SOLVAY-BRUSSELS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT NATIONAL ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY Vietnam –Belgium Master Programmes MASTERS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS FINAL PROJECT SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE THE OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF STATE BANK OF VIETNAM … Hanoi Page of 58 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would especially express my sincere thanks to Dr … Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge ULB-NEU administration and library staff who has helped in some ways to complete this Final Project Page of 58 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The oversight of payment and settlement systems get much concerns from governments, central banks and international organizations because payment and settlement systems are a major part of a country’s economic and financial infrastructure They contribute towards promoting economic activity and improving macroeconomic management, including the release of funds from the clearing and settlement functions for more productive use, the reduction of float levels, the lowering of transactions costs, and the control of monetary aggregates Central banks have always had a close interest in safe and efficient functioning of payment and settlement systems because of its direct link to their basic functions – safeguarding trust in the national currency and maintaining financial stability That is to say ensuring the reliability and efficiency of payment and settlement systems and minimizing systemic risk is the main objective of oversight function In Vietnam, the oversight of payment and settlement systems has just got intention recently because the payment and settlement systems not much develop so the systemic risks related to the operations of payment systems not get a lot concerns The Final Project is done aiming at giving “solutions to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of State Bank of Vietnam” In answering research questions (i) Why does SBV have to oversight payment and settlement systems?; (ii) What is real situation of carrying out the monitor and oversight function of SBV? and (iii) How to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV?, the study will present a picture of SBV’s oversight The picture is uniformly matched with a part of types of non-cash payment and settlement systems as well as the limitations and risks related to these systems In addition, another part of this picture is shown by limitations of the current situation of SBV’s oversight of these systems Other part of the picture is the analysis of chances and challenges of SBV in carrying out oversight function Basing on the findings, the suggestions are made to enhance the SBV’s oversight of payment and settlement systems The general suggestions have covered many fields from (i) Finalizing institutional mechanism for SBV’s oversight function; (ii) Enhancing the SBV’s oversight of payment and settlement systems; (iii) Finalizing payment and settlement in the economy; (iv) Enhancing SBV’s role in organizing and operating interbank payment system; (v) Improving competence and skills for staffs taking in charge of carrying out oversight and supervision of payment and settlement systems and (vi) Maintaining and improving the cooperation among Page of 58 relevant authorities A part from the general suggestions, the study also recommends an oversight framework for SBV in current circumstance Page of 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS LISTS OF FIGURES LISTS OF ANNEXES INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS .11 I.1 The importance of payment and settlement systems in the economy 11 I.2 Roles of the central banks in overseeing payment and settlement systems 12 I.3 General principles for effective oversight of payment and settlement systems developed by Bank of International Settlement (BIS) .14 CHAPTER II: PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN VIETNAM AND REAL SITUATION OF CARRYING OUT OVERSIGHT FUNCTION OF STATE BANK OF VIETNAM 16 II.1 Types of payment and settlement systems in Vietnam and the limitations and risks related to these systems 16 II.1.1 Payment and settlement systems held by SBV .17 II.1.2 Commercial Banks’ payment systems 22 II.1.3 Payment and settlement systems managed by other State Management Agencies 25 II.2 Oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV 27 II.2.1 Legal framework for the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV 27 II.2.2 Current situation of oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV 27 II.2.3 General comments on the current situation of oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV 32 Page of 58 CHAPTER III: SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE THE OVERSIGHT OF PAYMEMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF STATE BANK OF VIETNAM .35 III.1 Chances and challenges for the oversight function of SBV in the future 35 III.1.1 Chances 35 III.1.2 Challenges 35 III.2 Solutions to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of State Bank of Vietnam 36 III.2.1 Some general suggestions and recommendations 36 III.2.2 Suggestions of oversight framework for SBV .39 ANNEX 46 ANNEX 48 ANNEX 53 REFERENCES 56 Page of 58 LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS SBV: State Bank of Vietnam BIS: Bank of International Settlement WTO: World