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... distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the Myanmar state on the other hand The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of the state s mindset and analysing it helps... Accordingly, the term nation -state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap between the concepts of state and nation In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, ... Abstract This thesis explores the issue of nation- building in Myanmar It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the state to mould the Myanmar nation according to the state s
An Examination of the State of Nation-Building in Myanmar Revised edition Inga Gruss (MSc Contemporary Asian Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam) A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Southeast Asian Studies) Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences National University of Singapore 2008 Contents Abstract........................................................................................................................... ii Preface and Acknowledgements .....................................................................................iii Illustrations...................................................................................................................... v List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................ vi Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 Main Arguments .......................................................................................................... 2 Theoretical Concerns and Definitions.......................................................................... 4 Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research ............................. 8 Chapter Outline ......................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:” Nation-Building in Post-Colonial Myanmar 15 “We, the People of Burma:” Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma......................... 16 “Unity & Socialism:” a second Revolution, 1962-1988 ............................................... 21 “The Enemy who is more destructive than Nargis”, a Nation under Threat: Myanmar since 1988................................................................................................................. 27 Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 38 Chapter 2: Shattered Visions: Veteran Politicians’ Perspectives on Nation-Building ..... 40 Economic Stagnation and failed Political Reforms: Myanmar in inexorable Decline .. 41 Strong Man, Constitution and armed Struggle: the Way forward? ............................. 47 Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 51 Chapter 3: Pragmatism rules: engaging Nation-Building from below through social Development................................................................................................................. 53 Nation-building and civil engagement........................................................................ 53 Creating Opportunities for Participation in Nation-Building ........................................ 54 “They learn to overcome their Fear” .......................................................................... 58 Creating Bonds, creating Divisions............................................................................ 63 Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 65 Chapter 4: Together, Apart?: a Nation put to Test ......................................................... 68 Fighting Elites and apathetic Masses: constitutional Referendum 2008 .................... 69 Cyclone Nargis: a State in Torpidity .......................................................................... 77 A Nation stands up .................................................................................................... 81 Sometimes, somewhere, united they stand ............................................................... 85 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................. 89 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 94 Websites ................................................................................................................... 99 i Abstract This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar. It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the state to mould the Myanmar nation according to the state’s notions and ideology. The perceptions of veteran politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar. The conduct of state and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in Myanmar to test. The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach of the state. How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically? Which role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation? It is argued that the contemporary state’s project of nation-building is build around fabricated notions of a need for national unity. This strong emphasis on national unity is based upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the imminent threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s sovereignty. The military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome divisions inside the country and protect the country from foreign invasion. Most interviewees reject the state’s nation-building project. Nevertheless, the state’s endeavour has resulted in the creation of a sense of nationhood. Yet, it is not the content of the project itself that has yielded fruit, but it is the performance of the state while delivering the project that has created a common sense of nationhood. The state has repeatedly acted in a hostile way towards society in its nation-building project. The contents are meaningless and aim at glorifying the role of the state. The state shows little skill in approaching its citizens and has offered no ideological national platform for people to identify with. Although this ideological platform has failed to materialise the state has provided itself as the necessary platform for creating a sense of nationhood. During the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis the state showed little respect or concern for the victims and thereby enforced what lingered for a long time, an expression of nationhood that is centred around a common dislike of the state. ii Preface and Acknowledgements My interest in Myanmar has accompanied my life for the last five years and will hopefully stay with me for many more years. In far away Europe it seemed difficult to study and learn about a country that meant little to most people. Driven by curiosity about Southeast Asia and Myanmar I quit my job as a psychologist, packed my bags and boarded a flight to Bangkok in January 2006 and have since called this part of the world my abode. It is the place where I have met many interesting people who became close friends and Southeast Asia now feels more home than any other part of the world. My time at the Southeast Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore was marked by ups and downs. The programme has provided a great platform to interact and learn from my fellow students, maybe more than articles or books can teach. Wonderful teachers teach at the Programme who I would not have met otherwise. While I am grateful for the opportunity to have met these people, other experiences I would have preferred to miss. By any standards, the power of administrative structures at times seemed unreasonable and the programme’s commitment to support their students in their intellectual development questionable. Repeatedly, I experienced that my opinion in my role as a student with regard to the programme’s performance was not appreciated. As of today, I remain confused and do not understand why any department that wants to take pride in the intellectual performance of their students does not appreciate student’s criticism, although, as any student knows, only through constructive criticism one can learn and improve. This thesis marks the end of my time in Singapore that despite personal challenges was a time of great personal and intellectual encounters. I have been fortunate to meet many creative minds and the friendships of extraordinary people have accompanied me during my studies in Singapore. Beng Hui, Ermita, Mei Feng, Simon and Thiru, you have been friends as one can only wish to meet. Xin Mei, your patience to endure my all too often complaints has been amazing and your interest in my endeavours an incredible support, thank you. In Yangon, I thank K. Your home has provided serenity and peace of mind. C., our conversations over another portion of French fries and beer or at a musical restaurant and fashion show helped me stay sane in times of insanity. Your critical iii remarks about my work have challenged me to seek alternative trains of thoughts. Yu Yu, you are not just a great friend and teacher, but the best guide to your country. With great respect I thank the many veteran politicians who so kindly shared their views, ideas and life stories with me during my field work in Yangon. It was a humbling experience to meet these wonderful men who have stood up for their ideals and dreams without faltering for so many years. I owe gratitude to all my respondents for their trust in me. Without the contribution of my anonymous interviewees this thesis would not have been possible. My family in Europa has never stopped to encourage and support me, thanks. Dr. Pattana Kitiarsa has not only introduced me to the anthropology of Southeast Asia, but has been a supportive, encouraging supervisor. Your support during the thesis writing process made it easier to successfully pursue what at time’s seemed impossible. Your critical and constructive comments throughout the MA trajectory have helped me to intellectually mature. The two professors and friends who deserve the most heartfelt words of thanks are Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Dr. Michael J. Montesano. You have supported me throughout my studies and research, encouraged me to pursue my dreams and helped me to belief in myself. My wonderful future prospects I owe to both of you. Dr. Michael J. Montesano, your empathetic supervision and teaching has provided intellectual challenges that I wish for every student to experience. Your witty remarks have opened many new exciting horizons. Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, your commitment to help me understand Myanmar has been as demanding as rewarding. My field work would not have been possible without your support. iv Illustrations 1.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, August 13, 2000 32 1.2 Signboard opposite the former American embassy, Yangon 33 1.3 Father and son statue in People’s Park, Yangon 34 1.4 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008 36 4.