Commercial aviation in the jet era and the systems that make it possible, 1st ed , thomas filburn, 2020 1693

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Thomas Filburn Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible Thomas Filburn Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible Thomas Filburn College of Engineering, Technology and Architecture University of Hartford West Hartford, CT, USA ISBN 978-3-030-20110-4    ISBN 978-3-030-20111-1 (eBook) © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To Max, Ella, and Mason, may you find as much happiness as you have brought into our lives Kiki, thanks for everything Preface This book contains a short history of commercial aviation beginning with the Wright brothers inaugural flight It provides a more detailed glimpse into the aircraft subsystems like those found on the early piston engine propeller craft that flew the mail from Denver to Chicago These same subsystems now permit large, turbofan-­ powered aircraft to fly intercontinental routes at speeds four times those early mail planes The book explains the purpose of these subsystems and their evolution from flight’s early days into the 500+ passenger aircraft available today This book provides seven chapters dedicated to the design and operation of a multitude of subsystems required for large commercial aircraft to safely takeoff, cruise at Mach 0.85 (or higher), and land It shows how these items and systems have changed from the early years of straight wings, open cockpits, and fixed landing gear to the swept wing, retractable landing gear craft that can connect us to the far reaches of the globe The book includes seven additional chapters on the consequences of a component failure for each of the detailed subsystems These components and design flaws frequently lead to the loss of aircraft which can be deadly for passengers and crew This book demonstrates the complexity of today’s commercial aircraft and the importance of the design, fabrication, and installation of these systems even those that operate for mere seconds at the end of each flight (thrust reversers) West Hartford, CT, USA  Thomas Filburn vii Acknowledgments Thank you Taylor Goodell Benedum and Enrico Obst for the extra efforts you put in to make the graphics exemplary Dan Patterson, thanks for the photos Alan, I appreciate your editorial comments Randi and the staff at the Mortensen library, wonderful support! ix Contents 1Commercial Aviation History������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Early History����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Clipper Airplanes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    4 Commercial Air Travel Post-World War II������������������������������������������������    6 Commercial Jet Travel ������������������������������������������������������������������������������    6 Wide Bodies����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   14 Part I Sub-systems 2Flight Controls, High-Lift Systems, and Their Actuation��������������������   17 Fundamental Control ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 Control Surface Actuation��������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 High-Lift Devices��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   22 Flight Control Surface Actuation ��������������������������������������������������������������   26 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   28 3Engines and Nacelles�������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 Thrust Reverser������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   29 ETOPS ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   36 Engine Operating Envelope ����������������������������������������������������������������������   38 Nacelles������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   38 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   43 4Cabin Pressurization and Air-Conditioning������������������������������������������   45 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   57 5Wheels, Brakes, and Landing Gear��������������������������������������������������������   59 Tires ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   66 Wheels and Brakes������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   66 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   69 xi xii Contents 6Fuel Systems ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   71 Commercial Jet Aircraft Fuel System Requirements and Design��������������   76 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   81 7Instruments and Sensors ������������������������������������������������������������������������   83 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 8Anti-ice and Deice Systems for Wings, Nacelles, and Instruments ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  108 Part II Sub-system Accidents 9Loss of Flight Controls, United Flight 232��������������������������������������������  113 Early Type Accidents ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 United Airlines Flight 232 (UAL 232)������������������������������������������������������  118 Root Cause ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  123 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  124 10In Flight Thrust Reverse Actuation��������������������������������������������������������  125 What Happened on Lauda Air NG004������������������������������������������������������  131 Postaccident Changes��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  