Trade Organization ATM: Automated Teller Machine FRBNY: Federal Reserve Bank of New York WB: World Bank PM: Prime Minister NPSC: National Payment System Center PPC: Provincial Payment Center HVTS: High Value Sub-system LVTS:Low Value Sub-system KIPS: Korean Inter-Bank Payment System MoF: Ministry of Finance VSD: Vietnam Securities Depository SE: Securities Exchange STC: Stock Trading Center DVP: Delivery versus Payment SSC: State Securities Commission CPSIPS: Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems SIPS: Systemically Important Payment System Vietcombank: Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam BIDV: Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam Agribank: Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Eximbank: Vietnam Export Import Bank Incombank (Vietinbank): Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade Page of 58 LISTS OF FIGURES AND TABLE Figure Non-cash payment and settlement systems in Vietnam Figure The outline of the electronic interbank payment system provided by Hyundai Information Technology Figure The processing model of the electronic interbank payment system Figure The model of the electronic money transfer system Figure Model of the paper-based clearing system Figure Model of electronic clearing system Figure A model of Core Banking Table Suggested oversight framework for SBV LISTS OF ANNEXES Annex Core principles for systemically important payment systems and central bank responsibilities Annex The norms of payment activities (4B, 4C, 4D) of Circular number 21/2010/QD-NHNN dated October 8th 2010 by Governor on the regulations of report and statistic mode applying for SBV agencies and commercial banks Annex CPSS-IOSCO Task Force Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems Page of 58 INTRODUCTION Rationale of the study Payment and settlement systems are very important elements of financial infrastructure of a country Disruptions or inefficient implementation of these systems may badly affect to the stability of financial system and the economy as a whole Besides, safe and efficient functioning of payment and settlement systems can help central bank in implementing effectively monetary policies, maintaining financial system and safeguarding public confidence in national currency That leads to the fact that the oversight of payment and settlement systems as well as principles and standards for effective oversight gets much attention and priority from the government and central banks After 20 years of carrying out the economic renovation process, Vietnam financial system has gained significant changes in broad scale It also has gradually finalized the structure and infrastructure Within this development trend, payment and settlement systems have been broadened Technological infrastructure has been upgraded and completed Nowadays, most of payment and settlement systems have been computerized New payment instruments and services have been adopted and applied especially electronic ones that make payment transactions quicker and more convenient However, payment and settlement systems in Vietnam have been initially developed and each system exposes certain limitations and risks For example, internal payment systems of commercial banks and card-based payment systems face up with traditional, hi-tech and foreigner-related crimes and frauds as well as operational and reputation risks due to the unhomogeneity in payment system infrastructure investment The unhomogeneity causes difficulties in connecting these systems Besides, treasury payment system and securities settlement system haven’t been connected with interbank payment system of SBV that block the development of payment instruments and expose the systemic risks A part from that, the interdependency of payment systems in the economy is a certain tendency because payment and settlement systems in supporting financial markets and payment flows in the economy are increasingly connected through a wide array of complex inter-relationships Through these relationships, the smooth functioning of a single system often becomes contingent on the performance of other systems or being potential source of systemic risk Being the central bank of Vietnam, SBV has a close interest in safe and efficient functioning of payment and settlement systems because of their direct link to its basic functions – safeguarding trust in the national currency and maintaining financial stability If SBV has no effective risk management mechanism as well as a suitable oversight framework to Page of 58 localize risks of a single payment system, the risks can be transmitted to other payment and settlement systems Consequently, systemic risks are easily occurred, threatening the stability of financial system and the economy From these mentioned reasons, I choose the study named “Solutions to enhance the oversight of payment systems of State Bank of Vietnam” aiming at reviewing and evaluating real situation of carrying out the monitoring and oversight function of SBV Basing on the analysis results some recommendations to enhance the effective oversight of payment systems of SBV will be pointed out It is also hopeful that this study results will be suggestions for the policymakers of SBV in building up the master plan for the development of Vietnam banking system to the year 2020 Research objectives By reviewing and evaluating real situation of carrying out the monitoring and oversight function of