A Praise for Intelligence and U.S Foreign Policy —Martha Crenshaw, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University “Paul R Pillar has written a brilliant, lucid analysis of the evolution of U.S national security intelligence in the decade since the 9/11 attacks He shows how the intelligence agencies have been made scapegoats for the failures of our political leaders, how intelligence reform has become confused with bureaucratic reorganization, and how our foreign policy is driven by a psychological as well as political incapacity to accept the limitations of our knowledge about the plans and motivations of actual and potential adversaries Pillar's book is erudite, thorough, and authoritative, yet accessible to anyone concerned with the gravest issues of national and global security.” —Richard A Posner, author of Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps “The 9/11 attacks and the Iraq WMD estimate are both encumbered by erroneous legends Paul R Pillar, a senior intelligence analyst deeply involved in both issues, offers crucial correctives, also applicable to the overly esteemed 9/11 Commission Report These alone make this an important book Pillar goes further, offering a unique history of U.S intelligence and the issue of ‘intelligence reform.’ Not all will agree with his observations, but they come from substantial experience and deep thought and need to be seriously considered.” PAUL R PILLAR is visiting professor and —Mark M Lowenthal, president, The Intelligence and Security Academy, and former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production director of studies in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign ism and U.S Foreign Policy and Negotiating Peace: —Robert Jervis, author of Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Fall of the Shah and the Iraq War Service, Georgetown University He served in several senior positions with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council and is a retired War Termination as a Bargaining Process ISBN: 978-0-231-15792-6 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS / NEW YORK cup.columbia.edu Cover design by Michael Gibson Printed in the U.S.A Council showed Paul R Pillar that in- since 9/11, can be deeply misguided They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge Pillar revisits U.S foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America’s most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S policy and interests He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 Commission and the George W Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S policy, which Columbia army reserve officer He is the author of Terror- “Paul R Pillar brings to his study of intelligence and foreign policy the skills of an accomplished scholar and a wealth of experience as an intelligence officer A brief endorsement cannot justice to the richness and power of his arguments, which are essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what intelligence can and cannot do; why the appeal of reforms is often greater than their value; and how we can avoid repeating our past mistakes.” the CIA and the National Intelligence telligence reforms, especially measures enacted Intelligence and U.S Foreign Policy “Writing with the authority of a distinguished practitioner and scholar, Paul R Pillar presents a blunt and candid assessment of the profound disconnect between intelligence and American national security policy His pointed reflections expose the reality of the politicization and misuse of intelligence as well as the importance of the images of the world that policy makers bring to the table His book is an invaluable corrective to the assumption that policy blunders and the inability to predict can be blamed simply on ‘intelligence failure.’” career of nearly three decades with involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch, to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign 780231 157926 policy to inevitable uncertainties INTELLIGENCE AND U.S FOREIGN POLICY INTELLIGENCE AND U.S FO R EI G N P O L I CY Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform Paul R Pillar COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright © 2011 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pillar, Paul R., 1947– Intelligence and U.S Foreign Policy : Iraq, 9/11, and misguided Reform / Paul R Pillar p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 978-0-231-15792-6 (cloth : alk paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52780-4 (electronic) Intelligence service—United States Iraq War, 2003– September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001 I Title JK468.I6P55 2010 327.1273—dc22 2010048141 Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper This book was printed on paper with recycled content Printed in the United States of America c 10 References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared To Veronica, who puts her intelligence to good use CONTENTS L I S T O F A B B RE V I A T I O N S P RE F A C E IX XI CHAPTER ONE Introduction: A Comforting Explanation for Calamity CHAPTER TWO Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Iraq War CHAPTER THREE 69 Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence CHAPTER FIVE Politicization CHAPTER SEVEN CHAPTER EIGHT CHAPTER NINE 121 Scapegoats and Spectator Sport The Never-Ending Issue Catharsis and 9/11 233 202 13 43 Congress and the Politics of the Iraq War CHAPTER FOUR CHAPTER SIX Alternative Visions of the Iraq War 175 96 viii CONTENTS CHAPTER TEN Responses to Catharsis CHAPTER ELEVEN The Illusion of Reform C H A P T E R T W E LV E Real Reform CHAPTER THIRTEEN NOTES INDEX 357 401 281 293 311 Adapting Policy to Uncertainty 331 ABBREVIATIONS 9/11 September 11, 2001 9/11 Commission National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ASAT antisatellite BJP Bharatiya Janata Party CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CIA U.S Central Intelligence Agency CTC Counterterrorist Center DCI director of central intelligence DNI director of national intelligence DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam ExComm Executive Committee FAA Federal Aviation Administration FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICA intelligence community assessment INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research MACV U.S Military Assistance Command Vietnam NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration A D A P T I N G P O L I C Y T O U N C E R TA I N T Y 399 42 For