Preface No issue has been as central to twentieth-century democracies as that of equality. Most of the great struggles of this century have been waged in the name of equality: class conflict in Britain and elsewhere; the Third World struggle for independence from colonialism; demands in virtually all countries for the extension of suffrage to previously excluded people; pressures by women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups for redress of their grievances; even demands for equity in taxation. In a broader sense, the ideal of equality has been basic to the notion of the modern state itself. [1] Certainly no major state, whether democratic, socialist, communist, or authoritarian, has been able to avoid confronting, and having in some way to address, demands from within society for greater equality and participation. Yet from the standpoint of the state, no principle has been as thorny to deal with as this central issue of equality. Disparities in wealth, intelligence, talent, and all manner of other attributes arc ubiquitous in social life. Moreover, people's consciousness of inequality has increased dramatically in recent years as a result of a broad range of factors, from improved communications that make inequities in the distribution of wealth, benefits, and privileges more visible to ideological changes that legitimate the struggle for greater shares of the pie. Indeed, some have argued that the "crisis of democracy," to the extent that one in fact exists, is due to a growing inability of democratic states to accommodate all the pressures from below by the many claimants who want more of whatever there is to get. [1] Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967). See also Sidney Verba et al., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), for a major recent work on the centrality of equality as an issue. According to a study by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Watanuki Joji, the failure of the state to cope effectively with the challenge posed by people's wholesale pursuit of equality and freedom had by the mid 1970s resulted in a delegitimization of authority and an erosion of popular trust in leadership. [2] Serious ills in socialist systems revived faith in democracy and the free market in the late 1980s, but democratic systems had yet to overcome their basic problems. This book explores the problem of equality in one country: Japan, heralded today as the site of an economic "miracle" and a state with an enviable record of stability and effective rule. It looks at how struggles over equality are waged in Japan and how authority responds to them. Because inequalities take various forms, the focus of this book is on disparities in social status based on age, gender, ethnicity, caste background, and other attributes beyond the powers of the individual to change. I call struggles over such inequalities "status politics." The issue of equality has special importance in Japan today as a result of value changes that have occurred there, particularly since the end of World War II. Some 120 years ago, centuries after feudalism had ended in most of Europe, Japan was still a feudal society characterized by hierarchical status relations and a traditional Confucian ideology that saw inequalities in social relations as natural and legitimate. Although communitarianism at the village level, where most of society lived, provided a basis for solidarity and resistance to higher authority when conditions became unbearably oppressive, profound status differences were taken as given. These traditional norms and values persisted relatively unchallenged up to the end of World War II, legitimizing the many prerogatives exercised by status superiors over their inferiors and teaching inferiors to defer to those above them and to accept their lot. From the time of the Allied Occupation (1945–1952), however, as democratic values have been introduced into the legal system, the schools, and other institutions and Japan has become increasingly internationalized, the situation has undergone major change. Indeed, the past forty years have seen a marked increase in popular consciousness of inequalities in Japanese life, and today status inferiors seeking to alter the terms of social relationships can call on the counter-ideology of egalitarianism to support their demands. This book focuses on three specific protests over issues of equality that have arisen during the past few decades. The cases involve groups who [2] Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Watanuki Joji, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 3–9. ― xi ― traditionally have been assigned positions of social inferiority and who, in the postwar period, have sought to improve their lot in the name of equality: young people, former outcastes, and women. By examining a series of status-based conflicts, we will explore the conditions that generate such conflicts, the various ways the status-deprived express their grievances, how they mobilize and organize, and the goals they seek. These questions are important from the standpoint not only of assessing the successes and failures of status-based struggles in Japan, but also of examining Western theories regarding how interest groups arise and seek legitimacy in democratic societies. Implicit in the work of numerous writers who have studied the rise of interests in democracies—from E. E. Schattschneider to Mancur Olson and Terry Moe—is a developmental model the end products of which are relatively permanent, highly professionalized, and institutionalized "organized interests" of