SBV, the study will find out some gaps in the implementation of this function Some suggestions to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV will be pointed out basing on the analysis results The study will answer the following research questions - Why does SBV have to oversight payment and settlement systems? - What is real situation of carrying out the monitor and oversight function of SBV? - How to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV? Research methodology Firstly, it is necessary to say that this study is an in-desk one This study research objective is giving some suggestions to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV so the theories on the oversight of payment and settlement systems and general principles for effective oversight developed by Bank of International Settlement (BIS) – a world leading in payment field will be used as the theoretical background Due to the fact that there is any statistic report on the fraud types related to the payment and settlement systems which is officially published or announced, I made a list of cases that media mentioned recently Besides, many interviews are carried out in order to find out popular risks in payment and settlements and collect ideas on the oversight function of SBV The participants are mainly from SBV departments and banks The result of interviews is useful source for the suggestions and recommendations Page of 58 development activities so that issues related to payment and settlement systems can be well developed The objectives can be finalized through oversight tools and actions so that the targets are achieved For Vietnam current circumstance, the targets suggested well match the objectives Controlling access to payment system is crucial in determining the quality standards of participations and service providers so that payment systems, their participations and stakeholders are prevented from legal, financial and operational risks Risk control is also a key target of payment system oversight SBV should ensure that participant adopt consistent methods to manage their risks and that systems have enough incentives and safeguard against excessive risk-taking by individual participants In summary, by analyzing the chances and challenges for the oversight function of SBV, some general suggestions to enhance SBV’s role in overseeing payment and settlement systems are made Besides, a suggested oversight framework is worked out with main components such as SBV’s oversight roles, oversight objectives, scope, tools, actions and target Each component is covered with some detailed explanation Page 43 of 58 CONCLUSION Payment systems are a major part of a country’s economic and financial infrastructure They contribute towards promoting economic activity and improving macroeconomic management, including the release of funds from the clearing and settlement functions for more productive use, the reduction of float levels, the lowering of transactions costs, and the control of monetary aggregates While an efficient payment system facilitates the flow of funds, potential risks may also arise when payment failures occur, ranging from liquidity shortages to credit problems among participants Moreover, such risks may develop into systemic risk that is transmitted from one member to another in the system, disrupting the smooth functioning of the payment system and the stability of the financial system For such importance, the oversight of payment and settlement systems get much concerns from governments, central banks and international organizations In Vietnam, the oversight of payment and settlement systems has just got intention recently because the payment and settlement systems not much develop so the systemic risks related to the operations of payment systems not get a lot concerns In this study, types of non-cash payment and settlement systems in Vietnam as well as the limitations and risks related to these systems are described Besides, limitations of the current situation of SBV’s oversight of these systems are explored These findings in accordance with the analysis of chances and challenges of SBV in carrying out oversight function are sources to give suggestions to enhance the SBV’s oversight of payment and settlement systems The general suggestions have covered many fields from (i) Finalizing institutional mechanism for SBV’s oversight function; (ii) Enhancing the SBV’s oversight of payment and settlement systems; (iii) Finalizing payment and settlement in the economy; (iv) Enhancing SBV’s role in organizing and operating interbank payment system; (v) Improving competence and skills for staffs taking in charge of carrying out oversight and supervision of payment and settlement systems and (vi) Maintaining and improving the cooperation among relevant authorities A part from the general suggestions, the study also recommends an oversight framework for SBV in current circumstance It must be admitted that oversight of payment and settlement systems is a rather new issue in Vietnam By finishing this Final Project, I have had better understanding on the selected issue Besides, it is a good opportunity to once Page 44 of 58 again review studied theory; to get them all connected in a broader view of public management; to assess the situation and to propose changes Due to time constraints and limited resources, the overall picture of SBV’s oversight of payment and settlement systems would be more in depth and