, friendship, faith, and witness to the destruction around him. Halevi’s philosophic dialogue the Kuzari pictures the conversations that led the Khazar king to his historic con- version to Judaism. Having dreamed that his intentions but not his actions are pleasing to God, the king summons advisers. The intellectualism of the philosopher, he finds, critically needs fleshing out by ethical culture. Christian and Muslim doctrines clearly depend on Jewish lore. When a rabbi is finally summoned, he rests his case not on abstract reasoning but on historical experience, urging the primacy of the land, language, and peoplehood of Israel and addressing pure theology only after the Khazar is committed to the historic faith of Israel. Although widely cited as an anti-philosophical thinker, Halevi is a serious internal critic of philosophy. His strik- ingly modern rejection of the baroque ontology of disem- bodied intellects between God and nature aids his philosophical task of showing how God’s word enspirits the people of Israel, empowering them to achieve their mission to the nations. Like his literary persona, Halevi could not remain exiled in ‘the farthest West’. He left Spain for the Land of Israel, where, according to legend, he was ridden down by an Arab and slain. l.e.g. Judah Halevi, The Kuzari, tr. H. Hirschfeld (New York, 1964). The original title is preserved in The Book of Vindication and Evidence in Behalf of the Despised Faith. Critical edn. by David Baneth (Jerusalem, 1977). hallucination. Seeing and hearing things when there is nothing of the sort to be seen or heard. What we observe is usually explained by our surroundings, so theorists readily assume that hallucinations are similarly explained by something image-like and introspectible in our heads. Philosophers who reject this as armchair psychology sug- gest that hallucinators just form false *beliefs about what they perceive, whatever produces them being unavailable to the victim (if not to brain scientists). This ‘belief’ description, however, looks too intellectual if interpreted as entertaining thoughts about what you perceive, and too thin if interpreted as a disposition to act as if you per- ceive it; it is still hard to resist the idea that any false beliefs formed by hallucinators are based on what is happening to them, which is something like seeing or hearing. So what is the resemblance? j.e.r.s. hallucination 357 *dreams. P. Smith and O. R. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 1986), chs. 7 and 8. Hamilton, William (1788–1856). Educated at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Oxford, Hamilton first professed civil his- tory at Edinburgh in 1821. He later transferred to logic and metaphysics, achieving eminence as a teacher and editor. His invaluable editions of Dugald Stewart and Reid are scholarly but patronizing. He criticizes Reid effectively, yet misrepresents him as saying that sensation is a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain. He deliberately set out to counterbalance the materialism of natural science which ignores God, freedom, and immortality. Believing *knowledge to be perceptual, he called himself a ‘natural or intuitive realist’, although he admitted unconscious modifications of mind not accessible to consciousness but revealed through associations of ideas. Mill pointed out his inconsistency in holding that the primary qualities of objects are known while objects in themselves are not. v.h. William Hamilton, Lectures of Metaphysics and Logic, ed. H. L. Mansell and J. Veitch (Edinburgh, 1869). Hamlyn, David W. (1924– ). Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London (1964–88), and editor of Mind (1972–84). Interests in Aristotle (translation of De anima with commentary (Oxford, 1968)) and in Wittgenstein have influenced Hamlyn’s approach to questions in epistemology and philosophy of psychology. His central thesis (developed in Experience and the Growth of Under- standing (London, 1978), Perception, Learning and the Self (London, 1983), and In and Out of the Black Box (Oxford, 1990)) is that in order to be a knower a being must be active and seek to regulate its beliefs in accord with a norm of truth; this requires membership of a community, interaction with which involves emotional responses. In short, knowers are social, affective agents. The other main area of Hamlyn’s writing is history of philosophy. j.hal. *epistemology, history of; epistemology, problems of. Hampshire, Stuart Newton (1914–2004). English philoso- pher with special interests in the philosophical theory of freedom and the philosophy of mind. In the course of a long career in which he was Grote Professor of Philosophy at University College London, a professor at several American universities, and Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, Stuart Hampshire developed a distinctive and influential position. The key to his position is perhaps to be found in his early book Spinoza (1951) in which he explores