commentary on the most recent round of this drift, see Paul C Light, “Nominate and Wait,” New York Times, March 24, 2009; and David S Broder, “Running on Empty,” Washington Post, March 5, 2009 13 Adapting Policy to Uncertainty The river-crossing analogy is in Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007), 161 Daniel Gilbert, “What You Don’t Know Makes You Nervous,” New York Times, May 21, 2009 Philip E Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 40 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (New York: Mentor Books, 1957), 11, 43, 58 James B Steinberg, “The Policymaker’s Perspective: Transparency and Partnership,” in Roger Z George and James B Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 83 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, “Kennan Had a Vision: Things Aren’t So Clear Now,” Washington Post, July 13, 2008 A standard treatment of decision-making theory is given in Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968) Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 323 George P Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), 266 10 Ibid., 1003 11 James A Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), 143 12 Ibid 13 Taleb, The Black Swan, xxi 14 Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” International Security 28, no (Winter 2003–2004), 121 15 Paul R Pillar, “What to Ask Before the Next War,” Washington Post, February 4, 2007 400 A D A P T I N G P O L I C Y T O U N C E R TA I N T Y 16 Quoted in Lewis D Solomon, Paul D Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker, and Strategist (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 17 On how this tendency encourages a belief in domino theories, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 29–30 18 A Review of the Intelligence Community (March 10, 1971), 11, redacted version available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/doc ument%204.pdf 19 F. W Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper and Row, 1974) 20 Richard K Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 16 21 The most recent installment is National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, November 2008), available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_ Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf 22 For a brief summary of some leading-candidate grand strategies for the United States, see Daniel W Drezner, “The Grandest Strategy of Them All,” Washington Post, December 17, 2006 23 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 24 Leslie H Gelb and Richard K Betts draw a similar lesson from the Vietnam War in The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1979), 362–67 25 Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 216 INDEX Abrams, Creighton W., 129 Acheson, Dean, 97–98, 177 Adelman, Kenneth, 176 Afghanistan, 26, 112–15, 188, 256, 258–60 Allen, George, 131–32, 170 Allison, Graham, 99, 122, 131–32 Apollo 13 accident, 305–6 Armey, Dick, 71 Armitage, Richard, 13 assertive nationalism, 19, 25, 55, 63, 107, 352 Atta, Mohammed, 45, 142–43 Aum Shinrikyo subway attack (1995), 301–2 aviation security, 247, 256–58, 304–5 “axis of evil” rhetoric, 28, 360n45 Baker, James, 35, 118, 188, 327, 336–37, 344 Ball, George, 195 Bay of Pigs operation, 100, 122 Berger, Sandy, 248, 249 Berlin, Isaiah, 324–25, 333 The Best and the Brightest (Halberstam), 86 Betts, Richard, 90, 160, 227, 308 Biden, Joe, 71 bin Laden, Usama: and constraints on policymakers’ actions, 260; covert action against, 249, 255; as financier, 263, 265, 286; lack of connection between Iraq and al-Qa’ida, 27, 44, 46–49, 91, 165; pre-9/11 assessments of, 246, 248–49, 261–65; pre-9/11 briefings to policymakers on, 31, 251, 252 See also al-Qa’ida “black swan” events, 223, 340 Blair, Tony, 28, 41, 59 Bolton, John, 153–55 Bonk, Ben, 48, 169–70 Bremer Commission, 267 A Bright Shining Lie (Sheehan), 86 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 113–15, 188, 196–97, 276 Bundy, McGeorge, 63, 107 Bunker, Ellsworth, 131 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 154, 161–63 Bush (G. W.) administration: Agreed Framework on North Korea jettisoned, 54; barrier between president and skeptical input, 28, 52–53; and decision to invade Iraq, 10, 13–15, 24–25, 35–42, 402 INDEX Bush (G. W.) administration (continued) 51–56, 64–66, 88–92, 319, 344–48, 365n21; disdain for expertise, 51–55; establishment of Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 240; exploitation of 9/11 in order to invade Iraq, 25–30, 67; expressions of certainty about WMD, 37–38, 142–43, 148; and expulsion of weapons inspectors by U.S., 29, 39, 51; ill will between administration and intelligence community, 34–35, 67, 152–57, 166, 171–73; informed about al-Qa’ida threat prior to 9/11, 31, 249–50; insistence on existence of link between al-Qa’ida and Iraq, 27, 43–51, 140, 143, 145–48, 155, 163–67; intelligence assessments ignored/rejected/irrelevant, 15, 36–38, 48, 52–55, 59, 66–67, 88–92, 145; intelligence assessments not requested, 36, 53; intelligence misused, 32–39, 83–84, 140–52, 165–66, 313; lies about decision-making process, 41–42, 67; and neoconservative agenda, 15–18, 352; optimism about Iraq invasion and its aftermath, 59–62; and perfect prewar intelligence thought experiment, 88–92; political appointees, 323, 327–29; punishment of officials expressing reservations and pessimistic views of war, 52, 61, 156 (see also Iraq War, dissenters and skeptics); relations with the press, 87, 150–51; as scapegoat, 176–77; speeches and statements, 18, 28, 33–37, 39, 41, 91, 143–45, 148; uncertainties, risks, and possible consequences of war ignored, 63–64, 344–48; and working environment of intelligence community, 147–51, 153–57, 173 See also Bush, George W.; Cheney, Richard; Feith, Douglas; Powell, Colin; Rice, Condoleezza; Rumsfeld, Donald; Wolfowitz, Paul; headings beginning with Iraq War Bush, George H. W., 16, 65–66, 118–19, 134, 188, 336 Bush, George W., 24, 36, 52, 65, 70, 172–73, 206; background and personal experiences, 64–66; barrier between president and skeptical input, 28, 52–53; disdain for expertise, 51–55; expectations about war, 59–60; focus on Iraq prior to 9/11, 24–25; reasons for Iraq invasion, 14–18, 64–66; reliance on personal instincts, 51–52, 54, 55, 64; speeches and statements, 18, 28, 33–34, 39, 91, 360n45, 362n68 See also Bush (G. W.) administration butterfly effect, 221, 226 Byrd, Robert, 72–73 Card, Andrew, 35 Carter, Jimmy, 112–15, 134–35, 194–98, 334 Carter Doctrine, 114 Carver, George, 129, 131 Casey, William