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 27, 2008 71 4.2 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 22, 2008 72 4.3 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, May 11, 2008 78 v List of Acronyms ABSDF All Burma Students Democratic Front AFPFL Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League BBC British Broadcasting Company BNA Burma National Army BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPB Communist Party of Burma DVB Democratic Voice of Burma INGO International Non Governmental Organisation KBTS Karen Baptist Theological Seminary KDC Karen Development Committee KIO Kachin Independence Organisation KNU Karen National Union NLD National League for Democracy NDUF National Democratic United Front NGO Non Governmental Organisation RC Revolutionary Council RFA Radio Free Asia SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council SPDC State Peace and Development Council VOA Voice of America YMBA Young Men Buddhist Association vi Introduction “The entire national people are striving energetically hand in hand with the Tatmadaw for the emergence of a peaceful, modern, developed and disciplineflourishing democratic nation. The stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order, uplifting of education standard and raising the living standard of the people are essential for the multi-party democratic system.”1 References to the need to build a strong nation are found in countless speeches and publications issued by the Myanmar government, often resembling each other in a hard to distinguish manner. The central government portrays nation-building as one of the foremost activities that the state, represented by the ruling government, is engaged in. Central to the rhetoric of the Myanmar government concerning its nation-building efforts is the role of the Tatmadaw (or armed forces) as the preserver and protector of a unified Myanmar. According to the Myanmar government, one is led to believe that the country is threatened by “internal and external anti-government elements”2 who aim to destroy not only the government, but also peace and unity in Myanmar. Peace and unity are elusive concepts in a country where the government’s right to rule the country has been challenged over many decades by various parties. The early years after independence in 1948 were characterised by armed clashes between communist factions and the army. Communists questioned the legitimacy of the central Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government to rule the country. These violent clashes were soon intensified by armed ethnic minority insurgent groups who joined the armed efforts to contest the rule of the central government. Civil war dominated the perception of state – minority relations under the Revolutionary Council (RC) and its Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). This one-party government ruled between 1962 until 1988, outlawed any other political parties and tried to impose autarkist Socialist rule on its population. Political performance and legitimacy of the BSPP government were repeatedly challenged in demonstrations and armed attacks and culminated in 1988 in popular demonstrations. The demonstrations were quelled violently by the army and resulted in a power take over by the military under the name 1 st Than Shwe, excerpt from address delivered at the 61 Anniversary Armed Forces Day Parade, New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008. 2 New Light of Myanmar, June 16, 2008. 1 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The shift of name from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 was a mere change of name aided by a foreign consultancy and further manifested the nation-building project that was in place since 1988. The government considered it as their foremost task to restore law and order. Law, order, peace and unity have emerged to be dominant topics in the rhetoric of the government since 1988. The contemporary Myanmar governments’ publications or speeches by government representatives have often been ridiculed and portrayed as mere propaganda because of the widespread ill-reputation of the government and its utmost ineptness in presenting its point of view. However, despite these flaws the impact of the state’s nation-building campaign should be taken seriously as an object of study. Years of intensive nation-building efforts have left their traces upon the population and exploring its impact and implications can contribute to a better understanding of contemporary Myanmar society. Main Arguments This thesis explores the issue of nation-building in Myanmar. It focuses on the post-colonial period and examines the attempts of the Myanmar government to mould the Myanmar nation according to their notions and ideology. The perceptions of veteran politicians and civil society actors on the nation-building project will be compared with de facto experiences about the state of nation-building in Myanmar. The conduct of state and society during the relief work in the early phase of the cyclone Nargis is used as case study to put assumptions, opinions and propaganda about nation-building in Myanmar to test. The main question guiding my research relates to the ideological reach of the state. How far does the reach of the state go, in particular when it enjoys little domestic public support and popularity, in influencing its population ideologically?3 Which role can a state play in a case like Myanmar in forming and building a nation? 3 It should be acknowledged that there might be a discrepancy between the popularity of the government in popular discourse and day-to-day interaction. Nearly every person in Myanmar will have friends or family who in one way or another are part of the government body and their otherwise declared dislike of the government will not be reflected in their interaction with these people. Research demonstrating the nuances under which the government gains legitimacy in the eye of the public has been done by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Behind the Teak Curtain: authoritarianism, agricultural Policies, and political Legitimacy in rural Burma/Myanmar. (London: Kegan Paul Ltd.): 2004. There is, however, numerous research that indicates the overwhelmingly contested, negative perception of the government (see for example Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (New York: Routledge): 2008 or Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma under the Military Rule (New York: Zed Books): 2001). 2 It is argued that the reach of the state does not necessarily depend on its effectiveness or popularity. The Myanmar state has in its very peculiar way influenced and shaped its citizens, although possibly not in the way as originally intended. By means of analysing the nation-building project this argument will be illustrated. I will argue that the state’s contemporary project of nation-building is built around fabricated notions of a need for national unity. This strong emphasis on national unity is based upon concern over both the multi ethnic composition of Myanmar and the imminent threat of foreign nations that linger to endanger the Myanmar state’s sovereignty. The military is portrayed as a strong unified body that can overcome divisions inside the country and protect the country from foreign invasion. The state attempts to evoke loyalties and a common national feeling by emphasising these factors. An important component in the nation-building process is constitutional reform that the government uses as a milestone to achieve a prosperous, democratic nation. Most interviewees perceive this project as a sham and strongly reject the governments’ attempts to create national sentiments in this manner. Although most respondents clearly felt strongly patriotic about their country and experience a strong responsibility to contribute to the betterment of the country, I argue that their loyalties to their peer/interest groups supersede their sentiments of national loyalty. A strong factionalism has developed over the decades that hamper cooperation between different societal groups who all share a common concern to improve the circumstances of life for Myanmar citizens. I suggest that the relief operations carried out by ordinary citizens in the aftermath of Nargis can be understood as evidence for a common sense of responsibility towards largely unknown fellow national citizens. Thus a certain sense of national obligation is alive and drives people to act in societal responsible way. However, the factionalism mentioned earlier emerges here again. Many people rather provide assistance within the confinements of their social groups than to anonymous fellow citizens. This sense of nationhood is not a result of the nation-building efforts of the state, but I interpret this sense of national identity as a shared “anti-response” to the state’s nation-building project and the state more generally. It is suggested that the state was not successful in building a common sense of nationhood through the content of its campaign, but ironically created a common sense of national identity through providing a potent object of strong negative sentiments among the population. These anti-state sentiments are often directed towards the abstract notion of a state and are not 3 necessarily due to first hand experience, but more often based on public behaviour of the state and shared negative stories about the state. The argument presented above should not be considered an argument that attempts to establish a causal chain of evidence, but rather is of interpretative nature. It is a personal reading of texts, events, interviews and observations. By suggesting this line of argumentation I do not claim to offer the only possible understanding of the materials presented in this thesis. It is, however, one way to analyse the materials that provides a meaningful interpretation that opens new venues for further research rather than providing a conclusive statement on the state of affairs. I recognise that my argument is based upon my interpretation of interviews with people who represent only a small fragment of the Myanmar population and who do not provide a representative sample. However, while it is a weakness of the argument, it does not make the perspectives of those people interviewed less valid or truthful from their perspective. Theoretical Concerns and Definitions Within the Southeast Asian context, which has in the pre-colonial context been characterised as a “state-averse archipelago”4, nation-building remains a topic of relevance and the nation-state a meaningful unit of analysis.5 In November 2007 Malaysia was afflicted with protests of members of the Indian community who expressed their discontent with their current standing within the Malaysian society, the south of Thailand has for many years now been the setting of violent clashes between the minority Muslim community and the Thai state, the dominance of the Philippine state continues to be challenged in Mindanao and in Myanmar the hegemony of the state has been challenged from many sites for nearly 60 years now. Although many of these conflicts are closely linked to the existence of networks beyond national borders and the notion of individual or social groups to be part of these networks, these conflicts need to be understood within specific historical trajectories that particular nation-states took. Nation-state formations need to be analysed within greater political orders, but remain a useful and necessary unit of analysis. 4 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 13. See for example Charles Keyes, Helen Hardacre, and Laurel Kendall (Eds.) Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press): 1994. 