132 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133 11Cabin Pressurization Accident����������������������������������������������������������������  135 Failure Investigation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  139 Postaccident Actions����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  142 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  143 12Landing Gear Accident���������������������������������������������������������������������������  145 Accident Reconstruction����������������������������������������������������������������������������  148 Root Cause Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  155 13Fuel System Failure ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 TWA Flight 800 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 TWA 800����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  158 Accident and Cause������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  160 Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  165 Regulatory Changes ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  166 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 14Flight System Sensor Failure������������������������������������������������������������������  169 Accident Investigation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  173 Postaccident Recommendations����������������������������������������������������������������  178 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 Contents xiii 15Icing Conditions ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  181 Accident Investigation ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185 NTSB Recommendations��������������������������������������������������������������������������  189 BEA Response ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  190 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  190 16Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  191 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  198 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  199 NTSB Recommendations 189 The more significant NTSB conclusions (again many disputed by DGAC) are summarized below: If the FAA had acted more positively after the NTSB’s aircraft icing recommendation in 1981 (following a series of aircraft icing-related accidents), this accident may not have occurred ATR 42 and 72 ice-induced aileron hinge moment reversals, autopilot disconnects, and rapid, uncommented rolls could occur if the airplanes are operated near freezing temperatures and water droplet median volume diameter (MVD) typical of freezing drizzle The DGAC and the FAA failed to require the manufacturer to provide documentation of known undesirable post-SPS (stall protection system) flight characteristics, which contributed to their failure to identify and correct, or otherwise properly address, the abnormal aileron behavior early in the history of the ATR icing incidents Prior to the Roselawn accident, ATR recognized the reason for the aileron behavior in the previous incidents and determined that ice accumulation behind the deice boots, at an AOA sufficient to cause an airflow separation, would cause the ailerons to become unstable Therefore, ATR had sufficient basis to modify the airplane and/or provide operators and pilots with adequate, detailed information regarding this phenomenon NTSB Recommendations The NTSB issued several recommendations for the FAA as well as American Eagle operators using the ATR 42 and 72 aircraft For the FAA, the recommendations included: Revising the icing criteria as listed in 14 CFR part 23 and 25 (transport aircraft icing regulations) to include info from the latest research on ice accretion under varying atmospheric conditions Revise the icing certification testing regulations to ensure that all airplane types are properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to operation If safe operation cannot be demonstrated by the manufacturer, they should impose operational limits Encourage ATR to test their newly developed lateral control system design change and verify that it corrected the hinge moment reversal/ uncommanded aileron deflection problem These design changes, if effective, should be implemented on all new and existing ATR airplanes The board recommended that all ATR 42 and 72 aircraft be prohibited from flying in known icing conditions until the effects of upper wing ice buildup on the flying qualities and aileron hinge moment effects can be determined 190 15  Icing Conditions BEA Response The BEA needed an entire second volume to contain their comments and disagreement with the NTSB’s fundamental conclusion about the Roselawn accident [2] Its response to the NTSB, the BEA expressed disappointment at their lack of participation in the investigation phase, findings, causes and safety recommendations The BEA believed the NTSB had committed to allowing a strong contribution from the BEA in all phases of the investigation The probable cause as originally released in draft form is shown below The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal, that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots because: 1) ATR failed to completely disclose to operators, and incorporate in the ATR 72 airplane flight manual, flightcrew operating manual and flightcrew training programs, adequate information concerning previously known effects of freezing precipitation on the stability and control characteristics, autopilot and related operational