J., 117, 133, 136–37, 215 catastrophe theory, 222–23 catastrophic terrorism, 268–72 CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) weapons, 268–71 See also nuclear weapons; weapons of mass destruction Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): and anti-Soviet ideology, 136–39; and Bush administration’s discrediting intelligence, 173; covert action findings, 255; creation of CTC, 204, 213; cross assignments, 299; distrust of report on uranium ore and advice not to use it in speeches on Iraq, 32–34; and FBI, 287, 300; history of reorganizations, 204; interactions with Bush, 52; and lack of evidence for link between Iraq and al-Qai’da (Murky Relationship assessment), 46–48; and al-Libi’s statements, 143; and NCTC, 240; and 9/11 Commission report (2004), 239; Nixon’s antipathy toward, 108; origins of, 178; and politicization of intelligence about Soviet threat, 133–35; and politicization of intelligence during Vietnam War, 123–24, 129–32; and pressure on intelligence community to find a pretext for war, 33; public’s negative views of, 179; reversal of findings in inspector general’s report following release of 9/11 Commission report, 287–91; Rice’s attempt to shift blame for faulty uranium ore report, 34; and Roberts’s reorganization plan, 205; Shultz’s distrust of, 117; and “Team B” exercise (1976), 133–35; work on post–Cold War issues in INDEX the 1970s and 1980s, 212–13 See also Counterterrorist Center; director of central intelligence; intelligence assessments; intelligence assessments of Iraq; intelligence community; intelligence reform; National Intelligence Council; Office of National Estimates Central Intelligence Group, 178 Chafee, Lincoln, 72 Chalabi, Ahmed, 23, 59–60, 87 Challenger accident, 218–19, 305–6 chaos theory, 221 Cheney, Richard, 39, 88–92, 118; as “assertive nationalist,” 19; and attempts to link Iraq to al-Qa’ida, 146; attitude toward intelligence assessments, 36; and discrediting intelligence, 170–71; and Duelfer report on WMD, 89; expectations about war, 60; misuse of intelligence, 142; motivation for Iraq War, 19; and Operation Desert Storm, 16; speeches and statements, 18, 35–38, 41, 61, 71, 91, 142–43, 148, 345–46, 365n21 China, 103, 109–10, 190–93, 199, 340, 350 CIA See Central Intelligence Agency Civil War, U.S., 225–26, 228 Clarke, Richard, 27, 44, 244–45, 248, 249, 252–53, 267 Clinton, Bill, 44, 71, 190, 191, 248–49, 251, 255–56, 259 Clinton, Hillary, 71, 75 Coalition Provisional Authority, 328 Cohen, Richard, 91–93 Cold War, 9, 97, 102, 132–40, 207–13 See also Afghanistan; Cuban missile crisis; Indo-Pakistan War of 1971; Korean War; Soviet Union; Vietnam War Coll, Steve, 248, 261 Columbia accident, 218, 305–6 The Commission (Shenon), 238, 284 Communism See domino theory of communism Community Counterterrorism Board, 253–54 Congress, U.S.: cursory debates on Iraq War resolution, 72–73; difficulties of opposing a course already set in Iraq, 14, 70–71, 73; establishment of 9/11 Commission, 234 403 (see also 9/11 Commission report); initial inquiry into prewar intelligence focused on weapons assessment only, 75–76, 79–85; inquiry (quiet and delayed) into prewar intelligence on postinvasion consequences, 76–78; institutional culture, 70–71, 74; intelligence assessments ignored by, 70, 73–74; “intelligence failures” on WMD blamed for misleading members of Congress into supporting Iraq invasion, 75–79, 84; joint resolution authorizing invasion of Iraq (October 2002), 69, 71; Levin’s substitute resolution ignored, 72; need for expanded role as consumer of intelligence, 315–17; NIC assessments about post-Saddam Iraq distributed to, 58; and perfect prewar intelligence thought experiment, 93; political pressures on, 70–72, 74; politicization of intelligence assessments ignored by, 84; recommendation for training of, 320; search for scapegoats, 177; and Senate Intelligence Committee report (2004), 152, 155, 157; submissive behavior during run-up to Iraq War, 69–75; suggestion for congressional intelligence office, 316; and unrecognized types of politicization, 151–53; voting records on Iraq invasion, 71 See also Iraq War, dissenters and skeptics Counterterrorism Security Group, 248, 252–53 See also Clarke, Richard Counterterrorist Center (CTC): briefing on bin Laden’s organization to Clinton administration (1998), 251; characteristics of organization, 300; creation of, 204, 213, 300; establishment of unit devoted to bin Laden, 248, 263; and FBI, 300; and inspector general’s findings, 287; and intelligence products, 253; limited resources, 302; and NCTC, 300; and 9/11 Commission report, 247; repeated warnings on bin Laden in summer of 2001, 248; update to 1995 NIE on international terrorism (1997), 263 Couric, Katie, 150 Crenshaw, Martha, 209, 271–72 CTC See Counterterrorist Center Cuba, 153–54, 224 404 INDEX Cuban missile crisis, 99–100, 121–22, 187, 321 Curveball, 161, 295 Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War (Drogin), 15 Davis, Jack, 159 DCI See director of central intelligence decision making: adapting policy to uncertainty, 331–52; examples of effective processes, 321–22; factors influencing whether or not intelligence can be acted upon, 183, 187, 199, 224, 258–60; and future prospects for policy, 353–55; hedgehogs vs foxes (Berlin’s concept), 324–25, 333; impact of policy on intelligence greater than impact of intelligence on policy, 9–10, 136–40 (see also Bush [G. W.] administration; politicization); and inability to alter preexisting worldviews in response to new information, 6, 36, 108, 116, 319 (see also worldviews of political leaders); and irrelevance of intelligence, 5–7, 11, 96–120 (see also Bush [G. W.] administration); need to reduce politicization of decision making, 12, 319, 321–22; and political leaders’ images of the outside world, 6, 317–21 (see also worldviews of political leaders); and political pressures on policymakers, 100, 105–6, 113–14, 125, 128, 319, 334; problems with drawing to an inside straight, 342–43; problems with high numbers of political appointees, 322–25; and rational actor model, 99–100; recommendation for training in, 319–20; and structural changes in policy process, 321–22; textbook policy process, 3; textbook policy process not followed in reality, 5–6, 119–20; uncertainty associated with weakness, 334 See also foreign policy, U.S Defense Intelligence Agency, 47, 123, 129, 137, 143, 160, 204, 297 democratization, 17–20, 58–62, 66, 348 director of central intelligence (DCI), 206, 239–40, 294–96, 312–13 See also Bush, George H. W.; Casey, William J.; Helms, Richard; McCone, John; Smith, Walter