comprehensive if further researches to be done Page 45 of 58 ANNEX Core principles for systemically important payment systems and central bank responsibilities (Source: BIS) Core principles for systemically important payment systems I The system should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions II The system’s rules and procedures should enable participants to have a clear understanding of the system’s impact on each of the financial risks they incur through participation in it III The system should have clearly defined procedures for the management of credit risks and liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsibilities of the system operator and the participants and which provider appropriate incentives to manage and contain those risks IV* The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of value, preferably during the day and at a minimum at the end of the day V* A system in which multilateral netting takes place should, at a minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant with the largest single settlement obligation VI Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the central bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or no credit risk and little or no liquidity risk VII The system should ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have contingency arrangements for timely completion of daily processing VIII The system should provide a means of making payments which is practical for its users and efficient for the economy IX The system should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access X The system’s governance arrangements should be effective, accountable and transparent * System should seek to exceed the minima included in these two core principles Responsibilities of the central bank in applying the core principles Page 46 of 58 A The central bank should define clearly its payment system objectives and should disclose publicly its roles and major policies with respect to systemically important payment systems B The central bank should ensure that the systems it operates comply with the core principles C The central bank should oversee compliance with the core principles by systems it does not operate and it should have ability t carry out this oversight D The central bank, in promoting payment system safety and efficiency through the core principles, should cooperate with other central banks and with any other relevant domestic or foreign authorities Page 47 of 58 ANNEX The norms of payment activities (4B, 4C, 4D) of Circular number 21/2010/QD-NHNN dated October 8th 2010 by Governor on the regulations of report and statistic mode applying for SBV agencies and commercial banks CODE 4B REPORT PERIOD NORM’S NAME PAYMENT ACCOUNT ACCORDING TO OBJECTS Number of personal payment deposit accounts Month Balance of personal payment deposit accounts Month Number of organizational payment deposit accounts Month Balance of organizational payment deposit accounts Month Number of payment deposit accounts of other payment service providers Month Balance of payment deposit accounts of other payment service providers Month 4C PAYMENT ACCORDING TO PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS 4C.1 PAYMENT ACCORDING INSTRUMENTS TO PAYMENT Number of cash withdrawn transactions with payment instrument xxx Month Value of cash withdrawn transactions with payment instrument xxx Month Volume of payment transactions with payment instrument xxx Month Value of payment transactions with payment instrument xxx Month Number of payment transactions processed by electronic money transfer Month Value of payment transactions processed by electronic Month Page 48 of 58 money transfer Number of payment transactions processed by vouchers Month Value of payment transactions processed by vouchers Month Number of payment transactions processed by Internet, Mobile and connected PC Month 10 Value of payment transactions processed by Internet, Mobile and connected PC Month 11 Number of current domestic debit cards Month 12 Number of current domestic credit cards Month 13 Number of other current domestic cards Month 14 Number of current international debit cards Month 15 Number of current international credit cards Month 16 Number of other current international cards Month 17 Number of domestic cards faked Month 18 Number of transactions with faked domestic cards Month 19 Value of transactions with faked domestic cards Month 20 Number of international cards faked Month 21 Number of transactions with faked international cards Month 22 Value of transactions with faked international cards Month 23 Number of out-domestic money transfers by SWIFT Month 24 Value of out-domestic money transfers by SWIFT Month 25 Number of out-international money transfers by SWIFT Month 26 Value of out-international money transfers by SWIFT Month 27 Number of in-international money transfers by SWIFT Month 28 Value of in-international money transfers by SWIFT Month 29 Number of out-international money transfers by crossborder payment Month 30 Value of out-international money transfers by cross-border Month Page 49 of 58 payment 31 Number of in-international money transfers by crossborder payment Month 32 Value of in-international money transfers by cross-border payment Month 33 Number of out-international money transfers by other methods Month 34 Value of out-international money transfers by other methods Month 35 Number of in-international money transfers