HINDU NATIONALISM AND THE RISE OF CASTEBASED PARTIES IN NORTH INDIA Yamini Vasudevan A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME 2007 a CONTENTS Title Page Nos. Abstract i Acknowledgments ii Abbreviations iii Introduction 1 – 22 - Hindu nationalism and Indian politics Rise of caste-based parties Mandal and Mandir – Dual ideologies Literature review Chapter descriptions Chapter 2: The Sangh Parivar and the revival of Hindu nationalism - The BJP and the ‘new’ face of Hindutva Revival of religious nationalism in the 1980s Caste – The regional barometer of the north The BJP’s advance to power Mandal and Mandir Chapter 3: The BJP and caste-based parties (I): compulsions of coalition politics - Politics of the post-Ramajanambhoomi phase Moving towards moderation Constraints of caste politics Attempts at ideological reconciliation Sanghatan vs. Social Engineering Chapter 4: The BJP and caste-based parties (II): Case Study of Uttar Pradesh - Uttar Pradesh: The political stage Early 1990s: Expansion and consolidation of the BJP in UP 1 5 7 10 20 23 – 46 23 26 33 37 39 47 – 68 47 50 52 57 59 69 – 96 69 70 b - Mid to late 1990s: Impact of post-Mandal developments Caste (mis-) management – The Kalyan affair The 1999 elections – Battling the odds Early 2000 to 2004 elections – Coalitions and challenges The 2004 elections – Picking up the pieces Analysis – Charting the BJP’s career Conclusion - The 2004 elections and the BJP – Delusion and disappointment In retrospect – Re-visiting the BJP’s journey Looking to the future: Whither the BJP, whither Hindutva? 73 78 82 85 92 94 97 – 110 97 105 108 Appendix 111-113 Bibliography 114-133 c Abstract The rise of Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a major force in Indian politics in the early 1990s is an oft-examined topic of contemporary Indian political history. However, the progress of the BJP in the 1990s met several challenges, the strongest of which centred on the rise of caste-based parties as key state-level political mediators in north India. Whilst the Mandal Commission’s recommendations made caste a central element of target voter bases and electoral appeal, deep-seated processes from the 1970s spurred the rise of caste-based parties. The rise of caste-based parties challenged the pan-Indian overtones of Hindutva and the BJP’s attempts to consolidate the ‘Hindu vote’ – for acknowledging caste-based parties as political partners meant a dilution of commitment towards the Sangh Parivar’s call for a united Hindu society. The BJP’s handling of this ideological and political problematic, the effect this had on the party’s character and functioning, and the transformation effected on Hindu nationalism as a result of these challenges, forms the central queries of this thesis. i Acknowledgements This thesis was undertaken whilst in receipt of the Graduate Research Scholarship by the National University of Singapore. The grant was very helpful, and is gratefully acknowledged. Several people were instrumental in the writing of this thesis. Foremost amongst them was my supervisor, Dr. Rajesh Rai – a friend, philosopher and guide in the true sense of every word. His insightful comments and analysis were important to making this thesis complete, whilst his constant motivation kept me going till the end. I also thank Prof. Peter Reeves for his guidance through the years. Whatever little I may have gained by way of knowledge in the realm of academic research, I owe it to him. Needless to say, my family played one of the most important roles during this time. Despite being away from me, they never made the distance felt. They were my constant source of encouragement and support. Even though we were separated by time zones, it was very comforting to know they were just a phone call away, no matter what the time. A special thank you to Saras, my best friend. She always made time to listen to my tales of woe, helped to strengthen my resolve and enlivened my day – she was my Duracell battery. Thanks also to Kumeresh, a special friend, for keeping my spirits high through one of the toughest stages of my writing, and for putting a smile on my face no matter how dark the day. A hearty thank you to all my graduate roommates for all the good times we spent together, especially Sathia. I take back with me some very memorable moments. There are many others who have stood by me through these years, and touched me with their concern and words of encouragement. Thank you to all. Yamini Vasudevan ii Abbreviations BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party BJS: Bharatiya Jan Sangh BSP: Bahujan Samaj Party JP: Janata Party MP: Member of Parliament NDA: National Democratic Alliance OBC: Other Backward Classes RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh SC: Scheduled Castes SP: Samajwadi Party UP: Uttar Pradesh VHP: Vishwa Hindu Parishad iii Introduction Hindu nationalism and Indian politics In the late 1980s, India witnessed a surge in support for militant Hindu nationalism espoused by the umbrella group of organizations known as the Sangh Parivar. The change was a significant one in that it had occurred after nearly five decades of secular post independence history, and prompted academics worldwide to ponder if the country was on the verge of an identity crisis. Their concerns were heightened when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its sibling Hindu nationalist organizations launched the Ramjanambhoomi campaign, which sought to ‘liberate’ the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1990-91. Despite the fact that it left behind a trail of communal riots and at least 2000 people dead, the movement became extremely popular in the Hindi belt and acted as a launch pad for the BJP into Indian politics. In the 1991 General Elections, held in the aftermath of the Ramjanambhoomi movement, the BJP emerged as the second largest party in the Lok Sabha with 120 seats and 20 per cent of the vote share. For a party that had scraped up a humiliating tally of 2 seats in 1984, this was a tremendous achievement. In effect, the BJP seemed poised to emerge as a plausible successor to the Congress’s mantle at the Center, and alongside it, Hindutva as a possible alternative ideology in Indian politics.1 1 Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 1996 1 Contrary to expectations, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period made it amply clear that the BJP’s standing was far less secure than it appeared. In December 1992, members of the Hindu nationalist combine demolished the Babri Masjid in line with the promised aim of building a Ram temple in its place. However, in an ironical turn of events, Ayodhya failed to capture the public imagination as it had the previous year. The violent backlash that followed in many parts of north India had an unsettling effect on the population, and robbed the movement of its earlier credibility. More importantly, the impetus of regional politics had by this time shifted away from inter-religious differences to caste cleavages and caste-based parties – with the result that religious majoritarianism had lost much of its new found potency, and was instead challenged by the advent of a new form of politics that centered on caste-based affiliations. The intersection of the differentiated trajectories of Hindu nationalism and caste politics in the mid 1990s was not a coincidence, but rather the convergence of two parallel movements that had been engendered, and later aided, by the institutional and electoral decline of the Congress from the 1970s onwards. In the post-independence period, the Congress had instituted an extensive network of patronage politics that relied on local notables to help bring together diverse social groups (including Upper castes, Scheduled Castes (SC), and Muslims) under a common political umbrella, thereby allowing little room for alternative parties to carve out their individual spheres of influence. In the 1970s and 80s, the growing tendency towards centralization of decision-making and operation processes by the Congress leadership led to the degeneration of the clientelistic structure, and eroded the party’s control over its ‘coalition of extremes’. As the system 2 began to crumble, differentiated political voices and demands began to emerge from the cracks, which became manifest in the form of political parties over time. Along with the Congress’s decline, the party’s populist, inclusive rhetoric began to lose its importance, and in its place, political appeal based on communal and community identities began to dominate the electoral and political circles. In other words, the Indian polity came to be fragmented on religious and caste lines, freeing up the space and opportunity for differentiated political parties to carve out niche vote banks from those population segments hitherto appropriated by the Congress. The BJP was one of the beneficiaries of this change; caste-based parties were another. The developments mentioned above were subtle and had no perceptible impact on the BJP’s career, especially in the early years following its formation in 1980. In the initial period, the BJP decided to follow a moderate strategy that relied on Integral Humanism2 as its guiding principle and refrained from making direct overtures to religion. However, the strategy failed, and the party faced a humiliating defeat in the 1984 Parliament elections when it managed to secure only 2 seats. Faced with increasing pressure from the Sangh Parivar to assert its core identity, the party reverted to a hard line Hindutva stance and began to revive its efforts towards reinforcing ‘Hindu’ identity, with particular reference to the opposing ‘Other’, which was centered on the Muslims in the subcontinent. It was an ironic coincidence that by the mid 1980s, the Congress too had begun 2 A treatise written in 1965 by RSS ideologue Deendayal Upadhyaya, ‘Integral Humanism’ set forth a moderate socio-economic agenda that rejected westernization, and advocated a Gandhian socio-economic model that focused on indigenous production, small-scale industries, and national culture based on traditionalist ideals as the best means of progress. Integral Humanism was key to the foundation of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the predecessor of the BJP, and played a crucial role in creating an alternative ideological avenue for Hindu nationalists. Upadhyaya, Deendayal. Integral Humanism. 1965. (Taken from a series of four lectures delivered in Bombay in April 1965. Source: www.bjp.org/history/human.htm) 3 to rely on religious rhetoric and symbolism to revive its waning popularity, thereby relaxing the strict adherence to secularism and legitimizing the incorporation of religion into politics. This proved a major advantage for the BJP, for the Congress had indirectly sanctioned religious propaganda as a legitimate form of political appeal. In addition, the Congress’s lack of ideological coherence in its decisions over major politico-religious issues like the Shah Bano case3 eroded popular faith in both the party’s capability for governance and the viability of secularism, and thrust Hindu nationalism forward in new light as a viable political ideology. A significant feature of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts at religious revival in the 1980s involved the organizations’ concerted attempts to conspicuously ‘incorporate’ lower castes within the Hindu fold – a move that was a consequence of the Hindu nationalists’ vulnerability vis-à-vis the other religious groups that drew on the social stigma suffered by lower caste groups to propagate proselytisation. It is important to note that the stress on inter-caste harmonization was not a new feature in Hindu nationalist ideology. In the early stages of the Hindu nationalist movement, there had been several initiatives by reformers to ease the barriers of caste and commence the process of integration of lower castes, such as through Shuddhi or purification rituals advocated by the Arya Samaj for the reintegration of Untouchables into Hindu society. The difference lay in the fact that whilst these early initiatives were intended primarily to restructure the caste system so as to diminish the stigma associated with ‘lower’ caste status, the Sangh Parivar, especially 3 The Shah Bano case concerned the Congress’s controversial decision to override the Supreme Court’s judgment over the alimony to be paid to a divorced Muslim lady called Shah Bano. For more details, see Chapter 2, pp. 31-32 4 the RSS, took the idea a step further and aimed to institute a pan-Hindu identity that would subsume all internal sub-divisions completely over time. Whilst the RSS acted as the social medium of change from the grassroots, the BJP played the role of the negotiator of Hindu nationalist interests in the political sphere. Conventionally, the BJP derived much of its electoral support from the upper-caste, urban middle class segments, on account of their receptivity to the RSS’s traditionalist ethos and culture. In the early 1990s, the party had made better progress due to the popularity of the Ramjanambhoomi movement, but its appeal was still restricted to the upper-caste segments of the population. Given the limited demographic presence of the upper castes (about 15 per cent of the Hindu population), the party was hard pressed to expand its support base amongst the lower caste segments in order to strengthen its standing. This was an ideological necessity as well, to complement the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to institutionalize ethno-religious criteria as the primary determinant of identity. In doing so, however, the BJP was challenged by the rise of caste-based parties, which advocated a contradictory form of politics that placed caste identity at the heart of their socio-political agenda – one that demanded the redistribution of power to lower castes as the means of retribution for the material and psychological deprivation suffered by them in the past. Rise of caste-based parties The rise of caste-based parties in the Hindi belt was relatively delayed when compared to the south, where they had begun to dominate the political scene since the 1950s and 60s. The lack of a collective political consciousness on part of the lower castes in the north 5 was a result of contextual limitations including the strong demographic presence of the upper castes (10 to 15 per cent in the north as compared to 3 to 5 per cent in the south); and the prevalence of the Zamindari system of land ownership, which concentrated power in the hands of a select section of the population. In addition, the perceived superiority of upper-caste ethics led to the promulgation of a culture that relied primarily on Sanskritisation or the emulation of upper-caste practices as the means of social mobility, thereby strengthening the ‘moral’ authority of the upper castes on the one hand, and diminishing the chances of socio-political organization of lower castes on the other.4 Lower caste empowerment received a strong thrust from two movements in the 1960s and ‘70s – the peasant-based mobilisation led by Charan Singh and the socialism-oriented movement initiated by Ram Manohar Lohia – which helped lay the foundations for the rise of caste-based parties in the 1980s and 90s.5 More importantly, the two movements acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of lower castes into horizontal interest groups and the propagation of the idea that the fulfillment of collective socio-political interests was the key to the realization of personal benefits as well. Caste-based parties carried this idea further and prioritized the capture of political power as the primary means for the emancipation of the lower castes from the suppression they had suffered to date. The argument rested on the premise that “the capture of political power will automatically transform the composition of the bureaucratic elite”6 – a sign, as Varshney notes, that the 4 Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: The rise of lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. See also Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?” in The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 19 5 Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution. pp. 254-289 6 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?”. p. 19 6 caste-based parties had realised that “it [wa]s time now to play the game of democratic politics more equally.”7 Mandal and Mandir – Dual ideologies The inherent ideological contradiction between caste-based parties and Hindu nationalists came to light in 1989 when the incumbent Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced the implementation of the Mandal Commission reforms, which entailed the reservation of up to 27 per cent of seats in government jobs and education for the Other Backward Classes (OBC), apart from the existent reservation of jobs for the Scheduled Castes.8 The government’s announcement elicited a harsh response from the upper castes, which included public immolation by several students, who viewed the measure as an encroachment of their traditional dominance in the sectors of bureaucracy and higher education. Although a member of the ruling coalition government, the BJP condemned Singh’s move and opposed the ‘positive’ discrimination measures as divisive and eventually harmful to society at large. The BJP’s reaction helped to strengthen the party’s image as well as its standing amongst the upper castes, but it also added weight to the caste-based parties’ allegation that Hindutva was a pseudonym for Brahmanism, and the BJP was the political guardian of the upper castes. In the early 1990s, the polarization of opinion had little impact on the BJP due to the party’s ability to deflect public attention to the realm of Hindu-Muslim relations through the Ramjanambhoomi movement. However, once the communal dust had settled, caste- 7 8 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?”. p. 19 For more details on the Mandal Commission, please refer to Chapter 2, pp. 39 – 43 7 based parties began to dominate politics at the state level. The ability of caste-based parties to stake their claim to regional power lay in their ability to fuse together ascriptive categorization and socio-political connotation,9 which helped to overcome the presence of multiple sub-divisions within the community as well as their lack of geographic concentration. The extent of the caste-based parties’ strength in representative politics was made clear by the mid-1990s. For example, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which identified itself as the spokes-party of the Dalits, bolstered its standing from merely 2.5 per cent of the vote share in the 1985 elections to 16 per cent in 1989, and later 21 per cent of the vote share in the 1998 elections. Given that SCs and OBCs together constituted nearly 60 per cent of the total Hindu population, caste-based parties had a huge support base to tap into. It is important to note that the rise of caste-based parties was aided by shifts in the political system at the center as well. By the mid-1990s, the single-dominant-party system prominent until the late 1980s had given way to a “bi-modal, multi-party system”10 wherein “two major or national political parties [were] manoeuvring within a large vortex of small regional parties.”11 Major national parties, namely the Congress, the BJP and the Janata Dal, no longer functioned as individual political agents, but rather acted as poles around which regional parties formed coalitions. In other words, 9 Chandra, Kanchan. The Transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 2000). pp. 26-61 10 Wallace, Paul “Introduction: India's 1998 election – Hindutva, the tail wags the elephant, and Pokhran” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: regionalism, Hindutva and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. p. 17 11 Ibid. 8 [By the 1990s], the overall logic of electoral politics in India had over the last decade been transformed in such a way that the locus classicus of political power in India – the one-party dominance at the centre which remain[ed] the tantalizing object of BJP’s strategies – seem[ed] to have become a thing of the past.12 Thus, to form alliances with regional parties as a means to obtain power was no longer an option, but a compulsion. However, the process of forming and maintaining steady alliances with caste-based parties was fraught with ideological and practical concerns for the BJP. Unlike the RSS, which firmly believed in the long term transformation of society as the primary aim of Hindutva, the BJP’s immediate concern was the need to establish its presence beyond its niche support bases in order to maintain its place in the running for power. Yet, to acknowledge the caste-based parties’ presence and/or their aim of empowerment posed an ideological dichotomy, for Hindutva advocated a pan-Hindu identity that derided sectarian divisions. Furthermore, the BJP’s emergence as a prominent political agent was in large part derived from the shift of a large section of the upper-caste vote in its favor in the post-math of the Mandal affair. Hence, by forming an alliance with caste-based parties, the BJP faced the threat of alienating its core support base, in turn weakening its stability in the political sphere. The need of the hour was thus for a strategy that helped to balance the party’s traditionalist stance with the accommodation of caste issues. Whether the BJP was able to do so, and overcome the challenge or not, forms the central query of this thesis. 12 Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 2 9 Literature review A thesis that places Hindu nationalism as its central focus might seem redundant given the glut of literature available on the subject. With some exceptions,13 Hindu nationalism took the academic spotlight from the mid to late 1980s, when the Sangh Parivar began to emerge as a prominent force in Indian society and politics. With the rise of the Ramjanambhoomi movement as a pan-north Indian concern, it was evident that the surge in support for religious nationalism was the result of deep-rooted developments that had altered the political landscape of the Hindi belt significantly. It might be argued at this point that such a development was imminent given the strong presence of traditional Hindu elements in the social psyche of this region, even as part of the Congress’s functional agenda, since the pre-independence period. However, until the late 1980s, there was little by way of formal support for religious majoritarianism as a political ideology – as was seen from the failure of the BJS, and even the BJP in its early stages, to attain a reasonable level of popular acceptance and success. The change was thus one that spanned many dimensions and hence, created a need to interpret the nature of Hindutva as a socio-political ideology, and gain a better understanding of its influence in contemporary Indian society and politics. Studies on Hindu nationalism have been so numerous and comprehensive that it is near impossible to account for all of them. Hence, this brief review takes up some of the broad strands of study that encompass much of the relevant literature on this subject. The first 13 Curran, Jean Alonzo. 1951. Militant Hinduism in Indian politics: A study of the R.S.S. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1975. Strategy, risk, and personality in coalition politics: the case of India. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 10 amongst these is the focus on the ideological and socio-political origins of Hindu nationalism. Most studies place the genesis of Hindu nationalism at the late 19th century, wherein the conjunction of two strands of nationalist thought – Indian nationalism and Hindu revivalism – produced a synthesized ideology that was secular as well as religious. The unique, or ironic, blend of elements was derived to a large extent from the influence of European scholarship on the Indian elite, as a result of which the Indian elite attempted to emulate the West subconsciously,14 yet outwardly sought to reinstate a national identity that was shaped by elements of Indian tradition and culture. Significantly, Hinduism was seen as the only religion capable of engendering and sustaining such a transformation. The centrality of Hinduism to the nationalist movement was further strengthened by the formation of religious and socio-political organizations (Arya Samaj, Hindu Mahasabha) and mass-based movements (the Cow Protection movement), which helped to disseminate and strengthen a growing sense of religious consciousness.15 It is noteworthy that the influence was not limited to Hindu revivalists alone – the Congress’s ‘secular’ framework was itself constituted of traditionalist Hindu elements, especially at the state level.16 There is common consensus that Hindu nationalist ideology was ‘formalized’ in the early 1920s when V.D. Savarkar sought to provide a comprehensive definition of the ‘Hindu’ 14 Chatterjee, Partha. Bengal politics and the Muslim masses, 1920-47 in Hasan, Mushirul, ed. 1993. India's partition : process, strategy, and mobilization. Delhi: Oxford University Press; Prakash, Gyan. Body politic in colonial India in Mitchell, Timothy. 2000. Questions of modernity. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. 15 Pandey, Gyanendra. 1990. The construction of communalism in colonial north India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Zavos, John. 2000. The emergence of Hindu nationalism in India. New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 16 Gould, William. 2004. Hindu nationalism and the language of politics in late colonial India. New York: Cambridge University Press. 11 based on multiple markers of geography, race, religion and ethnicity in his thesis Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (First published in 1923).17 Savarkar’s work was instrumental to the development of Hindu nationalism for two important reasons: firstly, the centrality of religion to the definition of the nation and its citizenry marked the point of divergence between Hindu and Indian nationalism; and secondly, it provided a basis for the creation of an inclusive socio-political identity that could effectively override the presence of sectarian divisions within Hindu society. Despite his not being a member of the RSS, Savarkar’s work was to prove a central reference point for Hindu nationalists, especially the RSS. The borrowing of ideological precepts can be seen from RSS ideologue Golwalkar’s work, We or our nationhood defined (first published in 1939), which provides a similar set of defining features for the Hindu, albeit in an extreme, fascist framework.18 The importance of Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s works to contemporary Hindu nationalist ideology derives from their ability to provide a firm theoretical basis that legitimizes the exclusion of followers of other religions, especially Muslims, from the right to ‘belong’ in the country of their birth.19 Studies of the Ramjanambhoomi movement20 point to the centrality of this element to the campaign, especially with regard to the stress on the 17 Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. 1989. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? 6th ed. Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan. 18 The extremist nature of Golwalkar’s work needs to be seen in light of the prevalence of strong fascist ideologies during the IInd World War. It is important to take note that Golwalkar presented a highly moderated version of his ideological percepts in his next work, Bunch of thoughts. Details: Golwalkar, M.S. 1966. Bunch of Thoughts. Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan. 19 Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi; New York: Viking. 20 Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi; New York: Viking; Nandy, Ashis et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the self. Delhi: Oxford University Press; Ludden, David, ed. 1996. Contesting the nation: Religion, community, and the politics of democracy in India. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 12 ‘Muslim’ origins of the mosque and the call for the demonstration of ‘Hindu’ pride through participation in the effort to replace it with a temple. Apart from this central focus, the literature on the Ramjanambhoomi movement has dealt with several aspects that relate to the larger socio-economic forces shaping the country’s psyche such as the importance of media in shaping the public imagination, with particular reference to the televised series, Ramayana;21 the means by which socio-economic grievances had been contextualized within religion;22 and the contributory factors to, and impact of, communal rioting and its impact on political and social structures.23 Another dimension of the study of Hindu nationalism concentrates on the core organizations that constitute the Sangh Parivar. Of these, the RSS has received considerable attention, given its primacy as the foundation upon which the Sangh Parivar was built. On a general note, the RSS is often perceived as the progenitor and inheritor of the fascist tradition of Hindu nationalism, largely because of the extremist leanings of the organization in the 1930s and 40s. Although the RSS moderated much of its rhetoric and maintained its distance from politics in the post-independence period, certain elements that continued to be retained, such as the para-military style of its training and organization in the shakas24, sustained the stereotype of the organization. This perception 21 Rajagopal, Arvind. 2001. Politics after television: Religious nationalism and the reshaping of the Indian public. New York: Cambridge University Press. 22 Nandy, Ashis et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the self. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 23 McGuire, John, Peter Reeves and Howard Brasted, eds. 1996. Politics of violence: From Ayodhya to Behrampada. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 24 Shakas is the term used to refer to local branches or centers of the RSS. 13 has been tempered to some extent by studies in recent times,25 which have highlighted the different aspects of the ideology, structure and functioning of the RSS. In particular, these studies have dealt with important issues including the spread and development of Hindu nationalism in the post-independence period, the manner in which Hindu nationalism has come to be ingrained within the social and political culture of north India, and the limits to the RSS’s ‘non-involvement’ with politics. The steady growth in membership over the years from mere hundreds to over a million in recent times is a result of the RSS’s modus operandi that institutes cadre based networks throughout the country, which in turn implant memberships at the local level. Underlying this strategy is the RSS’s disregard for short-term social or numerical gain, with the sole aim of transforming society over time from the grassroots. The RSS’s strategy is complemented by its social welfare wings such as the ‘Sewa Bharti’ and schools like ‘Sanskrit Kendra’ and ‘Saraswathi Shishu Mandir’, which work with lower-caste or tribal groups. In recent times, these initiatives have come under criticism on account of the 25 Andersen, Walter K. and Shridhar D. Damle. 