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NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Doctrine of
Eternal Recurrence
The U.S. Military and
Counterinsurgency Doctrine,
1960–1970 and 2003–2006
Austin Long
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
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The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Long, Austin G.
Doctrine of eternal recurrence—the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine, 1960–1970 and
2003–2006 / Austin Long.
p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study ; Paper 6)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4470-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Counterinsurgency—United States. 2. Military doctrine—United States. I. Title.
U241.L64 2008
355.02'18097309046—dc22
2008018294
iii
Preface
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is not a new challenge for the U.S. military, yet creating an appro-
priate and uniform organizational response continues to bedevil the services. Typically, gener-
ating a uniform organizational response is accomplished by the formulation of service or joint
doctrine for a given type of conflict. us, the creation of new doctrine should be accompanied
(perhaps after a lag) by an overall change in organizational behavior. is paper challenges
this tight linkage between doctrine and behavior in the realm of COIN. By comparing COIN
doctrine and operations in the 1960s to the more recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
it seeks to demonstrate that more-fundamental organizational changes (involving significant
trade-offs) may be needed for the U.S. military to adapt to COIN both now and in the future.
is research is part of a larger RAND effort to develop a roadmap for long-term investment
in Department of Defense COIN capabilities.
is research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted
within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense
Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the
Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence
Community.
For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center,
please contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@
rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation,
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is
available at http://www.rand.org/.
v
Contents
Preface iii
Summary
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Abbreviations
xi
Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—e U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
1
Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms
2
Small Wars Before COIN: U.S. Experiences Prior to 1960
3
e Kennedy Years: e Birth of COIN Doctrine
5
Early Doctrinal Views on COIN Organization and Operations
6
Early Doctrinal Views on Intelligence and COIN
8
Limits of Doctrine: Vietnam, 1961 to 1963
9
Attempts to Put Doctrine into Practice: e PROVN Study, 1965 to 1966
10
COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1965 to 1968
12
Doctrine in the Late 1960s
15
COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1969 to 1972
17
Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003
19
COIN Doctrine, 2003 to 2005
20
COIN Operations, 2003 to 2005
22
Doctrine and Operations in 2006
23
Getting It Right? COIN in Iraq, 2007
26
Komer’s Lament: COIN Doctrine vs. COIN Practice
26
Conclusion
29
References
31
vii
Summary
e publication of a new COIN doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indi-
cation that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently
faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. is interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine
as written and operations conducted. As one way to test this proposition, this paper compares
modern COIN doctrine and operations with those of the 1960s.
In the 1960s, two periods of COIN doctrine can be observed. e first is 1960 to 1965,
the period after John Kennedy was elected President but before U.S. combat troops were
committed to Vietnam. e second is 1965 to 1970, the period of heaviest U.S. involvement
in the Vietnam War. In both cases, COIN doctrine as written by both the U.S. Army and
U.S. Marine Corps emphasized the role of the population (so-called hearts and minds), civil-
military relations, small-unit operations, intelligence gathering, and related concepts. Yet oper-
ations seldom matched this written doctrine; instead, the military attempted to attrite the
insurgency through large-scale operations and heavy reliance on firepower. In short, doctrine
as written and operations conducted were not tightly linked.
As at least a partial explanation for this weak linkage, this paper posits a deeper set of
organizational concepts and beliefs that has a much greater influence on operations than writ-
ten doctrine. While a set of beliefs can often be helpful to organizations in conducting their
preferred missions, it can be detrimental in other contexts. Much of the U.S. military prefers
high-intensity warfare, a mission for which the organization is mentally and materially well
prepared. However, mental preparation for this mission makes the military poorly suited to
COIN.
Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than
just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reori-
entation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the
military’s ability to truly be a “full-spectrum force,” because attempting to optimize for the
full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of
that spectrum.
[...]... Company, 1990, for an overview Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 5 tions in countries like Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, but these interventions were of very short duration and relatively bloodless The Kennedy Years: The Birth of COIN Doctrine With the election of John F Kennedy in 1960, COIN became one of the foremost concerns of the U.S government President... 2006, comparing these manuals with those of the earlier periods as well as to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms The U.S military has brief and easily accessible definitions of both doctrine and counterinsurgency Doctrine is defined as the “[f]undamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national... involving the participation of the people It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in the government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion The key to pacification is the provision of sustained... that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military I do not agree The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military. ”35 It was in Vietnam that the differences between written doctrine and actual practice became glaringly apparent First and foremost, the principle of unity of effort between civil and military elements of the U.S COIN effort enshrined in written doctrine. .. on all high-level contacts with the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam] and on major political and military plans, the operational command of U.S military personnel will be the direct responsibility of the senior U.S military commander.36 33 U.S Marine Corps, FMFM-21 (1962), pp 22–24; and U.S Department of the Army, FM 31-16 (1963), pp 95–98 34 U.S Department of the Army, FM 31-16 (1963), p 96... U.S Department of the Army (1966), pp 2-47–2-50 44 For the history of PROVN and reactions to it, see William Gibbons, The U.S Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, Part Four, pp 201–212; and 12 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine was minimal for the next several... the population and the need for civil -military integration: Since the essence of the counterguerilla campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government, the importance of civil affairs is paramount [I]n internal defense operations, because of the importance of isolating the guerillas from the people, civil affairs becomes one of the primary missions of the counterguerilla... 2–3 20 The White House (1962), pp 12–13 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 7 normally does not provide a complete solution The population must be convinced that the conduct or support of irregular activities will not only fail to gain the desired results, but may result in the imposition of sanctions and actually delay the elimination of the causes of discontent... Reinforce Military Judgment, Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1974, p 78 80 Ewell and Hunt (1974), p 160 Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U.S Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 19 taken under General Westmoreland, and continued to reward those who performed these operations well Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003 The end of significant U.S involvement in Vietnam also marked the. .. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the contingency underlying the deployment are vital to mission success 82 This edition also stresses the importance of the population and of coordination between civilian and military efforts.83 The chapter devoted to FID presents the following summary of COIN: Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that . Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U. S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
prevailed and became the basis of General MacArthur s successful pacification. Training and Doctrine Command
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
VC Viet Cong
1
Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence The U. S. Military and
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