5 4 The term nation as used in this thesis is considered to be “a distinctive group of people who feel a communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography, or linguistics.”6 This communal bond can be nurtured through various activities, for example top-down processes by the state or bottom-up processes by non-governmental actors. Nation-building in turn entails different components. On the one hand, it means to strengthen the structure of the state and political processes, and on the other hand it attempts to build a common national identity whereby “community development and personal relationships are the core elements when it is understood as the effort to develop a consciousness of shared destiny.”7 Accordingly, “nation-building thus combines two objectives: state-building, which relates to the development and extension of administrative function; and identity-building, which refers to the creation of a communal identity.”8 This communal identity can be achieved through economic, political and social development.. In this thesis the emphasis is on the creation of a common ideological perspective through concrete developments of economic, political and social nature. The first chapter of the thesis focuses on the attempts of the state, while the latter chapters focus on the ways in which these attempts are perceived and responded to. Both the terms nation and nation-building are social constructs. As mentioned above, part of the nation-building project is a top-down process driven by the state. It is necessary to be critical of an “exaggerated belief in the powers of elite manipulation of the masses”9, and not to overemphasise the potential of the state to manipulate the masses like mindless puppets, one must not ascribe too much ideological dominance power to the state. Furthermore, some scholars have remarked that there is more to the understanding and working of the nation-state than official ideology.10 Here, I use official ideology as the point from where to start my analysis. I follow the state’s perspective by analysing the channels and contents they choose in order to influence public perception and imagination. However, once the state has laid out their game plan it is up to the public to react. This reaction can have many faces, and only some of these faces will be presented here, bearing in mind the existence of multiple reactions. 6 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17.3 (2004): 559. 7 Ibid, 559. 8 Ibism 559. 9 Anthony Smith, The Nation in History (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), 3. 10 Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1. 5 One must draw clear conceptual distinctions between the terms state, statebuilding, nation, nation-building and nation-state. The state is defined as “the governmental and administrative institutions of a society, and […] the ideological claim as to the sovereignty of those institutions.”11 State-building refers to the creation and strengthening of these institutions. According to the definitions provided here, the term state is a political concept, whereas the term nation can be considered a cultural concept. The concept nation-state in turn is "the result of marrying a new cultural concept of the nation to an older legal and political concept of the state."12 Accordingly, the term nation-state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap between the concepts of state and nation. In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, military and government have come to be perceived as identical and been used in a conflated way.13 Although the terms state and government denominate different concepts, throughout this thesis I use the two terms interchangeably. In general, the concept of the state should not be regarded to entail a monolithic entity that acts uniformly within different settings and contexts. 14 In the case of Myanmar, nonetheless, the state has been perceived as a closely-knit unit that appears relatively united. Likely differences between people representing the state are not acted out in public and although “It is said that there are hard-liners and soft-liners in the Burmese armed forces but in reality there is not much difference between them.”15 Thus, possible differences in opinions and stances are not apparent to such an extent that for the purposes here I consider it necessary to represent them in my choice of words when talking about the ruling authorities in Myanmar. The processes of state and nation-building can be closely interlinked, but generally are independent of each other. Tarling argues that a nation can be built without building a state and vice versa a state can be build without a nation. However, he adds 11 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London, Routledge, 1994), 2. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 129. 13 “There has not even been a distinction between the state, the government and the armed forces, which have all been conflated.” Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002). 14 See for example Derek Sayer, “Dissident Remarks on Hegemony,” Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in modern Mexico. Joseph, Gilbert M. and Daniel Nugent (Eds). (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994): 367-377. 15 Lessons for Burma, Interview with Kyaw Yin Hlaing for BBC Burmese http://www.bbc.co.uk/burmese/learning/story/2005/09/050916_transition_prog19.shtml 12 6 that the latter is only possible on a theoretical level: “Building a state without building or maintaining a ‘nation’ is conceptually possible, and has been attempted in the past, but it is no longer possible in practice. Imperial powers created colonial state, but they faced nationalist movements that they helped to create.”16 In contrast, the number of communities considering themselves a nation without a state is listed as more then 60 by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. 17 These are groups, most often formed around an assumed common ethnic ancestry, that have not been granted a sovereign state in the existing political order, but who lay claim to the right to form a separate state. In the Myanmar context, there are writings about the Karen as “nation of intent”18 and the Kachin as “a stateless nation”19 which are widely used terms to describe such nations who have aspirations to become independent sovereign states. It has been suggested that the nation-state “is a precarious structure, merely one of several options for organising human communities, and a venture that has always been vulnerable to contest and subversion.”20 Although it is correct that the nation-state as form to organise people has been contested, it nevertheless has emerged as the dominant organising political principle. The strength of the nation-state lies in its potential to be emotionally meaningful to people. Its appeal must be recognised by the ruling elites, but also by society. Nationalism has little ideological appeal, but it allows leaders to mobilise this emotional potential to gather citizens behind their leadership.21 This thesis contributes to the discussion of the ideological reach of the state. It highlights the contestations of the nation-building project and how resistance has been employed to reject the prescribed ideology of a state. In the Myanmar case, the ill-repute of the state is often highlighted. This reputation is assumed to result in ideological immunity to the state’s narratives. I want to question the assumption that dislike of the 16 Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 11. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, “UNPO Brochure”, http://www.unpo.org/downloads/UNPOBrochure.pdf 18 Ananda Rajah, “A ‘nation of intent’ in Burma: Karen ethno-nationalism, nationalism and narrations of nation,” The Pacific Review 15.4 (2002): 517 19 Karin Dean, “Spaces and Territorialities on the Sino-Burmese Boundary”, Political Geography 24 (2005): 816. 20 Anthony Milner, “Historians writing Nations: Malaysian Contests.” in Nation-building: Five Southeast Asian Histories, ed. Wang Gungwu (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 117. 21 Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2004), 9. 17 7 state needs to result in rejection of the state’s rhetoric. First of all, why should one assume that people either need to fully reject or blindly disobey to a certain ideology? It is reasonable to assume that people might be able to identify with some messages of the state, while they find it more difficult to see their thoughts and feelings reflected in other statements. Furthermore, there are ample examples that indicate that the separation between state and society is not as strict as one would think according to the assumption that dislike of the state results in complete rejection of the state’s rhetoric. State – society interaction takes place on many levels and creates in one way or another way linkages. It is very unlikely to assume that all personal encounters with state officials will be of negative nature. In addition, even if one is convinced that it is possible fully to reject the state’s message, it is questionable to assume that people’s minds might not be influenced subconsciously. Myanmar studies, which have become a regrettable contentious field, are morally laden. It is often assumed that one party possesses greater moral authority than another and thereby has the right to attempt to influence others. Through examining nationbuilding in Myanmar I reject the assumption that the mobilisation of the concept of morality should guide one’s analysis. The claim to greater moral authority is subjective, and it is premature to assume that one party has a greater ideological influence than another party. The analysis of nation-building in Myanmar can help to unfold different point of views on the state and its ideological project. It can reveal different mechanisms that are at play and show the reader that many factors influence the workings of the state. I see my scholarly contribution in particular to the field of Myanmar studies and the understanding of state – society interaction in Myanmar. While in disciplinary programmes theoretical questions often drive the research, in this case an “area studies” approach encourages more sensitivity towards regional issues and predicaments. By engaging with the topic of nation-building in Southeast Asia in 2008 I will show that its study is not an anachronistic endeavour, but an enterprise that helps to shed light on regional realities and challenges. Fieldwork, ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Research I conducted fieldwork for this thesis in Myanmar between April 17 and June 18, 2008. I spent most of the ten weeks in Yangon and made one short trip to Sittwe and Myau-U in Rakhine state. During these ten weeks I collected printed materials 8 (newspapers, books), visited public sites such as museums, monuments and other places that are relevant to the understanding of nation-building in Myanmar and conducted interviews. The interviews were held with various veteran politicians, ethnic political leaders and members of ethnic community based organisations. In addition to the fieldwork in Myanmar I did additional research at the ISEAS library in Singapore. Conducting research in Myanmar is subject to various restrictions. The current government tolerates the presence