1987. The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications; Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman Viking. 25 Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari. 2003. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics. Hyderabad: Orient Longman; McKean, Lise. 1996. Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 25 Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Graham, Bruce Desmond. 1990. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 25 Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman; Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. 1994. Hindu nationalists in India: The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder: Westview Press; Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli, eds. 1998. Community conflicts and the state in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.; Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company; Kanungo, Pralay. 2003. RSS’s tryst with politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan. Delhi: Manohar Publisher and Distributors. 14 organizations’ efforts to propagate a synthesized set of Hindu practices that could promulgate attachment to the religion and the society simultaneously – a practice that is seen as representative of the RSS’s underlying pro-Brahminical ethos, and contradictory to its claims of a casteless agenda.26 Nevertheless, despite the questions raised over the nature of its ideological commitment, there is common consensus that the RSS is the primary representative of Hindutva in Indian society over the years. Whilst other organizations within the Sangh Parivar such as the VHP27 have also received considerable attention, the BJP commands a special place in academic discourse on account of its role as the sole envoy of the Sangh Parivar’s interests in the political forte. Although focus on the BJP intensified only in the late 1980s, the studies that have emerged since have been extensive and numerous, especially when compared to the works on the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS).28 The general themes of analysis include the BJP’s ideology, strategy and functioning.29 Amongst these, an oft-examined topic of analysis centers on the timing of the rise of the BJP in Indian politics. Given the close26 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company; Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and others: The question of identity in India today. New Delhi; New York: Viking; Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman. 27 Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman; Katju, Manjari. 2003. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics. Hyderabad: Orient Longman; McKean, Lise. 1996. Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 28 Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: A biography of an Indian political party. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Graham, Bruce Desmond. 1990. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 29 Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman; Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. 1994. Hindu nationalists in India: The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder: Westview Press; Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli, eds. 1998. Community conflicts and the state in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 15 knit framework of the Sangh Parivar, the BJP had a strong member network built up by the RSS since the 1920s to tap into for support. However, the BJP failed to make its mark as a prominent political force until the late 1980s. The reason for this delay lay in the lack of an opportune political moment, which was created by the convergence of specific socio-political conditions that provided the Sangh Parivar with an opportunity to implement its strategy of ethno-religious mobilization and validate the notion of the threatening ‘Other’.30 In particular, the ineptitude of the Congress in the 1970s and 80s31 and the inability of the state to adapt its secular ideology to suit a changing social polity32 resulted in the weakening of the secular principle and ‘legitimized’ the growth in support for religious nationalism in the early 1990s. Much has been said on the BJP’s ability to capitalize on the shifting trends through the Ramjanambhoomi movement. It is important to note that apart from its larger implications for Indian society and politics as a whole, the significance of the movement lay in its ability to provide the BJP with an opportunity to reconcile its roles as both a movement and a political party.33 However, the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period brought to fore challenges that restricted the BJP’s rise and expansion, and more importantly, put to test the resilience of the BJP’s commitment to the social agenda of the Sangh Parivar. As a result, the academic spotlight moved away from the dominant discourse on the communal leanings of the party to an assessment of the manner in which 30 Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 31 Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 32 Nandy, Ashis. 2002. Time warps: Silent and evasive pasts in Indian politics and religion. London: Hurst & Company. 33 Basu, Amrita. The dialectics of Hindu nationalism in Atul Kohli, ed. 2001. The success of India’s democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 16 the BJP had accommodated itself within Indian politics and the factors that tested its expansion. Given the instability of governance in the 1990s, reflected in the holding of four general elections in quick succession in 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999, much of the work on the BJP from the mid 1990s onwards centered on a comparative analysis of the party’s strategies and performance in the different sectors and states.34 When the BJP-led coalition emerged as the ruling alliance at the center in 1999, after a shaky term in power for one year, the party seemed to have finally found its footing in the political scene. However, the unexpected defeat of the BJP-led NDA coalition in the 2004 general elections and the re-emergence of the Congress gave rise to a new set of questions that aimed to better understand whether the BJP’s failure was more the verdict of an electorate afflicted by an anti-incumbency mood, or the end result of party’s inability to adapt to challenges and changes at the national and regional levels.35 In the discussion above, a commonly referred to but relatively unexplored factor has been the impact of the rise of caste politics and caste-based parties on the BJP’s strategy and functioning. Needless to say, extensive ground has been covered on the social and 34 Gould, Harold and Sumit Ganguly, eds. 1993. India votes: Alliance politics and minority governments in the ninth and tenth general elections. Boulder: Westview Press; Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Varshney, Ashutosh. 1998. India’s 12th national elections. New York: Asia Society; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: Regionalism, Hindutva and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 2003. India’s 1999 elections and 20th century politics. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Jenkins, Rob, ed. 2004. Regional reflections: Comparing politics across India’s states. New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 35 Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez. eds. 2005. Coalition politics and Hindu nationalism. New York: Routledge. 17 political significance of caste,36 the rise of caste-based parties, and their role in contemporary Indian politics.37 Furthermore, Froystad’s38 account of the shifts in the relationships between the different families in her study town of Kanpur in the state of Uttar Pradesh provides an excellent account of the manner in which this change manifested itself at the ground level. However, these studies have focused largely on the social and political processes that led to the rise of caste-based parties as a significant force in the 1980s and the manner in which they have transformed contemporary Indian politics. They point to the fact that the significance of the rise of caste-based parties lay in their ability to rephrase the demand for equality of opportunity and outcomes as one that called for the redistribution of power and resources to the underprivileged sections of society. Needles to say, the change was a relatively subtle one, and the extent to which caste had become ingrained in the socio-political psyche of the population became more evident in the fallout over the implementations of the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. As mentioned earlier, the BJP’s challenges came to fore only in the post-Mandal period. The Babri Masjid issue had lost its significance by the mid-1990s; the Hindutva bandwagon could no longer rely on religion as the sole basis of its propaganda, and the 36 Rudolph, Lloyd I and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 1967. The modernity of tradition: Political development in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Bayly, Susan. 1999. Caste, society and politics in India from the eighteenth century to the modern age. New York: Cambridge University Press; Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. Interrogating caste: Understanding hierarchy and difference in Indian society. New Delhi; New York: Penguin Books; Shah, Ghanshyam. ed. 2004. Caste and Democratic Politics in India. London: Anthem. 37 Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press; Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit assertion and the unfinished democratic revolution: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 38 Froystad, Kathinka. 2005. Blended boundaries: caste, class, and shifting faces of 'Hinduness' in a north Indian city. Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 18 party leadership was faced with the need to find new means of integrating their ideology within the larger political discourse. Given the BJP’s lack of support in terms of alliance partners at the centre and the restricted appeal of its ideology at the ground level, the choice of maintaining its ideological stringency and rejecting co-option with caste-based parties was a difficult choice to make. The need to form alliances with caste-based parties was further pressed by the fact that caste-based parties had been aided by the growing regionalization of politics and the resultant decentralization of power, and emerged as the power brokers at the state level. However, the process of forming and maintaining such alliances, and the larger challenge of integrating the issue of caste within the Hindu nationalist framework proved to be a far bigger challenge for the BJP than expected. Despite the vast literature on Hindu nationalism and caste, there is a lacuna in the analysis on the manner in which the trajectories of caste and Hindu nationalism have interacted, and the extent to which caste has come to affect the progress of the BJP, and the character of Hindu nationalism. Primarily, the discourse has centered on the discrepancy between the upper-caste nature of the BJP’s character and composition, and the leadership’s efforts to present it as a ‘catch-all’ party, in much the same mould as the Congress, to gain popular acceptance. Nevertheless, much of the discussion has been situated within the larger discourse of the Sangh Parivar’s efforts to ‘integrate’ the lower castes within the Hindu fold, and hence, place greater emphasis on the ideological and social initiatives of the Sangh Parivar as a whole. In other words, there is relatively little detail on the effects of the intricacies of political negotiation on the BJP’s rank and file on the one hand, and the manner in which its character and functioning have been affected 19 these changes. Focus on these issues is crucial to understanding the ideological and identity-based challenges faced by the party, which in turn point to the larger question of whether or not Hindutva has indeed managed to gain acceptance as an ideology of panIndian significance. Yet, given the concentration of RSS members and alumni within the BJP’s hierarchy and the strong ties between the two organizations, the challenges and issues specific to the BJP as a political party are oftentimes underplayed in light of the larger social and ideological perspectives. Chapter descriptions This thesis aims to address this concern by taking up the relationship between the BJP and caste-based parties, with emphasis on three specific dimensions of analysis: firstly, the manner in which relations with caste-based parties affected the party’s functioning at the state level; secondly, the effects of caste politics on the internal ranks of the BJP; and finally, the impact of these factors on the resilience of Hindutva and the extent to which the party has been effective in handling this challenge. Hence, the analysis is centered on key issues that affected the party’s functioning and the leadership’s response to these developments, with the discussion based on a chronological order of events from the party’s inception in 1980 to the latest general elections in 2004. Whilst it is very difficult to view the BJP in isolation from the workings of the RSS and other components of the Sangh Parivar, effort has been made to shed light on the ‘political’ pressures and issues that affect the party’s structure and functioning. 20 Chapter 2 takes up the progress of the BJP through the 1980s up to the early 1990s when the BJP could finally lay claim to the political spotlight. A closer look at some of the developments through the passage of the 1980s helps to highlight key socio-political vulnerabilities that resulted from the decline of the Congress, which were instrumental to the resurgence of Hindu nationalism; selfsame processes that also functioned as a catalyst for the deepening of caste boundaries and the rise of caste-based parties. It also examines the inherent tensions between caste and Hindu nationalism that came to light with the fallout over the Mandal issues, but were undermined by the progress of the Ramjanambhoomi movement. Chapter 3 picks up the thread of the discourse at the point immediately preceding the 1991 elections and traces the development of the BJP through the 1990s, with the impetus resting on an analysis of the main challenges faced by the BJP in its attempt to adapt to the constraints of caste and coalition politics. Consciousness of caste coupled with the limitations imposed by the RSS’s organicist philosophy was instrumental in reshaping the character of the BJP. The impact of these factors on the party’s strategy and functioning, and the depth of these changes helps to better understand the multi-faceted nature of the caste challenge, and the BJP’s calibre in handling it. To better illustrate the nature of these challenges, chapter 4 takes up a case study of the BJP’s career in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). Regarded as the barometer of politics in the Hindi belt, UP was central to the Ramjanambhoomi movement and the rise of castebased parties. The case study helps to elaborate the difficulties faced by the BJP in its 21 attempt to formulae a coherent strategy to suit the demands of multiple caste bases, and the difficulty in internalising caste divisions completely within a party structure traditionally indoctrinated with the organicist philosophy of the RSS. The concluding chapter traces the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance’s dismal performance in the 2004 elections and its implications for the BJP’s progress in the coming years. In particular, it takes up the retrospective view and highlights the BJP’s struggle with the need to maintain a balance of support bases whilst retaining its distinctiveness – a tough challenge that was accentuated by the constant need to sustain a harmony of interests with the RSS. This chapter thus provides a brief account of the key facets of the party’s strategy through the 1990s, the manner in which the BJP has ‘matured’ over the years and the extent to which it has managed to ascertain its identity in the political sphere, ending with a comment on its future prospects. 22 Chapter 2: The Sangh Parivar and the Revival of Hindu Nationalism The Bharatiya Janata Party and the ‘new’ face of Hindutva The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), formed in 1951, was the first step of Hindu nationalists’ involvement in post-independence Indian politics. The BJS was formed primarily as an anti-Congress alternative that sought to reinforce a pro-Hindu, pro-Hindi perspective on Indian politics. Throughout its career, the party remained a largely marginal player, despite its one shot at power with the Janata coalition after the 1977 elections. However, the inability to balance the different voices within the coalition led to the collapse of the Janata experiment within 30 months, following which the BJS was disbanded, and reorganised as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980. The BJP’s entry into the political foray was marked by two significant factors. Firstly, its predecessor had left behind little by way of a coherent political legacy for the party to follow. To a great extent, the BJS had oscillated between a strident Hindu nationalist stance, and a moderate position that was geared towards socio-economic issues. Over time, the party’s reliance on the RSS for physical and moral support made the choice of adopting a liberal tone a difficult one, and the leadership started “showing an increasing tendency to choose isolation and doctrinal purity”39 typified by the combination of puritan leanings with a call to Hindu unity, as was made explicit in the BJS’s manifesto: 39 Graham, Bruce Desmond. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: The origins and development of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990. p. 42 23 Unity in diversity has been the characteristic feature of Bharatiya culture which is a synthesis of different regional, local and tribal growths, natural in such a country. It has never been tied to the strings of any particular dogma or creed. All the creeds that form the commonwealth of the Bharatiya Rashtra have their share in the stream of Bharatiya culture which has flown down from the Vedas in an unbroken continuity absorbing and assimilating contributions made by different peoples, creeds and cultures that came in touch with it in the course of history, in such a way as to make them an indistinguishable part and parcel of the main current.40 It must be noted though that the BJS consistently refrained from alluding to a particular sect, caste or even book, in line with its aim to “offer a notion of Hinduism as a means of transcending the limitations of sect and of achieving the ultimate ideal of Hindu Sangathan”.41 However, adherence to the organicist nature of the Hindu community coloured the party’s ideology with a ‘Brahminical’ hue that implicitly seemed to encourage the acceptance of the traditional social hierarchy. As a result, the BJS’s support base was restricted to the upper caste and urban middle class sections, making it difficult for the party to stretch its political appeal to encompass a wider spectrum of population even within the Hindi belt. This limitation was to prove the dead albatross 40 Manifesto of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh. New Delhi. 1951. p. 2. Quoted in Graham. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics. p. 50 41 Graham. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics. p. 95 24 around the BJP’s neck in later years, especially in lieu of the compulsions of caste politics, when the party finally found its momentum in Indian politics. Yet, the BJS’s failure to emerge as a viable competitor was not a result of the party’s structural or ideological shortcomings alone. Rather, it was compounded by the Congress’s status as the political guardian for the umbrella amalgam of upper castes, lower castes and Muslims in the post-independence period. The Congress’s ability to forge the loyalties of the disparate groups derived largely from the party’s ability to position itself within the electorate such that it maintained a balance between elite representation and popular appeal. The classical Congress structure of the Nehruvian period was an intricate institutional mechanism negotiating power, resources, and mandates among districts and between the states and the center, distributing fiscal resources and arbiting social and political conflicts. Its resilience was premised on the inclusion of most important elite groups within a structure of negotiation, bargaining, and aggregation of the discrete powers and constituencies of local elites upward to the center.42 It is important to note that the Congress’s maintenance of a rainbow coalition of castes and communities did not translate to equal political representation for the different groups within the party structure or government. The party’s higher ranks were dominated by 42 Hansen, Thomas Blom. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1999. p. 135 (Emphasis added) 25 members of the upper castes with little opportunity provided to members of the lower castes, in tandem with the Congress’s reliance on a network of upper-caste notables and landlords for electoral support. The Congress’s ability to maintain a monopoly over much of the electorate, despite the lack of a corresponding programme that benefited all sections equally led to the establishment of a system that relied on the support of loosely demarcated socio-political segments, all of which relied on a single political party as their representative. As Graham has noted, “The central paradox of Indian politics in the 1950s and 1960s [was] that the party system, although highly differentiated in terms of programmes and doctrines, was unable to organize the mass electorate into clearly defined and separated sectors of social and regional support”.43 The deficiency of opposing forces that could capitalise on the disparity between rhetoric and reality in the Congress’s policies was a central reason behind the ability of the latter to maintain electoral harmony between the different social segments in popular politics in the 1950s and 60s. The breakdown of this idyllic balance was the second important factor that was to affect the BJP’s rise and growth in the 1980s and 90s. Revival of religion and nationalism in the 1980s The early years of the BJP’s career, from the early to mid-1980s, were influenced by different undercurrents of change, the conjunction of which created a volatile 43 Graham. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics. p. 53 26 atmosphere. At the national level, the proliferation of communal sentiments by ethnic factions in Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Punjab raised doubts over the legitimacy of secularism as the governing policy, and led to the re-emergence of communal politics in the Indian nation state. The growing presence of conditions conducive to the propagation of religious majoritarianism apart, the Congress’s conscious departure from its commitment to Nehruvian secularism to regain its waning popularity was a key factor in instigating a turnaround in the priorities of political competition and governance. The Congress essentially relied on a “…combination of contradictory elements for it appealed alternatively to Hindu, Muslim or anti-Sikh feelings. However its general effect was the establishment of communal idioms in political discourse at the expense of secular themes”.44 After decades of being confined to the margins of the Indian polity, Hindu nationalists found that the stage was set for them to legitimately embark on their longstanding ethno-religious program of creating a Hindu rashtra (Hindu nation). The Sangh Parivar was quick to take advantage of the Congress’s inability to uphold its secular agenda to set in place a concerted strategy, at the heart of which was the attempt to posit the genesis of the Hindus’ real and perceived insecurities vis-à-vis the Muslim community. This was to act as a corollary to the primary aim of disseminating the message of Hindu sangathan, or organised Hindu unity, as embodied in the Ekmata Yatra campaigns organised by the VHP in 1982-83.45 The Ekmata Yatra campaigns incorporated the image of the Bharat Mata (Mother India) as their main icon alongside 44 Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 1996. p. 332 45 Hansen. The saffron wave. p. 154 27 other Hindu deities, and were organised to run from north to south and east to west to symbolically depict the internal harmony within the territorial boundaries of India. Essentially, the VHP and RSS were making a strong “bid to dominate the public space with symbolic manifestations of religious community in order to give material body, concrete crystallisation, and emotional affiliation to the imaginary national space”,46 and in doing so, attempted to present Hindu nationalism “as a spontaneous surge of Hindus irrespective of caste, class, gender and sect”.47 The Sangh Parivar’s campaign was well timed as the 1980s had witnessed a growing sense of vulnerability amongst the Hindu community on account of events such as the Meenakshipuram conversions in south India in 1981, and the Shah Bano case in 1985. The Meenakshipuram conversions were a case in point wherein analogous socio-political grievances were situated within the dominant communal discourse to bolster its popular appeal. On 19 February 1981, about 1,000 members of Scheduled Castes converted to Islam in the village of Meenakshipuram, in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu.48 Interestingly, the conversions were timed to precede the laying of the foundation stone for a mosque in the village in early March. The Meenakshipuram incident acted as a catalyst for further such conversions in the following months, thus sparking off widespread debate over the issues of caste and proselytisation. It is noteworthy that the main justification given for the conversion by those who had embraced Islam was the social stigma of being born into a lower caste. Amongst those who had converted, some 46 Hansen. The saffron wave. p. 154 Ibid. 48 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 340-342. 47 28 were educated and economically mobile, but chose to convert to another religion to escape the brunt of caste discrimination. The Meenakshipuram conversions became notoriously popular because they were reinterpreted by sections of the media as part of an “International Islamic conspiracy”49 to increase the demographic presence of Muslims in India through proselytisation.50 This gave rise to a host of doubts including the nature and extent of involvement of organisations like the Jamaat-i-Islami and Arab countries in this ‘plan’, and the resultant possibility of the Hindu community diminishing over time – all of which contributed to a heightened sense of susceptibility on the part of the Hindu community to external ‘threats’. In an attempt to reinforce the message, an article in the Indian Express published statistics that predicted the decline of the Hindu population to a minority position in India by the year 2281 or 2231 if the conversions were allowed to continue.51 The anxiety over religious encroachment provided an ideal context for the Sangh Parivar to resound its call for a united Hindu society. By making it apparent that lower castes were most susceptible to proselytisation, the Meenakshipuram incident had brought up the need to address the issue of caste discrimination as well. As Mahant Avaidyanath, a prominent BJP candidate from eastern U.P. pointed out, there had been an underlying 49 ‘International Islamic Conspiracy’, Times of India. 12 March 1981. Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 341 50 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 340-342 51 Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 342 29 concern that the trend of lower caste conversion might mushroom in north India as well.52 In response, the executive wing of the RSS called for a meeting on 12 July 1981 to vote for a law against involuntary conversions. In the course of the meeting, the RSS pressed the need for internal transformation by asking “…the entire Hindu society to bury deep the internal caste dissensions and the pernicious practice of untouchability and stand up as one single homogenous family, so that the neglected and down-trodden sections will be assured of a place of equality, security and honour in the Hindu fold”.53 Two days later, a Hindu Solidarity Conference was organised by the VHP at Meenakshipuram. A proclamation, similar to that of the RSS, but grounded in strong theological terms, was made: We, the religious heads assembled today at Meenakshipuram solemnly declare that our Vedas and Shastras have not mentioned untouchability in any form, anywhere but have propounded only complete brotherhood. […] We therefore ardently appeal to all our Hindu brethren to individually and collectively throw out these evils lock, stock and barrel and strive to ensure equality and fraternity among all sections of our Hindu people.54 A series of such Solidarity conferences were organised in the south, and then later in other parts of India, in order to increase awareness of the dangers of proselytisation and 52 Avaidyanath’s comments on the Meenakshipuram incident were recorded in an interview regarding the hardline Hindu stance at a later date. See Joshi, Ishan. “Beating Vajpayee to pulp”. Outlook. Feb 18 1998. 53 Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 349 54 Seshadri, H.V. Warning of Meenakshipuram. Bangalore: Jagarana Prakashan. 1981. pp. 27-28. Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 349 30 the need for Hindu cohesion to guard against the same.55 Symbolic socio-religious practices were integrated within the conferences to reinforce the message of inter-caste solidarity. For example, in one of the conferences, religious leaders organised a sacrifice ceremony and held a banquet after, during which they shared a meal with 2,000 people from the Scheduled Castes.56 The aim was to present a complete socio-political ‘package’, which illustrated the socio-theological basis of a traditionalist Hindu society that could overcome the presence of internal differences for the greater goal of defending against ‘external’ elements. The Sangh Parivar’s attempt to encourage an inclusive Hindu brotherhood also received a strong boost from the perceived unanimity of Muslim conservatism over the Shah Bano case. Shah Bano was a Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband in 1978 after 46 years of marriage. Following her divorce, she sued her husband and established her right to alimony. In 1980, she demanded a review of her allowance, which was contested by her former husband on grounds that he was not obliged to continue payment after 3 months following divorce according to the Shariat law. The Supreme Court dismissed his claim and established Shah Bano’s right to alimony. The Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss the claim based on Shariat and the judges’ regret over the lack of a common civil code was regarded by Muslim organisations and leaders as interference with religious edicts, leading to widespread rallies and protests across India. 55 56 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 349-350 Indian express. 16 July 1981. Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 358-359 31 Public remonstrations over the Shah Bano affair were viewed by the Hindus as an unfair assertion of minority rights – a sentiment further stoked by Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to override the Supreme Court’s verdict to appease the Muslim population. Popular resentment against the Congress’s ineffective handling of the case, coupled with mounting apprehension over the ‘unity’ of the Muslim community, deepened social cleavages and made the Hindu populace more receptive to the communal undertone of Hindutva. The Shah Bano case had exposed a key deficiency of the ‘secular’ Indian constitution, a side effect of which was the raking up of dormant fears generated by the Meenakshipuram conversions. In brief, “Muslim mobilisation over the ‘Shah Bano’ affair was seen…as part of the same pattern as an earlier renewal of Islamic militancy”.57 The early to mid-1980s were thus marked by a growing tendency towards communal mobilisation – an important factor that enabled the Sangh Parivar to garner support for its majoritarian Hindu agenda. In contrast to its surrogate organisations’ active efforts, however, the BJP chose to maintain a low profile in the early 1980s and voted to continue with the moderate policy of the Jan Sangh, based on Integral Humanism and peppered with socio-economic concerns. The BJP’s decision to tone down its majoritarian rhetoric was probably based on the experience of the 1977 elections, when the BJS had managed to accumulate 92 seats by pedalling a ‘soft’ form of Hindutva. Nevertheless, the decision proved costly for the BJP, especially in lieu of the growing communal sensitivity, and the party suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1984 general elections when it scraped a tally of 57 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 338-339 32 just 2 seats. Following the 1984 elections, the BJP bowed to pressure from the RSS and steered its agenda towards an aggressive Hindu nationalist stand. Despite the lack of electoral returns, the Sangh Parivar’s efforts were instrumental in effecting a perceptible shift towards religious majoritarianism, especially in the Hindi belt. However, although the Hindu nationalists were able to propagate their political ideology in the public arena, they failed to foster a mutual identity that could bond the disparate Hindu sections under the umbrella of religious solidarity. This was on account of the continued dependence on the rhetoric of the “Other” and Hindu-Muslim antagonism, the constricted focus of which was challenged by the rise of an alternative form of representative politics based on caste in the mid to late 1980s. Caste – The regional barometer of north India Caste politics in the north experienced a delayed thrust when compared to the south, which had seen the entry of the lower castes in the state power structure as early as the 1950s. The increased demographic presence of upper castes and the Zamindari system of land ownership in north India were some of the main reasons behind the political suppression of lower castes. Furthermore, the ‘clientelistic’ policies of the Congress resulted in an overrepresentation of upper-caste members in the parliament till the early 1970s, thereby prolonging the political suppression of the lower castes.58 The roots of lower-caste empowerment in the north lay in two broad movements. In the 1960s, Ram 58 Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The rise of the Other Backward Classes in the Hindi belt” in The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 86 33 Manohar Lohia’s socialist principles, housed in an anti-Congress manifesto began to gain importance in the Hindi belt, especially amongst the backward sections of the population. The socialist principles were reinforced by capitalist developments in this region in the 1970s, following the advent of the Green Revolution, which led to the strengthening of the farmers’ lobby in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The beneficiaries of the Green Revolution were constituted mainly of members of middle and backward castes, who increasingly began to press for greater political participation alongside their newfound economic mobility. The need to fulfil the void created by a lack of access to power and party positions formed the central premise of Charan Singh’s demand for greater benefits and power to be channelled to the farmers.59 Whilst both Lohia and Singh represented different strands of anti-Congress politics, it was evident that regional politics was witnessing a deeper change. In effect, Social change arising from the breakdown of traditional pre-capitalist relation exerted a major influence on political development. The expansion of democracy and electoral politics attracted non-elite sections who desired greater participation…Both processes played a key role in political transformation. The pattern of vertical relationships and political aggregation gave way to more horizontal relationships and conflicts…”60 59 Hasan, Zoya. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. See also, Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: Yhe rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. 60 Hasan. Quest for power. p. 70 34 The growing political relevance of caste in the politics of the Hindi belt was manifest in the rise of political parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and later, the Samajwadi party (SP), as important regional players. By premising their political agenda and appeal on lower-caste empowerment, these political parties represented caste identity as not just an attribute, but also a means of ethno-political representation. In other words, lower-caste politicians did not reject affirmative action, but expanded their agenda to “…acquire power as a means of changing state outcomes, than to change the structures that produce them”.61 The repositioning of priorities in favour of political empowerment was the result of significant transformations in the psyche of regional grassroots politics. The Congress’s reliance on its extensive patronage networks in the post-independence period had resulted in a sense of ‘moral’ dissatisfaction amongst their support bases, who were no longer satisfied with their status as passive recipients of material benefits deriving from a vertical patron-client relationship with the upper castes. A case-study analysis by Kanchan Chandra of the BSP in Hoshiarpur district in Punjab provides an excellent example of the core issues that underline the dynamics of caste politics in the recent decades. Chandra points out that it was the “…emergence of an educated generation of Scheduled Castes as a consequence of the government’s affirmative action policies in education and employment”62 that provided the main base of support for the growth of caste-based parties. Their reason for supporting the BSP 61 Hasan, Zoya. “Representation and redistribution: The new lower caste politics of north India” in Francine, Frankel R. et al., eds. 2000. Transforming India: Social and political dynamics of democracy. New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 154 62 Chandra, Kanchan. “The transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 28 35 derived from the party’s ability to exploit the lack of representation for lower-caste members in the Congress party by premising this “…within a larger narrative of humiliation by upper-caste Hindus”.63 In her interviews with BSP workers, she found that “…[a]lthough the BSP workers acknowledged the need for the redress of material grievances such as the lack of education, employment, land, and poor living conditions, they argued that material deprivation derived from what they described as psychological oppression”.64 This change in political attitude was reflected in Kanshi Ram’s (founderleader of BSP) remark that the priority is to win power through elections, for “the capture of political power will automatically transform the composition of the bureaucratic elite”.65 By invoking the traditional Varna system to create a sense of solidarity vis-à-vis the upper castes in terms of humiliation, not deprivation, caste-based parties provided the basis for the creation of a distinct, overarching ideology for the lower castes, as well as shifted the impetus of representative politics in their favour. As caste politics became firmly entrenched in the Hindi turf, it created a distinct, exclusive identity that ran counter to the pan-Hindu grouping sought by the Sangh. The effect of the larger sociopolitical changes on the BJP was, however, seen most clearly not in the rise and development of caste-based parties, but in the fallout from the Mandal Commission issue. 63 Chandra, Kanchan. “The transformation of Ethnic Politics in India…” p. 39 Ibid. p. 37 65 Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?” in The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 19 64 36 The BJP’s advance to power As mentioned earlier, the BJP initially chose to maintain a moderate stand and pressed for socio-economic reforms whilst maintaining a studied distance from the communal agenda of the Sangh Parivar. Following the 1984 elections, the party leadership decided to abdicate the moderate stand and follow the RSS’s stead. The party’s decision to adopt a pro-active approach to Hindutva was influenced by two important factors. Firstly, the period leading to the 1984 elections had seen considerable distance between the RSS and the BJP, with the former understandably disappointed over the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the political wing for their central cause, with the rift heightened by the Congress’s adoption of a communal posture. Secondly, the BJP’s deviation from the Hindutva path had cost it the support of the upper castes, who had traditionally supported the Sangh Parivar for its propagation of and commitment to Hindu nationalist ethics. As a result, a considerable section of the BJP’s upper-caste vote began to shift towards the Congress, which was regarded as a capable ally instead. Thus, the party leadership’s anxieties were further deepened by …the Congress party’s success in winning over the BJP’s mainly uppercaste, urban vote bank as a compensation for the perceived loss of scheduled caste and minority – especially Muslim and Sikh – votes since the Emergency years. This, Rajiv Gandhi’s landslide victory in the 1984 parliamentary elections was attributed partly to his ability to win over most of the upper-caste support that previously went to the BJP.66 66 Nandy, Ashis, et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the self. Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 72 37 Prior to the 1989 general elections, the BJP formed a seat-sharing alliance with the Janata party led National Front Coalition government, a move that brought together different parties on a common anti-Congress manifesto. The BJP, having learnt its lesson from the Jan Sangh’s experience with the Janata Party in 1977, chose to form a loose spatial relationship that supported the coalition as an external member. Given that no individual party had obtained an absolute majority in the 1989 elections, all major parties focussed on expanding their support bases in time for the anticipated mid-term poll. As a result, the BJP’s primary agenda during this period was to regain its diminished upper-caste support whilst subsequently attempting to extend its political appeal to the more populous lower-caste support bases. Soon after the elections, the incumbent Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced the implementation of the Mandal Commission reforms, which would ensure a reservation of 27 per cent of the seats in education and public service appointments for the Other Backward Castes (OBC), in addition to the existing 22.5 per cent reservations for the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes. The Mandal Commission report had been submitted earlier to the Congress led government in 1980, but its implementation had been shelved by then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on account of the volatile nature of the recommendations.67 Singh’s decision to implement the Mandal Commission reforms was motivated by the Janata Party’s attempt to consolidate its diminishing support by appealing to the collective interests of the Other Backward Classes. In doing so, however, 67 Sridharan E. “Coalitions and party strategies in India’s Parliamentary federation” in Publius, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fall 2003). p. 139 38 Singh set in motion the process that acted as a catalyst to the crystallisation of OBC identity on one hand, and the deepening of social cleavages on the other. Mandal and Mandir The Mandal Commission’s report was distinct from prior efforts made for caste equality on account of the one unique feature. Primarily, “[t]he central premise of the Mandal Commission was that India should proceed from an ideology that rested on hereditary hierarchy to an ideology that emphasized equality of outcomes – not equality of opportunity”.68 As the report expounded on its guiding principles, By increasing the representation of OBCs in Government service, we give them an immediate feeling of participation in the governance of the country. When a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, the material benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated. Even when no tangible benefits flow to this community at large, the feeling that now it has its “own man” in the “corridors of Power” acts as a moral booster.69 The Mandal Commission’s recommendations were thus premised on principles similar to those of the caste-based parties. However, by setting caste as the determinant of 68 Weiner, Myron “The struggle for equality: Caste in Indian politics” in Kohli, Atul, ed. 2001. The success of India’s democracy. New Delhi: Foundation Books. p. 203. (Emphasis added) 69 Government of India. 1980 Report of the Backward Classes Commission. New Delhi: Government of India. Quoted in Weiner, “The struggle for equality”. p. 222 39 empowerment, the report’s recommendations awakened a strong sense of insecurity amongst the upper castes vis-à-vis the Other Backward Classes, who would be the primary recipients of the proposed schema of reservations. It has been pointed out that a central reason behind the upper-castes’ apprehension towards implementation of the reforms stemmed from the fact that they had enjoyed long-standing dominance in employment to government positions and feared that this advantage would soon be lost. However, the upper castes’ resistance to the Mandal Commission reforms needs to be viewed not only in lieu of their insecurity over the probable diminished presence of the members in the bureaucracy, but also in light of the conflict it represented between social norms and political empowerment. Although they traditionally occupied the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy, the Other Backward Classes had experienced relatively less social discrimination when compared to the Scheduled Castes, and hence, were seen as unfair beneficiaries of the intended socio-political benefits. As mentioned earlier, many OBC groups had experienced considerable upward economic mobility in the post-independence period, especially during the period of the Green Revolution in the 1970s. Although the sections that benefited formed a relatively small percentage of the total OBC population, it further compounded the upper-caste opposition to the reforms. The contentious nature of the socio-political discrepancies was further driven home by the fact that “[t]hese groups [OBCs] asserted their superior social status vis-à-vis Dalits and, at the same time, used their backwardness in relations to the upper castes in order to demand the benefits of 40 reservation”.70 Caste violence intensified following the V.P. Singh government’s decision to implement the reforms and many upper-caste youth publicly immolated themselves as a sign of protest against the implementation of the reforms, thus etching the divides even more strongly. Politically, the fallout from the Mandal Commission reforms proved damaging to the BJP for two important reasons. Firstly, by stressing caste rather than economic status as the main determinant, the Mandal Commission created a heightened sense of community consciousness that ran counter to Sangh Parivar’s ideal of unity amongst Hindus with disregard for caste divisions. To confirm its commitment to the pan-Hindu overtone of the Hindutva ideology, the BJP had little choice but to oppose the National Front’s decision – a position reinforced by the RSS’s condemnation of the Mandal reforms. The RSS’s position was clearly articulated in an article in its publication, the Organiser, called the ‘Raja’s Caste War’. V.P. Singh threatens to achieve in one year what the British could not do in their 150 year long alien rule…He wants to undo the great task of uniting Hindu society from the days of Vivekananda, Dayanand Saraswathi, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Hedgewar…What V.P. Singh through Mandalisation of the society intends to achieve is a division of Hindus on forward, backward and Harijan lines.71 70 71 Hasan. Quest for power. p. 131 Organiser, 26 Aug. 1990. p. 1. Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 415 41 Secondly, the BJP’s opposition to the reforms was regarded by the upper castes as being in line with their own interests, thereby strengthening the upper-caste support base of the party. Significantly, despite the fact that the BJS and BJP derived much of their backing from amongst the upper castes, they had not maintained a monopolistic hold over them. Rather, the support was derived from the upper castes who, prior to the Mandal issue, had been unstable and vacillated between the Congress and the BJP. On a parallel note, the shift also alienated the OBC votership who interpreted the move as one tailored to suit elite interests. Thus, “…the BJP was placed in a quandary, torn between its traditional support among upper castes who would be badly affected by the new policy, and the numbers of the OBCs in the electorate”.72 Ideological constraints, reinforced by increasing pressure from the RSS, led the BJP to adopt a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, it withdrew its support to the National Front on account of its opposition to Singh’s decision to implement the Mandal Commission’s reforms. Although the BJP continued to toe the RSS’s line on the caste question, the party reiterated a moderate stand on the issue and called for a reservation structure that was based on economic status. As was detailed in the BJP’s manifesto before the 1991 elections, Reservations should […] be made for other backward classes broadly on the basis of the Mandal Commission Report, with preference to be given to the poor amongst these very classes and […] [a]s poverty is an important contributory factor for backwardness, reservation should also be 72 Corbridge, Stuart and John Harriss. 2000. Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden: Blackwell. p. 127 42 provided for members of the other castes on the basis of their economic condition.73 Secondly, to diffuse caste tensions and reinforce the message of ‘Hindu Sangathan’ assiduously propagated through the 1980s, the BJP tried to bond the disparate sections “through a religious appeal to all Hindus to demolish the Babri Masjid and replace it with a Ram mandir”74 in Ayodhya in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Although the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) had been one of the primary agents in agitating for a Ram temple in place of the Babri Masjid since the 1980s, the BJP’s move in launching its Rath Yatra from Somnath in Gujarat to Ayodhya was significant for it shifted the impetus of political conflict away from caste for the time being, whilst providing a chance for the party to attempt a consolidation of Hindu amity in the light of the dominant communal discourse. In line with this aim, religious symbolism was employed on a massive scale during the Ramjanambhoomi movement, during the course of which the BJP drew heavily on the imagery of the televised version of the Ramayana, which had been broadcast as weekly serials from 1988-90. Given the increased reach of television in the late 1980s and the immense popularity of the Ramayana, the BJP was able to tap into the common public imagination effectively. The move was instrumental in disseminating the message to the grassroots and thereby shaping the character of the movement as a mass-based one. In 73 Bharatiya Janata Party. 1991. Towards Ram Rajya – Mid-Term poll to Lok Sabha, May 1991. New Delhi. pg. 27. Quoted in Jaffrelot, Christophe. “BJP and the Caste Barrier: Beyond the ‘Twice-Born’?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 32 74 Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. p. 32 43 doing so, “Hindu nationalist leaders and organs (such as the Organiser) presented the Ayodhya movement as the means of uniting all Hindus in such a way as to defuse the OBCs’ demands. By trying to make the OBCs regard themselves as Hindus first and foremost the RSS combine could preserve the social status quo”.75 Keeping in mind the need to reiterate the BJP’s commitment to lower caste upliftment, a Dalit by the name of Kameshwar Chaupal76 was asked to lay the first stone during the foundation ceremony for the proposed temple. Furthermore, during the campaign for the 1991 elections, the BJP took care to emphasize the central theme of the Ramjanambhoomi campaign – religion as the key to internal solidarity – in its own right, and as well in the context of deficiencies of other political parties. As one of its campaign advertisements read, “If Congress used minorityism to divide us, their worthy successors chose casteism to tear us apart. Turning Indians against Indians. Brothers against brothers.”77 The BJP’s strategy was successful in that the party was able to sieve out the upper-caste vote, which increased its vote share in the 1991 elections to 20 per cent and helped it to emerge as the second largest party in the Lok Sabha with 120 of the 468 seats it contested and increased its vote-share to 20.08 per cent.78 In addition, the party was also able to strengthen its position in its traditional strongholds such as Madhya Pradesh and made significant advances in its electoral standing in previously less responsive states like Uttar Pradesh. Although the BJP failed to translate the gains into a direct victory, given the Congress’s ability to capitalise on the 75 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 431 Kanungo, Pralay. 2002. RSS’s tryst with politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan. Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors. p. 148 77 National Mail. 6 May 1991. Quoted in Jaffrelot. Hindu nationalist movement. p. 438 78 Sridharan. “Coalitions and party strategies…” pp. 139-140 76 44 sympathy wave following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the party emerged as the second largest in the parliament – a development that marked a huge leap in its electoral standing. Parallel to the BJP’s attempts to foster an inclusive Hindu community, the political scene in the Hindi belt had begun to shift towards a polity that was polarized between caste groups. As a result, although the Ramjanambhoomi movement had been instrumental in bringing the party from the margins to the center, it failed to hold ground beyond the early 1990s. Notably, upper-caste opposition to the reforms had “…stressed the need to shift from the earlier strategy of reconstructing pride in the Yadav or Kurmi identity to a more inclusive or collective group identity based on a sharper assessment of their goals which traded social reform for political power”.79 The polarization of caste identity was carried forth by caste-based parties, which chose to capitalise on their importance as regional allies to further the lower-caste cause through political negotiation. Ideology and politics at the regional level thus came to be defined in ‘caste’ terms in the 1990s. The progress of the decade brought home the point much closer when the BJP had to deal with the compulsions of caste-based politics, which raised the need for compromises on part of the BJP on the ideological and political elements of its Hindutva agenda. Whilst Mandal and Mandir had formed the cornerstones of the 1991 elections, the impetus shifted to that of coalition politics in the later part of the 1990s. In other words, as the BJP attempted to carve for itself a niche in national and regional politics, the party was 79 Hasan. Quest for power. pp. 148-149 45 faced with the need to juggle coalition politics and internal restructuring – policies that involved distancing from the RSS’s ‘organicist’80 philosophy, which in turn translated into tensions between the RSS and the BJP on one hand, and between members within the party on the other. The manner in which the BJP handled these changes and the implications of its tightrope walk of politics and policies for the party’s character will form the focus of the next chapter. 80 Jaffrelot, Christophe “BJP and the caste barrier: Beyond the ‘twice-born’?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 46 Chapter 3: The BJP and Caste-based Parties: Compulsions of Coalition Politics (1) Politics of the ‘post-Ramjanambhoomi’ phase As detailed in the previous chapter, the Ramjanambhoomi movement had provided the RSS-BJP-VHP combine with an ideal context to reinstate an overarching, pan-Hindu cause that could successfully deflect attention away from the Mandal issue. Furthermore, the movement had “…brought support from Brahmins, forsaking the Congress for the BJP, while recruitment of OBCs excluded from the benefits of Mandal or in conflict with the numerous and powerful Yadav caste, also played an important part in bringing the BJP to power as well as broadening its social base”.81 Keeping in mind the central aim of the movement to build a Ram temple at the spot, the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 by Sangh Parivar activists seemed to mark the progression of the movement towards the fulfilment of its goal. Despite the lag of a year between the two events, the demolition of the Babri mosque led to a re-emergence of popular support for the Sangh Parivar in the Hindi belt, and the BJP seemed poised to emerge as the dominant party in the parliament after the party’s narrow miss at becoming the largest party in the 1991 elections. The opinion was reaffirmed by the results of a nationwide opinion poll conducted by MARG and published in the India Today magazine, wherein 52.6 per cent of the people interviewed in north India approved 81 Zernini-Brotel, Jasmine. “The BJP in Uttar Pradesh: From Hindutva to consensual politics?