Bedell; Tenet, George; Turner, Stansfield director of national intelligence (DNI), 206, 239–40, 295–99, 303, 311 See also McConnell, Mike; Negroponte, John DNI See director of national intelligence Dodd, Chris, 71 domino theory of communism, 19, 87, 97, 102, 103 domino theory of democratization, 17, 20, 58, 62, 66, 348 Donahue, Phil, 150 Duelfer, Charles, 88 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 118, 119, 183 Edwards, John, 71 Egypt, 185–87, 229, 262, 294, 339 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 101–2, 321 embassy bombings (Kenya and Tanzania, 1998), 248, 251, 258, 279, 338 Essence of Decision (Allison), 99 ExComm, 99–100, 321 FAA See Federal Aviation Administration “failure of imagination” rhetoric, 246–47, 259–60, 278, 319–20 FBI See Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 256–58 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 142, 205, 240, 256–57, 287, 300 Federal Reserve, 314–15, 397n10 Feith, Douglas: and attempts to link Iraq to al-Qa’ida, 45–46, 48, 146; on Bush administration’s selling of Iraq invasion, 30; disdain for expertise, 54; exploitation of 9/11 in order to invade Iraq, 26; and Israel, 22–23; opposition to international inspections, 39; and politicization of intelligence in testimony to congressional committees, 169–70; and pressure on Defense Intelligence Agency, 160; and Rumsfeld’s memo on what could go wrong in Iraq invasion, 63; statement on private views of Iraqis, 61 Flood, Daniel, 179 Foley, Alan, 33–34 Ford, Carl, 154 INDEX Ford, Gerald, 133–35 Ford, Harold, 103 foreign policy, U.S., 11; adapting policy to uncertainty, 331–52; American exceptionalism, 3; assumption that better intelligence would lead to better decision making, 4–5; causes of policy failures, 2–10 (see also headings beginning with decision making); and cautious warnings/ hesitant responses, 198–200; continuity as norm for, 194–95; credibility not lost through backing out of nonessential commitments, 104; disconnect between policy outcomes and intelligence “scorekeeping,” 182–83, 186–98; effects of limited time and attention for making new policies, 195–96; factors influencing whether or not intelligence can be acted upon, 183, 187, 199, 224, 258–60; and faith in governmental institutions and their perfectibility, 3–4; intelligence assessments largely irrelevant in decision making, 5–7, 11, 96–120, 183; and misperceptions of the outside world, 3–7, 317–21 (see also worldviews of political leaders); need to maintain reserves in order to meet unexpected issues, 352; problems with grand strategies, 352–53; and risk tolerance on behalf of a nation, 348–49; successes of, 1–2; textbook policy process, 3; textbook policy process not followed in reality, 5–6, 119–20; timing of predictions often not relevant to policy, 188–93, 350; and uncertainty, 7, 10, 198–200, 331–52 (see also uncertainty) See also Afghanistan; China; Cuban missile crisis; Indo-Pakistan War of 1971; Iran; Korean War; neoconservative ideology; politicization; Soviet Union; Vietnam War; specific presidents France, 191, 340 Franks, Tommy, 27, 52 Friedman, Tom, 328 Gates, Robert, 117–19, 136, 206, 296 Gephardt, Dick, 71 Gerges, Fawaz, 262 Germany, 340 405 Ghost Wars (Coll), 248 Goldwater, Barry, 106, 125 Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Gorbachev, Mikhail, 115–19, 336 Gordon, Michael, 20 Gore, Al, 71 Goss, Porter, 290 Gould, Stephen Jay, 223 Graham, Bob, 36, 38, 71, 73, 80 Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964), 124–28, 152 Gulf War (1990–1991), 16, 71, 188 Haass, Richard, 14, 28, 56 Hadley, Stephen, 28, 33, 47, 169 Halberstam, David, 86 Hamas, 341–42 Hamilton, Lee, 234–39, 242, 245–46, 284–85 Hardcastle, Bruce, 160 Harkins, Paul, 122–23 Hayden, Michael, 290–91, 297 The Hedgehog and the Fox (Berlin), 324–25, 333 Helms, Richard, 108, 111, 129–31, 179, 184 Hitler, Adolf, 6, 224–25 Hoopes, Townsend, 210–11 Hussein, Saddam: brutality and record of aggression, 20; Bush administration’s insistence on existence of link between al-Qa’ida and Iraq, 27, 43–51, 140, 143, 145–48, 155, 163–67; decision to oust (see Bush [G. W.] administration; Iraq War: motivation for); and Duelfer report on WMD, 88–89; evasive behavior on weapons issue, 94; and focus of Bush administration prior to 9/11, 24–25; intelligence community’s assessment of prior to 9/11, 31; invasion of Kuwait, 16, 188; and neoconservative agenda, 16; readmission of weapons inspectors, 39; U.S impressions of vulnerability, 27 ICAs (intelligence community assessments), 253 Immerman, Richard, 318–19, 375n90 India, 188–92 Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, 110–12 INR See Bureau of Intelligence and Research 406 INDEX intelligence agencies: history of reorganizations, 204–5, 213, 300; origins of, 178 See also intelligence community; intelligence products; intelligence reform; specific agencies intelligence assessments: analysis process described, 141–42; assessment of Iraq and other worldwide threats prior to 9/11, 30–32, 159, 246–60 (see also terrorism); challenges caused by unpredictable nature of U.S policy, 226–27; diminishing returns in efforts to eliminate uncertainty, 349–50; disjunction between intelligence input and policy output, 119–20, 228–29; impact of policy on intelligence greater than impact of intelligence on policy, 9–10 (see also Iraq War: politicization; politicization); incomplete/ambiguous data leading to analytic coin tosses, 127–28; incomplete/ambiguous data leading to misuse by political leaders, 145–47; inevitability of some types of failures, 11, 219–27, 305–7 (see also uncertainty); irrelevance in major decisions, 5–7, 11, 96–120; misrepresented in 9/11 Commission report, 4–5, 12, 246–72; as spectator sport, 11, 191–92, 200–201, 255 (see also “scorekeeping” of intelligence assessments) See also Afghanistan; Cuban missile crisis; intelligence assessments of Iraq; intelligence “failures”; intelligence products; Korean War; politicization; Soviet Union; uncertainty; Vietnam War; specific presidents, issues, and events intelligence assessments of Iraq: accuracy of pre-war assessments and their implications, 4, 60, 172–73; assessments biased by policymakers’ allocation of resources, 165–66; assessments ignored by Congress, 70, 73–74; assessments ignored/rejected by administration, 36–38, 48, 52–55, 59, 66–67, 145; assessments misused, 32–39, 83–84, 140–52, 165–66, 313; assessments not requested by administration, 36, 53; assessments playing no part in decision to invade Iraq, 11, 15, 36, 41–42, 66–67, 88–92; and barrier