of researchers and their work to a limited extent, although it is very difficult and challenging to obtain official research permission. Any research that could be considered political is unlikely to obtain tacit or open approval by the authorities. Most researchers enter the country on tourist or business visas and do not state their intentions to conduct research in any official documentation required by the government. While this raises an obvious ethical dilemma concerning deceiving the authorities about the actual purpose of the stay, it can have larger safety implications for the researcher and his/her respondents. In case unauthorised research comes to the attention of the authorities, the researcher might be denied visa for future visits or will be expelled from the country. However, the greater risk is being taken by people granting interviews to researchers. Interviews with researchers (in many cases non-Asian researchers) will often attract unwanted attention, no matter what the content of the conversation is. It is the responsibility of the researcher to take all necessary precautions to conceal the identity of the respondents and to protect them from possible harmful consequences. Throughout my thesis I will refer to respondents either by titles or invented names. The necessity to conceal the identities of the respondents makes it impossible to locate their current standing in society within their biographical trajectories here in my thesis. While I will frame the political and historical context within which the responses of my interviewees should be understood, I will refrain from providing too many biographical data in order to make it impossible to identity individuals. However, it is not only Myanmar authorities who impose restrictions on research in Myanmar. Burmese exile media groups do not hesitate to report on research activities by researchers whom they consider not in line with their ideological approach. Research has become politicised beyond reason, and one cannot hope to not avoid the unwanted attention of both the authorities and exile media groups. Part of the politicisation of research on Myanmar is the choice of name given to the country in one’s writing. The country carried the name Union of Burma from 1948 – 1974, from 1974 – 1988 it was called the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma and in 1989 it was renamed into 9 Union of Myanmar. In particular the last change of name into Union of Myanmar triggered hostile responses by some parties. The SLORC government changed the name of the country in 1989 without holding a referendum or consulting popular opinion in any other ways. Since the SLORC government is considered an illegitimate government by many parties, one that seized power by force, its actions are disapproved of in principle. Parties who call themselves pro-democracy forces 22 and reside to a large extent in exile in Thailand, but inside the country as well, strongly disapprove the change of name and have campaigned for many years to keep the name Burma in usage. In the rhetoric of the pro-democracy forces the usage of the name Myanmar implies tacit approval of a government that is widely considered repressive and authoritarian. This name controversy has sparked manifold discussions and angry exchanges. I distance myself from any political implications that either name has and use the name Burma when referring to the period until 1989 and thereafter the name Myanmar.23 The scope of my research is limited. The timeframe for fieldwork within the National University of Singapore Master’s degree programme is short and ten weeks barely allow more than a glimpse and the formulation of a first impression and ideas. I had spent a considerable amount of time in Myanmar before embarking on the fieldwork; thus I was familiar with living and working conditions in Myanmar. The National University of Singapore does not provide language training for graduate students and the little Burmese knowledge I possess, I had acquired on earlier trips. My basic knowledge of Burmese does not allow me to interview people in Burmese, instead all the interviews were conducted in English. Most respondents were comfortable speaking English, some had learned English under British rule or in missionary schools and have a higher level of English proficiency than I have. Two respondents did not speak English, 22 The term pro-democracy movement is a self imposed label. It has become a widely used term among people involved in Myanmar related issues when referring to groups and parties who are involved in anti-government activities. I use the term for the convenience of the reader, but want to emphasise that I do not take any political stance in favour or against any parties involved. The term pro-democracy movement is loaded with positive connotations and/or implies goals and activities that many people consider desirable. However, I want to remind the reader that a label such as pro-democracy movement does not ensure the ethically responsible behaviour of people involved in the movement and should not automatically be assumed to possess greater moral authority than other parties involved in Myanmar politics. 23 The name Myanmar is not less linked to the Myanmar government than the name Burma to the pro-democracy movement. Therefore the usage of either name could be interpreted as a political statement and I consider the association of my person with the political pro-democracy movement as undesirable as the association with the current Myanmar government. I am fully aware that the usage of the term Myanmar invites criticism and accusations of political naivety. 10 so here I asked other respondents who were present during the conversation to translate. Some of the interviews were conducted in a group setting which partly hampered the flow of the conversation. Some of the issues discussed during the interviews were politically or ideologically contested and it can be assumed that individuals did not always express their true sentiments, so as not to offend others or to cause friction within the group. All the interviews were conducted informally; questions and topics varied from interview to interview. All respondents are part of the educated political/civil elite and mostly live in Yangon. Their point of views cannot be generalised to other parts of the populations or be considered common public opinion. I am aware that as a female, European researcher I elicit different responses and reactions from my respondents than for example domestic researchers. Two of my respondents were female, and all other respondents were male. The time constraints did not allow me to revisit respondents and to conduct second or third interviews. Some of the interviewees are highly media trained and will in a first conversation not go beyond certain stereotypical utterances or portrayals. Nevertheless, certain topics were recurrent and came to dominate all the interviews thereby indicating a particular relevance. All respondents spoke under the guarantee of anonymity, and I conceal their organisational affiliations if they asked me to do so. The published materials I collected are largely written in English. Some of them are translations from Burmese into English, while other books were exclusively published for an English speaking audience. The New Light of Myanmar, the government issued daily newspaper, publishes many speeches delivered by government spokespersons and thereby providing a rich source of government perspectives. Editorials that engage with international public opinion about the Myanmar government show a surprising awareness among the authorities of their international standing and are also a rich source for research purposes. I am aware that I missed out on many publications, books, newspaper and magazines due to my limited knowledge of the Burmese language. All the limitations outlined above were predictable and could be taken into account when planning/conducting research. However, some events during my research period were not predictable and changed the course of research. During the night from 2 – 3 May the cyclone Nargis hit Yangon and the Irrawaddy delta and caused immense destruction. Many lives were lost, and huge material damage was caused. Lines of communication broke down for some days, electricity was cut off and movement across 11 Yangon was rendered difficult. The extent of the natural disaster became apparent after a few days and it appeared as if my research had come to an end. In Yangon and the Delta, people were struggling to rebuild their lives, were mourning the loss of loved ones and facing the hardship of economic losses. In such a situation I considered it ethically unacceptable to conduct further research. Within the first week after the cyclone an opportunity opened up for me to volunteer with a local organisation that conducted relief work in the Delta. I took the opportunity and thereby gained an unexpected perspective on the topic of my research. Parts of my personal experiences and observations from my volunteer work entered my research and are used here to provide perspective on nationbuilding in Myanmar. Chapter Outline In chapter one I will review nation-building policies and actions in Myanmar since independence in 1948. When analysing nation-building endeavours in Myanmar one needs to make a distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the Myanmar state on the other hand. The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of the state’s mindset and analysing it helps understand reasoning or argumentation. I will argue that the nation-building project has been contested from the start of independence in 1948 and these contestations have resulted in divisions and factions that have become more pronounced over the years. The creation of viable political and social institutions outside the military and sangha failed and left the state in a fragile position. No common national ideology was created, but ideology drove people apart. The Socialist government was heavily guided by socialist ideology in their nation-building project and paid little attention to other issues. The post-1988 state has adopted a different stance towards nation-building from earlier governments. In the absence of a guiding political ideology, the state adopted a nation-building vocabulary that describes a country under threat. No political or philosophical ideology is offered to appeal to the creation of a new ideological overarching commonality, but instead mistrust and the impression of a lingering danger are nurtured among the population. The state has more and more turned to promoting the role of the military as the defender of the unified country. Chapter one demonstrates that the government has failed to provide a unifying basis that would allow people with competing visions about nationhood to be united in the government’s nation-building efforts. In the absence of presenting a unifying national 12 ideology the government has presented itself as an object of dislike that provides a platform of identification. Chapter two presents the perspective of veteran politicians on the nation-building attempts of the government as gathered in personal interviews. The age and experience of this respondent group broadened the scope of my research. Most of the respondents were