procedures when the ATR 72 was operated in such conditions The final probable cause statement, incorporating the strong sentiments provided by BEA, reads as follows: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge moment reversal, that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the deice boots while the airplane was in a holding pattern during which it intermittently encountered supercooled cloud and drizzle/rain drops, the size and water content of which exceeded those described in the icing certification envelope The airplane was susceptible to this loss of control, and the crew was unable to recover While the FAA pinned most of the problem on the airplane and its propensity to lose control when ice built up downstream of the deice boots, BEA sought to include the flight crew in their fault analysis BEA claimed that the flight crew failed to comply with ATR procedures and that was a strong contributor to the accident The fact that the FAA immediately banned both ATR models (42 and 72) from flying in icing conditions immediately after the accident, and restricted their flight envelope until ATR had redesigned, recertified, and installed new, larger deicing boots, indicates that the FAA saw the accident cause in a different light [3] References NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR 96/01 7/9/96 Volume 1: Safety Board Report NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-96/02 7/9/96 Volume II: Response of Bureau Enquetes-Accidents to Safety Board’s Draft Report Aviation Week & Space Technology, “ ATR Boots pass Ice Test”, May 1, 1995 Chapter 16 Conclusion The commercial aviation industry has seen many improvements over the decades since its inception in the beginning of the twentieth century The early propeller, internal combustion engine driven craft have now evolved into jet-powered aircraft that can hold nearly 600 passengers The IC engine powered propeller planes broke ground on pressurized fuselages, which allowed planes to climb above the worst weather (except for takeoff and landing) and provide their passengers comfort and relief from the most severe turbulence The transports that now ply our skies have also evolved from the loud, fuel hogging turbojet planes that debuted in the 1950s to the new turbofan-powered planes that most airlines are clamoring for However, the transition from propeller driven passenger craft like the DC-6 to the new A321 have required changes in how the airplanes are built, and what subsystems are employed to support the overall operation of the airplane While the first chapter provided an overall history of transport (i.e., passenger) aircraft, it only touched on the changes that came about in the transition from propeller to jet power It did examine the changes that had been introduced during the first half-century of airplane travel that provided marked improvement in passenger safety and comfort This book details some of the systems that have been conceived and evolved over the decades to make air travel safe while traveling across the globe at over 500 mph It also details some of the tragedy that has occurred when designers, maintenance personnel, and sometimes even the flight crew failed When examining this recent aviation history, it is important to remember the roles of the various federal agencies that interact with air travelers In the USA, the FAA sets safety standards for the design, fabrication, and operation of these airplanes However, when they fail, it is the National Transportation Safety Board which is charged with investigating every civil aviation accident in the USA. The NTSB also has responsibility for advocating and promoting new safety recommendations, frequently at the conclusion of their accident investigation The NTSB traces its roots to the Air Commerce Act of 1926, when a congressional act m ­ andated © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 T Filburn, Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible, 191 192 16 Conclusion that the Commerce Dept investigate all aircraft accidents However, it is the FAA’s role whether to accept these recommendations and mandate them for the existing fleet and/or introduce these changes into new aircraft The international equivalent of the FAA is the European Aviation Safety Agency, while the Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) is an agency of the French Government that investigates aviation accidents in France, or through agreements with foreign governments accidents involving aircraft designed and/or built in France (e.g., Airbus, ATR) Chapter described the present generation of systems that have evolved to support the higher speeds, higher wing loading, and larger aircraft now operating around the world with the major airlines These changes included improvements necessitated by the higher speeds desired and offered by jet power With airplane drag being a function of velocity squared, the power required to operate planes at M = 0.82 (530 mph) vs the top end propeller transport (M = 0.5, 330 mph) is a roughly 2.7 × increase While the turbojet and now turbofan engines were able to increase the engine power available (in a reasonable volume) to achieve these new velocities, they required changes in the aircraft systems Wing design evolved between the propeller and turbine era A quick look at the DC-7 wing shows a lifting surface perpendicular to the fuselage out to the tip of the wing The higher speeds, near sonic, now being flown by the jet-powered planes meant a new