MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY - DISSERTATION VIETNAM'S COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW: EMERGING ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING EVFTA COMMITMENTS Major: International Trade Policy and Law PHAM THI THU HA Hanoi – 2020 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY DISSERTATION VIETNAM'S COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING EVFTA COMMITMENTS Major: International Trade Policy and Law Full Name: PHAM THI THU HA SUPERVISOR: Assoc.Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia Hanoi – 2020 DECLARATION I hereby declare that this master thesis is the scientific research of my own which made on the basis of theoretical studies and under the direction and supervision of Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia The research contents and results of this thesis is completely honest These data and documents for the analysis, review and evaluation were collected from various sources which are fully listed in the reference list I am fully responsible for the content of this master thesis as well as this declaration.s rd Hanoi, March 23 , 2020 PHAM THI THU HA ACKNOWLEDGEMENT One year and months in Foreign Trade University has come and gone It is my pleasure to become a part of Master’s of International Trade Policy and Law, Intake 6, where I had a chance to meet many interesting and unique friends as well as many enthusiastic and world class professors in the field of international trade and law Thanks, Foreign Trade University (FTU), I was able to experience a totally different academic environment from other school, which is worth to spend my time and challenge myself First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc Prof Dr Tang Van Nghia, Dean of Faculty of Graduate Studies of the Foreign Trade University for his enthusiasms, patience and support from the beginning to finishing of my master thesis With his numerous years of experiences and profound knowledge, he has always given me helpful advices whenever I crashed into a dead end Besides this, I want to express my thankfulness to my entire classmate, especially to become a part of my student life Hope that everyone will be successful and be happy in the future Finally, it will be missing without mentioning on the encouragement and support of my husband, my family, and my best friends who has supported me from the beginning until the end of this thesis Thank you my managers and colleagues in MPP, Vietnam Japan Universiy – for always giving me favorable conditions for me to complete this scientific research Thank you, for always stay by my side and encourage me TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .4 Table of contents i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi LIST OF BOX(PRACTICAL CASE) vii SUMMARY OF THESIS RESEARCH RESULTS viii CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research Rationale 1.2 Literature Review 1.3 Research objectives & Research questions 1.4 Scope of Research 1.5 Research methodology .5 1.6 Thesis outline CHAPTER FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPETITION, AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY .6 2.1 The concept of competition 2.2 Fundamentals of Competition Policy and Law 2.2.1 Competition Law and Competition Policy 2.2.2 Scope and links of competition law with other policies 2.2.3 Objectives of competition policy 2.2.4 Contents of Competition Policy .12 CHAPTER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF COMPETITION POLICY 14 3.1 Importance and history background of international co-operation in competition policy 14 3.2 Current situation of international cooperation of competition policy 15 3.3 Competition related provision in FTAs .16 3.3.1 Rationales for including Competition-related Provisions in FTAs 16 ii 3.3.2 Typology of Competition-related provisions in FTAs 17 CHAPTER COMPETITION POLICY IN EVFTA .25 4.1 Introduction to EVFTA .25 4.2 Potential macroeconomic implications of the EVFTA to Vietnam 27 4.3 Coverage of Competition policy in the EVFTA 27 4.4 Content of competition -related provisions in EVFTA .29 4.4.1 Promoting competition &Adopting and maintaining competition laws proscribe anti-competitive business conduct 29 4.4.2 Procedural fairness and transparency 30 4.4.3 Regulating designated monopolies and state-owned enterprises 31 4.4.4 Regulating subsidies/state aid 35 4.4.5 Co-operation and co-ordination on competition 37 4.4.6Dispute settlement mechanisms for conflicts on competition 38 CHAPTER 5.OVERVIEW ON VIETNAM’s COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY REGIME .40 5.1 Vietnam Competition Legislation .40 5.1.1 Over view of Vietnam Competition Legistration 40 5.1.2Scope of application 42 5.1.3 Agreement on restraint of competition policy .45 5.1.4 Abuse of dominance 49 5.1.5 Economic Concentration 52 5.1.6 Unfairs competitive practices 60 5.1.7 Competitive authorities agencies 62 5.1.8 Sanction 63 5.1.9 Leniency 65 5.2 Enforcement of Competition Policy in recent years 66 5.2.1 General assessment 66 5.2.2 Investigation of competition restriction cases 68 5.2.3 Investigation and handling of unfair competition cases 69 5.2.4 Controlling violation of economic concentration 70 iii CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN VIETNAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMITMENTS IN EVFTA 71 6.1 Improving provisions in VietnamCompetition Law in accordance with commitments in EVFTA 6.1.1 Interpretation of term: need to be improved 71 71 6.1.2 Requirement for consistency of Vietnam legal system 71 6.1.3 Improve provisions to control effectively economic concentration 73 6.1.4 Provide an incentive and transparent leniency program as an instrument to tackle core cartel (OECD, 2015) 73 6.2 SOEs and competitive neutrality issues in setting a transparent competition enviroment 6.2.1 Tax neutrality 74 74 6.2.2 Public procurement 75 6.2.3 Debt neutrality and outright subsidies 75 6.2.4 Regulatory neutrality 75 6.3 Maintain an independent and well resourced competition authority with the necessary powers to effectively enforce competition law 76 6.3.1 Complete draft decree which prescribes the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the competition authority 76 6.3.2 Build financial resource to boost capacities for Vietnam’s young competition authorities 77 6.3.3 Build human resource to boost capacities for Vietnam’s young competition authorities 78 6.4 Strengthen cooperation between competition authories of both Parties CHAPTER CONCLUSION 81 83 LIST OF REFERENCES iv iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Meaning Art Article CPL Competition Policy and Law EVFTA European Union - Vietnam Free Trade Agreement FTAs Free trade agreements ICN International Competition Network MOIT Ministry of Industry and Trade NCC National Competition Committee OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development RTAs Regional Trade Agreement SOEs State owned enterprises v LIST OF TABLES Table Page Table 1: Experience with International Co-operation in Enforcement, 15 by Enforcement Area (2007-2012) Table2: Summary outline of EVFTA 27 Table 3: Brief characteristics of state-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special rights or privileges, and designated monopolies in 33 EVFTA Table 4: Budget for operation of competition authorities in 2016 in 78 some chosen countries Table 5: comparison between countries in the world on the size of 80 the competition agency's personnel in 2016 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page Figure 1: Four elements of competition policy must be considered to promote a market-oriented economy Figure 2: Relationship between competition law, competition policy and economic development Figure 3: Types of Competition-related Provisions in FTAs 18 Figure 4: Review Timeline between Vietnam Competition Law 48 2004& 2018 Figure : Statistics of competition restriction case during 2006-2018 69 Figure : Statistics on unfair compeitition case from 2009-2018 69 73 referring proposed new business laws to the competition agency to consider whether and how it can contribute to avoiding unnecessary restrictions to competition 6.1.3 Improve provisions to control effectively economic concentration Only Art.38 of Decree 116/2005/ND-CP stipulates the responsibilities of the competition administration authority (the abolished regulation) in responding to economic concentration notices to business registration authorities However, the contents of controlling economic concentration such as identifying relevant markets, calculating combined market share, the impact of the case on the competitive structure of the market are not simple and There may arise different ways of defining and different points of view Therefore, it is necessary to have a mechanism of coordination, assignment and linkage to unify the calculation processes and reference sources Additionally, an information channel is required for exchanging databases related to enterprise information between the business registration/investment registration authority, competition authority (NCC) and specialized agencies such as the General Statistics Office, the Ministry of Finance, the State Securities Commission, the State Bank, and regulatory agencies 6.1.4 Provide an incentive and transparent leniency program as an instrument to tackle core cartel (OECD, 2015) Hard-core cartels are universally recognized because the most serious violations of competition law and as such are the main enforcement priority of many competition authorities However, cartels generally operate in secrecy, and this complicates detection and successful prosecution To overcome this difficulty, most jurisdictions around the world, have adopted leniency program, which provide cartelists a lenient treatment in prosecution in exchange for cooperation with the investigation There are two types of leniency program, those that reward only the first-in applicant with immunity, and those that correspondingly to granting immunity to the first applicant also reward subsequent applicants with more lenient treatment To encourage leniency applicants to come forward as early as possible, many authorities have adopted “marker” systems Marker systems allow a prospective leniency applicant to approach the authority with some initial 74 information about their participation in a cartel in exchange for a commitment by the authority to hold the applicants ‘place inline’ for amnesty/leniency (i.e., grant a “marker”), for a finite period of time, while the applicant