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1998. p. 79 47 of the demolition. Furthermore, a survey of voting intentions indicated that the BJP would have increased its seat share in the parliament from 120 to 170 seats, had an election been held immediately.82 The upsurge in popular support was, however, short lived. The demolition of the mosque acted as a catharsis to the intense communal tensions precipitated by the Ramjanambhoomi movement and deprived the movement of its central icon, thereby marking the “logical conclusion of the Ramjanambhoomi movement”.83 The appeal of the proposed Ram temple was not strong enough to sustain the movement as envisaged by the Hindu nationalists. Moreover, popular support and enthusiasm for the cause was mitigated by the violent backlash that followed in several parts of north India, the most significant of which was the simultaneous explosion of thirteen bombs in the city of Bombay.84 In other words, the violence and rivalry triggered by the subsequent communal riots led to insecurity over the viability of a religious-majoritarian agenda as the guiding principle of a democracy, thus making it difficult for the BJP to play the communal card with the same vigour as in 1991. Thus, the start of the 1990s marked a watershed in the BJP’s career, wherein the party had to adapt its Hindutva agenda to suit a tenuous political atmosphere, the vagaries of which were exacerbated by the fragmentation of the polity on caste lines. In the postAyodhya movement phase, the BJP was hard pressed to maintain its support base 82 Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 1996. p. 473 83 Ibid. p. 480 84 Ibid. p. 476 48 amongst the upper castes, who had vacillated in the past between the Congress and the BJP, whilst simultaneously making inroads into the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) voter bases. To do so, the party began to tap into the spill-over effects of Mandal – the vulnerability of the upper castes, and the political ambitions of the lower castes who hoped to capitalise on the Mandal agitation – by broadening its ideological agenda and expanding the party’s appeal to suit the demands of caste politics. The decision to move away from a staunchly ethno-religious agenda was also influenced by the fact that the BJP had come to be strongly identified with the fundamentalist face associated with the VHP, and the upper-caste persona of the RSS – a reputation that undermined the nationalist underpinnings of Hindutva as well as its ‘pan-Hindu’ nature. As a result, In 1991, after the BJP had become the second largest party in the Lok Sabha and formed the government in Uttar Pradesh, it seemed anxious not to be perceived as a ‘single-issue party’ and to fulfill its commitment to discipline by avoiding large-scale riots in the states where it held office. Most of the BJP leaders did not want to be identified with the Ayodhya issue because it was important for the party – as well as for the RSS and its affiliates – to present a Hindu nationalist image and not to become involved in an essentially religious controversy. Soon after his Rath Yatra Advani had insisted that he was a political, not a religious leader and that the same distinction applied to the BJP…85 85 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 449. (Emphasis present in original) 49 Moving Towards moderation In line with its priorities, the BJP reverted to a moderate agenda and took care to emphasise on socio-political issues of popular relevance. Ayodhya was not forgotten, but it was referred to as only one of several other issues affecting the hinterland, including Kashmiri separatism and Bangladeshi infiltration86 – a marked change from the context of the 1991 elections, during which the Ramjanambhoomi movement had dominated the party’s election propaganda. The shift in the BJP’s policy was seen clearly at the party’s National Council session at Bangalore in June 1993, wherein L.K. Advani’s statement on the Ram temple reflected the party leadership’s attempt to subtly diffuse the BJP’s responsibility towards the temple’s construction by placing the impetus on the movement’s mass support as the key motivation. The temple construction cannot be thwarted. Let our opponents realise one thing about Ayodhya. The campaign to construct Ram temple at the birthplace of Rama in Ayodhya may have been initiated by the sadhus, the VHP and the RSS. The BJP extended to it its full support. The campaign became a mass movement. Now it is not just the aspiration of any organisation or party, it is the resolve of the entire nation. Any attempt to thwart the people’s determination is doomed to fail.87 As Jaffrelot has pointed out in his analysis of the Hindu nationalist movement, the tendency to oscillate between an extremist and a moderate form of Hindutva in response to changes in the political scene was a characteristic feature of the BJS, now replicated by 86 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. p. 486 Puri, Geeta. 2005. Hindutva politics in India: Genesis, political strategies and growth of Bharatiya Janata Party. New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors Pvt. Ltd. p. 181 87 50 the BJP.88 However, the BJP’s moderation of rhetoric in the post-Ramjanambhoomi movement period was not only in communal terms, but one that was matched by an increased effort by the party to magnify its socio-political appeal to the lower castes – a development that was linked to the reinforcement of the ‘upper caste’ character of the BJP in the voters’ mindsets in the post-Mandal period. Despite the party’s attempts to present the Ayodhya issue as one that encompassed pan-Hindu interests, many sections of the lower castes remained unconvinced of the egalitarian and inclusive nature of the Hindu nationalist agenda. As Kancha Ilaiah commented, “At the time of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the Sangh Parivar mobilised youth from among the Sudra/OBCs and the Dalits for muscle power…Most of those who participated in the demolition came from a non-Brahminical background as they were, and still are, seen as being most useful for physical energy-related activities”.89 To contest the negative connotations of its ideology and to reiterate the centrality of caste egalitarianism to the creation of the ‘Bharatiya’ nation, the BJP adopted a ‘Social Justice and Social Harmony’ resolution during the Bangalore session of the National Council in June 1993. It stated, “All the socially and economically weak and backward constituents of the society will be helped along, through special welfare and other schemes, to reach their potential for contribution to the society and accord them an honoured place in the Great Society that is Bharat”.90 More importantly, the BJP made it a point to emphasize its ‘support’ for the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. 88 Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. Kancha Ilaiah, ‘Hindutva and caste’, The Hindu, Aug 20, 2002. 90 Puri. Hindutva politics in India. p. 186 89 51 The BJP advocates, as recommended by Mandal Commission, reservation of 27 per cent for other backward classes. Among the backward classes the benefit of reservation must in ascending order from the bottom so that the most backward of the backwards should get the benefit first. As poverty is one of the main causes of the backwardness in any section of society, the BJP pleads ten per cent reservation on the basis of economic criteria to all economically weaker sections, other than the SC/ST and the OBCs.91 Constraints of caste politics Yet, despite attempts to placate lower caste interests, the shifts in the BJP’s rhetoric did not indicate a radical change of priorities in the party’s agenda. On the contrary, the BJP’s continued dependence on the economic criterion to shield its support for the Mandal reforms seemed to indicate a defensiveness vis-à-vis the caste issue rather than a detachment from its ideological underpinnings. As Geetha Puri has noted, “…there was no agonising felt focus on social change, much less, social justice, in the BJP’s preoccupation with cultural nationalism. Its Bangalore ‘social charter’, though not insipid or toothless, did not really fit into its hallowed Hindutva”.92 91 Puri. Hindutva politics in India. p. 188. Following the Bangalore session, the decision was made that four party leaders would undertake Janadesh Yatras from 4 different points in the north, south, east and west, and attempt to cover 14 states and 2 union territories in one fortnight. The Janadesh Yatras were premised on the same principle as the Ekmata Yatras – an expression of communal and territorial unity – but its purpose was to prevent the dilution of Hindu support, rather than its expansion. This is itself was an indication of the changed circumstances of the 1990s. 92 Ibid. p. 194 52 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the acknowledgement of caste divisions and the attempt to address the importance of reservations was a major change for the BJP, in light of the dominant influence of the RSS’s doctrine over the party’s functioning. Unlike the Congress, which had maintained a broad ideological front that could be moderated to suit differentiated interests, the BJP’s structure and functioning was tied to the ‘organicist’ philosophy of the RSS, which viewed caste as a secondary form of sectarian affiliation that would, and should, be subsumed over time by the institutionalization of an overarching nationalist Hindu identity. As an RSS worker explained through an analogy, If you draw two lines on a piece of paper, one short, the other a little longer you have a difference in length. How can you diminish the difference between these two lines, without altering or interfering with any of them? The answer is: by drawing a much larger line above them. In comparison with the difference between the small lines and the big line, the internal difference between the small lines has been diminished. Thus, the small lines are castes and the big line is the Hindu nation. Instead of focussing on the small lines and their internal differences, one should look at the big line, the Nation, and forget about internal differences. This is how we in the Sangha look at caste in our society.93 The central principles highlighted in the analogy – voluntary membership and a willingness to shed individualist elements for the greater good of the nation – formed the 93 Hansen, Thomas Blom. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1999. p. 122 53 basis of the ‘Sanghatanist’94 nature of the RSS’s modus operandi, which involved the creation of a common brotherhood through the implantation of a homogenized set of cultural practices in its members. The willingness on the part of members to shed individualist elements for the greater good of the nation was a core component of this program, reinforced by the complete lack of reference to the members’ caste identities within the shakha. For a ‘social’ organization, such an exclusivist ideology was a strength in that it imparted a sense of impartiality and egalitarianism to its members – one of the key elements that helped popularize the RSS amongst the lower castes, despite its cultivation of a primarily Brahmanical culture. The BJP, on the contrary, faced a different set of circumstances, in the light of which it could not avail of the RSS’s sanghatanist strategy. One of the key issues that faced the party in this regard was the ‘ethnification’95 of regional politics on the basis of caste. Consequent to the growing importance of caste as a marker of political developments in the regional politics of the Hindi belt in the 1990s was the increased polarization of the electorate along the broad, inclusive categories of upper castes, SCs and OBCs, and the redefinition of political ideology and competition on caste lines. The most obvious indication of the voter’s increased association with caste identities was the growing strength of caste-based parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party 94 See Jaffrelot. The Hindu nationalist movement. pp. 64-72 The term ‘ethnification’ has been taken from Kanchan Chandra’s usage of the term in her study of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, whereby ethnic identities form the basis of selection of target voter bases, and the electoral appeal, of political parties. See Chandra, Kanchan. “Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: The Ethnification of the Party System and its Consequences” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: regionalism, Hindutva and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. pp. 58-59. See also Chandra, Kanchan. “The transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline of Congress and the Rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 59, No. 1. Feb 2000. p. 26 95 54 (SP). The growing popularity of these parties mirrored a deep-seated transformation within the region, namely the re-categorization of the population on caste lines, and the use of caste identity as the basis of selection of target voter bases, and the electoral appeal, of political parties in the 1990s.96 In other words, the upper Castes, SCs and OBCs were regarded as distinct voter blocs, and were therefore targeted by the different parties that claimed to represent their specific interests. The ability of political parties to create such differentiations between each other and amongst the populace arose from their ability to employ in political rhetoric the diacritical and syncretic values of caste, a concept referred to by Andre Beteille in his analysis of caste politics in Tamilnadu. Each segment – whether subcaste, caste or caste group – is characterised on the one hand by certain diacritical distinctions and on the other by a set of syncretic values. The diacritical distinctions ‘define the unity of the segment in terms of differentiations from other segments’, whereas syncretic values ‘define the unity of the segment in terms of internal solidarity’.97 Beteille’s framework was reflected in the categorizations employed by caste-based parties such as the BSP and SP to demarcate their electoral voter bases. The BSP differentiated between the minority alpjan or the three Hindu upper-castes, and the 96 See Chandra. “Post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh”. pp. 58-59. See also Chandra. “The transformation of Ethnic Politics…”. p. 26 97 Beteille, Andre. “Caste and political group formation in Tamilnad” in Kaviraj, Sudipta, ed. 1997. Politics in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 74 55 majority bahujan that constituted the rest of population, which were not represented amongst the upper castes. The party thus centred its focus on the bahujan as its target voter-base, with an emphasis on Dalits as its primary support base. The SP, on the other hand, divided the population into Hindu and Muslim segments, and then further subdivided each religious group into Forward Castes, Backward Castes and Scheduled Castes. The SP claimed to represent the Muslims, Backward and Scheduled Castes, but the impetus of its campaign was on the Other Backward Castes – a development that was in tandem with the fallout over the Mandal Commission issue. Within both these categorizations, the BSP and SP premised their electoral appeal on the diacritical differentiations from the upper castes in terms of the degradation of the lower castes by the former, whilst their syncretic value derived from their emphasis on the necessity for political empowerment of the lower castes. In short, the stress on the need for horizontal solidarities vis-à-vis the upper castes was further strengthened by the juxtaposition of traditional vertical differentiations of caste hierarchy onto the loyalty of the voter bases. The caste-based parties’ ability to create distinct demarcations between the upper and lower caste segments, coupled with the traditionalist profile of the Sangh Parivar, caused Hindutva to be reinterpreted at the regional level as a dogma with uppercaste leanings. Furthermore, the shift of upper caste support in the Sangh Parivar’s favour following the repercussions of the Mandal reinforced the character of the BJP as ‘uppercaste’ in the voters’ mindsets. In other words, the party was now posited on a caste spectrum as the representative of the upper castes as opposed to the lower caste parties – 56 a development that restricted severely its social appeal, as well as undermined its credibility to speak on behalf of the ‘Hindu’ community. Attempts at ideological reconciliation With the shift of the political balance in favour of the caste-based parties, the upper caste label of the Sangh Parivar proved to be a liability for the BJP, particularly in the mid- to late 1990s when the party was unable to consolidate its position in the parliament. Although the RSS and VHP attempted to incorporate the element of lower-caste empowerment within the overall agenda of Hindutva, the organizations’ primary references to caste within the context of proselytisation was indicative of their discomfort with the issue of inter-caste differences. For example, at the first anniversary celebration of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, a prominent display of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar alongside those of the deity Ram was arranged, and speeches were made condemning untouchability and extolling the virtues of Ambedkar as a national hero. However, the acceptance of Ambedkar within the Hindutva agenda was justified by interpreting his conversion to Buddhism as indicative of his anti-Muslim motives. According to the leaders of the VHP, Ambedkar had resisted the offer from Jinnah and the Nizam of Hyderabad and had instead “…converted to Buddhism – a religion grown in the soil of this country. That was the Hindu in him”.98 In the larger socio-political context, the RSS’s and VHP’s inability to address caste as a prerogative in its own right led to the perception of an upper-caste bias and further distanced the lower castes from the Sangh Parivar, and as a result, intensified the challenge of caste-based parties for the BJP. 98 Hansen. The saffron wave. p. 227 57 To combat the appeal of caste-based parties and limit the vagaries of its precarious position, the BJP began to move towards the adoption of a ‘catch-all’ character, similar to that of the Congress in the post-independence period, in the mid- to late 1990s. As before, the BJP’s strong ties to the Sangh Parivar made it difficult for the party to institute a complete change of policy with regard to lower-caste appeal. Rather, the BJP began to display an increased reluctance to defend the staunchly anti-caste stand of the RSS, matched by a greater level of acceptance of empowerment of lower castes. However, as was the case of the BJP National Council’s statements in 1993, the change was nebulous and the party’s stand on caste issues in the 1996 election manifesto remained ambiguous. Whilst the manifesto reflected greater willingness on part of the BJP to acknowledge the importance of reservation as a tool to help the uplift the lower castes, the party continued to evoke the economic criterion of judgment to justify its support for reservations. The BJP is committed to providing both social and economic justice to the socially and educationally backward classes (Other Backward Classes) through the instrument of reservations. At the same time, we hold that the path to progress of all sections of our people lies not through social divisions brought by casteist politics but through social harmony. The BJP advocates: 1. Continuation of reservations for the Other Backward Classes till they are socially and educational [sic] integrated with the rest of society; 2. A uniform criteria for demarcating the ‘creamy layer’; 3. Flow of reservation benefits in an ascending order to that the most backward sections of the OBCs get them first; 58 Ten per cent reservation on the basis of economic criteria to all economically weaker sections of society, apart from the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes.99 By the mid- to late 1990s, the subtle undercurrents that marked a shift in the BJP’s rhetoric were stronger. An example of the change could be seen from a speech by the party’s President, A.B. Vajpayee, at an election rally in 1998 in Uttar Pradesh. “We need to take care of everyone, take everyone along with us. When the Congress people come, they talk only of Gandhiji. When the BSP people come, they talk only of Ambedkar. We are the only ones who talk of both Gandhiji and Ambedkar, honor them both, think of both as important.”100 By placing Gandhi and Ambedkar as the key priorities of the campaign, the party was attempting to diffuse the Ram-centred propaganda that had dominated during the early 1990s, and instead reinstate the Congress’s tactics of broad, inclusive appeal. The BJP was now playing the political game in its full right, and hence, had delegated its part in the ethno-religious division of labour to its surrogate Hindu nationalist organizations. Sanghatan vs. Social Engineering In attempting to imitate the Congress’s ‘catch-all’ character, however, the BJP had to be wary of the fact that a multi-ethnic agenda that could accommodate a wide spectrum of interests was not sufficient to maintain voter loyalties – a lesson that was ironically 99 BJP, For A Strong and prosperous India – Election manifesto 1996. New Delhi. 1996. pg. 62. Quoted in Jaffrelot, Christophe “BJP and the caste barrier: Beyond the ‘twice-born’?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 33 (Emphasis added) 100 Chandra, Kanchan “Post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh…”. pp. 64-65 59 derived from the Congress experience as well. As discussed in the previous chapter, the caste-based parties’ call for political empowerment stemmed in large part from the lack of representational opportunities for lower castes within the Congress’s party structure in the post-independence period. The inability to satisfy the voters’ demands for representational opportunities was a key reason behind the decline in the Congress’s popularity in the 1980s and 90s. As caste-based parties emerged as regional gatekeepers to lower caste support in the 1990s, the question of representation became crucial for the BJP, in terms of the party’s viability on the one hand, and in the terms that governed its relationships with caste-based parties on the other. As discussed earlier, the polarization of the regional polity on caste lines in north India was a significant development that accentuated the importance of proportionate representation in the voters’ perception and evaluation of a party, oftentimes more so than ideology. As Kanchan Chandra has argued, the principal constituent of a political party’s success lies in its ability to convince its target voter-base of proportionately greater representation of the community’s elites than its competitors.101 In other words, a rational voter takes into count the number of, and extent to which, the elites from his/her ethnic category are represented in a particular party, and chooses to support the one which supports the most number of his co-ethnics as well as offers greater chances for intraparty advancement, if the party is seen as positioned in a strategically favourable position to come to power. The underlying logic behind ‘head counts’ as a viable means of party choice is that the voters are “…instrumental actors who invest in an identity because it 101 Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1. 60 offers them the best available means by which to obtain desired benefits”.102 These benefits may be “material or psychic or some combination of the two”.103 The reasoning behind the logic of headcounts is similar to the central arguments of the Mandal Commission’s recommendations,104 but it is important to note that Chandra’s argument assumes the unbending rationality of the party and voter – a prerequisite that may not be reflective of the actual situation. Furthermore, loyalties between voters and political parties are oftentimes determined by familial voting patterns and intra-societal allegiances, thus rendering the issue of ‘benefits’ itself a subjective one. Nevertheless, ‘head counting’ became a popular element of party and voter dynamics in the Hindi belt, especially since it seemed to provide an avenue to challenge a possible recurrence of the Congress’s clientelistic politics and the subversion of lower caste groups by means of a strong upper-caste network within and outside of the party. The growing tendency towards ‘head counting’, reinforced by the polarization of the electorate on caste lines, had serious implications for the BJP’s continued growth in the Hindi belt, given that the party’s ranks were dominated by upper castes. Even as late as 1991, at least 50 per cent of its MP’s in the Hindi belt were from the upper castes – a factor that made the BJP vulnerable to the alienation of the lower-caste vote, particularly since the proportion of upper castes within the party was comparatively much higher than that of the Congress and Janata Dal.105 The importance of caste calculations was 102 Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed. p. 11 Ibid. 104 Refer to chapter 2, pp. 39-42 for details on the Mandal Commission 105 Jaffrelot, “BJP and the caste barrier…”. p. 36. 103 61 highlighted by the party’s failure to capture key states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in the 1993 elections as a result of the loss of OBC vote. More importantly, the decline in the BJP’s vote-share amongst the lower castes was matched by the growing popularity of caste-based parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP), making it imperative for the party to shed its ‘Brahmin-Bania’ image if it intended to remain in the electoral fray. As Uma Bharti, a prominent OBC member of the Sangh Parivar, commented, “We have to go the grassroots, to the Dalits. The party has become complacent after the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. Kanshi Ram [founder-leader of BSP] has woken us up”.106 To better prove its commitment to the lower caste cause, the BJP’s leadership instituted a policy known as ‘Social Engineering’, which made way for the inclusion of greater numbers of lower caste members within the party hierarchy. By 1996 as compared to 1989, the composition of upper-caste Members of Parliament (MPs) from the BJP in the Hindi belt had declined to 43.8 per cent from 51.5 per cent, the percentage of intermediate castes had risen from 1.5 per cent to 5.8 per cent, OBC representation increased to 17.3 per cent from 15.6 per cent and the share of SC MPs rose to 22.3 per cent from 17.2 per cent.107 The increased presence of lower-caste members was supplemented by the appointment of prominent lower-caste members to important party posts. By doing so, the party was attempting to play the political game on the same principles that the caste-based derived their success from – the provision of increased 106 Cited in Times of India, 21 June 1997. Quoted in Jaffrelot, “The Sangh Parivar between Sanskritization and Social Engineering” in Hansen and Jaffrelot, The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1998. p. 31. 107 Jaffrelot, “BJP and the caste barrier…”. p. 36. 62 chances for representation for the respective caste populations within the bureaucracy, which in turn might translate into gains for the subject population. The institutionalization of Social Engineering marked a important transition in the BJP’s character – the party had now moved away from its earlier strategy of viewing the entire Hindu population in its singular right, and instead adopted a policy that that could appeal to multiple castes by addressing the collective needs of their subject population. The adoption of Social Engineering was, however, strongly opposed by the RSS leaders “…who objected in principle to any artificial transformation of the so-called equilibrium and who did not want to give new importance to castes as a result of pressures from the ‘Mandal affair’”.108 The RSS’s unwillingness to countenance the change was derived from its staunch disregard for cooptation and discouragement of any form of caste assertion, higher or lower, as a means to political gain. Dissent over the new policy also derived from the fact that prior to the late 1980s, the BJS and BJP had never restricted the entry of lower caste members within the party, but the induction of such members within the party was often a result of their prior close association with the RSS or its affiliate organisations. Furthermore, the caste identity of the members was rarely mentioned, especially in lieu of political gains by the BJS or BJP. Hence, an increased induction of lower-caste members with the aim of seducing the caste vote was denounced by the RSS as a dilution of Hindutva and a politically opportunistic move by the BJP. It is important to note, however, that despite attempts to modify the disposition of the party, the fundamental character of the BJP was not radically altered. High ranking or 108 Jaffrelot, “BJP and the caste barrier…”. p. 36. 63 prominent lower-caste representatives were largely drawn from the coterie of members who were imbued with the RSS culture from young, and who continued to maintain longstanding connections with the organisation.109 The internal ranks of the party were so strongly dominated by the culture of the Sangh Parivar that it was difficult for members with little or no affiliation to gain admittance easily, even if it meant a gain in vote share. Thus, Social Engineering marked at best a compromise between the compulsions of Hindutva and caste – a factor that made it seem a superficial proclamation than a serious policy change. However, like the moderation of the BJP’s manifesto and rhetoric, it was definitely a marker of the internalization of caste, and the party’s admission to the supersedence of caste in politics – both of which marked a break from the long term, puritan nature of the RSS’s inference of Hindutva. The Eleventh General Elections in 1996 brought the BJP to the position of the largest political party in India, but the party was unable to hold power beyond thirteen days owing to the lack of a majority in the Lok Sabha. Despite the popularity of A. B. Vajpayee as the ‘moderate’ face of the party, “…the party’s systematic use of communal rhetoric had antagonized other political parties to the extent that no coalition partners were forthcoming to form an alliance. The BJP had won the elections but not power, and was soon returned to a position of ‘mighty marginality’.”110 It was evident that the presence of popular support for the party’s ideology was not sufficient to help tide over coalition calculations at the center. 109 Prominent examples include members such as Bangaru Laxman (President of state unit of BJP in Andhra Pradesh in 1986) and Kalyan Singh (Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh for multiple terms since 199192). 