Spinoza’s conception of mind and will. These ideas were developed in much more detail in his major work Thought and Action (1959). In this book he examines a set of contrasts between that which is unavoidable in human thought and that which is contin- gent; between knowledge and decision; criticism and practice; philosophy and experience. These contrasts con- tinued to occupy his thinking in several later works. He was married to Nancy Cartwright. r.s.d. *London philosophy. Hannay, Alastair (1932– ). Professor emeritus at the Uni- versity of Oslo, educated in Edinburgh and London, he continues the Scottish tradition of subjective idealism. In Mental Images (1971, reprinted 2003) he argues that visual images, like physical portraits, resemble visible objects. As a kind of sensation a mental image has material properties of its own which allow it to picture. He thus contradicts Ryle and Dennett. Hannay has translated Kierkegaard, and written an intellectual biography and a monograph about his philosophy. Under Hannay’s direction (managing edi- tor 1962–71, editor 1971–2002), Inquiry grew into a widely read philosophical journal. Human Consciousness (1990) reviews contemporary theories of human consciousness while maintaining a characteristic conservatism. Hannay argues that consciousness and the first-person point of view cannot be analysed or displaced by scientific material- ism, nor can they be explained functionally, a view close to that of Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier. v.h. *Kierkegaard. Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (Arguments of the Philosophers, London, 1982, rev. edn. 1991). —— Kierkegaard: A Biography (London, 2001). —— Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays (London, 2003). Hao Wang: see Wang, Hao. happiness. Philosophical discussion of the concept of ‘happiness’ has tended to be found mainly within moral philosophy. It is associated especially with the classical *utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The utilitarians assert that happiness is as a matter of fact the ultimate aim at which all human actions are directed and that it is therefore the ultimate standard by which to judge the rightness or wrongness of actions. ‘Actions are right’, says Mill, ‘in proportion as they tend to promote happiness’—that is to say, ‘the general happiness’, the hap- piness of all concerned. Still following Bentham, Mill goes on to equate happi- ness with ‘pleasure and the absence of pain’. For Bentham the identity of ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ is quite straight- forward. An action’s tendency to promote happiness is determined simply by adding up the amounts of pleasure, and subtracting the amounts of pain, which it will pro- duce. It is a matter solely of quantitative factors such as the intensity and the duration of the pleasurable and painful feelings. Mill is aware that this is altogether too crude. Happi- ness, he acknowledges, depends not only on the quantity but also on the quality of pleasures. Human beings, because of the distinctively human capacities they possess, require more to make them happy than the accumulation of pleasurable sensations. They are made happy not by the 358 hallucination ‘lower pleasures’ but by the ‘higher pleasures’—‘the pleas- ures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments’. Mill departs still further from the purely quantitative notion of happiness when he recognizes that it is not just a sum of unrelated experiences but an ordered whole. To say that human beings aim at happiness is not to deny that they pursue more specific goals such as knowledge or artistic and cultural activity or moral goodness, and that they pursue these things for their own sake. These are some of the ‘ingredients’ which go to make up a life of happiness. Mill is here attempting, perhaps unsuccessfully, to combine two traditions of thought about ‘happiness’. The identification of ‘happiness’ with ‘pleasure’ we may call the ‘hedonistic’ conception of happiness. This we may contrast with what has been called the ‘eudaimonistic’ conception of happiness. The term comes from the Greek word *‘eudaimonia’, which is usually translated as ‘happi- ness’. Although one of the Greek philosophical schools, *Epicureanism, did identify eudaimonia with pleasure, the Greek concept lends itself less easily than the English term to this identification. In English one can speak of ‘feeling happy’, and although the relation between such states of feeling and a life of happiness is not entirely clear, they are undoubtedly connected—one could not be said to have a happy life if one never felt happy. The term eudaimonia refers not so much to a psychological state as to the objective character of a person’s life. The classic account of eudaimonia is given by Aristotle. He emphasizes that it has to do with the quality of one’s life as a whole; indeed, he sees some plausibility in the traditional aphorism ‘Call no man happy until he is dead’ (though he also recognizes that there is little plausibility in calling someone happy after he is dead). For Aristotle hap- piness is to be identified above all with the fulfilment of one’s distinctively human potentialities. These are located in the exercise of reason, in both its practical and its theor- etical form. Aristotle is thus the ancestor of one strand in Mill, and of that general conception of ‘happiness’ which links it with ideas of ‘fulfilment’ and ‘self-realization’. r.j.n. *well-being; hedonic calculus. J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993). Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, various edns. (e.g. Harmondsworth, 1976). John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, various editions (e.g. London, 1962). Elizabeth Telfer, Happiness (London, 1980). hard determinism: see freedom and determinism. Hare, Richard M. (1919–2002). Probably the most influen- tial moral philosopher of his generation, Hare’s ideas very largely shaped Anglo-American moral theory for upwards of twenty years, from the mid-1950s. His best-known works are The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952) and Free- dom and Reason (Oxford, 1963), in which he explores fun- damental questions regarding the meaning of value and moral words such as *‘good’ and *‘ought’, and regarding the foundations of moral reasoning. Hare argues that moral judgements have ‘prescriptive’ meaning, and imply universal imperatives. For instance, to declare something wrong is not (or is not principally) to indicate that it has some property of ‘wrongness’, but is to prescribe or direct its avoidance by anyone relevantly circumstanced. Because prescribing the doing or avoidance of something is logically distinct from giving a factual, descriptive account of the nature of the situation, Hare holds that there is no logical relationship between the facts of any case and the moral judgement we may make about it. But because of the universal (or ‘universalizable’) side of moral prescriptions, a person may be given cause to change his moral position by pointing out that it will also apply to himself in like circumstances. He will then realize that he is inconsistent if he does not wish to accept the pre- scription as applied to himself but still wishes to judge others in these terms. He must in consistency withdraw and revise his initial judgement. Hare’s full statement of his developed theory of moral judgement and reasoning is in Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981). In later years, Hare made extensive application of his theoretical principles to practical questions of morality, the environment, education, and so on. Several collec- tions of his essays in these areas have appeared, including Essays on Political Morality (Oxford, 1989) and Essays on Religion and Education (Oxford, 1992). Hare also wrote a short book on Plato (Oxford, 1982). He was White’s Pro- fessor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford from 1966 until 1983, and he held many visiting professorships particu- larly in America and in Australia. A collection of essays debating his work was published in 1988, Hare and Critics (ed. D. Seanor and N. Fotion, Oxford). n.j.h.d. *prescriptivism; universalizability. harm. Important to ethics and political philosophy, the concept is difficult to pin down. One view concentrates on consequences. A person is harmed by another if the actions of the ‘harmer’ negatively affect the interests of her victim. However, this must be specified further. If my health, say, was going to improve enormously relative to now, and you intervene (lightly poisoning me) so that it improves, but not as much as it would have, you have nevertheless harmed me in spite of my positive increase in health. One could instead say that harm is making me worse off than I would have been. This still faces a prob- lem of overdetermination: what if Jane shoots me a millisecond before a boulder falls on me? She can argue that I am no worse off than I would have been had she not shot me; either way I am dead. But it still seems that she harmed me, even if it made me no worse off. Further, not all negative effects on my interests count as harm. Being fined thousands of pounds for fraud, whilst negatively affecting my interests, or losing my house because of another’s contract enforcement, may not count as being harm 359 . interpreted. Thinkers turn to the great philoso- phers of the past—in particular Plato and Aristotle—for inspiration. A halt is called to the conflict between Platon- ists and Aristotelians that had prevailed. from the Christian creed. Parallel with this, he endeavours to assimilate the scientific findings of his time and to synthesize them into a unified theory of the cosmos and humankind. This trend towards. hence to the superstructure relative to the economic base. He used this insight to develop the con- cept of hegemony, or ideological power, to explain the resilience of liberal democracy in the