gathers additional information to complete its amnesty/leniency application Markers can, therefore, be seen as a mechanism to spur the race for leniency by reducing the initial barriers to entry into the leniency program and by providing transparency and predictability to parties regarding their leniency status (first-in, second-in, etc.) At the same time, commentators have noted that there is disparity in marker policies across jurisdictions concerning their availability, the information requirements, timing, and scope, which can disincentives companies engaged in international hard-core cartels from using the leniency program 6.2 SOEs and competitive neutrality issues in setting a transparent competition enviroment The reason why SOEs be subject to similar competition disciplines as private enterprises are their privileged position may negatively affect competition and it is therefore important to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible consistent with their public service responsibilities OECD, in the roundtable 2009 about SOEs and competition neutrality also disclosed the findings that while privatization eliminates competition distortions, it is not necessarily the preferred way for all countries and policies aimed at achieving competitive neutrality provide an alternative for dealing with an SOE's competitive advantages when the government does not wish to privatize Competitive neutrality can be understood as a regulatory framework (i) within which public and private enterprises face the same set of rules and (ii) where no contact with the state brings competitive advantage to any market participant.In other words, competitive neutrality aims to improve efficient competition by minimizing competitive advantages government business activities may enjoy over their private-sector competitors simply because they are government-owned 6.2.1 Tax neutrality The SOE should ideally be subject to taxation obligations as an ordinary corporate entity, but, if this is not the case, a level playing field should be established 75 through requiring the SOE to pay a special dividend or payment to the government that is calculated on the same basis as if the ordinary tax were to apply This principle should apply equally to income taxes, duties, governmental fee-for-service (e.g patent registration) and indirect taxes such as value- addedtaxes, goods and services taxes or pay-roll/employment taxes 6.2.2 Public procurement SOEs should neither be required to provide goods or services to the government for free or below cost, and nor should there be a preference by the government to buy from its own SOEs SOEs should also be subject to the same requirements as private suppliers when participating in procurement processes 6.2.3 Debt neutrality and outright subsidies In many cases, governments (including their SOEs) pay less when borrowing than private sector entities SOEs should not, however, receive the benefit of lower debt funding as an implicit subsidy – and nor should they receive explicit subsidies Explicit or implicit subsidies have the effect of the SOE displacing efficient private operators There are two mechanisms to remove the implicit subsidy associated with an SOE’s ability to access debt funding more cheaply than private rivals One way is for the government to operate a separate treasury function from its SOEs that undertakes all borrowing activity It would seek to borrow in capital markets on the most advantageous terms possible and then onlend funds to SOEs at interest rates that are benchmarked against the interest rates paid by a private business with comparable levels of risk 6.2.4 Regulatory neutrality As noted above, regulatory and commercial activities should be separated into separate entities SOEs should be required to meet the same regulatory requirements as private sector entities and should not enjoy any immunities or exemptions from laws Regulators should not discriminate in their regulatory approach as between SOEs and private sector entities Under the Competition Law, central and local public authorities should be prohibited from acting in a way that limits competition 76 or discriminates between market players, and the competition authority should have the power to take action against public entities at central and local levels that adopt/adopted acts that limit competition or discriminate among market players 6.3 Maintain an independent and well resourced competition authority with the necessary powers to effectively enforce competition law 6.3.1 Complete draft decree which prescribes the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the competition authority -Functions and powers The Vietnam Competition Commission, according to the Competition Law 2018, is an organization equivalent to the General Department under the MOIT, with the function of assisting the MOIT in operating the state management of competition, conducting competition legal proceedings; control of economic concentration; protecting consumers' interests and business activities in a multilevel mode; decide on exemptions to prohibited competition restriction agreements; settle complaints against decisions on handling competition cases pursuant to regulations InArt.4 of this draft decree, the Minister of MOIT is capable of: proposing dismiss the Chairman of the National Competition Commission members to Prime Minister and; regulating the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the units attached to the Committee, appointing and dismissing the leadership and management titles of the units attached to the Committee leading to the ability to dominate and control to this organization Currently, the MOIT still plays the leading role of a number of SOEs and the question about the objectivity in the operation of the competition management agencies are still grounded In fact, there is widespread agreement in the world that independent regulators are at the core of regulatory governance in liberalized economies Indeed, the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition is formulated on the assumption that the most efficient type of administrative authority for competition enforcement is possibly to be one that (a) is quasi-autonomous or independent of the Government, with strong judicial and administrative powers for conducting investigations and applying sanctions; and (b) provides the possibility of recourse to a higher judicial body 77 (OECD, 2012) a transparent appointment process for decision-makers and freedom of those decision-makers from arbitrary dismissal will bolster independence If this cornerstone of good institutional design is not present, political influence may result in well-connected businesses breaking the law with impunity, or even in the competition authority being utilized as a tool to punish businesses that are out of favor NCC's position as an autonomous competitive should be responsible to the National Assembly directly and has the obligation to respond to written or oral questions -Organizational structure Art.3 recommends that members of NCC are also civil servants of the MOIT, relevant ministries and scientists They are appointed and dismissed by the Prime Minister at the proposal of the Minister of Industry and Trade The term of office of a NCC member is (five) years and may be reappointed However, the author propose that the member of NCC should only be dismissed for a few reasons as specified in the law This will result in a higher level of legal security, greater objectivity, and less political influence on the agency Should not allow reappointment or should limit the number of terms, for example the possibility of an extension of only one term, because the possibility of re-appointment may change the motive and independence of the organization Vietnam refers to the experience of Thailand and some OECD member states (such as Mexico) on the "civil servant selection process" to ensure that the member of NCC have sufficient necessary knowledge and experience and ensure a transparent and competency-based process Appointment of those members’ posts requires the involvement of a state agency because majority consent is required 6.3.2 Build financial resource to boost capacities for Vietnam’s young competition authorities The powerful implementation of the Competition Law is based on many factors and considered one of them is the management's resources potential because the Government's commitment both from policy and financial perspective is very 78 important If there are not enough resources, then whether the NCC establish, the regulator will still struggle to make an impact on the market and make a contribution to reality Countries GPD(Million Euro) Budget for Competition authority ( Million Euro) Australia 1,204,611 48 Japan 4,939,383 93 Korean 1,411,245 91 Singapore 296,966 11 Malaysia 296,359 Vietnam 202,616 0,7 Table 4: Budget for operation of competition authorities in 2016 in some chosen countries (GCR, 2016) If the competition authority in Vietnam is not supplemented with sufficient financial conditions, and is not completely autonomous in using such resources, it is difficult for Vietnam to have a strong competition policy and effectively to be ready to successfully respond to Vietnam's commitments to EVFTA on competition 6.3.3 Build human resource to boost capacities for Vietnam’s young competition authorities We have to admit that, as well as the OECD Peer Review 2018 points out, in such a developing country as Vietnam, civil servants are generally paid less than their private-sector equivalents Capable civil servants will have a tendency to exit 79 the public sector when their training and qualifications make them attractive to potential private-sector employers Concerns additionally revolve around the ability of part-time board members holding senior positions in private companies to attain and maintain desirable levels of objectivity and the government-industry revolving door This is a problem additionally for developed countries, but in smaller and poorer economies these concerns take on a particular significance because there is a relatively smaller pool of individuals of sufficiently high standing to choose from The general scarcity of skills affects not only the competition authority but also the legal fraternity, the business sector, the judiciary, and the legislature Since competition enforcement is not undertaken in a vacuum, this renders competition advocacy by the authority a critical factor in gaining credibility and a constituency So far, the total personnel of both VCC and VCA