110 Hansen. The saffron wave. p. 218 64 Despite the BJP’s inability to capture and retain power, the 1996 elections had brought to fore an important development. “So far, the Hindu nationalist parties could make progress only on the basis of a militant strategy or of a nation-wide seat adjustments. For the first time in 1996, the BJP increased its share of representatives in the Lok Sabha through a rather moderate campaign and limited alliances with regional parties.”111 The decision to expand through a network of regional parties rather than as a ‘national’ party was also an effective means for the BJP to liaise with the lower caste voters with castebased parties acting as its interpreter. The BJP once again returned to power in 1998 with a thirteen-party coalition in tow. Following its re-election, the party faced several problems in terms of adjustments to power as well as with its new partners. In the Assembly elections following its reelection, the BJP suffered a heavy defeat in Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Rajasthan on account of the government’s inability to control inflation. The real test, however, came in 1999 when differences over governance issues led to the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazahagam’s (a political party based in the southern state of Tamil Nadu) withdrawal of its support to the coalition, which led to the toppling of the coalition and the holding of fresh elections in September-October 1999. Nevertheless, the BJP returned to power in 1999 with Vajpayee at its head, with the credit of two consecutive electoral victories and an increase in proportion of candidates who won, up from 46.8 per cent in 1998 to 53.9 per cent in 1999.112 111 Hansen and Jaffrelot, The BJP and compulsions of politics. p. 1 Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. The Sangh Parivar: A reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2005. p. 270 112 65 The BJP’s return to power was, however, marked by concerns regarding the stability of its support bases. Although the NDA had attracted 52 per cent of the upper-caste vote, the BJP in particular had received only 30 per cent. Furthermore, according to a CSDS poll, the BJP managed to attract only 16 per cent of the SC votes, 21 per cent of higherranking OBCs and 19 per cent of the lower end of the OBC voters. The upper-caste or elitist slant of the party’s vote distribution was indicative of continuing inability on the BJP’s part to expand its social base beyond the select circle that had always supported it, despite the leadership’s open display of solidarity with OBC interests. An example of this attempt was seen in the 1999 election manifesto of the NDA, wherein it was stated that, “If required, the Constitution will be amended to maintain the system of reservation…We are committed to extending the SC/ST reservation for another 10 years. Reservation percentages, above 50 per cent, as followed by certain states, shall be sanctified through necessary legislation measures.”113 Although this provision was a result of the BJP’s negotiations with its allies, it marked a shift away from the vague, theoretical proclamations of the past to grounded promises and compromises. Whether or not the BJP was able to maintain these promises and the effect of the new challenges and constraints facing the party on its structure and policies form an important element of this thesis. To some extent, although the BJP had broken away from the unyielding stance of the RSS, it is still indeterminate whether it had transformed into a ‘Congress clone’. Furthermore, it must be noted that the effects of the politicization of caste differ from the effects of caste-based parties. In other words, whilst caste as a sociopolitical factor has indeed resulted in a noticeable shift of perception on the part of Hindu 113 Quoted in Jaffrelot. The Sangh Parivar. p. 286 66 nationalists’ with regard to the presence of socio-political differences, one also has to take into account the question of whether the legitimate basis of Hindutva as a pan-Hindu ideology has indeed been challenged by the assertions of caste-based parties that sectarian affiliation was the primary basis of socio-political identity. To address the issues raised, the next chapter will take up a case study of the BJP’s tenure in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). UP has been a popular choice for case studies, given its importance as the barometer of Indian politics, national and regional. In the context of this thesis, UP is of particular relevance, for although the principle of Hindu nationalism received a decent level of support from the upper caste population, the Congress’s ability to subsume Hindu nationalist demands within its secular agenda resulted in the delineation of the BJS and later BJP to a minimal role on the political stage. It was only with the Ramjanambhoomi movement that the Hindu nationalists ascended to prominence in their own right within UP. Furthermore, UP was the center stage for the socialist movement by Ram Manohar Lohia and the peasant mobilization led by Charan Singh – developments which led to the development of a strong lower caste lobby within the state. In brief, it played host to the different movements that affected the subject of this study, thereby making it an ‘ideal’ scenario to examine. Through the case study, the following chapter will attempt to better illustrate the effects of the vagaries of the state level politics on the functioning of the BJP, and the manner in which the BJP has succumbed to or countered the influence of caste and caste-based 67 parties to gain a better understanding of the party’s interpretation of and engagement with Hindutva at the ‘local’ level. 68 Chapter 4: The BJP and Caste-based Parties (II) Case Study of Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh – The political stage “In the autumn of 1991, thousands of supporters of political Hinduism arrived in Ayodhya to demolish the Babri Masjid. They were prevented from doing so by the Janata Dal chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mulayam Singh Yadav, who mobilized a social coalition of backward classes and Muslims to frustrate the designs of the Hindutva combine. The ‘unity’ forged by Hindu nationalism was for the moment effectively challenged by an alternative politics that foregrounded another set of differences. Two years later, in the winter of 1992, the Babri Masjid was demolished by karsevaks loyal to political Hinduism. In retrospect, the two confrontations at Ayodhya, and the distinct trajectories represented by them, throw into sharp relief the twin dialectics of caste and community politics in modern India.”114 Zoya Hasan’s comment on the conjecture of the conflicting mobilisations by the Sangh Parivar and the caste-based parties points to a key development in the politics of Hindutva in the 1990s – the interlude of caste as a competing priority alongside religion in the Sangh Parivar’s definition of Hindu nationalist identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, the attempt to address and accommodate the growing importance of caste was a central characteristic of the BJP’s strategy of adjustment in the 1990s. In 114 Hasan, Zoya, 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 1 69 brief, the discussion focussed on the BJP’s attempt to moderate its ideology and restructure the composition of the party ranks to reflect the effect of caste on the party’s functioning and its ideological underpinnings. However, such an analysis falls short of providing a greater understanding of the BJP’s response to, and interaction with, castebased parties at the state level. In order to better understand this aspect, this chapter will take up a case study of the impact of the politics of caste and caste-based parties on the BJP in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The choice of UP was based on two primary factors: firstly, it was the main state in which caste politics took root in the 1960s and 70s, and the centre of the Ramjanambhoomi movement in the 1990s, thus making it a regional prism that reflected the different political currents at the ground level; secondly, UP witnessed a fourcornered contest between the Congress, BJP, BSP and SP through the 1990s – a development that brought together all the major agents of change in the Hindi belt. Hence, it provides an ideal background for a study of the politics of caste and caste-based parties. Whilst the conclusions from the case study on UP cannot be extended to other states in entirety, it is worth remembering that as the biggest and most politically active state in India, the developments in UP provide a relatively stable guide to the political trends at least in the Hindi speaking region, if not beyond. The early 1990s – Expansion and consolidation of the BJP in UP Parallel to its performance at the Center, the BJP was a marginal party in UP politics until the early 1990s. The Congress’s ability to form and maintain a ‘coalition of extremes’ 70 between the upper castes, Muslims and Scheduled Castes blocked off major venues for creation of niche support bases by other political parties, thereby curtailing their rise and expansion in the state. The 1970s and 80s witnessed a decline in the Congress’s standing in the state, matched by the rise of differentiated movements and parties. In particular, the 1970s were marked by the growth of caste movements of which Ram Manohar Lohia’s socialist movement and Charan Singh’s peasant-based movement were the most prominent; whilst by the late 1980s, Hindu nationalism emerged as a prominent ideological and political force in the state. The two movements worked on parallel bases, primarily as anti-Congress forces until 1989 when V.P. Singh’s decision to execute the Mandal Commission’s recommendations brought about their convergence on the grounds of mutual concern, thereby causing a decisive shift in the politics of the state. Essentially, the implementation of the Mandal reforms acted as a catalyst to the breakdown of the Congress’s patronage network, and led to the creation of opportunities for hitherto marginal players to emerge as agents of political representation and participation for the different sub-groups within the state. The Sangh Parivar’s opposition to the Mandal reforms and the consecutive launch of the Ramjanambhoomi movement helped the BJP to consolidate a niche support base amongst the upper-caste, urban population by tapping into their disgruntlement with the Congress on the one hand and their insecurity over the growing socio-political assertion of the lower castes. In addition to the Ramjanambhoomi movement’s potency as a means to mitigate the BJP’s opposition to the Mandal reforms, the appointment of Kalyan Singh, an OBC member, as the President of the state unit was instrumental in helping to qualify the inclusive nature 71 of Hindutva and alleviate the perceived anti lower-caste character of the party. Furthermore, Mulayam Singh Yadav’s attempt to halt the progress of the Ayodhya campaign through the use of strict measures including the deployment of security forces, curfews and the banning of newspapers weakened the Janata Dal’s (JD) hold on the state and instead strengthened the BJP’s status as a credible, all-encompassing alternative in U.P. The success of the BJP’s efforts was reflected in its increased vote share in the 1991 Parliamentary elections. The party emerged as the strongest party in UP with a tally of 51 seats and nearly 33 per cent of the total vote, whilst the Congress was ousted from the political stage with only 5 seats and less than 20 per cent of the total vote. Furthermore, the BJP chalked up an impressive 221 seats in the 1991 Assembly elections as compared to its prior holding of 8 seats in the 1989 elections. It is important to note that the results of the Assembly elections marked not only popular acceptance of the BJP’s ideology, but as well “…another trend expressing rejection at the Congress’s and the Janata Dal’s record in ruling the state”.115 Thus, alongside the growing acceptance of Hindu nationalism in the political sphere, the ability of the electorate to reject two parties from power due to dissatisfaction over governance pointed to a prevalent anti-incumbency mentality that the BJP had to be wary of. 115 Brotel-Zernini, Jasmine “The BJP in Uttar Pradesh: From Hindutva to consensual politics?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1998. pp. 77-78 72 Mid to late 1990s: Impact of post-Mandal developments The period following the 1991 elections was thus one in which the BJP was faced, for the first time as the party in power, with the multiple forces that had attributed to the volatility of UP politics in the 1980s and 90s. Whilst Mandal had helped to break down existent power structures within the state, it had concurrently led to the hardening of caste lines and the characterization of political parties on caste lines. In other words, despite its attempts to propagate Hindutva as an ideology that overrode sectarian divisions, the BJP was still perceived by many as an upper-caste party – a development that helped to stabilize the party’s support base amongst the upper castes who had vacillated in the past between the Congress and the BJP, but simultaneously alienated the SC and OBC votes from the party. The dismissal of the BJP government following the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 and the consequent imposition of President’s rule deprived the party of a chance to prove its mettle in government, and made it vulnerable to the shifts and swings of caste and party politics. In addition, although popular resentment against the demolition of the mosque was directed primarily at the Congress for failing to anticipate or prevent the demolition, the extremist religious element represented by the act deterred popular support and diluted the support the Sangh Parivar had received in the post-Ayodhya phase – a sentiment that was reflected in the decline of the BJP’s seat share in the 1993 Assembly elections to 177 from 221 seats in 1991.116 The BJP’s decline in the 1993 elections was paralleled by the rise of the SP-BSP combine to power. Apart from being 116 V. K. Rai, “A profile of Uttar Pradesh: Stability in instability” in Wallace, Paul and Ramashray Roy, eds. 2003. India’s 1999 elections and 20th century politics. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. p. 294 73 touted as the ideal combine that represented the combined might of the lower castes, the SP and BSP leaders, …portrayed their joint effort as part of a wider struggle to turn the tide of Hindu nationalism at the national level. As early as July 1993, Kanshi Ram had taken up the slogan that “the road to Delhi passes through UP” and had thus represented the state-level struggle as the vanguard of the fight against the BJP in the entire country. By September…the main theme had become the importance of stopping the BJP in Lucknow as a prelude to frustrating the party’s national ambitions.117 The efforts of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Kanshi Ram paid off and the SP-BSP alliance emerged as the closest competitor to the BJP in the 1993 elections with 176 seats, as compared to the Congress and JD, which secured 28 and 27 seats respectively. Nevertheless, “[a]lthough the SP/BSP alliance had fallen short of an absolute majority in the assembly, it could count on the reluctance of both Congress and the JD to see the BJP resuming office to ensure that it would have support to form a government”.118 To many, the assumption of power by the SP-BSP alliance represented a model solution to the political emancipation of the lower castes. Of the 27 members in the ministry, there were only two Thakurs and one Brahmin. “Never before had a UP government contained so many representatives of the backward classes and Dalits and so few from the upper castes”.119 However, the euphoria of victory was short lived. Disagreements over the 117 Duncan, Ian. “New political equations in north India: Mayawati, Mulayam, and government instability in Uttar Pradesh” in Asian Survey. Vol. 37, No. 10. Oct 1997. p. 988 118 Ibid. p. 982 119 Ibid. pp. 989-990 74 apportionment of power and control within the government, and the BSP’s insecurity over the dominance of the backward caste lobby within the government soon cropped up and the ‘ideal’ lower caste alliance was broken in 1995 amidst “serious acrimony and distrust”120, following which the BSP forged a power sharing alliance with the BJP in 1995. The BJP’s decision to support the BSP-led government was a surprise to many, given the extremities of ideology the two parties represented. The BSP proclaimed as its main aim the need to unite all the bahujan samaj who formed the bulk of the population in order to restructure the power balance in their favour, as a result of which the anti-upper caste tilt in its outlook and ideology was especially pronounced. For example, as one of its popular slogans read, Tilak, taraju aur talwar, isko maro joote char – the tilak [caste mark applied on the forehead, which symbolizes the Brahmin], the balance [measurement scales, which symbolize the merchants] and the sword [symbol of the warrior castes], hit them with your shoes [reference to the Chamars, a key scheduled caste in the north, which comprises of leather workers].121 More importantly, the three castes referred to in this slogan – the Brahmins, the traders and the warriors – formed the key components of the BJP’s support base. By choosing to support the BSP, the BJP faced the challenge of offending its own supporters, who could view the alliance as an affront to their loyalty. 120 Duncan, Ian. “New political equations in north India: Mayawati, Mulayam, and Government instability in Uttar Pradesh” in Asian Survey. Vol. 37, No. 10. Oct 1997. p. 979 121 Quoted in Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. p. 397 75 The BJP’s decision to support the BJP despite the presence of strong opposing factors made it obvious that electoral arithmetic had come to prevail over ideology, with the alliance signifying “an orchestrated move on the BJP’s part to enlarge its vote bank”.122 However the BJP-BSP combination proved untenable and within four months, on October 17, BJP leaders called on Governor Motilal Vora to formally withdraw their support to the BSP. Ostensibly, the differences in ideology and styles of governance were the central causes for the BJP’s decision to break away from the alliance. It was clear that “…the withdrawal of support within four months only showed that the party gets carried away more by rhetoric than by ground realities and objective assessments. The sip also realized that the alliance did not ensure a transfer of the Dalit base to the party”.123 Given that the break-up of the BJP-BSP alliance reneged more on the instability inherent in the dynamics of coalitions, it did not immediately translate to a decline in the BJP’s standing in the electoral arena. On the contrary, although the BJP’s chances to stabilize its vote share among the Dalits were reduced, the earlier break-up of the BSP and SP alliance had resulted in the splitting of the lower-caste vote, which proved to be a redeeming factor for the BJP. With Kalyan Singh at the helm, the BJP was well poised to take advantage of the non-Yadav OBC votes. In addition, the BJP made a conspicuous attempt to induct members from numerically smaller lower castes, which had been elbowed out of the BSP and SP by the dominant castes such as the Chamars and Yadavs respectively, thus giving it a wider field to play out its chances.124 122 Ghimle. Yubaraj. “Opposites don’t attract’, Outlook, 1 November, 1995 Ibid. 124 Brotel-Zernini. “The BJP in Uttar Pradesh…”. p. 87 123 76 Although the instability of the lower-caste vote was of concern for the BJP, it was offset by the support provided by the upper castes towards the party, which was an important advantage considering that they formed nearly 10 to 12 per cent of the population. With the near absence of the Congress from the political scene, the upper-caste voters were reliant on the BJP as the medium of representation – a trend reflected clearly in the voting patterns of the 1996 elections. “The stability demonstrated by the upper-caste vote, and in particular, Brahmins, stroke many commentators throughout UP: there seemed to be no other choice for them, whether in rural or urban areas, but to vote for the BJP as the sole representative of their interests.”125 However, the support thus gained was limited in that it did not help to tip the electoral scales in the BJP’s favour. The BJP’s inability to push forward with its Hindutva agenda stemmed from the fact that UP politics in the mid- to late 1990s had come to be marked by a quadrangle of competition between the BJP, BSP, SP and Congress, in which neither one party could successfully achieve a paramount position over the others. In an attempt to overcome the limitations of numbers and ideology, the BJP resorted to ‘political’ means and “…seized power in Uttar Pradesh in October 1997 by breaking the BSP and the Congress, reportedly offering the breakaway groups portfolios and large amounts of money”.126 Furthermore, it was alleged that Kalyan Singh, the new Chief Minister, purportedly offered positions to corrupt and criminal candidates in his grand cabinet of 91 ministers. Although the BJP’s actions were “…justified in the name of apadharma, the Brahmin’s 125 Brotel-Zernini. “The BJP in Uttar Pradesh…”. p. 92 Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The BJP at the Centre: A Central and Centrist Party?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1998. p. 315 126 77 dharma of survival”,127 they seemed to signify increasing desperation on part of the party leadership to gain power, and the resultant decision to move away from the RSS’s philosophy of long term grassroots transformation. Although the BJP’s actions helped the party to attain power, it eroded its reputation as a disciplined and ideologically stringent party. Furthermore, it did little to help expand the party’s influence beyond its incumbent support bases, as was reflected in the results of the next Parliamentary elections. In the 1998 elections, the BJP captured nearly 57 seats and 36 per cent of the vote and emerged as the strongest force in UP. However, the party’s progress was minimal when compared to the 1996 elections, when it had attained 52 seats and 33 per cent of the vote share. The BJP’s inability to make headway to augment its electoral standing was also a result of the growing strength of caste-based parties in the state, as was seen from the ability of the SP and BSP to capture 29 per cent and 21 per cent of the vote share respectively. More importantly, the effects of caste were not limited to electoral arithmetic. The party was faced with a parallel challenge – namely the formation of, and growing distance between, the upper and lower-caste lobbies within the party hierarchy – which was to prove just as difficult to deal with. Caste (mis-) management – The Kalyan Singh affair For caste to emerge as an issue of consideration within the party ranks was a serious threat to the Sangh Parivar’s reputation of discipline and unity, and in a larger context, the goal of a division-less Hindu brotherhood. The consciousness of caste as a divisive influence amongst the party’s cadre derived from two factors: firstly, the BJP’s 127 Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The BJP at the Centre…”. p. 315 78 acknowledgement and acceptance of caste as a defining principle of politics; and secondly, the resultant implementation of lower-caste oriented policies, which led to an increasing sense of sectarian identity in contrast to the stringent insistence on religion espoused by the RSS – both of which led to growing caste consciousness within the BJP. The caste divide began to surface in light of the rift between some of the party members and the key backward caste leader in the state, Kalyan Singh. Following his appointment as Chief Minister, Kalyan’s inability to match his ministers’ expectations was the key reason behind the disgruntlement of the members. Matters reached a head when a group of 36 legislators submitted their resignations as well as a demand for Kalyan’s expulsion to Party President Kushabau Thakre in May 1999. The charges against Kalyan included the Chief Minister’s inapproachability, an autocratic style of functioning, the lack of consultation with party members on decision making, and the creation of an internal coterie, dominated by Kalyan supporters.128 The fallout within the party was clearly based on caste lines – the dissidents were largely upper-caste members, whilst the backward and lower-caste members, including prominent leaders like Uma Bharti and Ganga Charan Rajput, rallied to Kalyan’s side. The sharpening of caste divisions between the party members was partly due to the fact that by the mid-1990s, Kalyan’s status as a long-standing member of the Sangh Parivar had been overshadowed by his functional role as a backward caste leader. As an article in the Outlook noted: 128 “Thrust and parry”. India today, 24 May 1999. If the complaints created fault lines within the party, the reactions from the Kalyan camp made them worse. Graffitti began to appear on walls in Lucknow, bearing threatening messages apparently meant for the opposite camp within the party – “Jo Kalyan ko mitayega, hum use mita denge” (He who dares to remove Kalyan will be wiped out by us) and “Kalyan nahin to desh nahin” (No Kalyan, no state). 79 While its true that Kalyan has been the BJP’s most potent and emphatic answer to Mulayam Singh Yadav’s backward politics in UP, being a natural upper-caste platform, the BJP has lived with a dangerous mix of both classes. With Kalyan becoming the inevitable choice for the prized position, the upper caste state leaders may have had every reason to feel suffocated.129 Despite escalating factionalism within the party, the central party unit’s leadership hesitated to displace Kalyan Singh from the post of Chief Minster on account of his ability to attract and sustain the backward vote, which was crucial for the BJP’s survival in U.P. However, as one of the dissidents in the party pointed out, Kalyan’s “indirect involvement in the circulation of pamphlets and posters abusing the upper castes…only worsened the situation”.130 The BJP, once appreciated for its cohesive structure and internal discipline, was now openly split on caste lines, and was rife with power struggles and factionalism. However, with the party in a precarious position and another round of elections approaching, its leaders were unwilling to rock the boat too hard. Nevertheless, the complainants’ call did not go unheeded – Kalyan was strongly reprimanded by the Party President and “told to fall in line or be prepared to face Central rule”.131 The warning went unheeded. Contrary to expectation, it was reported that: [t]he chief minister’s attitude has been something of an enigma…For Kalyan has been charting a most unusual course for a BJP man. In the last few months, he’s launched a virulent attack on high-caste Hindus, not just 129 Mukherjee, Sutapa. “Birthday bumps”. Outlook. 18 January 1999. “Thrust and parry”, India today. 24 May 1999. 131 Ibid. 130 80 against his rivals, but inside the BJP as well…At another rally last month, just when the dissidents’ tide seemed to ebb a little, Kalyan roared: “A good ruler is one who keeps his supporters happy and his rivals quaking in their boots” and upon backward castes to “snatch power from the privileged high castes”, as the only way out.132 Furthermore, throughout the campaign for the 13th Lok Sabha elections, Kalyan Singh “…sulked, failed to attend meetings addressed by even Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, complaining bitterly about his ‘marginalisation’ and the ‘inadequate’ distribution of tickets to backward leaders.”133 It did not help matters when one of Kalyan’s staunch loyalists, Sachchidanand Sakshi Maharaj, who was refused a ticket to Farrukhabad, began to make open statements against what he termed as the “Brahmin troika – comprising Vajpayee, Murli Manohar Joshi and Kalraj Mishra”134, as plotting the downfall of Kalyan Singh. He also reportedly added that “…Kalyan and Mulayam are ‘natural friends’ and that they would join hands after the elections”.135 Kalyan’s studied silence over Sakshi’s comments, and his son Rajbir Singh’s open campaign for the SP candidate in Aligarh only seemed to confirm the rumour, adding to the existent bad blood within the party. Despite efforts by leaders from the Central unit to patch up the rifts within the UP unit, little was accomplished. 132 Bhushan, Ranjit. “Writing on the wall”. Outlook, 24 May 1999 Mitra, Subhash. “Spoiling the party”. India today, 11 October 1999 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 133 81 Kalyan’s open revolt against the BJP leadership was indicative of the shifting bases within the party, and was in sharp contrast to his own efforts in the past to project himself as a strident Hindu leader, especially during the course of the Ramjanambhoomi movement. On the one hand, it pointed to a decline in the party leaders’ commitment to Hindutva; and on the other, to a deep-rooted upper-caste inclination within the party towards maintaining the power balance in favour of the upper-caste lobby – both of which were detrimental to the BJP’s efforts to propagate a ‘catch-all’ image. The 1999 elections – Battling the odds The period leading up to the 1999 Parliamentary elections was thus marked by a conflict between ideological and political compulsions for the BJP. In light of the united, disciplined image projected by the party ranks during the Ramjanambhoomi movement, the heightened prevalence of instability and factionalism within just a decade seemed to indicate that the BJP was incapable of handling the challenges brought about by its ascent to power and rapid expansion in support base. Whilst the ineptness of the Kalyan Singh government had contributed to the prevalent anti-incumbency mood within the electorate, the open show of dissidence and the growing OBC-upper caste divide had clearly disappointed voters and eroded the BJP’s image as a credible political representative. It must be noted that the party leadership were not oblivious to the changes taking place around them. Hence, the impetus for the 1999 elections was on the need to put up a convincing front and defend the BJP’s previous tally of 57 seats, rather than seek to advance its electoral standing. However, the BJP failed, and although the party managed 82 to secure 31.2 per cent of the vote share, its seat share shrunk by nearly half to 29 seats. The decline in the party’s seat share was a clear indication of its ineffectiveness in grappling with and resolving core issues at the state level. More importantly, the BJP’s losses had clearly translated to the gains of the caste-based parties – the SP, despite a decline in vote share to 24 per cent from 28.7 per cent, had increased its seat count from 20 in the previous (1998) elections to 26; and despite a negligible increase in vote share, the BSP had secured 14 seats, which was a gain of 10 seats up from its tally of 4 in 1998. Another noteworthy development in the 1999 elections was the re-emergence of the Congress in UP, with 10 seats and 14.8 per cent of the vote share. It is important to note that the Congress’s revival was marked by a shift of the upper-caste vote in its favour, supported by the fact that it received maximum support from Brahmins in key constituencies such as Kanpur, Shahjahanpur and Rai Bareilly. It is noteworthy that the Congress’s ability to revive its appeal was in part derived from the upper-caste voters’ dissatisfaction with the BJP over the Kalyan Singh controversy – a development that was indicative of the vagaries of caste politics, as well as the fact that the BJP had yet to come to terms with it. In a nutshell, although the BJP had successfully retained power at the center, the start of its new term in office was overshadowed by a dual quandary concerning its functioning in India’s politically crucial state – “analyzing why the BJP received such a drubbing in Uttar Pradesh and whether Chief Minister Kalyan Singh should stay or go”136. Though it 136 Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Heartland headaches”. India today. 