wing configuration The Boeing 707 and all the following jet-powered craft used a swept wing design to reduce drag and increase stability at the high speeds now being flown These wings were optimized for the high-speed cruise phase of their missions that comprised >90% of their flight time It made takeoff and landing more difficult These wings were designed to provide significant lift when operating at M = 0.82, they did not provide nearly enough lift when the airplane was operating at reasonable takeoff and landing speeds A reasonable takeoff speed can be defined by the runway length required to accelerate the airplane to takeoff speed Similarly a reasonable landing speed can be defined as the speed that can be stopped in the distance of a normal runway, without excessive G forces imposed on the passengers (e.g., the landing gear arresting wire of a US Navy carrier would not work) Figure 16.1 shows the change in wing drag coefficient between a straight wing (e.g., DC-7) and a swept wing (e.g., A320) While the drag coefficients are both low below M-0.7, there is a significantly higher drag coefficient for the straight wing at the new higher speeds (M = 0.82) of the jet aircraft The military with even higher top speeds attempted to overcome this lift vs drag conundrum by developing moving wing geometry The F-111 and the F-14 both took off and landed with wings in a conventional straight configuration, however they could be adjusted in flight to a swept arrangement to allow reasonable drag at higher (>M = 1) speeds Commercial airliners could not afford the cost nor the complexity of moveable wings The compromise reached for commercial jet airliners relied on moveable flaps (wing trailing edge surfaces) and slats (wing leading edge surfaces) to change the lift characteristics of the wing These moveable devices get employed during takeoff and landing to greatly increase the lift (but also drag) of the wing These enhancements allow commercial airliners to takeoff with reasonable 193 16 Conclusion 0.10 Wing drag coefficient, CD 0° Sweep 10 1/2° Sweep 0.05 40° Sweep 49 1/4° Sweep 1.0 1.1 Mach number Fig 16.1  Swept vs straight wing drag coefficient [1] takeoff runs and land on runways of less than 8000 ft These same flight control surfaces get stowed during cruise, allowing a low-drag aerodynamic shape to be employed A second critical improvement that has accompanied these flight control surfaces has been the use of high-pressure hydraulic systems to move them during flight The high speeds now seen by these large commercial aircraft will generate enormous aerodynamic loads opposing the movement of any flight control surface into the airstream High-pressure hydraulic systems boost the power available to move and control these surfaces well beyond the strength that could be generated by a pilot’s muscle Chapter details what happens when the cockpit no longer can make use of its flight control surfaces This chapter details the extraordinary efforts that the flight crew operating United 232 made to land their aircraft after an engine failure produced a total loss of all the hydraulic systems on-board These pilots brought their DC-10 into a controlled landing at Sioux City, IA, simply through changes in engine power of the two remaining wing-mounted turbofan engines This controlled landing occurred despite the total loss of hydraulic pressure and thereby complete inability to move any control surfaces (including high lift, rudder, elevator, and aileron) The aircraft was a complete loss after breaking up upon landing but 185 of the 296 persons on-board survived the accident Chapter discusses the dramatic changes that have occurred in the area of airplane propulsion Propellers were the devices that provided thrust from the first days of the Wright brothers through the 1940s However, the development of the gas turbine engine during WWII ushered in a new propulsion technology These 194 16 Conclusion Fig 16.2  Radial air cooled engine weight/hp development powerplants provided a much higher thrust capability in a lighter weight vs the internal combustion engine/ propeller combination they replaced Figure 16.2 shows the trend in weight per HP for air cooled piston engines and that it had leveled at about lb/HP near the end of WWII [2] As previously shown in Figure 3.1 turbofan engines have continued to improve on that figure Chapter documents the history and development of both the cabin pressurization and air management system (AMS) These coupled systems regularly (but not always) keep a comfortable temperature within the cabin, while also providing a pressurized (above outside ambient) environment These AMS routinely uses an air cycle system to provide heat and cooling for the passenger space conditioned air The introduction and development of pressurization and AMS were closely coupled Both these systems provided for passenger comfort against both the vagaries of weather, turbulence and temperature extremes found at altitude The metabolic requirement for oxygen limits the altitude at which humans can perform or even stay conscious However, weather systems and higher levels of turbulence can frequently be found at elevations up to 30,000 ft (higher than Mt Everest), thereby insuring that any aircraft that went above the turbulence would exceed human tolerance So, to maintain pilot, crew, and passenger cognition, airplanes rely on pressurization systems to raise the internal pressure to an equivalent lower altitude The pressure that airplanes reach during their