involved in handling competitive cases has 20 people In the draft decree regarding NCC mentioned above, Art.3, The maximum number of members of the Vietnam Competition Commission is 15 This is a very modest number of personnel, in particular, compared to competition agencies in other countries around the world However, it should be noted again that comparative results must be used with care, as comparative results are only useful if there is a significant disparity countries with more favorable economic conditions have better budgets to pay for human resources work and wages of workers are also higher On the other hand, the number of personnel who are representatives of the businesses participating in the supervision, representatives of central and local agencies that provide the consultancy tend to be proportional to the population of that country Therefore, when comparing, it should consider the size of the population of the country 80 Countries Population(Million) No of personnel working in competition authorities Australia 24 351 Japan 126 779 Korean 51 482 Singapore 39 Indonexia 260 358 Vietnam 93 27 Table : Comparison between countries in the world on the size of the competition agency's personnel in 2016 (GCR, 2017) Furthermore, most of the staff working at VCCA are young officers, with many limitations in experience, professional knowledge and specialized fields and case handling skills This may be partly due to the recruitment policy of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the salary is still quite low, and the rate of personnel reversal still high In fact, the anti-monopoly community in Vietnam thinks that the workforce has low remuneration and cost norms, which can spell out the situation of inexperienced personnel and relatively limited capacity preparations In its 2014 annual report, VCCA also identified the challenges in its investigation due to a number of limitations and limitations mentioned first due to a lack of manpower Notwithstanding that Competition Law can be taught at universities, teaching is still only a conceptual level because Vietnam has very few decision cases and has not published enough grounds for argument Therefore, VCCA, VCC and donors have to support "on-site" training a lot Once the budget is approved, NCC needs to have sufficient autonomy in how its budget is used NCC should have adequate and reasonable personnel in terms of 81 quantity and capacity and be able to autonomously recruit who, when, underemployment conditions, salaries, and other benefits, including the development of business, in its own budget management process The recruitment process should not be subjected to unreasonable restrictions such as civil servant recruitment exams or compliance with civil servant payroll The secretariat with strong potential will achieve high efficiency and efficiency The income for NCC staff should reflect (a) intensive, extremely specialized work; and (b) NCC's income is competitive with those of law firms or other consulting firms to retain high-quality personnel 6.4 Strengthen cooperation between competition authories of both Parties The EU is increasingly expanding to 27-member states, synonymous with 27 competing laws and 27 different jurisdictions The European Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States cooperate with each other through the European Competition Network (ECN) This is an advanced form of cooperation within their closed framework, under the European Competition Network, which allows for exchanges of all types of information between Member State competition authorities and the European Commission Provisions on cooperation in competition law enforcement in EVFTA regulated that both parties should provide each other with relevant information that enables their competition authorities to investigate and take appropriate and effective actions concerning anti-competitive practices and mergers with anti-competitive effects -In order to fulfill the objectives of this Chapter and to enhance effective competition enforcement, the Parties acknowledge that it is in their common interest to strengthen cooperation with regard to competition policy development, including subsidy control, subject to the availability of funding under the Parties' cooperation instruments and programs (Art.10.14) To implement effectively this commitment, Vietnam competition authority(NCC) should: Firstly, minimize the impact of legislation and regulations that might have the effect of restricting cooperation between competition authorities or hindering an investigation or proceeding of other EU members, such as legislation 82 and regulations prohibiting domestic enterprises or individuals from cooperating in an investigation or proceeding conducted by competition authorities of other EU members Secondly, make publicly available sufficient information on their substantive and procedural rules, including those relating to confidentiality, by appropriate means to facilitate mutual understanding of how national enforcement systems operate NCC should ordinarily notify other EU members when its investigation or proceeding can be expected to affect the other EU member’s important interests Where two or more countries investigate or proceed against the same or related anti-competitive