15 November 1999 83 was clear that a large section of the party was in favour of his retrenchment137, dismissing Kalyan was bound to have immediate negative repercussions on the OBC section. Nevertheless, the failure to hold on to the existent seat share, let alone expand it, had weakened Kalyan’s importance as the guarantor of the backward caste vote and diminished his credibility within the party – making it difficult for the central leadership to favour his continuity as the state head in UP. Finally, in what seemed like a desperate bid to resolve the issue, the BJP suspended Kalyan Singh from the post of Chief Minister and the party on 21 November 1999. In Kalyan’s place, the BJP appointed Ram Prakash Gupta, a “forgotten RSS nominee”,138 as the Chief Minister of UP. Whilst the decision to appoint a candidate who had little or no popular following was a result of the party’s attempt to avoid further dips on the caste scale, the new Chief Minister’s status as a titular head was a serious handicap in a state that was heavily segmented. A comment in India Today was telling of the incongruity in the BJP’s choice: At the root of political management in Uttar Pradesh is caste. Kalyan successfully forged a upper caste-backward alliance in the aftermath of Ayodhya…Now with Kalyan out of the way, the BJP’s backward-caste flank is vulnerable to poaching by Mulayam…By elevating a non-entity to 137 As India today reported, “The criticism borders on the crude. The source of his problems, says a state leader, is “launda aur laundi”. The reference is to his son Rajbir Singh who orders bureaucrats around and has been allotted a petrol pump in Ghaziabad, and the controversial corporator Kusum Rai, the lady the Chief Minister is said to be close to and who has become an extra-constitutional authority in Lucknow.” Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Heartland headaches”, India today, 15 November 1999 138 Ahmad, Farzand and Subhash Mitra, “Relic as ruler”, India today, 22 November 1999 84 the chief ministership, the BJP runs the risk of being reduced to its Brahmin-Bania core, a recipe for electoral disaster.139 In a bid to counter allegations that Kalyan’s suspension was a result of the upper-caste inclinations of the Sangh Parivar, the BJP announced the appointment of Bangaru Laxman, a Dalit, as President of the party in succession to Khuashabau Thakre. Laxman’s appointment was a strategically opportune move, in that he was “…the first Dalit president of the party which till recently was dubbed a “manuvadi” and “Brahminical” outfit”.140 Yet, it did not have the desired effect, largely because Bangaru Laxman was not as popular a leader as Kalyan. Furthermore, his appointment as party President seemed to be more a metaphorical adjustment than a means to address the deeper issues affecting state level calculations. The Kalyan affair had already thrown into sharp focus the cracks in the BJP’s hierarchy, and exposed the fallibility of ideology within the party despite decades of rigid ideological adherence. It also served as a reminder to the party leadership of the challenges that expansion brought in its wake. Early 2000 to the 2004 elections – Coalitions and challenges The rift between rhetoric and reality was an issue of concern for the BJP with regard to adjustment with its coalition partners as well. As mentioned earlier, coalitions provided one of the best means for the BJP to manipulate the swing vote to gain a greater vote and seat margin, whilst concurrently adapting the Hindutva idiom to the local context. This was the primary reasoning behind the BJP’s decision to support the BSP-led governments 139 140 Ahmad, Farzand and Subhash Mitra. “Relic as ruler”. India today. 22 November 1999. Ahmad, Farzand. “The PM’s point man”. India today. 13 August 2000 85 in 1995 and 1997. However, being situated on polar ends of the ideological spectrum, maintaining a functional relationship proved to be a task easier said than done. Like its first alliance with the BSP in 1995, the BJP’s second attempt at alliance formation in 1997 failed to hold. On 31 October 2002, 12 dissident BJP MLAs met Governor Vishnu Kant Shastri to inform him that they “had lost confidence” in the Mayawati-led BJP-BSP government.141 The source of dissatisfaction lay in the BSP leader’s “authoritarian” style of functioning, the allocation of relatively junior positions to BJP MLAs, and her abuse of power. To substantiate their demand, their leader Ganga Bhakt Singh made a public statement about the BJP MLAs’ grievances after their meeting with the governor. “We told the Governor that raids were being conducted at the houses of legislators, false criminal cases were being registered, and the police were generally harassing supporters of those legislators who had made their displeasure with the government public.”142 The dissidents’ demand to convene a special assembly to test the strength of the government was, however, rejected – Shastri asserted that none of the dissidents had actually given their withdrawal of support in writing, thereby mitigating the need for a special session.143 The threat, however, was a serious one. The BJP-BSP alliance maintained 216 members in coalition with other smaller parties in the state Assembly. Given the required number 141 Tripathi, Purnima, S. “Coalition troubles”. Frontline Vol. 19, Issue 23, November 9-22, 2002 Ibid. 143 Ibid. See also, Tripathi, Purnima S. “Living on borrowed time”. Vol. 19, Issue 25, December 7 – 20, 2002. To some extent, luck was also on the BJP’s side. As Frontline noted, “It paid to have a famous Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) pracharak as the occupant of the Raj Bhavan in Lucknow.” Tripathi, Purnima S. “A political farce”. Frontline. Vol. 19, Issue 24, November 23 – December 6, 2002 142 86 of 203 members, the withdrawal of the support of 12 MLAs had the potential to bring down the government dangerously close to the position of a minority. On 1 November, the SP general secretary, Amar Singh, presented the Governor with a list of 204 MLAs (including 37 BJP MLAs) whom he claimed would support a government led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. Shastri dismissed the claim on the grounds that he was “unconvinced”. Although the SP’s bid to power was a flimsy one, given that there was evidence that only 12 BJP MLAs were willing to confirm their support for Mulayam Singh, it highlighted the ongoing tensions within the BJP, which were persistent despite efforts by leaders including Rajnath Singh and Kushabau Thakre to contain the crisis. The signs of a dysfunctional relationship between the BJP and BSP continued to proliferate. In January 2003, Mayawati declared her birthday as Swabhiman Divas (selfrespect day) for Dalits and state funds amounting to over Rs. 1 crore were spent on celebrations. The implicit political message contained in the festivities was not hard to miss. As an article in Frontline observed, Birthdays have been celebrated by politicians in the past too with even greater ostentation, but this one was different in that it was personal event that was thrust on the state government and that it was used by the BSP to make a political statement. By proclaiming the day “swabiman divas” for Dalits, the BSP leadership made it clear to the Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress (I) that Dalit politics remained its forte.144 144 Tripathi, Purnima S. “A birthday message”. Frontline. Vol. 20, Issue 3, February 1 – 14, 2003 87 The message was particularly intended for the President of the BJP’s UP unit, Vinay Katiyar, who had portrayed Dr. Ambedkar as a pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim leader during his tour of the state in December 2002. An annoyed BSP had raised the issue with Prime Minister Vajpayee, who had in turn cautioned Katiyar to tone down his rhetoric. However, there was more dirty laundry to be washed in public. In addition to reiterating the BSP’s monopoly over the Dalit vote, Kanshi Ram declared in New Delhi that “his aim was to unseat the BJP from the number one slot.”145 In the 2002 Assembly elections, the BJP’s standing declined from 176 in the earlier elections to 88 – a clear sign of the party’s waning influence in the state – whilst the SP emerged the clear winner leading in nearly 150 constituencies. However, the lack of a clear majority in the house of 403 members put the SP at a disadvantage in terms of forming the government. A solution to the fractured mandate of the state seemed to lie in the re-formation of the BJP-BSP alliance since both parties held the required number of candidates to prop up a government. However, the distrust between the BJP and BSP had soured enough for the state unit of the BJP to hold back on its offer of support to the BSP. In addition, state party leaders including Kalraj Mishra and Rajnath Singh argued that it was necessary for the BJP to take the cue and sit in the Opposition – an opinion summed up in party President Jana Krishnamurthy’s statement, “We respect the people’s verdict”.146 The opinion found favourable standing with Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Home Minister L.K. Advani, who also had to take note of the fact that joining hands 145 146 Tripathi, Purnima S. “A birthday message”. Frontline. Vol. 20, Issue 3, February 1 – 14, 2003 Tripathi, Purnima S. “The Uttar Pradesh tangle”. Frontline. Vol 19, Issue 7, March 30 – April 12, 2002 88 with the BSP would further alienate the BJP's core vote bank – the upper-caste voters. As a senior BJP leader commented, “Like in the past she [Mayawati] is bound to invoke the Dalit Act. A Dalit resurgence under her leadership would demoralise our grassroots support base. After our already poor showing in the Assembly election, we cannot risk this. We should concentrate on recovering lost ground.”147 The BJP’s reluctance to rush into a power-sharing arrangement stemmed in part from the desire of all political parties within the state to maintain a state of suspended flux under President’s rule, which accorded them sufficient time to consolidate on their gains in time for the next Lok Sabha elections. Furthermore, leaders of the BJP’s state unit insisted that the BSP should accede to a government led by Rajnath Singh, with the BSP handling some important portfolios in the state and sharing power at the Centre. It was obvious that fears of Rajnath Singh going the ‘Kalyan way’ were a serious concern for the party leadership. As one of the senior leaders pointed out, supporting a Mayawati-led government against the wishes of leaders like Rajnath Singh and Kalraj Mishra could lead to a sense of disgruntlement amongst the cadre, which was damaging for the party’s cohesiveness in the long run.148 Despite the presence of convincing arguments, the central unit of the BJP diverged in its preferred course of action and advocated a reunion with the BSP. The leaders at the center were apparently more concerned with maintaining at least a semblance of order until the next Lok Sabha elections, “…even at the cost of alienating its vote bank for the 147 148 Tripathi, Purnima S. “The Uttar Pradesh tangle”. Frontline. Vol 19, Issue 7, March 30 – April 12, 2002 Ibid. 89 time being, because, in its opinion, the possible larger success [wa]s more important.”149 Furthermore, “The extent to which the BJP’s central leaders are willing to compromise with the BSP became evident when Katiyar and company were asked to continue to cooperate with Mayawati ‘despite her whims’, until the general elections.”150 Nevertheless, the BJP’s decision to continue the alliance was not bereft of costs. In April 2003, when Chief Minister Mayawati filed more than 100 First Information Reports against Mulayam Singh Yadav on charges of having made two videotapes of Mayawati’s private meetings, the BJP found itself in a quandary. The party could neither support the BSP nor condemn its “politically vindictive”151 actions. The BJP’s reluctance to comment on the BSP’s action was significant, considering that one of the videos showed Mayawati making “derogatory remarks about Hindu practices and rituals”. However, the party continued to uphold a cautious stand, owing to concern that any form of conflict might affect the political equilibrium in the state. Conversely, the lack of censure had the effect of exasperating the party’s core base of upper castes, who were “already frustrated with the innumerable compromises the party has had to make to stay in power.”152 The difficulties of holding together the unhappy marriage were compounded by the efforts of the oppositions parties – the SP, the Congress, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) and the Rashtriya Kranti Party (RKP) – to topple the government by luring away the independents and the “erstwhile dissident 20 to 25 BJP MLAs who all but left the party in 149 Tripathi, Purnima S. “Coalition troubles” Frontline. Vol 20, Issue 5, March 1 – 14, 2003 Ibid. 151 Shukla, J.P. “BSP-SP confrontation building up”. The Hindu. 17 April, 2003 152 Tripathi, Purnima S. “Politics of vendetta”. Frontline. Vol 20, Issue 9, April 26 – May 9, 2003 150 90 an earlier attempt.”153 However, the attempt failed yet again. Despite the withdrawal of support by RLD leader Ajit Singh and 14 MLAs, Governor Shastri rejected the Opposition’s request for a special session of the Assembly for a fresh vote of confidence on the grounds that they had not provided adequate proof that the government was reduced to a minority. However, the coming together of the opposition parties in a mutual effort was a clear sign that the gains accruing for the BJP from the split between the BSP and SP were not perennial. The rocky state of affairs finally came to an end on August 25 2003, when Mayawati announced the termination of the BSP’s alliance with the BJP and recommended the dissolution of the Assembly. Whilst different opinions proliferated over the possible reasons behind her withdrawal of support, “the most plausible hypothesis seem[ed] to be that the alliance had outlived its utility for her; and that she had an inkling that a split in her Legislature Party had become imminent, with growing manipulation by her opponents.”154 Taken aback by the dissolution announcement, the BJP attempted to reclaim its dignity by handing Governor Shastri a formal letter stating their withdrawal of support to the BSP, but the move was of little help. The BJP’s past attempts at salvaging the alliance came to naught, and the party had to shoulder the reputation of having “agreed to a bizarre, servile and humiliating arrangement just to share power with a leader who made no secret of her contempt for its Manuvadi ideology.” 155 153 Parsai, Gargi. “Moves on to rope in UP BJP MLAs”. The Hindu. 2 June, 2003 Bidwai, Praful. “Big setback for the BJP”. Frontline. Vol. 20, Issue 19, September 13 – 26, 2003 155 Ibid. 154 91 The 2004 elections – Picking up the pieces On August 28, the Governor invited Mulyam Singh Yadav to form the government, with a condition that he prove his majority within 14 days. Mulayam managed to secure the required majority, with the BJP providing tacit support in the form of a lack of active effort towards spoiling the SP’s chances. The BJP’s decision to ‘support’ the SP-led government was a surprise to most, given that Mulayam had been the party’s bete noire since the early 1990s when he had ordered state forces to curb the Ramjanambhoomi movement, and later attempted to engineer the fall of the BJP-BSP governments. The move towards reconciliation was possibly based on the fact that having a government led by Mulayam Singh would at least provide the BJP with the space to revive their Ram temple movement and once again establish the Hindutva charm in the Hindi heartland – a desperate move by the party to regain its lost ground.156 However, given the time elapsed and the changes undergone by the BJP through the decade, reviving the Ramjanambhoomi movement was no longer a quick fix to the party’s problems of dented support bases and lost integrity. As an internal survey conducted by the BJP pointed out, the job of securing the required support from UP would be the “biggest challenge”.157 The survey findings were, however, challenged by the trends presented by the results of media polls in April 2004, including the NDTVIndian Express, India Today-Bhaskar and Outlook polls, which predicted a situation with the SP and BJP in combined lead, followed by the BSP and SP. However, as Yogendra Yadav warned, the extent to which an upward trend might translate into seats was still 156 157 Tripathi, Purnima S. “Calculated risk”. Frontline. Vol. 20, Issue 19, September 13 – 26, 2003 “BJP’s survey sees uphill task in U.P.”. The Hindu. 6 March 2003 92 indeterminate, particularly in light of the fact that “…in recent years, the opinion polls have tended to…overestimate the BJP in the state.”158 Yadav’s comment pointed to the intrinsic element of doubt surrounding the fate of the BJP in UP – an issue of concern for the leadership, when viewed in light of the fact that the gains in UP had formed the backbone of the BJP’s success in the 1990s. In a calculated move to salvage the OBC vote, and gain a competitive edge vis-à-vis the other parties, the BJP decided to re-induct Kalyan Singh into the party in February 2004. The decision was based on the hope that it would help fulfil the statistical and psychological deficiencies in the BJP’s support base, as made evident from the remarks of Murli Manohar Joshi. “Kalyan Singh’s return to the party had created an atmosphere of confidence among party workers, and also in the people. Now that Kalyan Singh is back, even if 80 per cent of the four per cent section of the people [the backward Lodh community] he leads vote for the BJP, it will mean a substantial increase in our strength.”159 Whilst the fragmented state of the electorate dictated the need for a prolower caste agenda, the move to reinstate Kalyan just months before the General elections, notwithstanding the long drawn rifts within the party on his account, painted the BJP as an opportunistic party with little regard for the OBC interests at stake. Furthermore, Kalyan’s and his successors’ incompetence in government still rankled in the voters’ minds and heightened the prevalent anti-incumbency mood in UP. 158 159 Yadav, Yogendra. “Making sense of the opinion polls”. The Hindu. 19 April 2004 “Q&A: Murali Manohar Joshi”. The Hindu. 1 April 2004 93 The concomitant effects of the pitfalls and failures of the BJP government whilst in power were reflected in perceptible shifts in the party’s core upper-caste base during the first phase of elections in 32 out of the 80 seats in UP – the party suffered a dilution of support within its core upper-caste bases of Brahmins and Rajputs. The downward trend witnessed in the BJP’s standing was confirmed by the results of the 2004 elections. The BJP, contrary to its hopes of securing over 50 seats, secured merely 10 seats. The SP emerged as the dominant party with 36 seats followed by the BSP with 19 seats. If it was of any solace to the BJP leadership, the fact that the Congress managed a meagre 9 seats seemed to indicate that the road to Delhi was not necessarily through UP. However, it did prove the point that caste had emerged as the ruling ideology at the state level. Analysis – Charting the BJP’s career In retrospect, it would appear that the source of the BJP’s declining popularity from the late 1990s onwards lay in the party’s inability to maintain the loyalties of its core support bases. In the past, the BJP had drawn considerable support from the Brahmin and Rajput communities, and complemented it with efforts to solicit the support of SC and OBC communities. In effect, the BJP worked out an agenda whereby it tried to bring together disparate social groupings to work toward a mutual goal in the hope that they would be subsumed over time within a framework based on religious solidarity. However, although the strategy had worked in the early 1990s, it failed to procure the desired results in the post-math of the Ramjanambhoomi movement. In effect, the party had underestimated the extent to which caste divisions had sharpened in the 1990s, and hence, failed in its attempts to woo the lower caste vote and destabilized its own core support base as well. 94 Another important factor needs to taken into account when analyzing the BJP’s failure in replicating the Congress’s strategy – namely the presence of a strong populist rhetoric that could accommodate all sections of the population within the Congress’s ideology and manifesto. The BJP, however, could not replicate a similar ‘catch-all’ idiom due to the prevalence of traditionalist ideas and practices within the RSS, which automatically imprinted the party’s image as ‘upper-caste’ in the minds of the voters. In other words, although the Congress had suffered a severe dent in its popularity in the 1980s and ‘90s, it was due to the inadequacy of the party’s leadership rather than a failure to maintain ideological consistency. In other words, it was seen as a party that had failed to deliver on its promises. On the other hand, the BJP’s attempts to distance itself from the upper-caste label and re-model its image to suit the demands of multiple castes was seen as a dilution of the party’s ideology, and tantamount to infidelity towards its support base. As a result, despite the Congress’s regression in the 1980s and ‘90s, it was able to maintain its ‘catch-all’ image and revive its populist rhetoric in the 2004 elections to suit the caste factor as well. Unfortunately for the BJP, its upper-caste image was too strongly imprinted in the minds of the voters for the party to successfully erode it within a decade. As a result, the upper castes began to source for alternative political representatives and turned their support to the Congress instead. In the past, the BJP had drawn considerable support from the Brahmin and Rajput communities, and complemented it with efforts to solicit the support of SC and OBC communities. However, the Congress-like ability to “…make all kinds of alliances with divergent subaltern social groups and yet preserve its 95 Hindutva appeal” 160 had since declined. The BJP’s continued placation of the BSP had frustrated and alienated its upper-caste supporters, who began to source for alternative parties to represent their interests. In consequence, the Brahmins gravitated toward the Congress, whilst the Rajputs began to shift toward the SP.161 Evidently, the Congress’s ability to revive the ‘Nehru-Gandhi’ dynastic appeal with Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Vadra had overwhelmed the allure of Hindutva. On a parallel note, the SP’s conspicuous fielding of Rajput candidates had won it the support of the Kshatriya segments of the populace. Having burnt its bridges to the Dalit vote bank from its earlier divorce from the BSP, the BJP had attempted to secure the OBC vote with Kalyan Singh. However, the strategy had failed miserably – in fact, the former Chief Minister had had trouble saving his own seat, winning it by a margin of merely 16, 651 votes.162 The message was clear – the saffron wave had subsided in UP. 160 Bidwai, Praful. “Big setback for the BJP”. Frontline. Vol 20, Issue 19, September 13 – 26, 2003 Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “Shift seen in BJP’s core vote base in U.P.”. The Hindu. 28 April 2004. See also Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “A no-holds-barred contest”. The Hindu. 2 May 2004 162 Tripathi, Purnima S. “Decisive defeat for Hindutva”. Frontline. Vol. 21 Issue 11, May 22 – June 4, 2004 161 96 Conclusion The 2004 elections and the BJP – Delusion and disappointment “If the media were to decide elections, the general elections to the 14th Lok Sabha would be a pointless exercise. The verdict is already out: the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance is sure to return to power. Almost all sections of the media have said this from the day the NDA decided to advance the polls. Two serious nationwide surveys have supported this forecast, though in varying degrees. Add to this the umpteen number of newspaper articles, views of poll pundits and the astrologers. The hawa, as they say, favours the ruling coalition.”163 Yogendra Yadav’s comment on the pre-2004 election speculation by the media points to the intensity of the then prevalent belief that the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance would return to power in the 14th General elections. The basis of these predictions rested on several factors, including the BJP’s ability to keep together its coalition act despite the unstable nature of central and regional politics, its achievements in advancing the economy to an 8 per cent growth rate, and the strengthening of relations with Pakistan. Buoyed up these predictions, and encouraged by the party’s victory in the Assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chattisgarh, the BJP leadership called for the elections even earlier than scheduled. The reigning anti-incumbency mood that had created considerable instability during the 1990s seemed to have mellowed, and the BJP seemed poised to return for a second term. 163 Yogendra Yadav. “Never mind the pollsters, the race is still open”. The Hindu. 15 March 2004 97 In an ironical twist of events, the BJP suffered massive defeats in key states, and despite long drawn hopes, was shunted out of the Center by a revamped and re-organised Congress, which came to power as head of the United Party Alliance (UPA). In numerical terms, the BJP’s 138 seats were close to the Congress’s tally of 145 seats. However, the difference between the BJP’s valid vote share of 22.16 per cent and the Congress’s 26.69 per cent indicated a wider gap between the two parties. More importantly, “…the BJP, after 20 years of continuous electoral growth, has almost reverted back to the situation in 1991 when they won 120 seats and 20.1 per cent of the valid votes.”164 However, as Jaffrelot clarifies the true weightage of the numbers, “…the erosion is not so drastic as this statistic makes it appear. First of all, in 1991 the BJP won 20 per cent of the valid votes while contesting 468 seats; whereas in 2004 it won more than 22 per cent whilst contesting only 361 seats.”165 Whilst it might also be argued that the strong leaning of analysts and journalists towards a BJP victory had coloured the political mindset, thereby leading to an exaggerated perception of the party’s defeat, the drop from 182 seats in 1999 to 138 is an important indication of the party’s decline. Moreover, in a system wherein the major parties acted more as poles around which coalitions were formed rather than as independent players, the difference of even a few seats was indicative of the larger gap in overall gains and party standing. In other words, it was apparent that the BJP had failed to sustain its 164 Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The BJP and the 2004 general election: dimensions, causes, and implications of an unexpected defeat” in Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez, eds. Coalition politics and Hindu nationalism. New York: Routledge. 2005. p. 237 165 Ibid. pp. 237-238 98 popular standing and the loyalties of its support base, let alone expand its reach to hitherto untapped sections of the populace. The results of the 2004 elections were a severe blow to the BJP and the Sangh Parivar. In the aftermath of the elections, the BJP leadership proffered several explanations for the party’s less than par performance. Vajpayee declared that a possible explanation lay in the communal violence that had been unleashed in Gujarat in 2004, whilst Advani seemed to support the stand that the neglect of Hindutva had been a key cause for the party’s defeat.166 Needless to say, the RSS and VHP were convinced that the BJP’s dilution of support for the Hindu nationalist cause in order to chase the lower-caste vote had cost the party its reputation as well as the loyalty of its upper-caste support base. In other words, the Sangh Parivar was convinced that to return to power, the BJP had to revert to its earlier stand and embrace the Hindutva cause to the fullest. As Jaffrelot has pointed out, the BJP (and the BJS) have often exhibited the tendency to oscillate between a radical and moderate strategy as suits the situation at hand. The key elements of Hindu nationalist strategy – the formulation of a strong, ideologically influenced identity that draws on feelings of vulnerability, ethno-religious mobilisation based on symbolic and instrumentalist representation, and an extensive grassroots network of implantation – were strongly affected by the political conditions that governed the extent of the effectiveness of their implementation. However, his argument is more 166 Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The BJP and the 2004 general election: dimensions, causes, and implications of an unexpected defeat” in Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez, eds. Coalition politics and Hindu nationalism. New York: Routledge. 2005. p. 244 99 inclined towards the Sangh Parivar’s stand on the religious issue, and whilst it helps to understand the factors that affect the BJP’s functioning, they differ in considerable measure from the factors that affect the BJP’s relationship with caste. One of the key reasons behind the BJS’s inability to emerge as a prominent political alternative lay in its failure to propagate Hindu nationalism to a wide audience, which was further exacerbated by the Congress’s ability to subsume Hindu nationalism amongst other prerogatives within its agenda. The breakdown of the Congress’s patronage structure in the 1970s and the concomitant rise of different political forces allowed for Hindu nationalism to lay claim to its own niche as a religious-majoritarian ideology that was centred on a predominantly upper-caste culture, but which had the potential to embrace multiple social groups within its agenda. In other words, unlike the Congress, which relied on a socialist, secular model, the BJP relied on a religious framework that could be adapted to suit differentiated socio-political concerns. In the 1980s, the Congress’s decline and the fragmentation of the electorate had led to a sense of susceptibility amongst sections of the populace, which the BJP had tried to engage through its strategy of Hindutva. As Amrita Basu has pointed out, the party’s ability to fit the cast of multiple roles was a key reason behind its success in the early 1990s. “The BJP’s success l[ay] in its having become the major voice of opposition to incumbent governments at national and regional levels. Indeed, one of the BJP’s greatest skills [wa]s its ability to speak in many voices…In the early 1990s it was a vehicle for upper-caste resentment at 100 the growing political influences of the lower castes…However, by 1996, the BJP had gained lower caste support in many states…”167 In other words, the BJP had formulated a strategy, similar to that of the Congress’s ‘catch-all’ policy, and now presented a modified version of Hindutva that sought to extend the boundaries of religion to subsume varied socio-political groups within a mutual agenda. The Ramjanambhoomi movement was an excellent example of the BJP’s strategy, for it sought to address the dual issues of religious encroachment168 and the vulnerability of upper-castes over the growing strength of the OBC lobby, by positing the Ram temple as the key concern of the different groups involved. The movement’s progress was further aided by the Congress’s ineffectiveness in upholding the interests of the different groups that constituted its coalition of extremes and the Janata Dal’s (JD) excessive leaning towards the OBC vote with the decision to implement the Mandal Commission’s recommendations, which left several sections of upper and lower-caste voters dissatisfied and provided the BJP with a niche to occupy. Thus, “[t]he rise of the low caste parties and that of the BJP ran parallel not only because the Mandal affair and the Mandir movement coincided but also because the BJP attracted new support as the only party which was against caste-based reservations.”169 167 Amrita basu, “Caste and class: The rise of Hindu nationalism in India” Harvard International Review, Summer 1996, Vol. 18, Issue 3. p. 28 168 The two instances refer to the Meenakshipuram conversions and the Shah Bano case. Refer to Chapter 2, pp. 28-33 for details. 