by other methods Month 36 Value of in-international money transfers by other methods Month 4C.2 PAYMENT ACCORDING TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 4C.2.1 Every-time by deposit account at SVB – Paper voucher Number of every-time by deposit account at SVB (paper voucher) Month Volume of every-time by deposit account at SVB (paper voucher) Month 4C.2.2 Internal payment of commercial bank Number of internal payment transactions Month Volume of internal payment transactions Month 4C.2.3 Payment by other commercial banks Number of out-VND money transfer by other commercial banks Month Volume of out-VND money transfer by other commercial banks Month Number of out-foreign currency transfer by other commercial banks Month Volume of out-foreign currency transfer by other commercial banks Month 4C.2.4 Electronic dual payment Page 50 of 58 Number of out-VND money transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Volume of out-VND money transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Number of in-VND money transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Volume of in-VND money transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Number of out-foreign currency transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Volume of out-foreign currency transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Number of in-foreign currency transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month Volume of in-foreign currency transfer by electronic dual payment with commercial bank xxx Month 4C.2.5 ATM/POS/EFTPOS/EDC Number of ATM at province xx Month Number of POS/EFTPOS/EDC Month Number of card acceptance units Month Number of transactions with ATMs Month Value of transactions with ATMs Month Number of cash withdrawn transactions with ATMs Month Value of cash withdrawn transactions with ATMs Month Number of demand deposit transactions with ATMs Month Value of demand deposit transactions with ATMs Month 10 Number of transactions with ATMs which have claim checks Month 11 Value of transactions with ATMs which have claim checks Month 12 Number of transactions with POS/EFTPOS/EDC Month Page 51 of 58 13 Value of transactions with POS/EFTPOS/EDC 14 Number of cash POS/EFTPOS/EDC 15 Value of cash POS/EFTPOS/EDC 4D INTERNATIONAL PAYMENT withdrawn Month transactions with Month transactions with Month Collecting of money transfer from embassies, consulates, foreign military organizations and international organizations in Vietnam according to currency types Month Spending of money transfer from embassies, consulates, foreign military organizations and international organizations in Vietnam according to currency types Month Collecting of membership fees according to currency types Month Spending of membership fees according to currency types Month withdrawn ANNEX CPSS-IOSCO Task Force Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems Legal risk Legal framework Securities settlement systems should have a well founded, clear and transparent legal basis in the relevant jurisdictions Pre-settlement risk Trade confirmation Page 52 of 58 Confirmation of trades between direct market participants should occur as soon as possible after trade execution, but no later than trade date (T+0) Where confirmation of trades by indirect market participants (such as institutional investors) is required, it should occur as soon as possible after trade execution, preferably on T+0, but no later than T+1 Settlement cycles Rolling settlement should be adopted in all securities markets Final settlement should occur no later than T+3 The benefits and costs of a settlement cycle shorter than T+3 should be assessed Central counterparties The benefits and costs of a central counterparty should be assessed Where such a mechanism is introduced, the central counterparty should rigorously control the risks it assumes Securities lending Securities lending and borrowing (or repurchase agreements and other economically equivalent transactions) should be encouraged as a method for expediting the settlement of securities transactions Barriers that inhibit the practice of lending securities for this purpose should be removed Settlement risk Central securities depositories (CSDs) Securities should be immobilised or dematerialised and transferred by book entry in CSDs to the greatest extent possible Delivery versus payment (DVP) Securities settlement systems should eliminate principal risk by linking securities transfers to funds transfers in a way that achieves delivery versus payment Timing of settlement finality Final settlement on a DVP basis should occur no later than the end of the settlement day Intraday or real-time finality should be provided where necessary to reduce risks CSD risk controls to address participant defaults Deferred net settlement systems should institute risk controls that, at a minimum, ensure timely settlement in the event that the participant with the largest payment obligation is unable to settle In any system in which a CSD extends credit or Page 53 of 58 arranges securities loans to facilitate settlement, best practice is for the resulting credit exposures to be fully collateralised 10 Cash settlement assets Assets used to settle the cash leg of securities transactions between CSD members should carry little or no credit or liquidity risk If central bank money is not used, steps must be taken to protect CSD members from potential losses and liquidity pressures