involved in political activities in the 1940’s, 1950’s, and 1960’s and their perspective reflected a unique long term acquaintance with politics and nation-building in Myanmar. Many of the former politicians have been sidelined in national politics during the course of time and bear personal grudges against the current government. This is not to say that their statements are less valid or useful. The respondents made it clear that I can’t understand contemporary Myanmar unless I am willing to engage with the past. I will argue that from the point of view of veteran politicians, the nation-building project in Myanmar is considered a failure. The contemporary state and its attempt to build a nation are seen in the light of 60 years of failed political reform. The basis for successful political reforms is constitutional reform. From the veteran politicians’ point of view a constitution would provide the heart of the project around which a nation could be built. Any attempts of the government or progress with regard to civil societal structures are ridiculed and declared irrelevant. With the recent approval of a new constitution, that in the eyes of this respondent group is mocking the population, the nation-building project has been rendered impossible. The future is seen as bleak and the prospect of creating any viable form of community as impossible. The interviewees represented the interests of different political factions and had competing visions about nation-building strategies. Yet, they presented themselves willing to overcome their individual differences in possibly joining armed struggle against the government which suggests that the actions and campaigns of the government have not yielded any fruit, but the government has presented itself as a readily available platform of unification. The third chapter deals with the perspective of young social and/or politically active figures from urban backgrounds. Besides presenting the accounts of my respondents, I use secondary literature to locate these respondents’ activities within post-colonial civil societal developments. Similarly as among the veteran politicians, the nation-building project by the government is discarded as meaningless by these figures. However, many respondents have actively taken up opportunities that opened under the SPDC government. I will argue that their rejection of the government’s nation-building endeavour does not prevent them from engaging and interacting with government 13 officials. Civil society has been strengthened, in particular in ethnic-minority states, and although the central government is largely despised, many people have chosen to engage with government officials in order to enhance the well-being of the population. Many interviewees felt obliged, in the light of the inadequate actions of the government to respond to the needs of underprivileged citizens, to fill in the role that otherwise a government would fulfil. Thus, it is the commonly perceived failure of the government to enhance the citizen’s welfare that brings ordinary citizens together in their wish to contribute to betterment of the nation. Yet, within this wish to contribute to the advancement of fellow countrymen, many actors operate within the confines of their ethnic or religious boundaries, thereby reflecting a deeply imbedded factionalism in society. The fourth chapter uses the unique situation created by cyclone Nargis to study nation-building in a post-disaster context. The national outcry to help and support fellow citizens in need was immense. Large financial sums were mobilised, human resources made available and time and moral support offered. The citizens of Myanmar responded in an empathetic unified way in their relief efforts. In contrast, the central government did only gradually develop a common approach. Disagreement among various levels of high ranking officers surfaced and, though in the end curbed by the head of state, revealed ideological factions within the government. That this empathetic societal response reflects a strong national spirit that can be considered an effect of the nation-building project. It is curious that despite the rejection of the nation-building project that all respondents echoed, nevertheless a national identity has been created. Overall, based upon similar observation in chapters one to four I suggest that this sense of national loyalty has its root in the state’s nation-building project. However, while I reject the assumption that the nation-building project has not left any traces in the national memories of citizens, I interpret the performed national spirit as an unintended reaction to the nation-building project. The state’s growing ideological disorientation and increasingly hostile nation-building vocabulary have turned themselves into a potent image of national identification. Not the rejection of the nation-building project, but the dislike of the state accelerated by the nation-building project, provides an object that allows the imagination of a common national suffering and thereby creates a common national identity. 14 Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation:”24 Nation-Building in PostColonial Myanmar Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948. The state and nationbuilders faced great challenges. Contesting calls for state power, an ethnically diverse population, various religious groups and remnants of colonial rule were important issues that called for attention. Successive post-colonial governments have adopted different nation-building strategies to meet these diverse challenges. Successive trajectories were contested by various parties and raised the political stake of the nation-building project considerably. This chapter reviews the nation-building policies of the post-independence regimes. It demonstrates that the immediate post-independence years were coined by emerging contestations of the state’s nation-building project. As a consequence, factionalism among different groups developed into an enduring feature of the Myanmar political landscape. The immediate post-independence regime attempted to implement a political system leaning towards a socialist ideology. The government hoped to gather support among its citizens by attempting to implement a socialist welfare system and to provide increased spiritual guidance by centre-staging Buddhism. With colonial rule having ended only recently, socialism and nationalism were ideologies appealing to policy-makers as base for building a post-independence nation. The attempt to build the nation around a moderate socialist political and economic system was interrupted by a regime change. The autarkist Socialist regime that took over power concentrated in their nation-building efforts heavily on implementing the Burmese Way to Socialism, stressing the equality of all citizens and abolishing exploitative capitalist structures. The failure to provide economically for the population led to the abortion of this project. After 1988 the military in the form of SPDC focused more and more on emphasising elements of unity in diversity against a common enemy threatening the nation. I suggest, that this attempt at nation-building has not led to a common national spirit, but has rather led to a stronger common anti-government sentiment that in turn has created a shared sense of common suffering. Although all respective post-colonial governments have employed an anti-foreign element vocabulary, the SPDC has 24 Than Nyun, Keynote Address to Human Resource Development and Nation Building in Myanmar, by Office of Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence (Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies Ministry of Defence, 1997), 6. 15 intensified this project greatly. In the absence of a guiding political ideology anti-foreign battle cries have turned into hollow meaningless phrases. A schism emerged between the state and society. The state offered little ideological guidance, but instead increasingly attempted to manifest itself as the only eligible holder of power and exploits the population for economic and political gains, while the latter experiences continuous material hardship in the absence of a meaningful political ideology. “We, the People of Burma:”25 Nation-Building in parliamentary Burma Many theorists of nationalism and nation-building debate whether these concepts are a product of modernity or have their roots in pre-modern times. For present purposes this question is not of central relevance. However, Reid26 argues that the modern state had a stronger need to justify its rule than the pre-modern state and therefore nationbuilding and state nationalism gained greater importance after the end of colonial rule than before. Monarchs and other feudal rulers were not under pressure to justify their right to rule before their people, but “ruled by divine right”27. With the demise of colonial rule in Southeast Asia the expectations developed that national governments should “rule in the name of a people and therefore to define and mould that people”.28 State nationalism and nation-building became more powerful in the light of this development. In a similar vein, the nation-building project in Myanmar was intensified after the end of colonial rule. The AFPFL government that took power in 1948 was an alliance of several political factions. It had not been formed on the basis of a common political ideology, but on its common goal to end colonial rule.29 The AFPFL government advanced two main nation-building policies: the creation of a welfare state and the implementation of Buddhism as state religion. The government appealed to the collective trauma that the country had undergone under British Colonial rule. The British had believed in economic progress and introduced a competitive market economy. Participation in the market economy as entrepreneur was difficult for people without capital and largely had excluded Burmese from participation in the profit economy. While many Burmese had not been able to profit 25 Opening words of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, approved on 24 September 1947, effective 4 January 1948 26 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 27 Ibid, 4. 28 Ibid, 4. 29 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 155. 