flight becomes a compromise between passenger comfort (lower altitude, higher pressure) and fuselage thickness to retain that pressure (thicker walls equals greater weight, fewer passengers) Airbus and 16 Conclusion 195 Boeing (plus the commuter airline manufacturers) have generally settled on cabin equivalent altitudes of 6000–8000 ft altitude, lower than sea level pressure (hence your ears may pop going up or down), but well within the tolerance of the human respiratory system Chapter 10 details an accident that occurred on a United flight (811) leaving Honolulu bound for Sydney The same cabin pressurization system that keeps passengers and crew alert during the flight creates a significant pressure difference between the inside cabin environment and the outside air At 40,000 ft altitude, with an equivalent 6000 ft altitude inside the cabin, this pressure difference can reach over lbf over every square inch of exposed surface Chapter detailed how this pressure difference must be resisted over numerous cycles (take off to cruise and landing) and demonstrated how one of the earliest jet transports (De Haviland Comte) did not design well for the metal fatigue that occurs over these multiple pressurize/depress cycles United airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747, also had a design flaw from its initial entry into service The new 747 provided a large increase in passenger capacity, but beneath the cabin floor, it also created a much larger cargo volume The aircraft designers wanted to take advantage of that cargo capacity, without impacting the passenger experience Therefore, they designed a cargo door that could open outward to allow full access to the interior cargo compartment The Boeing 747 cargo door was a key component in keeping the fuselage and all occupants at the higher pressure desired when at altitude Most passenger doors open inwardly initially, which means they are kept sealed and in place by the cabin pressure differential (higher inside vs outside), the cargo door would have to resist the pressure difference directly through its attaching and locking features This door had been designed with multiple latches and cams to link with the fuselage at eight points along the bottom The hinge attached to the fuselage at the top provided the upper restraint mechanism The door also had a mid-span latch on either side, about ½ way down the length of the door Unfortunately for the passengers on United flight 811, the balky cargo door had shown problems in the past and in fact had forced a 747 bound for New York to return to London when it experienced pressurization problems while climbing through 20,000 ft An examination of the door upon landing showed a ½ inch gap along the bottom of the door, but the cargo warning light in the cockpit did not annunciate When the door explosively let go on Flight 811, it buckled the main cabin floor and sent 10 first class seats out of the plane, along with passengers The pilot was able to safely return the aircraft and remaining passengers to Honolulu This accident underscored the large pressure difference found in all modern airliners traveling at altitude In addition, it demonstrates the energy that can be released when that high-pressure air (relative to ambient) explosively leaves the aircraft Chapter examined those systems that get used for less than 1% of the flight, the landing gear and their individual wheels and brakes The proper operation of the landing gear plus the wheels and brakes are imperative for the safety of the passengers The massive weights that new aircraft are reaching, coupled with the inherent sink rate required to descend to the airport means that the landing gear absorb an 196 16 Conclusion enormous load That continuous load plus the instantaneous energy absorbing shock of touching down must both be supported by the landing gear The wheels and brakes have similar brief but large load requirements The wheels go from stationary to landing speed in a fraction of a second (hence the large skid pad and smoke when first touching down) The brakes must absorb MJ of energy in less than 10  s and turn the plane’s kinetic energy into thermal energy (heat up) Finally, all of these systems must work on snowy, wet runways, when anti-lock braking systems may be limiting the stopping power of the brakes Chapter 12 details the Concorde accident that occurred upon takeoff from Paris’ Charles De Gaulle airport This supersonic transport had a delta wing shape, required for low drag necessary at its supersonic cruise speed This same delta wing shape could not benefit from the same high-lift devices of the more conventional swept wing Instead, it required a very high takeoff velocity than nose rotation to get lift The high takeoff velocity meant higher wheel loads, higher wheel speeds, and unfortunately higher susceptibility to runway foreign object damage (FOD, anything that didn’t belong on the runway) A French Airways Concorde tire hit a piece of titanium that had just fallen off a Continental Airlines DC-10 The Concorde ran over the DC-10 titanium strip at the worst point during its takeoff acceleration run By the time the impact of the strip was noticed, the Concorde was traveling too fast to abort the takeoff However, the damage initiated by the DC-10 part breached a fuel tank, produced a loss of thrust on engines (from the fuel leaking and burning near the engines and spreading to the wing fuel tank), and prevented the gear from retracting The combination of the low speed inherent