arising from the failure of a settlement bank Operational risk 11 Operational reliability Sources of operational risk arising in the clearing and settlement process should be identified and minimised through the development of appropriate systems, controls and procedures Systems should be reliable and secure, and have adequate, scalable capacity Contingency plans and backup facilities should be established to allow for timely recovery of operations and completion of the settlement process Custody risk 12 Protection of customers’ securities Entities holding securities in custody should employ accounting practices and safekeeping procedures that fully protect customers’ securities It is essential that customers’ securities be protected against the claims of a custodian’s creditors Other issues 13 Governance Governance arrangements for CSDs and central counterparties should be designed to fulfil public interest requirements and to promote the objectives of owners and users 14 Access CSDs and central counterparties should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation that permit fair and open access 15 Efficiency While maintaining safe and secure operations, securities settlement systems should be cost-effective in meeting the requirements of users 16 Communication procedures and standards Page 54 of 58 Securities settlement systems should use or accommodate the relevant international communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient settlement of cross-border transactions 17 Transparency CSDs and central counterparties should provide market participants with sufficient information for them to accurately identify and evaluate the risks and costs associated with using the CSD or central counterparty services 18 Regulation and oversight Securities settlement systems should be subject to regulation and oversight The responsibilities and objectives of the securities regulator and the central bank with respect to SSSs should be clearly defined, and their roles and major policies should be publicly disclosed They should have the ability and the resources to perform their responsibilities, including assessing and promoting implementation of these recommendations They should cooperate with each other and with other relevant authorities REFERENCES Bank for International Settlement, 2005 Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems BIS Basel, Switzerland http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss68.pdf Bank for International Settlement, 2001 Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems: Report of the CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task Force on Securities Settlement Systems BIS Basel, Switzerland http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss42.pdf Bank for International Settlement, 2001 Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems BIS Basel, Switzerland http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss34e.pdf Page 55 of 58 Bank for International Settlement, 2008 The Interdependencies of Payment and Settlement Systems BIS Basel, Switzerland http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss84.htm Bank for International Settlement, 2003 The Role of Central Bank Money in Payment Systems BIS Basel, Switzerland http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss55.pdf Kovsted, Jens, John Rand, and Finn Tarp, Le Viet Thai, Vuong Nhat Huong and Nguyen Minh Thao, 2003 Financial Sector Reforms in Vietnam: Selected Issues and Problems CIEM http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/barvell.pdf http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/83761/BossoneCirasino pdf http://www.cbc.gov.tw/public/Data/010269422971.pdf 10 http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/psr_overview.pdf 11 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004C00974 12 www.gbld.org/downloads/Korea/BK.doc 13 www.boj.or.jp/en/about/outline/data/foboj12.pdf 14 www.bank-banque-canada.ca/ /payments.html 15 Bui Quang Tien, 2007 Key Factors to Enhance Payment Activities in VietNam Now: Presentation at the Payment Conference 5/2007 Hanoi, Vietnam 16 Le Van Xuan, 2007 Security Process of Electronic Interbank Payment System of State Bank of Vietnam: Presentation at the Payment Conference 5/2007 Hanoi, Vietnam 17 MK Company, 2010 The Application of Core Banking in Commercial Banks of Vietnam: Presentation at the Banking Fair 2010 Hanoi, Vietnam 18 http://www.sbv.gov.vn/ 19 http://vietbao.vn/An-ninh-Phap-luat/Pha-mot-diem-phat-hanh the-tindung-gia/30140110/218/ 20 http://tuoitre.vn/Chinh-tri-xa-hoi/Phap-luat/115685/Lam-the-ATM-gia %C2%A0mot-bang-toi-pham-bi-bat.html 21 http://tintuc.timnhanh.com/phap-luat/20100920/35AABEFD/Bat-banguoi-Trung-Quoc-dung-the-tin-dung-gia.htm Page 56 of 58 22 http://vnexpress.net/gl/phap-luat/2009/06/3ba10b4b Page 57 of 58 ... SOLUTIONS TO ENHANCE THE OVERSIGHT OF PAYMEMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF STATE BANK OF VIETNAM Recommendations and suggestions to enhance the oversight of payment and settlement systems of SBV are... oversight of these systems are source for suggestions and recommendations to enhance the oversight of SBV Chapter 3: Solutions to enhance the oversight of payment systems of State Bank of Vietnam. .. efficiency of these systems for the sake of financial sector and the economy Generally, the oversight of payment and settlement systems is one of the main tasks of central banks I.2 Roles of the central