16 from the competition, Indian and Chinese migrants had easier access to capital and profited to a greater extent. This exclusion of Burmese people from the economy and the onset of social disintegration created dissatisfaction with “Western” political systems and Socialism and Marxism gained greater appeal in the light of colonial rule. The introduction of a socialist economy would render impossible capitalist enrichment and exploitation of the under-privileged.30 The 1948 constitution did not define Burma as a socialist state, but included articles that emphasised the socialist stance that the post-independence nation-builders hoped to implement. The government assigned itself the core role in structuring the postcolonial economy. Industrialisation of the economy was one of the foremost goals, partly stemming from the experience during the Pacific war where Burma had greatly suffered under the need to import textiles and other goods. Furthermore, colonial rule had left bitter memories of being a raw material-producing country that had to rely on imports of most processed goods. Besides wanting to modernise the Burmese economy, land nationalisation enjoyed a high priority in the post-independence economic planning.31 First steps to nationalise land were successful in a way as land was put from the hands of Indian land owners into the hands of Burmese farmers, but resulted in a budgetary deficit in 1949 largely due to the lack of land revenues. The civil war additionally put a heavy strain on the financial situation of the state. As a consequence, Nu, the first prime minister of the Union of Burma and a former Thakin,32 invited foreign investments and aid to Burma: “Since we do not possess either the capital or the technical resources necessary for industrialisation, we must enlist the help of foreign capital and technicians.”33 Foreign economic aid advisors developed an economic plan that the Burmese government consulted and used in order to develop their own future economic plans. These economic schemes were presented in 1952 at the first nationwide welfare state conference. The notion of the welfare state that was elaborated upon at this conference was subsumed under the Burmese term pyidawtha, a "country 30 David Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 66. 31 Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific relations: New York, 1958), 90. 32 The term Thakin was the Burmese term for master and Burmese people had been required to refer to the British colonial rulers by this title. The independence movement initiated by young Burmese student’s referred to each as Thakin’s in reference to the colonial usage. The term Thakin has come to be stand for the heroic deeds of young freedom fighters and is still held in high regard. 33 Nu cited from Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: a Study of the first years of independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 96. 17 of peace and prosperity.”34 The core of the welfare state creation was the introduction of further central economic planning and social welfare schemes. However, in the light of an ill-equipped administrative apparatus, problems related to the agricultural sectors and continuing insurgency, the welfare plan was overambitious and destined to fail. The number of civil servants who according to the 1952 economic plan had to work in the civil service to fulfil its entire tasks was impossible to achieve. Not enough qualified people entered the civil service to perform necessary tasks such as policing, taxing, postal services, trade control or land redistribution. Through the emphasis on industrialisation the agricultural sector had not been given as much attention as in earlier years. The rice production declined and at the same time the international market price for rice dropped. This led to a severe stagnation of the export economy and resulted in further financial shortcomings of the state. Combined with an increased need to finance anti-insurgent activities of the state, the financial burdens on the state made it impossible to invest into the economy as planned. 35 The implementation of a successful economy was further complicated by a neglect of the government to create peaceful domestic conditions. The government did not sufficiently invested into the creation of law and order which was necessary to allow further investments into economic sectors. The failure of the state to create a functioning domestic economy disappointed many Burmese citizens whose hopes and expectations for the period after independence were neatly summarised by Furnivall: On the eve of independence I attended a modern Burmese play. Successive scenes depicted typical incidents of the old regime: the cultivator making over his cattle to the Indian moneylender; the wife abandoning her loom; the foreign capitalists, European, Indian, and Chinese, counting their gold; and the Burman middlemen helping them to pile it up. The play ended with the people filling their pockets in a shower of gold and silver. That is what Burmans expected as the result of independence. Now, of course, they are impatient.”36 Nu made a last attempt to gain popular support for the implementation of the government’s pyidawtha state and called on the support of the army to implement the economic plans in order to ”free the Union from the ravages of both internal and external 34 Mya Maung, “The Burma Road from the Union of Burma to Myanmar,” Asian Survey 30.6 (1990): 604. 35 John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 617 and Frank Trager, Building a Welfare State in Burma: 1948 – 1956 (New York: Institute of Pacific relations: New York, 1958), 104-105. 36 J.S. Furnivall, “Burma, Past and Present,” Far Eastern Survey 22.3 (1953): 26. 18 enemies.”37 With the realisation that the introduction of the welfare state would remain an elusive notion, the state’s promotion of Buddhism gained greater importance. Myanmar was initially founded as a secular state, but Buddhism immediately played an important role after 1948. The re-centralisation of Buddhism by the state started in 1949 with the passage of several acts that intended to strengthen the sangha and its role in society. Nu played an important role in promoting the role of Buddhism in the young nation. He was a deeply religious person who was able to influence state politics with his personal, religious convictions. The government sponsored the Sixth Great Buddhist Council that took place between 1954 and 1956. Nu announced his intention to make Buddhism the state religion at the conclusion of the Sixth Buddhist Council. His huge electoral success in 1961 had made him believe that he had the support of a wide range of the population and let him pass constitutional amendments by the parliament to give Buddhism an overarching role in the state.38 The appeal of Buddhism as a unifying national ideology might have been personal to Prime Minister Nu, but had its deeper historical roots and was suitable for emotional mobilisation of the masses. With the onset of colonial rule, the last monarch of the Konbaung dynasty Thibaw had been deposed and sent into exile to British India. Under the monarchy Buddhism had played a central role and the king presented himself as the defender of the faith. Monks had a superior social status and were greatly venerated. Under colonialism the decline of the Buddhist sangha had set in. Its social status was incomparably lower and people gave less alms to monks who relied on the financial support of the population for their survival. Monks had been at the forefront of the independence movement, bewailing colonial suppression and the loss of their social status. In 1917, an incident at Shwedagon Pagoda that entered history books as the “shoe question” occurred. While in Myanmar it is common to take off one’s socks and shoes before entering a pagoda, it was British custom to not take off one’s shoes when visiting pagodas. The Young Men Buddhist Association (YMBA) mobilised popular support against this British habit. The shoe question developed its very own dynamic. At 37 Burma Weekly Bulletin, September 22, 1995 quoted from Mary P. Callahan, War and State Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004):180 38 Donald E. Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965): 117-120. 19 its very core was an expression of Buddhist identity which developed into the epitome of anti-British feelings. 39 Nu re-mobilised these existing sentiments by blaming the colonial rulers for the decline of Buddhism in Myanmar and emphasised his intention to restore the former glory of Buddhism. 40 Furthermore, people were familiar with the Buddhist belief system and it was easy to identity with, at least for the 85 % of the population who were followers of Buddhism. Buddhism was closely intertwined with the Burman nationalist movement. It stood for national pride, represented deep-rooted values and might provide a bedrock in times of modernisation. Its mobilisation as the unifying core value of the struggling young nation might have seemed all too natural.41 However, not all parties were equally thrilled by the prospects of Buddhism as state religion. As mentioned, the AFPFL government was a coalition of different ideological factions. Once the “anti-imperial nationalism”42 that had provided a strong enough catalyst to hold these opposing factions together faded ideological conflicts emerged within the AFPFL. Conflicts about the right political ideology, foreign policy strategies or domestic economic development strategies in the end culminated in a split into “clean” and “stable” factions of the AFPFL in 1958. The military used this split to advance its claim to political power. The clean AFPFL faction held on to power for five more months, but then handed over power to the military for an agreed period of six month, after which elections were supposed to take place. The rule of the military was extended from six into 18 months and ended with elections that returned Nu and the clean AFPFL faction to power. The interregnum by the military in 1958 sowed further distrust among competing political factions. The rational behind the military take-over was to re-establish central state dominance that had been hampered by intra-political conflicts, to curb armed insurgent movements and to hinder the increasing religiosity of the state. Ethnic populations were increasingly distrustful over the role and attitude of the government towards the minority populations. A feeling of neglect in national budget allocation, 39 Donald Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook (New York: The Free Press, 1971): 106-109. 40 Bruce Matthews, “The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar,” in Buddhism and Politics in twentieth-century Asia ed. Ian Harris (London, New York: Pinter, 1999): 33. 41 Manning Nash, “Buddhist Revitalisation in the Nation State: The Burmese Experience,” in Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, ed. Robert F. Spencer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971): 105-106. 42 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), 6. 20 regardless of the actual financial capacities of the central government, led to further polarisation of opinions. The increasing role of Buddhism in state considerations did not contribute to appeasing the sentiments of many non-Buddhists citizens who happened to live primarily in the border regions. Even though the total number of insurgents decreased during the first military reign between 1958 and 1960, various insurgent groups formed the National Democratic United Front (NDUF) during this period. Informal peace talks with the Karen National Union (KNU) occurred under the aegis of the military caretaker government, but they failed to find any common ground between the parties. Nu’s return to power in 1960 was characterised by his campaign to make Buddhism the state religion if he was returned to power in that year’s elections. The fulfilment of this promise after the elections took place and was the fatal blow to Nu’s rule. Not only did more insurgent groups join the armed movement since many of them as non-Buddhist adherents considered Buddhism as state religion a threat to their religious freedom, but the military also used it in 1962 as one of the reasons to stage a coup d’état. 43 The government attempted to mobilise concepts that widely resonated among the citizens and had a strong emotional appeal. The promotion of social justice and spirituality were in line with the nationalist ambitions and the dominant Socialist ideology. However, the attempts of the central government to promote the “we, the people of Burma”44 spirit that had been promoted in the opening words of the constitution was on the one hand thwarted by the failure of the state to realise its economic vision and on the other hand made difficult by many citizens who could not identify with Buddhism as state religion. “Unity & Socialism:”45 a second Revolution, 1962-1988 In 1962 the Revolutionary Council (RC), under the leadership of Ne Win, staged a coup d’état and appropriated state power. Ne Win had been one of the Thirty Comrades, 46 commander of the Burma National Army (BNA) and prime minister from 43 Bruce Matthews, “Religious Minorities in Myanmar – Hints of the Shadow,” Contemporary South Asia 4.3 (1995): 289. 