in takeoff, the loss of thrust from engines, and the added drag of the landing gear remaining extended made the aircraft extremely unstable It crashed into a hotel near the airport with a loss of everyone on-board Chapter discusses the design and operation of the fuel storage and transfer systems required for large transport aircraft The long-range design of today’s intercontinental airplanes coupled with high passenger loads (the A380 can hold over 600 passengers) mean that large quantities of fuel must be stored and then transferred to the engines during flight In addition, the fuel must also be frequently transferred during flight to keep the Cg in an appropriate point on the aircraft (both fore and aft, plus port and starboard) Chapter 13 examines what happened with TWA 800, a Boeing 747 that exploded shortly after takeoff from New York’s JFK airport The investigation into the explosion ultimately placed the blame on an unintended and unexpected electrical anomaly inside the center wing fuel tank (CWT) This CWT had both an extremely low level of liquid fuel inside it, meaning the vast majority of the tank was filled with fuel vapor In addition, this same CWT had received significant heat input due to its location (directly above the air management system, AMS) and the operation of the aircraft’s AMS for several hours before takeoff While TWA 800 was a complete loss including all crew and passengers, it did introduce changes into the fuel systems By 2005, the FAA mandated that all CWTs be provided with a nonexplosive atmosphere In reducing this mandate to practice, the airplane manufacturers have elected to rely on nitrogen enriched air generation systems These systems take 16 Conclusion 197 pressurized and based on varying gas permeabilities through a membrane wall produce a gas stream that has less than 12% oxygen, sufficient to make the ullage volume a nonexplosive environment Chapter details the seemingly enormous change in instruments, sensors, and the human-machine interface (HMI) While it is true that the cockpit environment has changed dramatically from the open-air days of the Wright brothers, the fundamental instrument for measuring airspeed (pitot probe) has not really changed since the 1940s How this data gets presented in the cockpit has improved, with new digital cockpit displays placing a wealth of data in the hands of the flight crew Chapter 14 explains what can happen to a modern jet airliner when one of those pitot probes fails to provide accurate speed data This Airbus A330 suffered an icing incident on one of pitot probes that was feeding airspeed information into the autopilot system When the probe iced over due to heavy icing conditions, the autopilot automatically disconnected, and the flight crew responded poorly They were not well trained in how to diagnose nor recover from an aircraft stall incident at high altitude (when the plane had little margin for climbing) The resultant accident caused the death of all 228 souls on-board Chapter describes the long history and premature announcement of success in defeating ice as a hazard to flight This chapter identifies one of the primary initiatives of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA, the precursor to NASA) which started in the 1920s One of its major efforts was aimed at reducing the hazard posed by airplane icing This group helped to develop the early pneumatic deicing systems that helped transport aircraft in the 1930s NACA performed testing to validate the use of engine exhaust heat as a viable wing, leading edge deicing system This thermally focused system has now evolved into using high-­ temperature compressed air from the engine, before it has entered the combustor or turbine sections, as the deicing system on large-scale transport aircraft Chapter 15 discusses the Roselawn accident, where an ATR 72, turboprop, commuter aircraft was brought down by ice buildup on Halloween 1994 This accident highlighted the lack of insight into the fact that even modern aircraft (this ATR 72 was built that same year 1994) could still be susceptible to icing conditions This accident also displayed a rift between the US NTSB and the French BEA.  The NTSB highlighted previous role problems with this aircraft when operating in heavy icing conditions, with the flaps set at 15° In addition, the NTSB claimed that inadequate information had been offered regarding the performance of the ATR aircraft during this type of icing incident The BEA tried to deflect this aircraft design criticism and offered that the flight crew failed to follow standard procedure This accident did highlight the lack of understanding to the magnitude of icing that could be produced by various meteorological conditions including supercooled large liquid droplets All of these chapters have painted a picture of the complex nature of jet travel in the twenty-first century While these systems have evolved to make airplane travel the safest form of travel today (as measured by passenger-mile), it also demonstrates the frailty of the overall system if one of these subsystems becomes compromised 198 16 Conclusion References, retrieved 11/25/18 The Engines of Pratt & Whitney: A Technical History, Connors, J., AIAA, 2010 Index A Accident investigation, 185–188 Accident reconstruction, 148, 149, 151, 152 Aileron, 19, 21, 24, 25 Aileron assembly, 187 Airbus A330 FBW, 171 large transport aircraft, 176 pitot probes, 175 Rio de Janeiro’s airport, 169 speed measurement system, 176 Aircraft flight control