the kind able to play a role in policymaking. [3] Less organized interests—including relatively amorphous, impermanent groups or movements—are seen as less stable, and therefore less significant, forms of political life that may or may not survive a transition (generally assumed to be desired by the members) to such an end condition. Organized interests, in contrast, are viewed as inherently expansionist in their drive to maximize resources, from money to members. Behind this developmental model lie many assumptions, first and foremost of which being that organized interests can, by maximizing their resources, gain access to policymaking. "Access to policymaking" itself is thought to involve the active participation of organized and bureaucratized interest groups, operating through their professional staffs, in the actual decision- making process, whether by influencing legislation, as in the United States, or by joining in corporatist arrangements, as in Sweden. In Anselm Strauss's terms, organized interest groups become involved in the actual "negotiations," or bargaining, of policymaking. [4] The case of interests in Japan, I will argue, calls this developmental model into question and challenges the assumptions on which it rests. Although organized economic interests, including big business and the agricultural lobby, enjoy an astonishing level of access to policymaking in [3] Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967). [4] Anselm Strauss, Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), 1–7. ― xii ― Japan, when it comes to noneconomic interests the story is quite different. Given their limited access to policymaking at the national level, less organized interests such as social protest groups may have little incentive to become more institutionalized. In a society in which the dominant positive response of authorities to interest-group claimants is likely to be unilaterally granted concessions rather than actual admission to the bargaining process, there may be little to gain from amassing the staff or other organizational resources needed to play a role in policymaking. Indeed, at least in some cases, less organized interests may find it more advantageous to minimize their resources, to limit their group to those most committed, and, through various strategies, to present themselves as victims in order to trigger a paternalistic response on the part of the authorities. Certainly the study of how and why interests arise, organize, and pursue their goals in Japan poses important challenges to theories of interest groups and the assumptions that underlie them. After focusing on the protest groups in chapters 3 through 7, I will turn in chapter 8 to an examination of how authorities respond to conflicts over equality as they unfold, and the consequences of that pattern of response, as a way of assessing how well Japan is coping with an issue that has proven so difficult for most states in the twentieth century. In addition to exploring the question of equality in Japan, a major aim of this book is to look at how, in a broader sense, the Japanese deal with social conflict. Social protest may arise over many issues, ranging from quality-of-life concerns to economic ones. Status-based conflicts, for many reasons to be set out here, constitute a "worst case" of protest in Japan, both from the standpoint of persons attempting to press their grievances and in the view of authorities who must in some manner respond. Issues of equality are difficult to resolve in any country, but especially so in Japan, for in their essence all status-based protests involve an assertion of self, claims of entitlement, and demands for oneself and one's group that fly in the face of the Japanese "ideal model of protest," according to which some kinds of protest are judged to be more acceptable than others. Thus protesters face major obstacles in pressing their case, and authorities may in response bring into play a full range of conflict-management strategies, from "soft" backstage acts of appeasement to "harder" methods of social control. By studying Japanese struggles over equality, then, we can look both at how one country is dealing with a challenge that is felt worldwide and, at the same time, at how Japanese authorities approach the problem of social conflict in general. The response of authorities to protest has an important bearing not only on the particular developmental pattern that interests will undergo in ― xiii ― society but also on our understanding of how democracy works in practice. Conflict theorists and many political scientists—Schattschneider and Giuseppe DiPalma are two examples—have long upheld the value to political systems of allowing social grievances to be aired and of creating and maintaining institutionalized channels for the resolution of social conflict, arguing that openness to conflict and responsiveness to new interests assure the long-term health, viability, and stability of democratic systems. [5] Protest movements, some hold, advance the "statemaking" process itself. In Western democracies, moreover, these views of social scientists are generally backed by both average people and public officials (even though official support sometimes proves more rhetorical than real when actual social protests arise). Authorities in Japan, as we shall see, take a dramatically different view of social conflict and protest, and of what should be done about it. The legacy of Confucianism, with its emphasis on harmony as a social good, causes even rhetorical tributes to the value of airing social grievances to be