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3. Assessing natural catastrophe risk 3.1. Expert modelling of natural disaster risk Assessments of future risk are inherently difficult because of the uncertainties associated with the impacts of climate change and socio economic development on future
this was echoed by the affected actors saying thatthe government was ‘buying water entitlementsnot actual water’. The group of affected actorswas also blaming the government for ignoringthe broader impact of their policies:Wouldn’t it be a tragedy if people in townweren’t paid. If the farmer is paid to leave,there would be no town. So it would just be aridiculous proposition to buy out the farmersand not buy out the town (2 September, 2008).In summary, it can be noted that this was themost politicized frame of all, going against pre-vious research primarily pointing out the causesof the crisis to be the frame determining politici-zation in crisis. One reason might well be that thescientists, who in the two other frames wereallowed to make authoritative claims when defin-ing the situation and its causes, had a less strongrole in this frame, thus opening up more of a com-petition among other actors’ framing.4. DiscussionThe article has illustrated that responsibilityframing in connection with compounded crisescan significantly gain by considering not onlypolitical actors’ framing of a situation but alsothose other actor groups involved in framing acrisis. Such an approach will provide a richerunderstanding of constraints and opportunitiesfacing various actors. One conclusion to bedrawn from the analysis is that crisis managersare facing basically two types of constraints affect-ing their ‘communicative spaces’: external mediafactors (actors’ own previous policies in relatedareas) and internal media factors (other actors’framing of the issue as it plays out in themedia). Actors are in general in control of thefirst one (in which they are rather bound bytheir own previous policy commitments),whereas the latter depends on media coverage ofa particular event. Before moving on to the pro-positions derived from the case in relation tofurther research on communication in com-pounded crises, it should be noted that thisdiscussion was based on a single case study andthat additional studies are needed in order tofurther develop the general propositions below.Starting with the external aspect affectingactors’ communicative spaces, the case is a goodexample of the coupling mechanism betweena concrete crisis and climate change that gives‘climate change induced’ compounded crisescertain characteristics (see also Olsson andPaglia, 2008). In this case, the coupling betweenthe actual crisis and related policies urges crisiscommunication research to move outside thedomains of the crisis at hand by taking into con-sideration the broader policymaking context. Inrelation to the focus on single crisis communica-tive settings in previous research, communicatorsin compounded crises run the risk of having a par-ticular crisis contaminated by related policyissues, which limit the actors’ communicativeoptions. Or, from the other perspective, it canbe used to strengthen their case. It reminds meof what Boin et al. (2009) refer to as ‘crisis exploi-tation’, which means that political actors canexploit crises in order to push through their petpolicies. In order for actors to be trustworthy,they need to be consistent. In this case, thatmeans not only communicating in the actualcrisis but also in relation to what has been saidand done prior to the crisis in areas that are nowbeing linked to the crisis. This explains why thegovernment made the link between theMurray–Darling crisis and climate change,whereas the opposition first tried to downplaythe link. In summary, previous policy commit-ments framed as being linked to the crisis athand will both enable and constrain the actors’ability to communicate.4.1. Proposition one: The communicative spaceprovided to political actors will be affected byprevious policies proposed in area(s) framedas being linked to the acute crisisAs already argued, not only external policy com-mitments but also media aspects will have animpact on political actors’ crisis communication236 OlssonENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS options. This is so because media coverage ofcrises consists of a variety of actors involved inframing the event. In the actual case, the scien-tists and affected actors were given considerablespace on all three framing themes. As argued byprevious researchers in the field (Weingart et al.,2000; Andreadis and Smith, 2007), climatechange coverage has moved beyond its previousoccupation with scientific uncertainty intobeing reported as foremost a political issue.However, as can be seen in the empirical analysis,this does not mean that scientists are not partici-pating in the debate. On the contrary, it can beargued that scientists’ framing power becomeseven stronger when there is a consensus on a par-ticular issue, since it poses limitations on otheractors’ framing options. The fact that the opposi-tion leader Brendan Nelson came under heavy cri-ticism for denying the link points to anotherimportant aspect here, that the link betweenclimate change and extreme weather events hasbecome stronger, up to the point where itsimply cannot be questioned. Together, the dis-cussion above stresses the notion that politicalactors are constrained by the societal and politicaldiscourse in which they communicate. Given thestrong role of scientists quoted in the news cover-age, it seems fair to argue that other actors hadless space in framing the issue, as illustrated inthe figures in this analysis, in connection withframing the severity of the crisis and its causes.These two factors are vital to responsibilityframing since they limit the range of potentialmeasures aimed at curbing the crisis. On a morespecific level, there were also examples of whenscientists spoke more directly to politicians.They were then acting in the capacity of ‘frameguards’ determined by how other actors oughtto frame the crisis. One example was when thescientists urged the political actors to stoparguing over the link between the drought andclimate change for fear that the climate changeissue risked taking over the debate and beingused as an excuse for inaction. The second prop-osition is then that the participation of otheractors in the media coverage had an impact onthe political actors’ communicative spaces.More specifically, in relation to ‘climate changeinduced’ crises, we can