between president and skeptical input, 52–53; contents of assessments, 27, 44, 48–49, 55–59, 61, 79–84, 88–89, 91, 142, 144–45, 159, 172 (see also weapons of mass destruction); and inherent uncertainty, 158, 163; inquiries into, 75–85; and al-Libi’s statements, 143, 164–65; 9/11 Commission report’s misrepresentation of, 4–5, 12, 246–72; PCTEG’s attempts to discredit other intelligence assessments and link Iraq and al-Qa’ida, 45–49; perfect prewar intelligence thought experiment, 88–92; pressure on intelligence community to find pretexts for war, 32–35, 147–51; U.S attack on Iraq viewed as only scenario likely to result in Iraq-sponsored WMD attack on U.S., 38–39, 66, 78, 165 intelligence community: attempts not to seem subversive while presenting assessments contrary to policymakers’ wishes, 56, 167; blamed for Iraq invasion, 75–79, 84, 94–95 (see also intelligence “failures”); cooptation of senior officials, 156–57; distortion of perceived mission, 200; expectations for uninterrupted success, 217; and hedgehogs vs foxes (Berlin’s concept), 324–25, 333; ill will between Bush administration and intelligence community, 34–35, 67, 152–57, 166, 171–73; insiders’ perspectives dismissed as biased, 181; intelligence community as check on vs intelligence community as part of executive branch, 313; internal drive for improvement and adaptation, 5, 94, 204, 207, 254, 294–95; judged for how vigorously it resists policymakers’ willful distortions and misguided policies, 34–35, 167–69, 313; and Kissinger, 109, 313; lack of informed public discourse about, 180–81; lack of input into decision to invade Iraq, 14 (see also Bush [G. W.] administration); lack of supportive constituency, 179–80, 285; loyalty of dissenters and pessimists questioned, 132, 156, 168, 173; mythology about, 8–11, 180–82, 198, 228–29, 272–74; need for greater autonomy, 314–15; Nixon’s antipathy toward, 108; and problems of politicization of issues (see Iraq War: INDEX politicization; politicization); public relations, 180; public’s negative views of, 177–80, 200, 214–16; and reducing politicization, 311–17; reputation from previous successes and failures affecting ability to resist politicization pressures, 124; as scapegoat, 177–81 (see also intelligence “failures”); self-initiated assessments, 56; trade-offs in distancing vs getting close to policymakers, 312–14; training for analysts, 319–20 intelligence “failures,” 2–10; and diversion of blame for policy mistakes, 11, 75–79, 84, 151–52, 231–32; examples, 185–98, 301–5; focus on predictions without regard to policy outcomes, 183–98; inevitability of, 11, 219–27, 305–7 (see also uncertainty); and 9/11, 2, 12, 272–73 (see also 9/11 Commission report); perceptions of, 11, 66–67, 180, 208–19, 227–31; and perpetual prominence of reform issue, 202–32; and politicization, 124, 157–61; and problems with “scorekeeping,” 180–201 (see also “scorekeeping” of intelligence assessments); reasons for failures, 219–27, 304; and “Team B” exercise (1976), 133–35; and trade-offs between different objectives and different performance criteria, 306–7 intelligence products, 251–56 See also national intelligence estimates intelligence reform, 4, 8–12, 151–53, 181, 202–32, 293–330; damaging effects of enacting 9/11 Commission recommendations, 295–303; failure of 2004 reorganization to improve counterterrorism, 303–5; history of reorganizations, 204–5, 213, 300; intelligence community’s self-initiated reforms ignored, 205–6, 254, 294–95; and 9/11 Commission report recommendations, 12, 236–37, 239–40, 243, 275, 293–310 (see also director of national intelligence; National Counterterrorism Center); recommendations for real reform, 311–22, 325–29; standard model of intelligence reform, 307–10; underlying assumptions, 203–13 Iran, 28, 40, 193–98, 276, 341, 346–47, 360n45 407 Iraq, 59–62; administration’s optimism about Iraq invasion and its aftermath, 59–62; implications of oil reserves, 21; international sanctions, 88–89; invasion of Kuwait, 16, 188; and need for uncertainty-sensitive policies, 347–48; NIC assessment of likely situation (Principal Challenges assessment), 55–59; as part of “axis of evil,” 28 See also Hussein, Saddam; and following headings Iraq and al-Qa’ida: A Murky Relationship report (2002), 46, 47, 48 Iraq War: congressional support for, 69–75; cost of, 62; failure to consider risks and consequences, 59–64, 345–48; and focus on “intelligence failures,” 2, 66–67, 75–79, 84, 151–52; as huge gamble, 345–46, 349; impact of large number of political appointees, 327–28; motivation for, 14–20, 26–27, 64–66; objectives of, 17–24, 32–41, 62, 63; planning for, 21, 27–28, 56, 59–64; and politicization, 27, 43–51, 84, 87, 140–74 (see also Iraq War, selling to the public); souring of, 8, 15, 63, 65, 75–79, 84–86, 176–77, 285, 344–45; and withdrawal of troops, 344–45 See also Bush (G. W.) administration; and following headings Iraq War, dissenters and skeptics, 14, 28, 38, 40–41, 56, 70–72, 85–86, 161–63, 327; barrier between president and skeptical input, 28, 52–53; Bush administration’s attempts to discredit intelligence, 171–73; Bush administration’s harsh treatment of dissenters, 52, 61, 67, 156; hypothetical presence of WMD not logically equated with need for invasion, 40–41; loyalty of dissenters and pessimists questioned, 156, 168, 173; self-initiated NIC assessments, 55–59; U.S attack on Iraq viewed by intelligence community as only scenario likely to result in Iraq-sponsored WMD attack on U.S., 38–39, 66, 78, 165 See also Baker, James; Chafee, Lincoln; Graham, Bob; Haass, Richard; Levin, Carl; Pillar, Paul R.; Scowcroft, Brent; Tenet, George Iraq War, selling to the public, 10, 14–15, 55, 63–64, 70, 88–92; administration’s 408 INDEX Iraq War, selling to the public (continued) dissembling about intentions, 28–29; administration’s insistence on existence of link between al-Qa’ida and Iraq, 27, 43–51, 140, 143, 145–48, 155, 163–67; administration’s pressure on intelligence community to find a pretext for war, 32–35, 147–51, 155; as extreme case of politicization of intelligence, 140–47, 169–70; focus of pro-war advocacy, 14–15, 18, 20, 25–34, 37–41, 43–51, 67; hypothetical presence of WMD falsely equated with need for invasion, 40–41, 67; and misuse of intelligence assessments, 32–39, 83–84, 140–52, 165–66, 313; speeches and statements, 28, 33, 35–37, 39, 91, 148, 360n45, 362n68 Iraq War, supporters and advocates See Bush, George W.; Cheney, Richard; Feith, Douglas; Kay, David; Perle, Richard; Pollack, Kenneth; Rumsfeld, Donald; Wolfowitz, Paul; Wurmser, David Israel, 21–24, 