control stick (yoke), 18 DC-3 cockpit with, 19 design, 17 directional stability, 17 forces acting, 17, 18 fundamental control axis, 17, 18 Air cycle machine (ACM), 53, 54 Air data inertial reference units (ADIRU), 176 Air date reference (ADR), 175 Air-driven generator (ADG), 121 Air France 447 AOA, 171 CVR, 170 ECAM, 171 FBW, 171 ITCZ, 170 ND, 170 nose-up attitude, 172, 173 outside air temperature, 170 PF, 170, 171 PNF, 171, 172 sidestick controller, 172 speed display, 172 turbulent zone, 170 Air France flight 4590, 145, 146, 155 1925 Air Mail act, Air management system (AMS), 194, 196 Airplane designers, 46 Air traffic control (ATC), 182 Airworthiness Directive ADT, 142 Altimeter, 83, 86–88, 94 American Eagle Flight 4184, 181 Angle of attack (AOA), 95 aircraft velocity vector vs wings, 176 EASA and FAA, 179 higher drag, 177 vs lift coefficient, 176, 177 lift increases, 171 pilot input, 179 wings, 171 Anti-ice/deicing systems accumulation, 99 active in-flight deicing system, 106 aerodynamic forces, 108 aeronautical surfaces, 99 aviation industry, 99 delivery schedules, 99 engineers and material scientists, 102 financial and weight penalties, 102 ice buildup at wing stagnation point, 100 ice crystals formation, 100 inflatable rubber boots, early biplanes, 101 inflated and deflated configuration, 103 NACA, 99 noncritical surfaces, 102 rotary winged craft, 100 thermodynamic laws, 105 Anti-Icing Advisory System (AAS), 188 Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), 96 Artificial horizon, 89–92, 94, 95 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 T Filburn, Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible, 199 200 ATR roll control scheme, 186 ATR72 Aircraft, 182 ATR-72 turboprop aircraft, 181 Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), 173 Auxiliary power unit (APU), 56 Aviation gas (Avgas), 72 Aviation history challenges, high altitudes, service ceiling and load carrying capability, Trimotor, world conflicts, Wright brothers, B Bleed air heat, 105, 108 Blocker doors, 129, 130 Boeing 247, Boeing B-52 bomber, 33 Boeing Model 307, 49–51, 53 Boeing Stratoliner, Brayton Cycle, 31 British Aerospace Corporation (BAC), Bungee energy absorber, 61 C 767 Cabin altitude schedule, 139 Cabin altitude schedule, 137 Cabin pressure airplane cabin altitude horn, 137 and cabin safety, 139–140 Cabin pressurization, 194 Calibrated airspeed (CAS), 175 Cam lock mechanism, 141 Carbon brakes, 66 Carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) materials, 51 Cascade TR system, 126, 127, 129 Center wing fuel tank (CWT), 160, 162, 196 Chlorate candles, 57 Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), 90 Clipper airplanes, 4, Cockpit aircraft manufacturers and pilots, 87 air speed indicators, 83 altimeters, 86 artificial horizon, 89 directional gyros, 90 engine revolution counter, 83 external visual cues, 83 inclinometer, 86 Index inductive compass, 88 navigation requirements, 90 pinwheel-type anemometer, 84 pitot probe, 85 pressure difference, 86 simple U tube manometer, 85 spring-constrained revolving weights, 84 stagnation pressure, 86 visual access, 83 war aircraft, 86 Cockpit voice recorder (CVR), 128, 149, 169 Commercial airliners, 192 Commercial air travel post, Commercial aviation industry, 191 Commercial jet travel, 6–11 Compass, 86–88, 90, 94 Concorde designers, 51 Concorde fuel tank locations, 150 Concorde main landing gear, 148 Concorde SST, 145 Continental DC-10, 149 Control stick, 17–19, 21, 26, 27 Conventional airline configuration, 125 D DC-10 cargo door, 114–116 DC-10, three-engine plane, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120–123 Delta wing design, 145–147 Derwent model, 31 Directional control valve (DCV), 130 Directional gyros, 90, 91 Douglas DC-2, Douglas DC-3, 3, 91 Drag coefficient, 192, 193 E Early type accidents, 113–117 Electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM), 171 Electronic engine control (EEC), 128 Elevators, 18, 19, 24, 26, 27 Engine indication and crew-alerting system (EICAS, 129 Engine operating envelope, 38 Engine pressure ratio (EPR), 138 Engine-reversing system, 127 Engine weight-to-power ratio, 29 Environmental control system (ECS), 54, 55 European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), 181 European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 36 Index Exhaust gas temperature (EGT), 138 Extended twin engine operations (ETOPS) certified aircraft/engine types, 37 defined, 37 De Havilland design, 37 EASA and FAA, 36 engine transition, 37 growth in engine thrust, 38 F Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 36 Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR), 51, 127 Flaps, 21–25, 27 Flight data recorder (FDR), 149, 183 Flight System Sensor Failure Air France 447 (see Air France 447) Airbus A330 (see Airbus A330) Fly-by-wire (FBW), 171 Ford Trimotor, interwar commercial airliner, 61 Foreign object damage (FOD), 35, 196 Fuel quantity indication system (FQIS), 164 Fuel systems commercial airliner fuel tank capacity, 75 early aviators, 71 fuel tank location, 71 in-line regulating valve, 71 jet A vs AvGas 100 properties, 75, 76 jet engines, 74 oil fraction into various constituents, 72, 73 operational reliability, 73 predetonation/knocking, 72 propulsion system operation, 71 regular automotive gas, 74 requirements and design, 76, 78–81 US rubber companies, 74 Fuel Tank Inerting task group, 166, 167 Fuel tanks, 71, 79, 80, 150, 153–155 Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC), 81 G Gas turbine engine