expect scientists to playan important role in framing the situation andits causes.4.2. Proposition two: The strong role of scientistsin framing crisis severity and causes limitspolitical actors' framing optionsExcept for scientists, the second most frequentlyquoted group was ‘affected actors’, especiallywhen it came to framing concrete measures. Itmight well be the case that interest groupsalways play a prominent role in framing measuresin relation to crises, but their strong presence inthis case might likewise rest on the specific cul-tural Australian context in which farmers andrural communities have a strong cultural sym-bolic and economic value. As argued byGoffman (1981, p. 63), frames are culturallygrounded, making them ‘a central part of aculture’. According to Botterill (2003), droughthas to be understood as a social constructionand as such highly political in its nature.However, as argued by West and Smith (1996),drought is a national symbol of Australia, whichmeans that in contrast to climate change,drought policies have not been a politically sensi-tive issue in Australia, and have not been ques-tioned in the media debate. Rather, the ‘bush’and the rural areas have been presented as quin-tessentially Australian – as an important part ofthe national character. In the case study at handthe actor groups, scientists and affected actorswere basically promoting two different frameswhere the first focused on structural adjustmentsand the latter on direct effects on rural commu-nities. Whereas the scientific frame was focusedon long-term impacts and risk assessments, thecoverage of affected communities had muchmore of an emotional tone. This was so especiallywhen individual farmers and their struggles werebeing portrayed. This means that even thoughthe scientific frame had a strong impact in termsof status and authority, the affected actors’frame was equally powerful on an emotionalResponsibility framing in a crisis 237ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS level in relating to fundamental values suchas culture, identity and solidarity. The culturalframing of measures to cope with the crisismight then account for why no major policy revi-sions in terms of what Boin et al. (2008) refer to asparadigm shifts, involving the altering of funda-mental normative values, were thoroughly dis-cussed in the coverage. Rather, the politicalframing connected to measures was ratherfocused on technical aspects and not the long-term implications of irrigation agriculture in adrought-prone area like the Murray–DarlingBasin. This argument leads to the third prop-osition in relation to responsibility framing of‘climate change induced’ crises.4.3. Proposition three: Affected actors withstrong cultural, economic and societal supportwill further limit political actors' framingoptions in terms of measures aimed at curbingthe crisisIn summary, this paper has argued for research oncrisis communication to take external (outsidethe media coverage) as well as internal (insidethe media coverage) factors into account whenexamining responsibility frames in connectionwith compounded crises. In relation to the rec-ommendations provided by Boin et al. (2005,p. 70), stating that successful meaning makingrequires the ability to communicate ‘a persuasivestory line that explains what happened, why ithad to be that way, what its repercussions are,how it can be resolved, who can be relied upon,and who is to blame’, the article at hand demon-strates how these storylines are constantly ‘inter-rupted’ by other actors. As illustrated in thisarticle, the weight given to each actor groupdepends on the issue at hand, wheredifferent groups dominated the frames relatedto severity, causes and appropriate measuresrespectively. Together, this means that politicalactors’ own storylines will be mediated andfinally understood in the light of these otheractors’ framing. The dynamics of this framingcontest will probably look different in variouscultural settings. In order to further develop thepropositions above, additional studies will beneeded.Notes1. It should thus be noted that, for example, politicalscientists Rosenthal et al. (2001, p. 20) open up amore dynamic approach to crisis aftermaths,proposing that ‘Crises mark the transition fromone stable pattern into one of many possible alterna-tive futures. Actions taken during the crisis processbecome defining elements for the (temporary) resol-ution of that crisis, but at the same time, theybecome steps towards the creation of the next crisis.’2. The Australian reported that ‘Dr Nelson yesterdaydenied that he had rejected a link to climatechange.’ ‘That is not what I said’, he told ABCRadio in Adelaide. But in an interview with ABC pre-senter Tony Jones on Monday night’s Lateline pro-gramme, Dr Nelson was asked explicitly whetherhe accepted that the Murray crisis was related toclimate change. Dr Nelson replied initially, ‘No, Ido not’ (ABC Radio, 4 September 2008).3. Cubbie Station is a cotton farm in southern Queens-land and is Australia’s biggest irrigator, which haslong been accused of taking too much water, indoing so denying farmers downstream water (ABC,24 February 2004, www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1052459.htm). In general, Australian cottonis mostly (82.5 per cent) grown under irrigation.‘From the growth of the first crop in 1961 –62near Wee Waa in the Namoi Valley cotton pro-duction has expanded rapidly to become one ofAustralia’s major agricultural industries. It nowmakes a major contribution to the economies ofthe growing areas and to the Australian economyas a whole’, www.mdbc.gov.au/subs/eResource_book/chapter3/p4.htm).4. The connection between water management andclimate change was justified by the fact that MinisterPenny Wong was the minister for climate changeand water.5. The Coorong Wetlands are one of the most impor-tant wetlands in Australia. The wetland consists ofocean beach, the mouth of the Murray River, lakesand estuaries. This combination provides a widerange of habitats that vary from freshwater to hyper-saline and which are for the most part in a naturalstate. The wetlands around the Coorong (including238 OlssonENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS Lake Alexandrina and Lake Albert) cover 140,500 ha.The Coorong is a long, shallow lagoon more than100 km in length that is separated from the SouthernOcean by a narrow sand dune peninsula. LakesAlexandrina and Albert form the mouth of theMurray River and are comprised of fresh to salinewaters. 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