[...]... terms of the nature of the corresponding branch of discourse; it is not even that I believe that it is impossible to explain the nature of normative thought—thinking about what ought to be—except by means of an account of the nature of normative discourse Indeed, in the end I shall do the opposite: I shall offer an account of the meaning of normative language in terms of the distinctive type of mental... the point of the book could be summed up in one sentence, that sentence would be: the normativity of the intentional is the key to metaethics Specifically, the specific version of the normativity of the intentional that I defend is, in effect, a simultaneous account both of the nature of these mental states that have intentional content and of the various normative properties and relations—that is, of. .. book The Nature of Normativity At the same time, there is another meaning of the word nature , which features in one of the main objections that may be raised against my broadly Platonist conception of the normative This is the objection that my conception cannot be reconciled with a plausibly naturalistic view of the world—where a naturalistic view of the world is one according to which facts of the. .. There are three concepts, all of them vague Imagine three solid pieces of stone You pick them up, fit them together and you get now a ball What you’ve now got tells you something about the three shapes Now consider you have three balls of or lumps of soft mud or putty—formless Now you put the three together and mould out of them a ball Ewing makes a soft ball out of three pieces of mud The account of. .. give an account of the following three issues 1 First, I shall give an account of what such normative questions mean That is, I shall give an account of the semantics of normative discourse and of the content of normative thought This will be the theme of Part I of the book 2 Secondly, since my account of the meaning of such normative questions involves the idea that some answers to these questions... This aspect of my theory also explains why it differs from some other approaches to the epistemology of normative beliefs in yet another way: unlike those other approaches, it does not deny the possibility of rationally irresoluble disagreements about normative questions Underlying this account of normative intuitions is the key idea that unifies my whole theory of the nature of the normative the idea... while the rest of the chapter is based on ‘ The Normativity of the Intentional’’, Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian McLaughlin (forthcoming a) In Chapter 8, Sections 8.1– 8.3 are new, while Sections 8.4 and 8.5 are based on parts of ‘ The Normative Force of Reasoning’’, Noˆ s, 40 (2006) Chapter 9 is based on ‘ The u Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism’’, Noˆ s, 34 (2000), with the. .. the meaning of normative statements.) Expressivists must also give us an account of the nature of normative judgments—that is, of the distinctive sort of mental states that normative statements express Most expressivists aim to give an account of the nature of these mental states in wholly non-normative naturalistic terms This is what enables their theory to be a sort of anti-realism about the normative... account of the meaning of the proper name ‘Socrates’ that simply presupposes what it is for someone to be the person called ‘Socrates’—whereas it is precisely the task of an account of the reference of this name to explain what it is for someone to be the person referred to by ‘Socrates’ Hence, for an account of the reference of the name ‘Socrates’ to be acceptable, it must not use the notion of ‘‘being... right, while other answers to these questions are wrong, I shall then offer an account of what would make something the right answer to such a normative question That is, I shall offer an account of the metaphysics of normative truths This will be the theme of Part II of the book 3 Finally, I shall try to give an account of how we could ever know, or have a rational or justified belief about, the right . an account of the semantics of normative discourse and of the content of normative thought. This will be the theme of Part I of the book. 2. Secondly, since my account of the meaning of such normative. University, the University of Cambridge, the University of Oxford, the University of Glasgow, the University of Leeds, University College London, the University of York, the University of Reading, the. short, if the point of the book could be summed up in one sentence, that sentence would be: the normativity of the intentional is the key to metaethics. Specifically, the specific version of the normativity