practice or a merger with anti-competitive effects, authorities should endeavor to co-ordinate their investigations or proceedings where their competition authorities agree that it would be in their interest to so Vietnam should consider promoting the adoption of legal provisions allowing for the exchange of confidential information between competition authorities without the need to obtain prior consent from the source of the information (“information gateways”) 83 CHAPTER CONCLUSION The EVFTA is expected to be a lever for Vietnam’s international economic integration process in new decades The ratification of the EVFTA comes at the time that Vietnam achieved significant development; with GPD growth rates of >7% in 2018 and 2019 - one of the strongest growing economies in Southeast Asia This is also particularly meaningful against the background of Trade War between US and China, which affect the global supply chain and forced many nations to adjust their economic outlook The theory of competition in the context of globalization and empirical research shows that when free trade agreements (FTAs) are signed, not only bring opportunities but also create many challenges, especially for developing countries where the competition authority is still the young and legal framework of competition is still weak With the official signature of new-generation FTAs: EVFTA in June 2019 and ratification of the European Parliament on Feb 2020 - the institutional reforms and policy adjustment in Vietnam have become more imperative than ever All the commitments regarding competition, economic concentration, or designating of SOEs in EVFTA is significant pressure for Vietnam From the perspective of international trade, bolster large enterprises (such as FPT, Viettel, Vingroup, Petrolimex…) to compete in the international market and simultaneously create an equal competition environment in the domestic market all play the same important role Therefore, Vietnam needs both an appropriate master plan and a strong legal framework on competition policy to ensure a level playing field for Vietnamese enterprises and big corporations from the EU The Government of Vietnam had improved weaknesses of Competition Law 2004 by amended Competition Law 2018, which included substantially appropriate regulations It is important to highlight the fact that Vietnam should complete soon improve bye-laws and relevant documents also By issuing decrees and guidance documents firstly, aim to build up an independent and effective competition authority 84 (NCC) which address requirement of strong judicial and administrative powers for conducting investigations and applying sanctions; whose decisions are not politicized, discriminatory or implemented based on narrow goals of interest groups; secondly, be right hand in review mechanism toward other complementary prodevelopment policies (legal framework of specialized laws) to assure the unification in Vietnam legislation system and facilitate for the competition authority to implement competition law and policy In the long-term, build up a centralized route to improve awareness and support enlarge the capacity of the small and medium enterprises of CPL by organization advocacy activities; encourage complaint submission by beginning a leniency program Only by doing so, the nation will have an effective law system and a healthy competitive environment for all entities from enterprises to consumers to obtain the benefit LIST OF REFERENCES APEC, Use of Economic Evidence Experience from APEC Members and Implications to APEC Developing Economies 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OECD (Executive Summary of The Discussion on The Use of Markers in Leniency Programs, The Use of Markers in Leniency Programs, 2015 18 OECD, Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Viet Nam, 2018 19 Seet, John M Hickin; Hannah C L Ha; Joshua E Y Vietnam Competition Law Key Changes, MayerBrown, 2019 20 Sidak., David E M Sappington; J Gregory, "Anticompetitive Behavior by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives and Capabilities", Vol523, 2004 21 Cung, Nguyễn Đình; Thắng, Trần Tồn, The institutional and policy adjustment implication of the EVFTA, CIEM, 2017, 22 VCA, Báo cáo tập trung kinh tê ViệtNam - hiện trạng dư báo, 2018 23 VCA, Bình Luận Pháp Luật Cạnh Tranh Đặt Trong Mối Quan Hệ Và Tương Quan So Sánh Với Pháp Luật Doanh Nghiệp, at https://thegioiluat.vn/bai- vi viet-hoc-thuat/Binh-Luan-Phap-Luat-Canh-Tranh-Dat-Trong-Moi-Quan-He-VaTuong-Quan-So-Sanh-Voi-Phap-Luat-Doanh-Nghiep-6981/, Accessed on 2018 24 VCC, Vụ việc Thỏa thuận hạn chê cạnh tranh, 2019 25 World Bank–OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy, Paris, 1997 ... o above main parts for interpreting and analysing meaning 4.4 Content of competition -related provisions in EVFTA 4.4.1 Promoting competition &Adopting and maintaining competition laws proscribe... in designing trade and competition policies and implementing domestic laws 3.3.2.2 Adopting and maintaining competition laws There is 36 percent trade agreements consist of provisions requiring... 4.3 Coverage of Competition policy in the EVFTA 27 4.4 Content of competition -related provisions in EVFTA .29 4.4.1 Promoting competition &Adopting and maintaining competition laws proscribe