Brayton Cycle, 31 bypass ratios, 35 commercial high-bypass engines, 34 DOD contracts, 33 FOD, 35 geared turbofan (GTF), 36 generic two-spool turbofan engine, 34 ME 262, 31 Meteor’s jet engine, 31 201 noise, 32 passengers convenience, 31 prime mover, 29 propulsion method, 29 pylon and nacelle interaction, 36 transport aircraft cruise speed progress, 29, 31 TSFC, 32 turbojet engine regions, 29, 30 twin-spool design, 33 variable stator positions, 35 weight-to-power ratio, 29, 30 General aviation (GA) aircraft, 103, 183 Generic two-spool turbofan engine, 34 Glass cockpit, 85, 95 Global Positioning System (GPS), 96 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), 147, 184, 187 H High-bypass turbofan engines, 125 High lift devices, 22–26 Hollow fiber membranes (HFM), 80 Human-machine interface (HMI), 197 Hydraulic brakes, 67 Hydraulic isolation valve (HIV), 130 Hydraulic lines, 130 Hydromechanical flight control system, 21, 27 Hypoxia, 48 I Ice crystals, 174, 178 Icing pitot probe, 176 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), 183 Integrated standby instrument system (ISIS), 175 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 169 Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), 170 J Jet engine, 5, 6, 8, 13 K Knots indicated air speed (KIAS), 183 L Landing gear, 147–149, 151–154 Lauda Air Lines, 125, 127, 128 202 Index Lauda Air NG004, 131 Lindbergh’s Ryan monoplane, 88 Lockheed Constellation, 126 Long-range navigation (LORAN), 91 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), 136 747 Lower cargo door system, 140 Pneumatic deicing boots, 103, 107 Post-accident change, FAA, 132 Post-accident investigation, 139, 141, 142 Pressure swing adsorption (PSA), 52 Pressurized fuselages, 191 Propeller actuation systems, 126 M Max takeoff weight (MTOW), 135 Q Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), 129 N Nacelles, 38–40, 42, 43 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 99, 197 National Transportation Safety Board, 190 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 123, 191 conclusions, 189 recommendations, 189 Nautical miles (NM), 170 Navigation Display (ND), 170 R Rejected takeoff (RTO), 68, 69 Remotely operated vehicle (ROV), 173 Retracting landing gear, 63 REV ISLN annunciator, 129 Right-wing-down (RWD) position, 184 Rolls-Royce/SNECMA turbojet engines, 146 Root cause analysis, 152, 154, 155, 160, 162, 164, 165 Rotor burst zones, 76, 77 Rudder, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25 O On-board, inert gas generating system (OBIGGS), 80 On-board oxygen generating systems, 52 Operators Information Message (OIM), 188 Original equipment makers (OEMs), 105 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), 76 Oxygen masks, 52 S Self-sealing fuel tank, 74 Shock strut operation, 63, 64 Side-scan sonar, 173 Sidestick controller, 171, 172, 176, 178 Slats, 22, 24, 25, 27 Stagnation pressure, 86 Stall nose-down attitude, 171 warning, 171, 172, 177–179 Straight wing, 192, 193 Stratoliner 307 model, Supercharger, 49, 50, 53 Surface actuation, 19, 21, 22, 26–28 Swept wing design, 192, 196 P Pan American Airways (PanAm), 4, Physiological Requirements of Sealed High Altitude Aircraft Compartments, 47 Pilot and copilots, 137 Pilot flying (PF), 170 Pilot non-flying (PNF), 171, 172, 176–178 Pin wheel anemometer, 83, 84 Piston engines, 3, 6, Pitot probe, 85, 95, 96 airspeed data, 173 ice crystals, 178 locations, 173, 174 static port and total air temperature probe, 175 static unmoving air vs dynamic air pressure, 174 velocity measurement, 174 Plexiglas windows, 50 T Tachometer, 83, 84, 86, 88 Tail dragger configurations, 59 type designs, 60 Thrust reverser (TR) cascade-type, 127, 129 FAR, 127 in-flight actuation, 128 isolation valve, 129 PW4000 engines, 132 USAF C-17, 126 Index Thrust reversing system (TRS), 130 Thrust-specific fuel consumption (TSFC), 32, 33, 35, 36, 78 Tires, 66 Titanium alloy, 123 Translating cowl, 129 Transport aircraft cruise speed progress, 29, 31 Tricycle landing gear aerodynamic surfaces, 60 Airbus A380, 65 aircraft design cycle, 59 Boeing 737, 64 bungee energy absorber for WWI aircraft, 60, 61 Cg and passenger placement, 62 commercial transport aircraft, 62, 63 design and operation, 65 Ford Trimotor, interwar commercial airliner, 61 nose wheels, 62 Oleo strut, 63 requirements, 59 shock strut operation, 63, 64 tail dragging aircraft, 61 tires, 66 type designs, 60 U-2 design features, 62 wheels and brakes, 66–69 203 wide-body and single-aisle airliners, 62 Wright Brothers, 59 Tropopause region, 46 TWA Flight 800, 157–160 U Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio system, 90, 91 Underwater locator beacons (ULBs), 178 United Airlines Flight 232 (UAL 232), 118, 121, 122 U tube manometer, 85 V Very high frequency (VHF), 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR), 183 W Wheels and brakes, 66–69 Wide bodies, 11–14 Winglet, 27 Y Yoke (control stick), 18, 19, 21, 27 .. .Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible Thomas Filburn Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible Thomas Filburn College of Engineering,... Switzerland AG 2020 T Filburn, Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible, 8-3 -0 3 0-2 011 1-1 _1 1  Commercial Aviation History efforts of the. .. benefits to the commercial aviation industry It is interesting and coincidental that the jet engine would be developed by both Germany (Ohain) and Great Britain (Whittle) during the war, with
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