184–87, 229, 294, 341–42, 359n20 Jacoby, Admiral “Jake,” 47, 48 Jervis, Robert, 318 Johndroe, Gordon, 41–42 Johnson, Lyndon, 184–85, 190–91; political pressures on, 105–6, 125, 128; and politicization of intelligence, 126, 128, 130, 152; and Vietnam, 19, 63, 103–6, 125–26, 152, 199; worldview, 6, 102, 103 Joseph, Robert, 33–34 Kagan, Robert, 17 Kantor, Mckinlay, 225–26 Kay, David, 72, 88 Kean, Thomas, 234–39, 242, 245–46, 284–85, 303–4 Kennedy, John F., 99–100, 102, 122, 124, 216, 321 Kennedy, Robert, 100, 106, 187 Kerr, Richard, 117 Kerry, John, 71, 281 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 16 Kissinger, Henry, 107–12, 132, 185–87, 194, 313 Komer, Robert (“Blowtorch Bob”), 129–30 Korean War, 97–98, 177 Krauthammer, Charles, 19 Kucinich, Dennis, 71 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion of, 16, 188 Landay, Jonathan, 85 Levin, Carl, 38, 48, 72 Libby, I Lewis, 33, 47, 50, 154 al-Libi, Ibn al-Shaykh, 143, 164–65 Lieberman, Joseph, 71 Lindsey, Lawrence B., 61 The Looming Tower (Wright), 261 Lorenz, Edward, 221 Lowenkron, Barry, 49–50 MacEachin, Douglas, 242, 250–51, 275 The Making of a Quagmire (Halberstam), 86 Maliki, Nouri, 51 Marshall Plan, 1–2, 57, 62 May, Ernest, 225–26, 228, 388n15 McCone, John, 123–24, 190 McConnell, Mike, 157, 308 McLaughlin, John, 59, 154, 169, 252, 265–66 McNamara, Robert, 105, 106, 123, 125, 131, 297, 316, 335 Mead, Walter Russell, media, U.S.: Cheney’s statements on Meet the Press (September 2002), 142, 145; and democratic transformation rationale for Iraq War, 19; and discrediting intelligence, 172–73; docudrama on 9/11, 284–85; failure to challenge Iraq war decision, 85–88; Iraq War skeptics in, 85–86; relations with Bush administration, 87, 150–51; self-criticism following Iraq War, 85–86; Tenet pressured to alter briefing to New York Times, 165; uncritical acceptance of 9/11 Commission report, 283–86; and Vietnam War, 86–87, 125 Meyer, Herbert E., 215 Middle East, 17–21, 63, 341, 344 Miscik, Jami, 148 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 263, 289–90 Mudd, Phil, 164 Muravchik, Joshua, 18 Mylroie, Laurie, 244 INDEX National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 192–93, 218–19, 305–6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States See 9/11 Commission report National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 239–40, 242, 254, 300–302 National Intelligence Council (NIC), 31–32, 55–59, 80–84, 154, 297, 351 See also national intelligence estimates national intelligence estimates (NIEs): on international terrorism, 256–57, 263–64, 267; on Iraqi weapons programs (October 2002), 35–39, 73–76, 79–82; NIE format owned by NIC, 253; 9/11 Commission report’s misleading fixation on lack of NIEs, 251–56; as one of the least influential intelligence products, 252 National Security Agency (NSA), 126–28, 152, 287, 289, 295 National Security Council (NSC), 26, 33, 39, 102, 108, 118, 194, 255, 304, 321 See also ExComm National Security Service, 205 NCTC See National Counterterrorism Center Negroponte, John, 297 Nelson, Bill, 74–75 neoconservative ideology, 15–20, 26–27, 55, 67, 352 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 22, 23 Neustadt, Richard, 225–26, 228 Newbold, Gregory, 26 NIC See National Intelligence Council NIEs See national intelligence estimates 9/11 Commission report (2004), 12, 234–80; influence of, 234, 241, 245–46, 280–91; integrity subordinated to public relations, 235, 238, 244, 277–80; intelligence community’s comments and corrections to draft report, 246, 247, 265, 269; lack of accountability for flawed content, 291–92; lack of integrity in preparation process, 235, 237–46, 265, 276, 283, 285–86; leadership of, 234–38 (see also Hamilton, Lee; Kean, Thomas; Zelikow, Philip); misrepresentation of pre-war intelligence, 4–5, 12, 246–72, 277–80, 285; politicization, 409 12, 274–77; recommendations of, 12, 236–37, 239–40, 243, 275, 293–310 (see also director of national intelligence; National Counterterrorism Center); responses to, 281–92, 294; role as advocate more than investigator, 237, 243, 275, 277; summary of myths perpetuated by, 272–74; transformation into unofficial pressure group, 237 Nixon, Richard, 107–12, 132, 185–87, 194 North Korea, 28, 40, 54, 360n45 Northwest Airlines bombing attempt (2009), 303–5 Novak, Robert, 173 NSA See National Security Agency NSC See National Security Council NSC Executive Committee, 99–100, 321 NSC Planning Board, 321 nuclear weapons: and assessments of Iraq prior to 9/11, 31–32; Cheney’s statement on necessity of acting as if possibilities were certainties, 41, 345–46; Cheney’s statements on Iraq’s capabilities, 37; China’s tests of 1964, 190–92, 350; and flawed NIE on Iraqi weapons systems (October 2002), 35–39, 73–76, 79–82; India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests of 1998, 188–92; and Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, 112; and need for uncertainty-sensitive policy toward Iran, 341, 346–47 See also Iran; North Korea; weapons of mass destruction Obama, Barack, 304 Oberdorfer, Don, 199 ODNI See Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 297–98 oil, and considerations about Iraq invasion, 20–21, 62 O’Neill, Paul, 25 Operation Desert Storm, 16, 71, 188 Pakistan, 110–12, 114, 188–92, 259–60 Palestinian issue, 185–86, 341–42, 344 PCTEG See Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group 410 INDEX Pentagon Papers, 101, 102 Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Jervis), 318 Perle, Richard, 22, 78, 176–77, 327–28 Pillar, Paul R.: and administration’s attempts to link Iraq and Islamist terrorists, 49–50; and administration’s discrediting intelligence, 171–73; and administration’s speeches and statements, 144–45; and aviation security, 257; background and career, xi–xvi; and choice of intelligence products, 253; and Cohen’s pro-leak article, 92–93; and Congress’s failure to read intelligence assessments, 74–75; and consequences of 9/11 Commission recommendations, 297, 299; early work on post–Cold War issues, 212; and inquiry into prewar intelligence on postinvasion consequences, 77; and intelligence community’s assessment of Iraq prior to 9/11, 31; and al-Libi’s statements, 164–65; and mistaken assumptions about catastrophic terrorism, 268–71; and NIE on Iraqi weapons systems, 38, 74; and 9/11 Commission report, 234, 242–43, 267–70, 274; and PCTEG’s attempts to discredit other intelligence assessments and link Iraq and al-Qa’ida, 48; and politicization of intelligence in testimony to congressional committees, 169–70; Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq