... 174.7Total3,157.3DangerousUnintendedConsequences:HowBankingBailouts,BuyoutsandNationalizationCanOnlyProlong America’s Second Great Depression andWeakenAnySubsequentRecoveryPresentedbyMartinD.Weiss,Ph.D.WeissResearch,Inc.NationalPressClubWashington,DCMarch19,200920Inconclusion,beyondthe$2.32trillioninassetsofbanksatriskbasedontheirFinancialStrengthRatingscitedinPartI,WeissResearchestimatesthereareadditionalassetsof$3.16trillioninlargeinstitutionsatrisk,foratotalof$5.48trillioninat‐riskinstitutions.21PartIIISilencingthePotentialTriggersofGlobalCollapseDoesNotAddressItsCausesAnyonestillskepticalofthenatureandmagnitudeofthesystemicdangersneedonlyreviewtheFebruary26,2009draftmemorandumissuedbyAIG,titled“AIG:IstheRiskSystemic?”Althoughmarked“strictlyconfidential,”itfounditswayintothepublicdomaininearlyMarch.19Init,AIGstates: ... $36,405,06023However,ifthisglobalstructureisshaky,neitherafuturefailureofAIGnorthe2008bankruptcyofLehmanBrotherscanbeproperlyconstruedastheunderlyingcause.Rather,theyaremerelypotentialtriggersofaglobalcollapse.Theunderlyingcausesofglobalinstabilityaremanyyearsofoverborrowingandundersaving,plusthecumulativeweightoftheU.S.housingbust,mortgagemeltdown,widespreaddeleveraginginthefinancialsystem,andthedeepesteconomicdownturnsincethe Great Depression. Meanwhile,thepotentialtriggersofaglobalcollapseareubiquitous—notlimitedtojustoneortwofirmssuchasAIGorLehmanBrothers.Aswedemonstrateinthispaper,inthebankingindustryalone,thereareatleastfourmegabanksandthousandsofsmallerinstitutionsatrisk.Thus,althoughabundanttaxpayerfundsmaylockdownsomeofthepotentialtriggerssomeofthetime,itisunreasonabletoexpectthegovernmenttosilenceallthegunsallthetime.24PartIVU.S.CommercialBanksAreVulnerabletoContagionDespiteExpandedDepositInsuranceOnejustificationoftencitedprivately—andsometimespublicly—forgovernmentactionstoavertlargebankfailuresistheconcernthat ... to“optout”andaccepttheirshareofwhatevercashwasavailable,oftenaslittleas50centsonthedollar.Further,inordertodiscourageopt‐outs,theauthoritiesimposedanadditionalpenaltyforthoseseekingimmediatereimbursement.Overall,however,bothchoicesinvolvedsimilarlylargelosses,eitheracceptedimmediatelyupfrontviaalossofprincipalorincurredovertimeviaalossofincome.Thisepisodewastheworstinsuranceindustrydisastersincethe Great Depression. Andalthoughinadifferentindustry,thelessonstobelearnedfromthisexperiencecanbeveryinstructiveforthebankingindustryanditsregulators:Lesson1.Itisamistakeforbankstoprovide,orforregulatorstopermit,guaranteedorabove‐marketyields.Yet,thisisanerrorthathasbeenfrequentlyrepeatedintherecenthistoryofbankingtroubles.20Datasource:Statutoryreports(“BlueBooks”)filedwiththestateinsurancecommissioners.27Lesson2....