rare. Meanwhile, the tests that a social protest must meet if it is to be judged legitimate by the watching public and potential supporters are rigorous. If social conflict cannot in the end be avoided, authorities in Japan seek to contain it to the extent possible, using strategies that tend to marginalize protesters and to keep the protest outside existing channels and institutions of conflict resolution and policymaking. At the same time, however, in what is a crucial part of the "Japanese formula" for handling social conflict, authorities do address—if less adequately than protesters generally would like—the issues raised as a means of heading off future conflicts. In daily life the unilateral granting of preemptive concessions is powerfully supported by societal norms that enjoin status superiors to avoid abusing their authority, to anticipate the needs of inferiors, and to be sensitive to how their behavior is viewed by the watching public. At the national level these same norms, which combine elements of paternalism and of communitarianism, have translated into a society in which social welfare measures compare favorably with those in place in the United States, and where the gap between the rich and the poor ranks Japan near Sweden as one of the more egalitarian nations—economically speaking—in the world. Given the country's extraordinary record of stability and governability in the postwar era, Japan's approach of privatizing social conflict while granting preemptive concessions challenges the assumptions of many conflict theorists and invites examination [5] Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People; Giuseppe DiPalma, The Study of Conflict in Western Society (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973). ― xiv ― by scholars and policymakers alike. Yet it is important to look as well at the costs of this approach, its consequences for the overall pattern of interest-group representation in society and the conditions on which it rests, and at how and why the Japanese approach to social protest may be changing in Japan today and in the future. I am indebted to a great many people and institutions for their help while I worked on this book. Fieldwork was conducted in Tokyo and Kyoto in 1978 with the generous assistance of the Japan Foundation, and in a follow-up visit in 1985. Sakamoto Yoshikazu was kind enough to arrange for my affiliation with the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo for the earlier period, and I am grateful to him and to other faculty members and staff there for the aid they offered me. [6] Ishida Takeshi, then of the University of Tokyo and now retired, extended to me the same willing assistance, insightful comments and suggestions on my work, and warm hospitality that he has extended to so many other American scholars working in Japan. My research in Japan could not have gone forward without the generous help of Uchida Mitsuru, of Waseda University, and Muramatsu Michio, of Kyoto University. Akamatsu Ryoko, former director-general of the Women's and Young Workers' Bureau of the Ministry of Labor, and her husband, Hanami Tadashi, of the Faculty of Law, Sophia University, both of them friends for some twenty years, provided many helpful suggestions and a number of introductions to informants, as well as a home where I have always felt welcome in Japan. Each of the case studies brought me in contact with dozens of persons without whom I could not have pursued my research and whom I regret that I cannot acknowledge individually. I am deeply grateful to the headquarters staffs of the Liberal Democratic party and of the New Liberal Club for their extensive help with background material and for arranging interviews with Diet members. The Public Employees' Union office of Kyoto and Sakai Sadako of the regional office of the Women's and Young Workers' Bureau in Kyoto helped me immeasurably on the case study of gender-related politics. A great many people and organizations likewise provided generous assistance on the case study involving the problems of former outcastes in Japan, for which I am most grateful; these include the staffs of the Buraku Liberation League's offices, branches, and research institutes in Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, and the Tajima area of Hyogo Prefec- [6] Throughout the text of this book, personal names of Japanese individuals are given in Japanese fashion, that is, family name first. In the bibliography and notes, authors of works published in English are generally cited Western-style; authors of works published in Japanese are cited Japanese-style. ― xv ― ture; the Buraku Problems Research Institute in Kyoto; the town office in Tajima; Yoka Senior High School; and a great many other organizations in the Tajima area, Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto, and Tokyo. I am grateful to several institutions for support at all phases of the writing of this book. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., provided a highly congenial and stimulating setting in 1981–1982 for me to begin to write up my research, which I then continued with summer support from the University of Wisconsin. A year in 1984 at Harvard University as a visiting faculty member in the Department of Government and in what is now the Reischauer Institute saw completion of the first draft, and I finished the book as holder of the Japan chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Colleagues from a broad range of fields provided comments and suggestions on all or part of the manuscript throughout the writing process. I would like to express appreciation to John Campbell, Gary Allinson, T. J. Pempel, Ellis Krauss, Muramatsu Michio, Ishida Takeshi, Murray Edelman, Richard Merelman, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Crawford Young, Herbert Passin, George DeVos, James White, Frank Upham, Ezra Vogel, Thomas Rohlen, John McCarthy, Patricia Steinhoff, Chalmers Johnson, and Tsurumi Shunsuke for their many helpful remarks. I am especially grateful to David Titus for his detailed and astonishingly insightful comments on the completed manuscript. I express my sincerest appreciation to Sato Ikuko and Mori Shizuko, who were unfailingly helpful as research assistants in Japan, and to Kishima Takako and Oyadomari Motoko for research assistance as graduate students at the University of Wisconsin. Special thanks go to Kishima Takako, who is now a research associate at Harvard University, for her many valuable comments at all stages of preparation of the manuscript. No one I have named, of course, bears responsibility for my mistakes, but all have contributed greatly to my work. I am grateful to Jim Clark, director of University of California Press, for his patience and encouragement, and to Betsey Scheiner and Anne Canright of the Press and Frank Schwartz of Harvard for their superb editorial efforts. I would also like to thank Joanne Klys, Mary Mulrenan, and Susan Scott for the care they took with many drafts of the manuscript. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my husband, Robert Cameron Mitchell, for his help as I worked to complete the book. My marriage to him in 1983 brought not only the strongest possible support and encouragement in the pursuit of my work, but deep bonds of intellectual companionship as well. ― 1 ― 1 Status Politics in Japan In the mid 1970s, Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Watanuki Joji issued a report on behalf of the Trilateral Commission which argued that the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were in the grip of a crisis of governability: social demands were rising, outstripping the capacity of the state to respond, while authority was on the decline. [1] When they compared the situation in the three regions, however, the authors found that in terms of success rates for governability, Japan came out ahead—in a sense foreshadowing the current "Japan boom," led by writers such as Ezra Vogel, in which Japan's accomplishments in everything from industrial organization to crime control have become the subject of Western study and admiration. Chalmers Johnson spurred further acclaim for Japanese governmental performance in 1982 by heralding Japan as the ultimate "developmental" state; whereas the bureaucracy has provided the driving force behind the economic miracle, the politicians, he said, "create space for bureaucratic initiative" by successfully handling, among other things, disaffection and social protest. [2] By the late 1980s, many observers were arguing that the "crisis of democracy" had been overstated and that democratic governments and capitalism itself were showing resiliency in all three regions. [3] Indeed, market- [1] Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Watanuki Joji, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 3–9, 161–170. [2] Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 316. [3] See, for example, Hans Daalder, ed., Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Joseph LaPalombara, Democracy, Italian Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987; Eva Kolinsky, ed., Opposition in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); and Inoguchi Takashi, ed., Shin hoshushugi no taito (The rise of neoconservatism), Leviathan, no. 1 (special issue) (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1987). ― 2 ― oriented economic reforms in the Soviet Union and China, and pressure for greater democratization in socialist countries as well as in authoritarian systems such as those of South Korea and Taiwan, suggested that capitalism and democracy were proving their superiority over alternative arrangements. Within the democratic camp, however, Japan's superior record of economic success and governmental stability continued to stand out. Even as Japan became a target of steady Western criticism because of conflict over trade and investment issues, the country's political, social, and economic systems continued to be the object of Western fascination and study. Japan's record of success in governing is all the more striking because this continuity has been maintained despite regular tests of the authority of those in power by political parties, protest groups, and opposition movements. [4] Japan has four major opposition parties, two of which, the Japan Socialist and Communist parties, pose fundamental ideological challenges to rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP). The percentage of popular votes cast for all opposition parties has surpassed that cast for the LDP in numerous postwar elections. Indeed, as of 1989 the LDP has failed to capture a majority of seats in three out of five of the most recent lower house elections; only through postelection overtures to non-LDP conservatives was it able to secure a working majority. In the area of mass movements, Japanese labor has successfully organized more workers than has the U.S. labor movement. [5] Unions, some of which are quite radical by American standards, annually engage in nationwide mass demonstrations, as well as in "offensives" against both the government and employers. [6] Citizens' movements demanding that the government cope with Japan's environmental pollution problems were a major phenomenon of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, according to [4] A valuable survey of the changing pattern of protest activities is found in Michitoshi Takabatake, "Mass Movements: Change and Diversity," in Annals of the Japan Political Science Association 1977: The Political Process in Modern Japan, ed. Japan Political Science Association, 323–359. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979). See also James W. White, "Civic Attitudes, Political Participation, and System Stability in Japan," Comparative Political Studies 14 (October 1981): 371–400. [5] In 1986, 28.2 percent of Japanese workers were in unions, as compared to 18.0 percent in the United States; Japan 1988: An International Comparison (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1988), 73. [6] See Solomon Levine, "Labor in Japan," in Business and Society in Japan, ed. Bradley M. Richardson and Taizo Ueda, 29–61, (New York: Praeger, 1981). ― 3 ― one estimate some seventy-five thousand complaints over pollution were lodged with local governments in 1971, and in 1973 antipollution groups sparked as many as ten thousand local disputes over environmental issues. [7] In the postwar era vast numbers of protesters have been mobilized at peak periods by peace movements and student movements, and in recent years conflicts over land use at Narita Airport, over property and people affected by extension plans for the bullet train (shinkansen ), and over nuclear power plant siting have commanded national attention. Recent protests over proposed expansion of U.S. military facilities in Zushi and Miyakejima follow in the same tradition. [8] Certain watershed protests, notably the struggles in 1960 and 1970 against the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, have been mammoth in scale: for the antitreaty protest on 23 June 1970, for example, almost three-quarters of a million people took to the streets. [9] Other advanced industrial democracies have seen relatively few protests of comparable magnitude and intensity over the past three and a half decades. [10] A critical view of the social order under the LDP is echoed in the opinions of many ordinary people, as reflected in numerous survey results. At the same time that the foreign media were conveying images of the happy and productive Japanese worker adjusting ably to rapid technological change, the majority of Japanese were voicing a deep-seated malaise about the nature and quality of life and work in Japan. Between 1958 and 1973, for example, a steadily increasing percentage of young people in the twenty-to-twenty-nine-year age group—well over the majority of them by 1973—agreed that human feeling is lost with the development of science and technology. [11] An eleven-nation survey conducted by the Manage- [7] Ellis S. Krauss and Bradford L. Simcock, "Citizens' Movements: The Growth and Impact of Environmental Protest in Japan," in Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan, ed. Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 187. [8] See New York Times, 5 March 1986, A32, for an account of a citizens' protest over a U.S. Navy housing project in Zushi; and Daily Yomiuri, 11 February 1986, 5, concerning a protest in Miyakejima over a proposed U.S. Navy landing strip. [9] Ellis S. Krauss, Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 1, uses that figure; Asahi Shinbun, 24 June 1970, 1, gives the figure as 770,000. [10] The nearest thing in Europe may be protests over nuclear issues. See Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, The Atom Besieged: Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). [11] Chikio Hayashi, "Changes in Japanese Thought During the Past Twenty Years," in Text of Seminar on "Changing Values in Modern Japan," ed. Nihonjin Kenkyukai (Tokyo: Nihonjin Kenkyukai, 1977), 10–11, 48. ― 4 ― ment and Coordination Agency in 1988 showed that the percentage of Japanese youth expressing satisfaction with society had increased substantially compared to five years earlier, but that Japanese youth ranked only seventh, well behind the young people of Singapore, Sweden, and West Germany, in their overall satisfaction level. [12] Political alienation is also common. The belief that government is unresponsive to the electorate and that it is run primarily for the benefit of big business is frequently expressed, and even before the Recruit Cosmos scandal of late 1988 and 1989 brought approval levels to an all-time low, negative evaluations of the Diet and cabinet were widespread. [13] Levels of political dissatisfaction are seemingly at least as high as in the United States. Indeed, in 1989 discontent with everything from an unpopular consumption tax to the sexual misconduct of Prime Minister Uno Sousuke gave the opposition parties an unprecedented victory in the July upper house elections. [14] Few would argue that the alienation and dissatisfaction expressed regarding the policies and priorities of the government in power and the nature of Japanese social and political life in general mean that the overall level of discontent is higher in Japan than elsewhere in the industrial capitalist world. But the record certainly does not suggest that Japan's stability and governability are attributable to a lack of social and political protest or to mass quiescence. How, then, do we explain the seeming paradox of high governability in the face of relatively high levels of protest and alienation? Given the strong authority of the state as reflected in Japan's long record of stable one-party rule, under