assessment, 55–59; projections about likely usage of WMD, 38; and Reagan administration’s antiSoviet ideology, 149; recommendations for real reform, 311–30; recommendations for uncertainty-sensitive policies, 331–52; Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq assessment, 55–59; and reorganization of agencies, 204; and Silberman-Robb Commission report (2005), 243; Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy, 267–68, 271; and Yom Kippur War of 1973, 229 Plame, Valerie, 170 Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), 45–46 policymakers See decision making; foreign policy, U.S.; politicization; worldviews of political leaders political appointees, 322–29 politicization, 9–11, 121–74, 311–17, 322–29, 353; Cold War examples, 121–40, 149, 152; defined, 275; and hedgehogs vs foxes (Berlin’s concept), 324–25, 333; and Iraq War, 27, 43–51, 84, 87, 140–74 (see also Iraq War, selling to the public); and 9/11 (see 9/11 Commission report); reforms aimed at reducing, 12, 311–17, 325–29 See also intelligence “failures”; scapegoats; specific presidents Pollack, Kenneth, 71 Posner, Richard, 282, 294 Powell, Colin, 32, 49–50, 52–53, 92–93, 167–68 Priest, Dana, 150 public, U.S.: adulation of “new” things, 208; belief about connection between Iraq and 9/11, 45; belief about “intelligence failures” as cause of Iraq War, 66–67; beliefs about need for intelligence reform (see intelligence reform); desire for reassuring explanations about fixable problems, 5, 8–12, 180, 210, 230–31, 278, 354; distorted views of intelligence mission, 200; and the future, 353–55; and impact of 9/11 and souring of Iraq War, 8; impressions of leaders and institutions gained from fictionalized media, 285; misunderstandings extended by 9/11 Commission report, 281–87, 291–92; and mythology about intelligence, 8–11, 180–82, 198, 228–29, 272–74; need for expanded role as consumer of intelligence, 316–17; negative views of intelligence community, 177–80, 200, 214–16; perceptions of intelligence failures worse than reality, 11, 227–29; perceptions of 9/11 Commission report, 234, 241, 245–46, 280–83, 285; and televised hearings on 9/11 of 2003–2004, 243–46 See also Iraq War, selling to the public; 9/11 Commission report al-Qa’ida: ability to frustrate collection of intelligence about, 219; Bush administration’s insistence on existence of link between al-Qa’ida and Iraq, 27, 43–51, 140, 143, 145–47, 155, 163–67; INDEX Clinton-era assessments of, 44, 248–52, 255–57; covert action findings, 249, 255; development of organization, 261–64; lack of connection between Iraq and al-Qa’ida, 27, 44, 48–49, 91; and al-Libi’s statements, 143; and NIC predictions about postSaddam Iraq, 58; pre-9/11 assessments of al-Qa’ida threat concealed by 9/11 Commission report, 246–72 Ransom, Harry Howe, 354 Reagan, Ronald, 115–18, 136–40, 149, 317 Rice, Condoleezza, 28, 36, 143, 164, 165, 283, 362n68, 365n21; and administration’s focus on Iraq prior to 9/11, 24; attempt to shift blame to CIA for administration’s misuse of intelligence, 34; informed about al-Qa’ida threat prior to 9/11, 249, 267, 283–84; and pressure on intelligence community to find a pretext for war, 33, 34 Ricks, Thomas, 74 risk See decision making; uncertainty Roberts, Pat, 205–6 Roemer, Tim, 241, 286 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 178 Rostow, Walt, 130, 131, 170, 199 Rumsfeld, Donald, 16, 19, 24–27, 36, 47, 52, 53, 61, 66, 89, 260; expectations about war, 60, 62; expressions of certainty about WMD, 37–38, 148; memo on what could go wrong in Iraq invasion, 63–64; not consulted about advisability of war, 52; as scapegoat, 176 Rusk, Dean, 191, 192, 350 al-Sadr, Muqtada, 144 SALT See strategic arms limitation talks Santorum, Rick, 184 Saudi Arabia, 339 scapegoats, 175–201 See also intelligence “failures”; “scorekeeping” of intelligence assessments Schlesinger, James, 250 “scorekeeping” of intelligence assessments, 11, 180–201, 219–29, 255, 305–7, 340 Scowcroft, Brent, 35, 118, 327 September 11, 2001, 2, 8, 11–12, 26, 210, 235–36, 244, 272–76, 284–85; deeply flawed investigation of (see 9/11 411 Commission report); exploited as pretext for Iraq invasion, 25–30, 67 See also intelligence “failures” Sheehan, Neil, 86 Shenon, Philip, 238–39, 284 Shinseki, Eric, 52, 61 Shultz, George, 116–17, 336–37 Sick, Gary, 194–95, 384n56 Silberman, Laurence, 168–69 Silberman-Robb Commission report (2005), 152–53, 157, 168–69, 294; compared to 9/11 Commission report, 276–77 Sims, Jennifer, 229 Six-Day War of 1967, 184–86 Smith, Walter Bedell, Snow, Edgar, 373n54 Sobel, Robert, 222 Soviet Union: arms race with U.S., 115–18; collapse of, 118–19; and Cuban missile crisis, 100, 121–22; and examples of effective policymaking adapted to uncertainty, 336–37; and Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, 111; invasion of Afghanistan, 112–15, 188; and Nixon administration, 109, 132; overestimation of armed forces capabilities, 134–35; perestroika, 115, 118; and Reagan administration, 115–18, 136–40, 149; Russian Revolution, 223–24; Soviet threat as dominant theme of Cold War national security policy, 132–40; strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), 132; and terrorism, 137–40; and U.S beliefs about Korean conflict, 97; and Vietnam War, 103 State Department See Bureau of Intelligence and Research Sterling, Claire, 137–38 Stimson, Henry L., 177 strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), 132 Strobel, Warren, 85 Sullivan, William, 195, 197 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, 223, 340 “Team B” exercise (1976), 133–35 Tenet, George, 9, 24, 32, 34, 38, 74, 167–68, 205, 283, 288, 312–13; assessment of worldwide threats prior to 9/11, 31, 248–50, 283–84; difficult position of, 156, 167–68; and draft statements from 412 INDEX Tenet, George (continued) administration, 143–44; left out of planning for Iraq War, 27; and 9/11 Commission report, 239, 244–45; not consulted about advisability of war, 52; oral briefings and conversations about terrorism and al-Qa’ida threat, 31, 252; and PCTEG’s attempts to discredit other intelligence assessments and link Iraq and al-Qa’ida, 47, 48; pressured to revise or withdraw assessments, 154, 165; and pressure on intelligence community to find a pretext for war, 32–34, 156 terrorism: and adapting to uncertainty, 338; and anti-Soviet ideology, 137–40; assessment of likely targets, 256–57; Bush administration’s insistence on existence of link between al-Qa’ida and Iraq, 27, 43–51, 140, 143, 145–47, 163–67; and Bush administration’s pressure