44 Opening words of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, approved on 24 September 1947, effective 4 January 1948 45 Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1974. 46 The term “Thirty Comrades” describes a group of young Burmese men who left Burma in 1941 and obtained military training by the Japanese army to fight the British colonial rulers. These Thirty Comrades constitute the core of what later emerged as the Burma National Army, Myanmar’s first national defence forces. 21 1958 to 1960. The military considered the takeover necessary since in their eyes the Union government “represented the interests of feudal elements; exploiting landlords; national and foreign capitalists who wielded their influence on public affairs; bureaucrats, political opportunists who acknowledged their allegiance to such capitalists.”47 Ne Win and the RC introduced the Burmese Way to Socialism. The BSPP was founded to implement the Burmese Way to Socialism. Most of the party and the RC were dominated by military personnel. In particular, the early years of the RC were characterised by an intensification of the ideologies that had dominated the Burmese political scene in the preceding years already: nationalism and socialism. The RC considered socialism the way adequately to build a young nation: “We are in the throes of a social revolution under the leadership of the RC and the BSPP. Eighteen years of independence under the former political governments had not brought us any nearer to our ultimate goal – socialism, to which Bogyoke Aung San had pledged to march all along our struggle before his untimely death.”48 An important reason why the earlier parliamentary government had failed in the eyes of the RC to achieve an appropriate form of socialism was the political divisions that characterised the central government. 49 In order finally to achieve socialism as a goal set during the struggle for independence, radical nationalisation of the economy was to be introduced: “[…] the next stage, as important and in some practical respects more problematical than confusing, is to consolidate the independence won and effectively utilise it to serve the national weal. With this sameness of purpose binding them all, it is also unique in this decade of rapid growth of newlyindependent states that their leaders by and large favour socialism as scientific nation-building. Socialism is their avowed ideal, even though it varies in labels and degree of implementation. This trend is particularly noticeable in underdeveloped countries […] The attraction of socialism for the new nations is understandable from their refusal to be naively satisfied with purely symbolical trappings of sovereignty. For it is socialism which convincingly teaches that political independence must be equated with economic independence.”50 Emphasis was placed on a strategy of central economic planning and a large scale nationalisation of the economy. It aimed at putting back economic power into the hands of the Myanmar people. From 1963 on, all banks, industries and large business 47 Quoted from Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Programme Party Government to eradicate internal economic Impediments,” South East Asia Research 11.1 (2003): 6. 48 Working People’s Daily, January 4, 1970. 49 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 151-157. 50 Working People’s Daily, January 4, 1966. 22 were nationalised, independent newspapers outlawed, and trade unions and political parties other than the BSPP declared illegal. The largest currency denominations at that time, 50 and 100 kyat notes, were declared worthless and those persons who still owned private business, mainly Chinese and Indians, became poor overnight and had to sell their businesses to the government. During these years many migrants of Chinese and Indian descent returned to their home countries.51 The government took pride in driving away foreign businesses and foreign nationals: “Out of 50 foreign technicians serving with the Burma Oil Company (1954) limited on January 1, 1963, when it was taken over by the state, only 3 foreigner geologists will remain with the nationalised Bama Yenan Company limited. The remaining 3 will leave in April.”52 This nationalisation of the Myanmar economy and related measures that aimed at putting Burmese people back in charge of Burmese affairs has widely been referred to as Burmanisation of the economy. The state attempted to restore Burmese dominance in the civil service by replacing Indian citizens who worked as civil servants with Burmese civil servants,53 and “to place what remains of private enterprises in the hands of Burmese citizens and to eliminate foreign economic control”54 by “nationalisation of existing assets, by reserving certain economic functions to Burmese citizens or the State, by direct competition of the State with alien enterprises, by giving economic advantages to Burmese nationals vis-à-vis aliens, and by measures to limit the number of alien residents.”55 According to Golay, the introduction of economic nationalism as the guiding force behind any economic policy implementation resulted in the failure to implement more apt economic policies that would have been more suited to adequately stimulate the economy. Socialism undergirded the rhetoric of the government. Even the issue of national identity and ethnic nationalities was addressed through socialist vocabulary. The Union day spirit was celebrated emphasising the unified nature of peasants and workers no 51 David Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 77. 52 Working People’s Daily, February 8. 1964. 53 Albert D Moscotti, British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma 1917-1937 (Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii, 1974), 101-107. 54 Robert A. Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Politics: The Politics of Burmanization,” Asian Survey 7.3 (1967): 211. 55 Frank Golay et al., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969): 211. 23 matter which ethnic nationality they belonged to.56 One advertisement, though not issued by the government, but in a funny way imitating government rhetoric was published by Nissan proclaiming that “Nissan-Datsun Vehicles are serving for all the peoples of the Union of Burma even in Shan, Kayah, Karen, Kachin and Chin States as people’s car. Fills your every need for tough dependable service.”57 Reality looked slightly different to what was celebrated in the Union spirit speeches by the RC. Formed in 1961, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) turned out to be one of most formidable ethnic armies. The BSPP had initiated peace talks in 1963. Little will to compromise among all parties made a peaceful settlement impossible. The RC and BSPP focused in their earlier years more on implementing socialism and only later tried to address issues of political dissent more intensely. In 1974 a new constitution was introduced with the goal to implement socialism in the law and at the same time to address some of the issues of contention between the central government and ethnic nationality groups. Nevertheless, the focus of the 1974 constitution was on providing a legal framework to implement socialism.58 The constitution allotted seven states the names of ethnic groups (and seven divisions Burman names), but re-distribution of central state power did not take place. This symbolic gesture had little meaning for the ethnic parties seeking greater political autonomy. The failure to end armed conflicts and to instigate sustainable economic policies contributed to the BSSP government’s failure to achieve “performance legitimacy,”59 which in turn contributed to the final downfall of BSPP government in 1988. The ensuing violent clashes between the central government and ethnic nationality armies have come to dominant the understanding of many people and scholars of state 56 See for example Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1966. Working People’s Daily, February 12, 1964. 58 See for example a mock dialogue that was published in the Working People’s Daily, January 29 1974 in order to explain the connection between socialism and the constitution: “What is the use of the rule of law? Can it bring down prices of commodities so that I can eat two square meals a day?” asked an anxious Mg Tun Aye, who is my next-door neighbour, over a cup of plain tea at his house recently. “It can,” replied U Ba Aye, his father, assertively. “There will be some kind of law definitely, as in other civilised countries, forbidding such anti-social crimes as hoarding of the staples and profiteering thereby.” “Exactly,” I nodded approvingly. “In that case,” inquired Mg Tun Aye, “will the government proceed against the peasants if they are found hoarding up their paddy for a very high return of profits?” ”It will certainly,” U Ba Aye answered […] “But in a socialist country like ours it is not a wise thing for the government to quarrel with the peasants.” Mg Tun Aye expressed his doubt in a plain manner. ‘In Socialism, the law does not make a difference between a peasant and a potter. They are equal,” said U Ba Aye.” 59 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar (Burma),” in Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia eds. Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005), 76. 57 24 – minority relations in the Socialist period in Myanmar. Many scholars argue that the BSPP government, besides violently fighting armed insurgents, introduced cultural Burmanisation initiatives towards ethnic nationalities.60 Although it is not correct to say that ethnic nationalities were denied any cultural or religious rights, it might be more appropriate to assume that the notions of a unified socialist Burmese culture were based upon cultural elements of the Burman majority: “the prevalence of Burman chauvinistic elements in the national building discourse and activities undertaken by post-colonial Myanmar governments”61 can be acknowledged. Language policies were a contentious issue. Burmese was declared the only official language of instruction in all university and pre-university classes. Teaching of minority languages was partly restricted, but primarily did not receive any official support or endorsement. A request by the Shan student organisation in the late 60’s to introduce a new Shan script was turned down by the Shan state council since in their eyes the new script was associated with Shan nationalism and consequently the insurgent movement. Local teachers nonetheless taught the new script in schools; this practice in turn led to the complete suspension of teaching in Shan language at public schools under the jurisdiction of this Shan state council. The Mon cultural organisation initiated an attempt to re-introduce Mon language classes at public schools. This request to make Mon language an official part of the curriculum at public schools was turned down by government actors. The official reason was that this would have disadvantaged Mon students since Mon language classes would have meant additional workload for the local students and might have led to minority students lagging behind in the education systems. 