what conditions does protest arise, and what factors constrain its impact? What is the response of Japanese authorities to social conflict and protest, and to the rise of new interests and issues in society more generally? These questions provide a beginning point for the study of one particular type of protest in Japanese society—protest over the issue of social equality. At one level, this book explores sources of protest in today's Japan [12] The survey, conducted every five years since 1972, was of youth eighteen to twenty-four years old in Japan, the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, Sweden, Australia, Singapore, South Korea, China, and Brazil: see Japan Times, 15 January 1989, 2; and Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 15 January 1989, 31. [13] Scott C. Flanagan and Bradley M. Richardson, "Political Disaffection and Political Stability: A Comparison of Japanese and Western Findings," in Comparative Social Research, ed. Richard [...]... emphasizes the role of the state, notably the LDP, in containing protests and thereby enabling the bureaucracy to do its work [7] See, for example, the line of reasoning advanced in Robert A Scalapino, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962) [8] Robert A Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First... Political Culture of American and Japanese Elites (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) ― 10 ― over status inequalities in Japan, including all three types dealt with in this study: intergenerational conflict, gender conflict, and conflict arising out of hereditary caste distinctions Thus, conflicts involving inequalities in authority based on age have received much attention in the literature,... attribute of what Tsurumi Kazuko has called the "many-layered" personality of the Japanese.[30] Finally, because Japanese often ignore nominal rules in favor of informal approaches to problem solving, new rules gain currency only with difficulty This tendency, which is reflected in many areas of life—for example, in contract negotiations, where the practice of overlooking legalisms and of resorting instead... discuss status inequality in terms of the importance that inferior-superior (or junior-senior) relationships and other rank and status considerations are accorded in the ordering of social relationships in Japan Some years ago the prominent Japanese social anthropologist Nakane Chie drew much attention with a work treating the pattern of Japanese status inequalities somewhat more systematically in which... most Japanese continue to view the official ideology, with its linkage to a notion of individual rights, as basically "Western." Thus in Japan the gap is one of foreign ideals as official ideology versus practice with respect to all groups From the standpoint of status inferiors in Japan, however, the implications of the complex ideological changes that have occurred since 1868, and especially since... and interests The outpouring of books on Japan as a model of economic success and efficient governmental performance suggests that Japan scores high on the first task This book assesses Japan' s formula and record in dealing with the second challenge On the Nature of Status Politics Status- based conflict, or status politics, arises from the efforts of persons of a given social status to adjust their status. .. outcaste status was removed, the burakumin continued to be exposed to various forms of status- based discrimination As a result of many centuries of acquiescence to their inferior status vis-à-vis all other social groups, numerous members of this group have risen up against the system in movements that affect both local and prefectural policy and politics in Japan, ― 14 ― especially in regions of the... (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980) In the wake of the Recruit Cosmos scandal, in which many of Japan' s leading politicians were implicated in a shady stock deal, public approval ratings for Prime Minister Takeshita and his cabinet dropped to 4 percent (Asahi Shinbun, 25 April 1989, 1) [14] Asahi Shinbun, 25 July 1989, 1 ―5― by looking at "status politics, " that is, the struggles of people attempting to challenge... village head, for instance) in meeting responsibilities (such as rice quotas) vis-à-vis those higher up In villages, bonds of blood, marriage, or tenancy linked larger landowners and agricultural laborers in fictive kinship relations.[18] Better-off landowners, in their role as village officials, often saw their duty of representing the community's interests against domain leaders as something tantamount... part 1 of a 3-part series, "Aspects of Endogenous Development in Modern Japan, " Research Papers of the Institute of International Relations, Sophia University, Series A36 (Tokyo, 1979), 22–23 [29] James C Abegglen, The Japanese Factory (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Robert F Cole, Japanese Blue Collar (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971); and Lewis Austin, Saints and . standpoint not only of assessing the successes and failures of status- based struggles in Japan, but also of examining Western theories regarding how interest groups arise and seek legitimacy in. Sweden. In Anselm Strauss's terms, organized interest groups become involved in the actual "negotiations," or bargaining, of policymaking. [4] The case of interests in Japan, . object of Western fascination and study. Japan& apos;s record of success in governing is all the more striking because this continuity has been maintained despite regular tests of the authority of