on intelligence community to find a pretext for war, 155; and Carter administration’s handling of Afghanistan, 114; Cheney’s statement on necessity of acting as if possibilities were certainties, 41, 345–46; and Clinton administration, 248–49, 251, 255–56, 260; and constraints on what policymakers can in response to warnings, 258–60; mistaken assumptions about catastrophic terrorism, 268–71; misuse of link analysis, 146–47; and NIC predictions about post-Saddam Iraq, 58; overreliance on tactical warning, 338; and perception that intelligence community is slow to adapt to new challenges, 209–10; pre-9/11 assessments of al-Qa’ida threat concealed by 9/11 Commission report, 246–72; and self-negating predictions, 184; and selling the Iraq War, 15, 28, 43–51; terrorist attacks in the 1970s, 209–10; U.S attack on Iraq viewed by intelligence community as only scenario likely to result in Iraq-sponsored WMD attack on U.S., 38–39, 66, 78, 165 See also Counterterrorist Center; intelligence “failures”; National Counterterrorism Center; Terrorist Threat Integration Center; al-Qa’ida; specific incidents Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy (Pillar), 267–68, 271 Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 240, 301 Tetlock, Philip, 226, 325 Thompson, Llewellyn, 99, 109 The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Pollack), 71 Tokyo subway attack (1995), 301–2 Trainor, Bernard, 20 Treverton, Greg, 160 Truman, Harry S., 6, 97–98, 177, 178, 325 Turner, Stansfield, 115 uncertainty, 7, 10, 12; adaptations in the business world, 335; adapting policy to uncertainty, 331–52; beneficial unpredicted events, 187, 340; Cheney’s statements on necessity of acting as if possibilities were certainties, 41, 345–46 United Kingdom, 28, 29, 34, 41, 225–26 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 39, 90 UNMOVIC See United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission UN Security Council: Powell’s presentation to (February 2003), 49–50, 92–93, 167–68 Updike, John, 282 U.S Central Command (CENTCOM), 27 Vance, Cyrus, 112–13, 195–97 Vietnam syndrome, 317 Vietnam War: bombing campaign against North Vietnam, 104–5, 130–31; and Bundy’s memo on what could go wrong, 63; causes of, 9, 19, 87, 103–6; Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964), 124–28, 152; Halberstam on, 86; irrelevance of intelligence assessments in decision making, 100–107; and Johnson’s personal and political needs, 105–6; loss of public support for, 128, 130–32; McNamara on, 316, 335; and media, 86–87, 125; overly optimistic assessments, 122–24; perceived lack of good alternatives for policy, 195; politicization of intelligence, 122–32; INDEX public relations campaign, 130–32; and public’s negative views of intelligence community, 178; scapegoats, 175; sense that policy must be followed even though likely to fail, 106–7; Tet Offensive (1968), 199–200; and worldviews of policymakers, 87, 102–3 Walpole, Bob, 38, 169 For Want of a Nail: If Burgoyne Had Won at Saratoga (Sobel), 222 Watergate, 178 weapons inspections, 29, 39, 51 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 66, 78–79, 198; Bush administration’s emphasis on what Saddam Hussein “could” do, 39, 41, 78, 89, 132; Bush administration’s expressions of certainty on, 37–38, 142, 148; Cheney’s statement on necessity of acting as if possibilities were certainties, 41, 345–46; complexity of assessment and politicization issue, 157–61; and congressional inquiry into prewar intelligence, 75–76, 78–85; and Curveball source, 161, 295; flawed national intelligence estimate (NIE) on (October 2002), 35–39, 73–76, 79–82, 198; focus on WMD as main selling point for Iraq invasion, 15, 30–32, 37–39; hypothetical presence of WMD falsely equated with need for invasion, 40–41, 67; and impact of Iraq War souring on American consciousness, 8; INR agnosticism about, 161–63; and intelligence community’s assessment of Iraq, 31, 66; and al-Libi’s statements, 143, 164–65; and media, 87–88; and mistaken assumptions about catastrophic terrorism, 268–71; perfect prewar intelligence thought experiment, 88–92; and politically driven inaction on the part of intelligence officers, 159–60; postinvasion assessment (Duelfer report), 88–89; and Rumsfeld’s memo on what could go wrong, 64; and Silberman-Robb Commission report (2005), 152–53, 157, 159–61; U.S attack 413 on Iraq viewed as only scenario likely to result in Iraq-sponsored WMD attack on U.S., 38–39, 66, 78, 165 See also intelligence assessments of Iraq Weinberger, Caspar, 116 Weiner, Tim, 87, 267 Westmoreland, William C., 104, 128–31 Wilson, Woodrow, 178, 224 WMD See weapons of mass destruction Wolfowitz, Paul: and attempts to link Iraq to al-Qa’ida, 45–46, 166; on bias toward inaction, 347; governing images of, 319–20; and Iraq War, 16, 26–27, 30, 52–54, 60–62, 64, 160, 319; and Israel, 23; and Operation Desert Storm, 16; and “Team B” exercise (1976), 133 Woodward, Bob, 52, 53, 283, 284 World Islamic Front, 262 World Trade Center attack of 1993, 210, 244, 247, 263, 264, 267, 278 worldviews of political leaders, 6–7, 59, 62, 98, 99, 119–20, 333; Cold War attitudes, 97–99, 102–7, 113, 115–16, 136–40; and future prospects for policy, 353–55; hedgehogs vs foxes (Berlin’s concept), 324–25, 333; inability to alter worldview in response to new evidence, 6, 36, 108, 116, 319; recommendations for improving images and policies, 317–25, 339–42, 352–53 See also politicization; specific leaders World War I, 99, 175 World War II, 59, 98, 224–25, 350 Wright, Lawrence, 261 Wurmser, David, 22, 23 Yom Kippur War of 1973, 185–87, 229, 294 Yousef, Ramzi, 247, 263, 267, 278 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 144 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 260, 262 Zelikow, Philip: focus on unconventional weapons as only source of catastrophic terrorism, 268–69, 271–72; and 9/11 Commission, 237–39, 241–42, 244, 245, 249, 274, 283; and second CIA inspector general’s report, 291 .. .INTELLIGENCE AND U.S FOREIGN POLICY INTELLIGENCE AND U.S FO R EI G N P O L I CY Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform Paul R Pillar COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY... and leads them to ponder how the making of their country’s foreign policy is really—not just theoretically or ideally—informed and guided and what this understanding implies for making that policy. .. that the proper response is to fix intelligence A major refrain in discourse about making U.S foreign and security policy better is thus intelligence failure and intelligence “reform.” (I often