169 Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. p. 462 101 Until the mid- to late 1990s, the precarious nature of electoral politics, exacerbated by the holding of multiple general elections, helped to keep the parties’ balance in flux, thereby allowing for some room to manoeuvre between core and swing voter bases. Caste lines, however, began to harden in the post-1992 period, and the predominantly upper-caste perception of the BJP caused the party to lose both Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Madhya Pradesh (MP) in the 1993 elections to emerging caste-based parties.170 With the coming of the BJP-led coalition to power in 1998 and later, 1999, the volatility that had characterised the Indian political scene was stilled to some extent. Ironically, whilst the BJP could now lay claim to the fulfilment of a cherished goal, it was on account of its position as the party in power that the party faced some of the stiffest challenges thus far in its political career – the need to balance different agendas to the mutual satisfaction of all the socio-political groups it had tried to represent. The party had little choice but to face the underlying issues that had caused the fallout of parties and voter bases over the Mandal issue – namely the increased importance of caste politics, which was buttressed by the strong demographic presence of the SC and OBC voter bases – and adapt its ideology and strategy to suit the circumstances. With the progress of the decade, the boundaries etched by the rise of conflicting ideologies became more pronounced and state-level politics was defined more by the nature of the parties competing against each other. Herein, the complexities of head-count politics and caste loyalties created a dichotomous challenge for the BJP wherein any attempt to fortify the lower-caste vote was seen as a betrayal of upper-caste interests, and 170 Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution. p. 463 102 vice-versa. Consequently, the BJP’s attempt to capitalise on the growing strength of caste-based parties by forming mutual power-sharing relationships with them was regarded by members of its core upper-caste voter base as indicative of dilution of the party’s ideology, and thereby declining commitment to the fulfilment of upper-caste interests. In particular, the BJP leadership’s attempt to forge alliances with the BSP time and again, despite the inherent contradictions in their ideologies and style of functioning, caused a decline in the party’s credibility amongst its core supporters, who regarded the move as being excessively accommodating of lower-caste interests. Another key development that affected the BJP’s reputation arose from the party’s inability to fend off the growing presence of caste lobbies within its own ranks. This was seen particularly in the case of UP, wherein the split between the upper and lower caste factions within the party over the Kalyan affair undermined the party’s reputation and more importantly, acted as an anti-thesis to its claim that Hindutva could act as a binding force for all segments of society. Whether or not Kalyan’s suspension from the party was directly a result of an anti-lower caste bias had little bearing on the fact that lower-caste voters were disillusioned by the BJP leadership’s decision. In addition, the decision to reinduct Kalyan just prior to the 2004 elections was denounced by the upper-caste segment as a politically opportunistic move that betrayed the BJP’s chase behind the lower-caste vote. Furthermore, the Kalyan affair also brought to light the party’s inability to coordinate national and state-level politics, which caused a severe dent to the BJP’s reputation of discipline and cooperation. 103 On a parallel note, the Congress’s return to the political scene with Sonia Gandhi at its helm was a key development that eroded the BJP’s upper-caste support base. The lapse of time had helped to mitigate the negative connotations associated with the Congress’s patronage politics, and it was now able to posit itself as a neutral competitor in the run up to the elections. Furthermore, “One of the main factors that caused the flow of Brahmin votes to the Congress [was] the entry of Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Vadra into active politics.” 171 Apart from the upper castes’ feeling of neglect due to the BJP’s overtures to the SC and OBC vote, the revival of the Nehru-Gandhi dynastic charm was effective in drawing the upper-caste vote to the Congress. As Upendra Mishra, a Congress activist from Lucknow in UP explained, “…it is natural that Brahmins are the first to return, because the Congress is the community’s original political platform.”172 The Muslims too, in their attempt to strategically vote the BJP out of power, began to drift towards the Congress, thereby recreating a trend similar to the post-independence coalition of extremes. In retrospect, a key shortcoming in the BJP’s political strategy lay in its short sighted efforts to recreate a support framework similar to that of the Congress’s postindependence structure, without taking stock of the changes that had occurred in the Indian polity. As Yogendra Yadav summed up whilst writing on the state assembly elections between 1993 and 1995, the core dilemma faced by the parties derived from the very nature of the ‘middle ground’ they tried so hard to occupy: 171 172 Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “The battle for UP”. Frontline. Vol. 21, Issue 10, May 8-21, 2004 Ibid. 104 The legacy of the national movement enabled the Congress to occupy and define the middle ground of various ideological and social cleavages. The resultant enduring loyalties of a cross-section of the electorate to the Congress ensured its electoral success. Any new political formation without such a historical advantage finds this ground too slippery now. If it tries to catch all, it loses any distinctiveness and thus ends up catching none. If, on the other hand, it tries to acquire and maintain distinctiveness, it ends up being exclusivist and loses its capacity for cross-sectional mobilization.173 In retrospect – Revisiting the BJP’s journey The 2004 General elections marked a watershed in the BJP’s career – the end to a cycle that began with the party’s ascent in 1989. However, the extent of the BJP’s loss needs to be qualified against the fact that electoral data too has its limitations in providing an accurate picture of a party’s progress. As Yadav has pointed out, elections “…are not a mirror of political reality. As a representational device, elections are better compared to a camera; in a sense it merely records what is ‘out there’, but it all depends on who holds it, in which direction and with what focus.”174 In other words, whilst the results of the 2004 elections are a good means to gauging the areas in which the BJP needs to take stock of its policy and make improvements, it is not a reliable indicator of the extent to which the 173 Yadav, Yogendra. “Reconfiguration in Indian politics: State Assembly elections 1993-1995” in Partha Chatterjee, ed. State and politics in India, Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 1997. p. 198 174 Ibid. p. 179 105 challenge of caste will continue to affect the progress of the party and the general direction in which it will move in the future. An important factor in this regard is the skewed nature of the political results in UP. Despite the SP’s emergence as the biggest winner in the state with 36 seats, it did not play a major role in the formation of the government at the center, whilst the ruling party at the center, the Congress, managed to scrape up only 9 seats. On a superficial level, this is a wake-up call to academics to question the efficacy of relying on UP politics as the barometer of national level politics. On a deeper level, however, it points to the intensification of regional level politics, which has led to the mushrooming of subautonomous political spheres at the state level. The result is a complex network of power relations that make the process of political speculation and trend spotting difficult in the years to come. As Ludden has summed up, We can thus reasonably imagine two very different Indias. One is unitary. In this India, the line between top and bottom of the political system is variously complex, state-by-state, but all localities are influentially connected to the central government. In this unitary India, Congress and BJP contest the future. Another India, however, is composed of regions. State borders so heavily transect lines connecting Centre and localities that each state constitutes a separate polity. In this regional India, national 106 trends are illusive, deceptive or irrelevant; only state politics matter, even as each state is separately connected to the Centre.175 As a result of the manner in which the transformations that have occurred within the Indian polity, regional parties continue to act as mediators to state-based support bases, but are now reliant on the support of national parties like the BJP and Congress to gain access to power. In this regard, caste-based parties face additional constraints due to the geographical dispersion of caste populations within the states, which undermines the potential of their demographic strength; and the persistence of sub-divisions within the lower caste bases, which dilates the possibility of a united SC or OBC voter bloc emerging in the near future – two crucial factors that act as a check on the extent to which caste-based parties can flex their political muscle. However, the fallout over the Mandal issue and the developments in the post-Mandal period have been sufficient to ensure that caste has been entrenched as an important determinant of political loyalties at the state level. Political parties that aim to rule at the center have little choice but to abide by the caste considerations they face in each state, and formulate strategies in accordance with the situation in that state. In this regard, the BJP has been able neither to resolve the ideological dichotomy between Hindutva and caste, nor internalise the presence of caste differences within its own party. Whilst a key factor that prolongs this inability to resolve this issue lies in the RSS’s insistence on strict 175 Ludden, David, ed. 2005. Making India Hindu: Religion, community, and the politics of democracy in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. xvi 107 adherence to its organicist philosophy of society, it also points to the BJP’s shortsightedness in evaluating the extent to which caste would affect the party’s progress, and thereby adapting the party’s culture and functioning to suit the change. Rather, the BJP leaders relied on short-term solutions such as ‘Social Engineering’ in an attempt to prove their commitment to the empowerment of lower castes, which failed to deliver results due to the rigid framework in which it was instituted. Nevertheless, hope remains for the BJP. Its position as one of the key coalition poles at the center gives it considerable leeway in handling the incongruities of regional level politics. Furthermore, given the long-standing presence of the Sangh Parivar, Hindu nationalism is not an unknown ideology to the people. However, the limited influence of the BJS and later BJP till the late 1980s limited its influence to the social context, thereby restricting its adaptation to the political context. To elaborate, Hindu nationalism in the political context has all along been associated with fascist, puritan connotations, which limited the BJP’s ability to model its implications to suit the political context. The inability to address the caste issue derives from this lacuna. Needless to say, the process is a long one, the results of which cannot be expected within one term in government. Looking to the Future – Whither the BJP, Whither Hindutva? Taking stock of the BJP’s political career since the late 1980s, it is obvious that the party has certainly come a long way, and has transformed its image to one of a socio-political entity rather than a political extension of the RSS whose strength was largely derived 108 from the movements it supported. In its attempt to reconcile the compulsions of caste with the dictates of Hindu nationalism, the BJP has over the years tried to speak in various tongues to suit the interests of different segments of the population, with the long-term aim of subsuming their individual concerns within the language of Hindu nationalism. To judge the results of this strategy based on developments that span roughly a decade and a half would be premature, given the dynamic nature of the Indian polity. Furthermore, it is a notable sign that the leadership has matured enough to realise that building a Ram temple is not the ideal solution for the multiple challenges that accrue from within and outside the party. The future progress of the BJP will depend largely on the resolution of its identity either as a political party or as the political wing of the Hindu nationalist movement. At this juncture, it has to its credit the ability to retain its team at the center for a full term, which was instrumental in taming hyperactivity on the electoral front. Thus, despite its inability to overcome the anti-incumbency mood of the voters, the BJP did prove its caliber as a party that can achieve the mandate for power, and retain it. As the generation of leaders who have held the reigns of the party thus far give way to a new line of leaders, the party’s future direction remains ambiguous. Suffice to say that despite concerns that history might repeat itself, one can expect that the BJP will not be pushed to the sidelines of the political stage as it was in the early 1980s. Strategic advantages aside, the BJP’s lineage rests on a resilient ideology that has held forth since the early 1920s. Needless to say, “Hindu nationalism will always exist, not as the ‘pure’ or unreconstructed force…nor as the product of an ideological agenda, but of an ongoing interchange 109 between tradition and modernity…”176 Whether or not the BJP leadership can understand the intricacies of this interchange, and mould it to suit the dialectics of a sociological affiliations and political loyalties, is for time to tell. 176 Rajesh Rai, Antecedents and development of Hindu nationalism in the Bharatiya Janata Party, 19801998. Ph.D. Diss. University of Birmingham. March 2001. p. 315 110 APPENDIX 1: Tables 1 – 3 Table 1: Caste-wise profile of members of the BJP’s National Executive from 1991 and 1998. Community Profile Upper Castes Intermediate Castes Other Backward Caste Scheduled Castes 1991 72.2 4.8 8 4.9 Year 1996 1998 54 59.7 5.4 6.8 13.3 6.9 4.7 4.8 1999 54.9 5.6 4.2 4.3 Source: Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: the rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. p. 470 Table 2: Caste-wise profile of members of the BJP governments in Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and 1999. Community Profile Upper Castes Intermediary Castes Other Backward Castes Scheduled Castes Year 1991 1999 57.45 49.21 4.25 4.76 21.28 31.76 8.51 7.94 Source: Jaffrelot, Christophe. India’s silent revolution: the rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 2003. p. 489 Table 3: Caste background of candidates of different parties contesting in the 1991 and 1996 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh. Party BJP Congress SP BSP Brahmins 1996 1991 19 22 25 19 2 10 2 0 Comparative Caste Breakdown by Year Rajputs OBC 1996 1991 1996 1991 20 13 15 15 13 11 12 10 7 10 21 18 5 0 30 13 SC 1996 18 18 16 22 Source: Jaffrelot, Christophe. “BJP and the Caste Barrier: Beyond the ‘Twice-Born’?” in Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. 2nd Ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 36 111 1991 20 19 18 37 APPENDIX 2: Graphical Distribution of Percentage Vote Share of INC, BJP, BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh Lok Sabha Elections from 1984 – 1998 100 90 80 70 SP BSP BJP INC 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1984 1989 1991 Party INC BJP BSP SP 1996 1998 Year 1984 51.03 6.42 2.18 NA 1989 31.77 7.58 9.93 NA 1991 18.28 32.83 8.7 NA 1996 8.14 33.44 20.61 20.84 1998 6.02 35.8 20.9 28.7 Sources: Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. “India Decides: Elections 1952 – 1995” in Chatterjee, Partha, ed. State and Politics in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 1997; Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 1996; Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1998; Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications 112 APPENDIX 3: Vote Distribution by Party for Uttar Pradesh Parliamentary elections 2004 Source: Election Commission of India. (www.eci.gov.in) 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS and BOOK CHAPTERS: 1. Adeney, Katharine and Lawrence Saez. eds. 2005. Coalition politics and Hindu Nationalism. New York: Routledge. 2. Agarwalla, Shyam Sunder. 1998. Religion and caste politics. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 3. Andersen, Walter K. and Shridhar D. Damle. 1987. The brotherhood in saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu revivalism. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. 4. Barnett, Marguerite Ross [et al]. 1975. Electoral politics in the Indian states: arty systems and cleavages. Delhi : Manohar Book Service. 5. Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli, eds. 1998. Community conflicts and the state in India. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 6. Basu, Tapan et al. 1993. Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi: Orient Longman. 7. Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian political party. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 8. Bayly, Susan. 1999. Caste, society and politics in India from the eighteenth century to the modern age. New York: Cambridge University Press. 9. Benjamin, Joseph. 1989. Scheduled castes in Indian politics and society. New Delhi: Ess Ess Publications. 10. Beteille, Andrew. 1991. Society and politics in India: A comparative perspective. London; New Jersey: Athlone Press. 11. Blondel, Jean and Maurizio Cotta, eds.n 1996. Party and government: An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press. 12. Brass, Paul R. 1965. Factional politics in an Indian State; the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh. Berkeley: University of California Press. 114 13. Brass, Paul R. 1974. Language, religion and politics in north India. London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 14. Brass, Paul R. 1994. The Politics of India since independence. 2nd Ed. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 15. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1975. Strategy, risk, and personality in coalition politics: the case of India. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 16. Chandra, Bipan. 1984. Communalism in modern India. New Delhi: Vani Educational Books. 17. Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 18. Chatterjee, Mary-Searle and Usurla Sharma, eds. 1994. Contextualising caste: post-Dumontian approaches. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell Pusblishers/ Sociological Review. 19. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. The Nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 20. Chatterjee, Partha. Bengal Politics and the Muslim Masses, 1920-47 in Hasan, Mushirul, ed. 1993. India's partition: process, strategy, and mobilization. Delhi: Oxford University Press; 21. Chatterjee, Partha, ed. 1997. State and politics in India. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 22. Chatterjee, Partha, ed. 1998. Wages of freedom: Fifty years of the Indian nation state. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 23. Chhibber, Pradeep K. 1999. Democracy without associations: Transformation of the party system and social cleavages in India. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 24. Conversi, Daniele, ed. 2004. Ethnonationalism in the contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism. New York: Routledge. 25. Corbridge, Stuart and John Harriss. 2000. Reinventing India: liberalization, Hindu nationalism and popular democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden: Blackwell. 115 26. Curran, Jean Alonzo. 1951. Militant Hinduism in Indian politics: A study of the R.S.S. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 27. De Souza, Peter Ronald. 2000. Contemporary India – Transitions. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 28. Frankel, Francine R and M.S.A. Rao, eds. 1989. Dominance and state power in modern India: Decline of a social order. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 29. Frankel, Francine R, et al. eds. 2000. Transforming India: social and political dynamics of democracy. New Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 30. Frick, Gita Dharampal. 1995. Shifting Discourses on caste: some historical observations. In Representing Hinduism: the construction of religious traditions and national identity, eds. Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich von Stietencron. pp. 82103. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 31. Froystad, Kathinka. 2005. Blended boundaries: Caste, class, and shifting faces of 'Hinduness' in a north Indian city. Delhi, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 32. Fuller, C.J., ed. 1996. Caste today. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 33. Ghosh, Ashish. 1999. Dalits and peasants: The emerging caste-class dynamics. Delhi: Gyan Sagar Publications. 34. Golwalkar, M.S. 1966. Bunch of thoughts. Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan. 35. Gould, Harold and Sumit Ganguly, eds. 1993. India votes: Alliance politics and minority governments in the ninth and tenth general elections. Boulder: Westview Press. 36. Graham, Bruce Desmond. 1990. Hindu nationalism and Indian politics: the origins and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 37. Gould, William, 2004. Hindu Nationalism and the language of politics in late colonial India. New York: Cambridge University Press. 38. Gupta, Dipankar. Caste and politics: The presumption of numbers in Veena Das, Dipankar Gupta and Patricia Uberoi, eds. 1999. Tradition, pluralism and identity: Essays in honour of T.N. Madan. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 116 39. Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. Interrogating caste: Understanding hierarchy and difference in Indian society. New Delhi, New York: Penguin Books 40. Gupta, Dipankar. ed. 2004. Caste in question: Identity or hierarchy. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 41. Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. 1998. The BJP and the compulsions of politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 42. Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The saffron wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in modern India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 43. Hardgrave Jr., Robert L. Hindu nationalism and the BJP: transforming religion and politics in India in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S Rowen, eds. 2005. Prospects for peace in South Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 44. Hasan, Zoya, S.N. Jha and Rasheeduddin Khan, eds. 1988. The State, political processes and identity: Reflections on modern India. New Delhi, California: Sage Publications. 45. Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for power: Oppositional movements and post-Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 46. Hasan, Zoya, ed. 2000. Politics and the state in India. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 47. Hasan, Zoya, ed. 2001. Parties and party politics in India. India: Oxford University Press. 48. Horowitz, Donald L. 2000. Ethnic groups in conflict. 2nd Ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. 49. Iliah, Kancha. 1996. Why I am not a Hindu: A Sudra critique of Hindutva philosophy, culture and political economy. Calcutta: SAMYA. 50. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian politics: 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of identity-building, implantation and mobilization. London: Hurst & Company. 51. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in north India. London: Hurst & Company. 52. Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. 2005. The Sangh Parivar: A reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 117 53. Jayal, Niraja Gopal and Sudha Pai, eds. 2001. Democratic governance in India: Challenges of poverty, development and identity. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 54. Jenkins, Rob, ed. 2004. Regional reflections: Comparing politics across India’s states. New Delhi, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 55. Jodhka, Surinder S., ed. 2001. Community and identities: Contemporary discourses on culture and politics in India. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 56. Kak, Subhash. 1994. India at century’s end: Essays on history and politics. New Delhi: Voice of India. 57. Katju, Manjari. 2003. Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Indian politics. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. 58. Kaviraj, Sudipta, ed. 1997. Politics in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 59. Kochanek, Stanley A. 1968. The Congress party of India; The dynamics of oneparty democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 60. Kohli, Atul. 2001. The success of India's democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 61. Kothari, Rajni, ed. 1970. Caste in Indian politics. New Delhi: Orient Longman. 62. Limaye, Madhu. 1992. Decline of a political system: Indian politics at the crossroads. Allahabad: Wheeler Publishing. 63. Ludden, David, ed. 1996. Contesting the nation: Religion, community, and the politics of democracy in India. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 64. Ludden, David, ed. 2005. Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 65. Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. 1994. Hindu nationalists in India: the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder: Westview Press. 66. McKean, Lise. 1996. Divine enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu nationalist movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 67. Mehra, Ajay K., D. D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck. 2003. Political parties and party systems. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 68. Michael, S.M., ed. 1999. Untouchable: Dalits in modern India. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 118 69. Mitra, Subrata K, Mike Enksat and Clemens Spiess, eds. 2004. Political parties in South Asia. Westport: Prager. 70. Mohanty, Manoranjan. 2004. Caste, class, gender. New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 71. Nandy, Ashis et al. 1995. Creating a nationality: the Ramjanmabhumi movement and fear of the Self. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 72. Nandy, Ashis. 1999. The Twilight of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism and other Masks of Deculturation in Tradition, pluralism and identity: Essays in honour of T.N. Madan, eds. Veena Das, Dipankar Gupta and Patricia Uberoi. pp. 401-420. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 73. Nandy, Ashis. 2002. Time warps: Silent and evasive pasts in Indian politics and religion. London: Hurst & Company. 74. Pai, Sudha. 2002. Dalit assertion and the unfinished democratic revolution: the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 75. Pandey, Gyanendra. 1990. The construction of communalism in colonial north India. Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press. 76. Pandey, Gyanendra, ed. 1993. Hindus and Others: the Question of identity in India today. New Delhi, New York: Viking. 77. Prakash, Gyan. Body Politic in Colonial India in Mitchell, Timothy. 2000. Questions of modernity. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. 78. Kanungo, Pralay. 2003. RSS’s tryst with politics: From Hedgewar to Sudarshan. Delhi: Manohar Publisher and Distributors. 79. Rajagopal, Arvind. 2001. Politics after television: Religious nationalism and the reshaping of the Indian public. New York: Cambridge University Press. 80. Rao, Ramesh N. 2001. Coalition conundrum: the BJP’s trials, tribulations, and triumphs. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. 81. Reynolds, Andrew, ed. 2002. The architecture of democracy: Constitutional design, conflict management, and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 82. Rudolph, Lloyd I and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 1967. The modernity of tradition: political development in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 119 83. Roy, Burman B.K. 1992. Beyond Mandal and after: Backward classes in perspective. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. 84. Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 1999. Indian politics and the 1998 election: Regionalism, Hindutva and state politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 85. Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace, eds. 2003. India’s 1999 elections and 20th century politics. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 86. Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. 1989. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?. 6th ed. Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan. 87. Sinha, Sachchidanand. 1978. The permanent crisis in India: After Janata, what? New Delhi: Heritage. 88. Shah, Ghanshyam. 1990. Social movements in India: A review of the literature. New Delhi; Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 89. Shah, Ghanshyam. ed. 2001. Dalit identity and politics. Cultural Subordination and the Dalit Challenge, Vol. 2. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 90. Shah, Ghanshyam. ed. 2002. Social movements and the state. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 91. Shah, Ghanshyam. ed. 2004. Caste and democratic politics in India. London: Anthem. 92. Sharma, K.L. ed. 1994. Caste and class in India. Jaipur: Rawat publications. 93. Sharma, K.L. ed. 1995. Social inequality in India: profiles of caste, class, power and social mobility. Jaipur: Rawat publications. 94. Shukla, Kiran. 1987. Caste politics in India: A case study. Delhi: Mittal Publications. 95. Thapar, Romila, Harbans Mukhia and Bipan Chandra. 1969. Communalism and the writing of Indian history. Delhi: People’s Pub. House. 96. Vanaik, Achin. 1997. Communalism contested: Religion, modernity and secularization. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. 97. Varshney, Ashutosh. 1998. India’s 12th national elections. New York: Asia Society. 98. Weiner, Myron, ed. 1968. State politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 120 99. Weiner, Myron. 1983. India at the polls, 1980: A study of the parliamentary elections. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 100. Weiner, Myron. 1989. The Indian paradox: Essays in Indian politics. New Delhi; Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 101. Wood, John R., ed. 1984. State politics in contemporary India: Crisis or continuity? Boulder: Westview Press 102. Wyatt, Andrew and John Zavos, eds. 2003. Decentering the Indian nation. London; Portland: Frank Cass. 103. Younger, Paul. 1987. From Ashoka to Rajiv: An analysis of Indian political culture. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. 104. Zavos, John. 2000. The emergence of Hindu nationalism in India. New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 105. Zelliot, Eleanor. 1992. From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar movement. New Delhi: Manohar Publications. UNPUBLISHED THESIS: 1. Rai, Rajesh. March 2001. Antecedents and development of Hindu nationalism in the Bharatiya Janata Party, 1980-1998. Ph.D. Diss. University of Birmingham. JOURNAL ARTICLES: 1. Anderson, Walter K. “Election 1989 in India: The dawn of coalition politics?” in Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 6 (Jun. 1990). pp. 527-540. 2. Anderson, Walter K. “India's 1991 elections: The uncertain verdict” in Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 (Oct. 1991). pp. 976-989. 3. Anderson, Walter K. “India in 1995: Year of the long campaign” in Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1995: Part II (Feb. 1996). pp. 165-178. 4. Basu, Amrita. “Caste and class: The rise of Hindu nationalism” in Harvard International Review, Vol. 18, Issue 3 (Summer 1996). pp. 28-31, 79 121 5. Basu, Amrita. “Reflections on community conflicts and the State in India” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May 1997). pp. 391-397. 6. Brass, Paul R. “Factionalism and the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh” in Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 9 (Sept. 1964). pp. 1037-1047. 7. Brass, Paul R. “Congress, the Lok Dal, and the middle-peasant castes: An analysis of the 1977 and 1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Spring, 1981). pp. 5-41. 8. Chandra, Kanchan. “The transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 2000). pp. 26-61. 9. Chandra, Kanchan. “Elite incorporation in multi-ethnic societies” in Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 5, Modernizing Tradition in India. (Sept. - Oct. 2000). pp. 836-865. 10. Chhibber, Pradeep K. and John R. Petrocik. “The puzzle of Indian politics: Social cleavages and the Indian party system” in the British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr. 1989). pp. 191-210. 11. Chhibber, Pradeep. K., Subhash Misra and Richard Sisson. “Order and the Indian electorate: For whom does Shiva dance?: in Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 7 (Jul. 1992). pp. 606-616 12. Chhibber, Pradeep. K. “Who voted for the Bharatiya Janata Party” in British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Oct. 1997). pp. 631-639. 13. Duncan, Ian. “New political equations in north India: Mayawati, Mulayam, and government instability in Uttar Pradesh” in Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10 (Oct. 1997). pp. 979-996. 14. Gould, Harold A. “The second coming: The 1980 Elections in India's Hindi belt” in Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 6 (Jun. 1980). pp. 595-616. 15. Gould, Harold A. “A sociological perspective on the eighth General Elections in India” in Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 6 (Jun. 1986). pp. 630-652. 16. Goyal, O. P. and Harlal Hahn. “The nature of party competition in five Indian states” in Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 10 (Oct. 1966). pp. 580-588. 17. Hardgrave Jr., Robert L. “India on the eve of elections: Congress and the opposition” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Autumn 1984). pp. 404-428. 122 18. Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The rise of the Other Backward Castes in the Hindi belt” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 2000). pp. 86-108. 19. Jaffrelot, Christophe. “Sanskritization vs. Ethnicization in India: Changing identities and caste politics before Mandal” in Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 5, Modernizing Tradition in India (Sept. –Oct. 2000). pp. 756-766. 20. Joshi, Barbara R. “"Ex-Untouchable": Problems, progress, and policies in Indian social change” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1980). pp. 193-222. 21. Kashyap, Subhash C. “The politics of defection: The changing contours of the political power structure in state politics in India” in Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Mar. 1970). pp. 195-208. 22. Malik, Yogendra K. and V. B. Singh. “Bharatiya Janata Party: An alternative to the Congress (I)?” in Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Apr. 1992). pp. 318-336. 23. Narain, Iqbal and Mohan Lal. “Election politics in India: Notes toward an empirical theory” in Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Mar. 1969). pp. 202-220. 24. Nigam, Aditya. “India after the 1996 elections: Nation, locality, and representation” in Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 12 (Dec. 1996). pp. 1157-1169. 25. Pai, Sudha. “Transformation of the Indian party system: The 1996 Lok Sabha elections” in Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 12 (Dec. 1996). pp. 1170-1183. 26. Pai, Sudha. “The Indian party system under transformation: Lok Sabha elections 1998” in Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 9 (Sept. 1998). pp. 836-852. 27. Palmer, Norman D. “Elections and the political system in India: The 1972 State Assembly elections and after” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter 1972). pp. 535-555. 28. Riker, William H. “The number of political parties: A reexamination of Duverger’s Law” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Oct. 1976). pp. 93-106 29. Rudolph, Lloyd I. “Continuities and change in electoral behavior: The 1971 Parliamentary election in India” in Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 12 (Dec. 1971). pp. 1119-1132. 30. Rudolph, Lloyd. I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. “The centrist future of Indian politics” in Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 6 (Jun. 1980). pp. 575-594. 123 31. Singh, Mahendra Prasad. “The dilemma of the new Indian party system: To govern or not to govern?” in Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Apr. 1992). pp. 303317. 32. Singh, M. P. “India’s National Front and United Front coalition governments: A phase in federalized governance” in Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Mar. – Apr. 2001). pp. 328-350. 33. Sisson, Richard. “India in 1989: A year of elections in a culture of change” in Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1989: Part II (Feb. 1990). pp. 111-125. 34. Sisson, Richard and Munira Majmundar. “India in 1990: Political polarization” in Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1990: Part II (Feb. 1991). pp. 103-112. 35. Sridharan E. “Coalitions and party strategies in India’s Parliamentary federation” in Publius, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fall 2003). pg. 139 36. Stone, Brewer S. “Institutional decay and the traditionalization of politics: The Uttar Pradesh Congress party” in Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10 (Oct. 1988). pp. 1018-1030. 37. Varshney, Ashutosh. “Is India becoming more democratic?” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb. 2000). pp. 3-25. 38. Wariavwalla, Bharat. “India in 1988: Drift, disarray, or pattern?” in Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1988: Part II (Feb. 1989). pp. 189-198. 39. Weiner, Myron. “Congress restored: Continuities and discontinuities in Indian politics” in Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Apr. 1982). pp. 339-355. 40. Weiner, Myron. “The Political consequences of preferential policies: A comparative perspective” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Oct. 1983). pp. 35-52. 124 NEWSPAPER/MAGAZINE ARTICLES: India Today: 1. “Still no clear winner”, India Today, 23 February 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/23021998/cover1.html) 2. Ahmed, Farzand, Saba Naqvi Bhaumik and Subhash Mishra. “Doublespeak duo”, India Today, 22 September 1997 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/22091997/covers.html) 3. Ahmed, Farzand. “Backlash blues”, India Today, 18 January 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/18011999/up.html) 4. Ahmed, Farzand. “Idle worship”, India Today, 30 November 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/30111998/up.html) 5. Ahmed, Farzand and Subhash Mishra. “Relic as ruler”, India Today, 22 November 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991122/states.html) 6. Ahmed, Farzand. “The PM’s point man”, India Today, 14 August 2000 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/20000813/nation2.html) 7. Ahmed, Farzand. “Ideology in the time of government”, India Today, 27 December 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991227/nation.html) 8. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Surviving friends”, India today, 19 January 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19011998/p98bjp.html) 9. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Man with the towel”, India Today, 27 April 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/27041998/thakre.html) 10. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Heartland headaches”, India Today, 15 November 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991115/nation.html) 11. Dasgupta, Swapan and Saba Naqvi Bhaumik. “Advantage BJP”, India Today, 3 November 1997 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/03111997/cov.html) 12. Dasgupta, Swapan. “BJP’s early surge”, India Today, 5 January 1998 (http://www.indiatoday.com/itoday/05011998/poll.htm) 13. Dasgupta, Swapan. “Give us governance”, India Today, 5 January 1998 (http://www.indiatoday.com/itoday/05011998/swapan.html) 125 14. Dasgupta Swapan. “No nose for power”, India Today, 18 May 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/18051998/bjp.html) 15. Dasgupta, Swapan. “The spoilers”, India Today, 16 August 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19990816/election.html) 16. Dasgupta, Swapan. “Splits and swings”, India Today, 20 September 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19990920/election2.html) 17. Dasgupta, Swapan. “Still for Vajpayee”, India Today, 4 October 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991004/election5.html) 18. Malik, Ashok. “How India voted”, India Today, 18 October 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991018/cover3.html) 19. Mishra, Subhash. “Spoiling the party”, India Today, 11 October 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991011/up.html) 20. Mishra, Subhash. “Awesome twosome”, India Today, 18 October 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991018/mandate2.html) 21. Mishra, Subhash. “Home alone”, India Today, 13 December 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19991213/states.html) 22. Mishra, Subhash. “Forget me not”, India Today, 14 February 2000 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/20000214/states3.html) 23. Mitra, Sumit and Harinder Baweja. “RSS on the rampage”, India Today, 28 September 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/28091998/rss.html) 24. Mitra, Sumit, Saba Naqvi Bhaumik and Javed M Ansari, “Everyone loses”, India Today, 19 April 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19041999/cover.html) 25. Ramesh, Jairam. “Vote your caste”, India Today, 27 September 1999 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19990927/jairam.html) 26. Yadav, Yogendra. “India’s alliance arithmetic”, India Today, 19 January 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/19011998/p98.html) 27. Yadav, Yogendra. “Blurred battlelines”, India Today, 2 February 1998 (http://www.indiatoday/itoday/02021998/p98.html) 126 The Hindu: 28. “BJP ahead in exit polls”, The Hindu, 15 February 2002 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/02/15/stories/2002021508030100.htm) 29. “President’s rule imposed in U.P.”, The Hindu, 9 March 2002 (www.hinduonnet.com/2002/03/09/stories/2002030906251100.htm) 30. “Crisis as 8 independent MLAs withdraw support to U.P. Govt.”, The Hindu, 26 October 2002 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/10/26/stories/2002102605580100.htm) 31. “BJP suspends key dissident in U.P.”, The Hindu, 28 October 2002 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/10/28/stories/2002102808701100.htm) 32. “Mulayam to tie up with Kalyan Singh”, The Hindu, 12 May 2003 (http://www.thehindu.com/2003/05/12/stories/2003051203641100.htm) 33. “BJP’s survey sees uphill task in U.P.”, The Hindu, 3 March 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/03/06/stories/2004030611271300.htm) 34. Ananth, Krishna V. “BJP down but not out in Gangetic Plains”, The Hindu, 16 February 2002 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/02/16/stories/2002021606261200.htm) 35. Chenoy, Kamal Mitra. “Systems of political thought”, The Hindu, 12 September 1999 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/folio/fo9909/99090160.htm) 36. Joshua, Anita. “Caste considerations will be decisive here”, The Hindu, 22 April 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/04/22/stories/2004042203041200.htm) 37. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “Shift seen in BJP’s core vote base in U.P.”, The Hindu, 28 April 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/04/28/stories/2004042806520300.htm) 38. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “A no-holds-barred contest”, The Hindu, 2 May 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/02/stories/2004050202711600.htm) 39. Shukla, J.P. “Marriage of inconvenience”, The Hindu, 8 June 2003 (www.hinduonnet.com/2002/07/07/05hdline.htm) 40. Vyas, Neena. “Anti-BJP mood more pronounced now”, The Hindu, 16 February 2002 (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/02/16/stories/2002021606271200.htm) 127 41. Vyas, Neena. “Despite defeat, BJP has not lost hope in U.P.”, The Hindu, 25 February 2002 (www.hinduonnet.com/2002/02/25/stories/2002022503281100.htm) 42. Vyas, Neena. “A time for stocktaking and jockeying”, The Hindu, 23 May 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/23/stories/2004052301721400.htm) 43. Yadav, Yogendra, “Never mind the pollsters, the race is sill open”, The Hindu, 15 March 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/03/15/stories/2004031501571200.htm) 44. Yadav, Yogendra, “The opinion polls and what they mean”, The Hindu, 31 March 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/03/31/stories/2004033100821200.htm) 45. Yadav, Yogendra, “Making sense of the opinion polls”, The Hindu, 19 April 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/04/19/stories/2004041902151200.htm) 46. Yadav, Yogendra. “Swings, splits, vote shares and seats”, The Hindu, 1 May 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/01/stories/2004050108681200.htm) 47. Yadav, Yogendra. “Uttar Pradesh: Beyond the arithmetic of caste”, The Hindu, 2 May 2004 (http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/02/stories/2004050205621200.htm) Frontline: 48. Bidwai, Praful. “Big setback for the BJP”, Frontline, Vol. 20 Issue 19, September 13 – 26, 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2019/fl201900.htm) 49. Bidwai, Praful. “The BJP’s plan B?”, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 24, November 22 – December 5 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2024/stories/20031205003611000.htm) 50. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Living on borrowed time”, Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 25, December 7 – 20 2002 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl1925/stories/20021220003803300.htm) 51. Tripathi, Purnima S. “A birthday message”, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 3, February 1 – 14 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2003/stories/20030214002204200.htm) 128 52. Tripathi, Purnima S. “A new line-up in U.P.”, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 13, June 21 – July 4, 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2013/stories/20030704003003300.htm) 53. Tripathi, Purnima S. “All for Bahujan Samaj”, Frontline, Vol. 19 Issue 21, October 12 – 25, 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl1921/stories/20021025003104300.htm) 54. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Coalition troubles”, Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 23, November 9 – 22 2002 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl1923/stories/20021122005002200.htm) 55. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Politics of vendetta”, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 9, April 26 – May 9 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2009/stories/20030509004403200.htm) 56. Tripathi, Purnima S. “The Uttar Pradesh drama”, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 19, September 13 – 26 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2019/stories/20030926005200400.htm) 57. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Rising aspirations”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 8, April 10 – 23 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2108/stories/20040423007301000.htm) 58. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Strategic voting”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 10, May 8 – 21 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2110/stories/20040521005501200.htm) 59. Tripathi, Purnima S. “Decisive defeat for Hindutva”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 11, May 22 – June 4 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2111/stories/20040604004901800.htm) 60. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “Power play in Uttar Pradesh”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 13, June 21 – July 4 2003 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2113/stories/20040702005003000.htm) 61. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “Signs of a revival”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 10, May 8 – 21 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2110/stories/20040521005801000.htm) 62. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “The battle for U.P.”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 10, May 8 – 21 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2110/stories/20040521006200400.htm) 63. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “The return of the Congress”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 11, May 22 – June 4 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2111/stories/20040604006700400.htm) 129 64. Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh. “Secular divide”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 21, October 9 – 22 2004 (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2121/stories/20041022005203100.htm) Outlook India: 65. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Caste no bar”, Outlook, 4 September 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20000904&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 66. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “Sangh in their soul”, Outlook, 25 September 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20000925&fname=bjp&sid=1) 67. Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. “The wilting of Vajpayee”, Outlook, 23 April 2001 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20010423&fname=Cover+story +%28F%29&sid=1) 68. Bhushan, Ranjit. “All in the game”, Outlook, 9 March 1998 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19980309&fname=cover%5Fst ory&sid=1) 69. Bhushan, Ranjit. “Kalyan’s cup of woes”, Outlook, 11 May 1998 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19980511&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 70. Bhushan, Ranjit. “King for the day”, Outlook, 19 April 1999 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19990419&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 71. Bhushan, Ranjit. “Writing on the wall”, Outlook, 24 May 1999 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19990524&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 72. Bhushan, Ranjit. “The deep rising”, Outlook, 11 March 2002 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20020311&fname=Mayavati+% 28F%29&sid=1) 130 73. Hasan, Mushirul. “Where alliances make history”, Outlook, 13 December 1995 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19951213&fname=opinion&sid =1) 74. Hasan, Mushirul. “Caste is the vote”, Outlook, 8 May 1996 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19960508&fname=hindi%2Dhe artland&sid=1) 75. Jha, Padmanand. “Still a three-horse race”, Outlook, 10 April 1996 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19960410&fname=cover+story &sid=1) 76. Jha, Prem Shankar. “Picking up the pieces”, Outlook, 10 May 1999 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19990510&fname=picking&sid =1) 77. Jha, Prem Shankar. “Soft saffron’s litmus test”, Outlook, 11 March 2002 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20020311&fname=Column+Pre m+%28F%29&sid=1) 78. Joshi, Ishan. “Beating Vajpayee to pulp”, Outlook, 16 February 1998 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19980216&fname=bjp&sid=1) 79. Joshi, Ishan. “An old swayamsevak’s dilemma”. Outlook, 27 March 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20000327&fname=cover%5Fst ory&sid=4) 80. Joshi, Ishan. “Its Gupta, period”, Outlook, 29 May 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20000529&fname=bjp&sid=1) 81. Joshi, Rajesh, “More dirty laundry”, Outlook, 3 January 1996 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19960103&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 82. Joshi, Rajesh. “Would-be kingmaker”, Outlook, 10 April 1996 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19960410&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 83. Joshi, Rajesh. “The Mandir spillover”, Outlook, 6 October 1997 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19971006&fname=uttar%5Fpra desh&sid=1) 131 84. Joshi, Rajesh. “The debris of consensus”, Outlook, 22 January 2001 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20010122&fname=Babri+%28F %29&sid=1) 85. Kang, Bhavdeep. “Together again!”, Outlook, 2 April 1997 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19970402&fname=cover%5Fst ory&sid=1) 86. Kang, Bhavdeep. “Suspended animation”, Outlook, 1 November 1995 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19951101&fname=COVER+ST ORY&sid=1) 87. Kang, Bhavdeep. “When will the knives come out?”, Outlook, 25 June 2001 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20010625&fname=UP+%28F% 29&sid=3) 88. Kang, Bhavdeep. “Headcold in the heartland”, Outlook, 4 March 2002 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20020304&fname=Cover+UP+ %28F%29&sid=1) 89. Kang, Bhavdeep. “Feud in the family”, Outlook, 1 April 2002 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20020401&fname=Cover+Story &sid=1) 90. Kang, Bhavdeep. “UPward ascent”. Outlook, 8 July 2002 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20020708&fname=Katiyar+%2 8F%29&sid=1) 91. Khilnani, Sunil. “Can the BJP escape its political DNA?”, Outlook, 30 March 1998 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=19980330&fname=p%5Fe%5Fr %5Fs%5Fp%5Fe%5Fc%5Ft%5Fi%5Fv%5Fe&sid=1) 92. Khilnani, Sunil. “Orphaned script seeks an author”, Outlook, 16 October 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20001016&fname=Column+Kh ilnani+%28F%29&sid=1) 93. Mukherjee, Sutapa. “Birthday bumps”, Outlook, 18 January 1999 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20010115&fname=BJP+%28F %29&sid=2) 132 94. Pratap, Anita. “A clone’s slow death”, Outlook, 11 June 2001 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20010611&fname=Column+An ita+%28F%29&sid=1) 95. Pillai, Ajith. “Company of critics”, Outlook, 20 March 2000 (http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20000320&fname=bjp&sid=1) WEBSITES: The Bharatiya Janata Party’s official website: www.bjp.org The Election Commission of India: www.eci.gov.in 133 [...]... studies in recent times,25 which have highlighted the different aspects of the ideology, structure and functioning of the RSS In particular, these studies have dealt with important issues including the spread and development of Hindu nationalism in the post-independence period, the manner in which Hindu nationalism has come to be ingrained within the social and political culture of north India, and the. .. alliances, and the larger challenge of integrating the issue of caste within the Hindu nationalist framework proved to be a far bigger challenge for the BJP than expected Despite the vast literature on Hindu nationalism and caste, there is a lacuna in the analysis on the manner in which the trajectories of caste and Hindu nationalism have interacted, and the extent to which caste has come to affect the progress... the deepening of caste boundaries and the rise of caste- based parties It also examines the inherent tensions between caste and Hindu nationalism that came to light with the fallout over the Mandal issues, but were undermined by the progress of the Ramjanambhoomi movement Chapter 3 picks up the thread of the discourse at the point immediately preceding the 1991 elections and traces the development of. .. account of the manner in which this change manifested itself at the ground level However, these studies have focused largely on the social and political processes that led to the rise of caste- based parties as a significant force in the 1980s and the manner in which they have transformed contemporary Indian politics They point to the fact that the significance of the rise of caste- based parties lay in their... of their socio-political agenda – one that demanded the redistribution of power to lower castes as the means of retribution for the material and psychological deprivation suffered by them in the past Rise of caste- based parties The rise of caste- based parties in the Hindi belt was relatively delayed when compared to the south, where they had begun to dominate the political scene since the 1950s and. .. 60s The lack of a collective political consciousness on part of the lower castes in the north 5 was a result of contextual limitations including the strong demographic presence of the upper castes (10 to 15 per cent in the north as compared to 3 to 5 per cent in the south); and the prevalence of the Zamindari system of land ownership, which concentrated power in the hands of a select section of the. .. that the trend of lower caste conversion might mushroom in north India as well.52 In response, the executive wing of the RSS called for a meeting on 12 July 1981 to vote for a law against involuntary conversions In the course of the meeting, the RSS pressed the need for internal transformation by asking “ the entire Hindu society to bury deep the internal caste dissensions and the pernicious practice of. .. and the depth of these changes helps to better understand the multi-faceted nature of the caste challenge, and the BJP’s calibre in handling it To better illustrate the nature of these challenges, chapter 4 takes up a case study of the BJP’s career in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) Regarded as the barometer of politics in the Hindi belt, UP was central to the Ramjanambhoomi movement and the rise of. .. emerged since have been extensive and numerous, especially when compared to the works on the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS).28 The general themes of analysis include the BJP’s ideology, strategy and functioning.29 Amongst these, an oft-examined topic of analysis centers on the timing of the rise of the BJP in Indian politics Given the close26 Jaffrelot, Christophe 1996 The Hindu nationalist movement and Indian... functioning at the state level; secondly, the effects of caste politics on the internal ranks of the BJP; and finally, the impact of these factors on the resilience of Hindutva and the extent to which the party has been effective in handling this challenge Hence, the analysis is centered on key issues that affected the party’s functioning and the leadership’s response to these developments, with the discussion ... processes from the 1970s spurred the rise of caste-based parties The rise of caste-based parties challenged the pan-Indian overtones of Hindutva and the BJP’s attempts to consolidate the Hindu vote’... Sangh Parivar and the revival of Hindu nationalism - The BJP and the ‘new’ face of Hindutva Revival of religious nationalism in the 1980s Caste – The regional barometer of the north The BJP’s advance... strategy of ethno-religious mobilization and validate the notion of the threatening ‘Other’.30 In particular, the ineptitude of the Congress in the 1970s and 80s31 and the inability of the state