62 The bans on these particular language initiatives must not be understood as the complete refusal of the state to allow these organisations to function and exist. Rather, government officials prohibited potentially controversial activities under their tutelage and granted these organisations permission only to engage in purely non-controversial 60 See for example Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press) 1980, Bruce Matthews, “Ethnic and Religious Diversity: Myanmar’s unfolding Nemesis,” ISEAS Visiting Researchers Series No. 3, 2001 or Alan Collins, “Burma’s Civil War: a Case of Societal Security,” Civil Wars 5.4, 2002. 61 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness, practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, ed. Lee Hock Guan and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 150. 62 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness, practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, ed. Lee Hock Guan and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 164-166. 25 welfare activities for the benefit of the local communities. There are several reasons why such little space for cultural and political organisations was granted. The BSPP government’s lack of full sovereignty created insecurity among party members and any form of organised communal life constituted a possible threat to their dominance. Even though social and cultural grass-root spaces were not ruled out by law, any usage of these spaces was subject to negotiations with reluctant BSPP officials. In particular initiatives related to minority languages were controversial since they were regarded as avenue for expressing nationalistic sentiments and anti-government protest. In addition, social, cultural and political spaces and organisations were often conflated in the eyes of government officials. Many were unable to make a distinction between such initiatives or considered them to closely related to insurgent activities. Accordingly, their existence was tolerated, but their functioning highly restricted. In contrast to language issues, religious affairs were treated more carefully. The promotion of the Union government of Buddhism as state religion had contributed to its downfall and the BSPP adopted religious policies that changed the endorsement of Buddhism into a private matter again and not a matter of the state. The government ceased financial support for any religious institutions and monks were banned from any political activities. The government intensified its secularisation policies and by 1965 the sangha had lost its political relevance and a large part of its influence on daily life. Because of the changing economic situation the sangha not only lost its institutionalised role, but it also suffered further material decline as the population was not able any more to provide the sangha with the same financial support through donations as earlier.63 The government attempted to subsume all issues by and large related to nationbuilding under the header socialist endeavour. No matter whether it concerned health issues 64 or questions of the right way to lead the revolution65, Socialism was presented as the appropriate way to address all issues. 63 Tin Maung Maung Than, “The Sangha and Sasana in Socialist Burma,” Sojourn: Social Issues in Southeast Asia 3.1 (1988), 26-32. 64 “The general consensus of opinion is that it is most desirable for the working people of the country to be equipped with the basic facts with regard to health education and to cultivate practices which are conducive to cleanliness and good health,” Working People’s Daily, February 4, 1966. 65 “We are now in the throes of a social revolution. But this can only be achieved, as in the previous case, with the co-operation of the ludu. Hence the importance of mass organisation cannot be minimised. Workers and peasant form the basis of that mass organisation. That should be well understood. They must prepare themselves for the leading role they are to play in the building up of a Socialist society. If they are not co-operative, the goal set for them can never be realised. Now, of course, the Army leads. But it leads for the preparatory period. But what is 26 In a nutshell, the RC had initiated radical policies of socialism through in particular economic nationalisation. They considered constitutional reform as a way to achieve their socialist goals. The RC distanced themselves from parliamentary period politics and saw them as dominated by bourgeois and divisive party political interests. Issues of ethnic insurgent movements were rather addressed through combat than political or institutional reform. “The Enemy who is more destructive than Nargis”66, a Nation under Threat: Myanmar since 1988 By the late 80’s BSPP government had lost control of the economic development of the country. Stagnation accompanied by impoverishment of the population, demonetisation of certain currency notes and the announcement that Myanmar had reached Least Developed Country status by 1987 resulted in the nadir of popularity for the BSPP government. The demonstrations held by students and the civilian population in August and September 1988 triggered by these developments led to the downfall of the BSPP and a military takeover of state power. Attempts of the BSPP to appease the demonstrating public by announcing multi-party elections were unsuccessful, the government had lost trust among the population and their announcements of multi-party elections were greeted with disbelief. Dr. Maung Maung of the BSPP saw handing over power to the military as the only way out of the prevailing conflict. He had been appointed chairman of the BSPP and president of Burma in August 1988 in a last attempt to solve the tense political situation peacefully. Earlier in his career he had served as judge, judicial minister, member of the council of state in 1974 and the central executive committee of the BSPP. He believed in constitutional reform and had hoped to facilitate a peaceful constitutional transition of power by serving as president.67 His political experience did not help him in negotiating a political settlement. The military not only ended the economic policies of the BSPP government, but also abandoned socialism completely and entered an altogether new ideological era. leadership without a following? And whom will one follow in the absence of leadership?” Working People’s Daily, March 27, 1966. 66 New Light of Myanmar, June 8, 2008. 67 Robert H. Taylor (Ed), Dr Maung Maung: Gentlemen, Scholar, Patriot (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 526. 27 The new government, called the SLORC until 1997 and then renamed into the SPDC, announced its plan to hold on to power only until peace and order were reestablished in the country. The takeover was not prepared or planned beforehand. In 1958 the takeover of the military had been planned and the army was equipped to deal with the pressing issues. In 1988, the loss of power for the BSPP government came by surprise and no initial plan was drawn on how to address the prevailing concerns or which ideology to follow.68 The political situation demanded restoration of law and order and precisely these issues became the main concerns of the military government. The SLORC/SPDC quickly developed a nation-building strategy and vocabulary. By November 1988 they adopted the practice to publish pro-military slogans on the front paper of the Working People’s Daily, the government-run newspaper (after 1992 renamed into New Light of Myanmar).69 Soon, not only the front page was decorated with propaganda slogans, but many publications and speeches were dominated by text passages that glorified the role of the military in building the post-independence Myanmar nation. The military pledged their “Noble Desire”70 in the newspaper, described their achievements and reminded citizens of their duties daily.71 These slogans and “Our three main national causes” 68 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and factional struggles in post-independence Burmese governments,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39.1 (2008): 163. 69 On November 8, 1988 the following slogan appeared for the first time on the front page of the Working People’s Daily: “Only when the rule of law and order and peace and tranquillity prevail would the lives, homes and properties of the people be safe and secure; only then would they be able to earn their livelihood in peace and freedom. The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task.” 70 The “Noble Desire” was printed for the first time on the front page of the Working People’s Daily on February 19, 1990: “Although the State law and order Restoration Council has had to take over, due to unavoidable circumstances, the sovereign power of the State to prevent the Union from disintegration and for ensuring the safety and security of the lives, homes and property of the people, it wishes to retransfer State power to the people, in whom it was initially invested, through democratic means within the shortest time possible. Therefore, the entire people are urged to give all their co-operation to ensure the rule of law and for prevalence of peace and tranquillity.” 71 The following slogans are the most common quotations in the Working People’s Daily/New Light of Myanmar after February 1990: “Only when the people are able to enjoy convenient and easy livelihood would they be physically and mentally at peace. The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task;” “The Tatmadaw has been sacrificing much of its blood and swear to prevent disintegration of the Union. All nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task;” “The interest of the state cannot be served and promoted by disturbances and instability, join hands with the Tatmadaw in preventing disturbances and acts of instability;” and “Only when there is security and efficiency in transportation and communication would there be convenience in travel, commerce and earning of livelihood. The Tatmadaw is carrying out this duty and all nationalities of the Union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task.” 28 Non-disintegration of the Union - our cause! Non-disintegration of national sovereignty - our cause! Consolidation of national sovereignty - our cause! 72 culminated in the formulation of the 12 national goals. The 12 national goals first appeared on the front page of the New Light of Myanmar on July 6, 1995, were printed somewhere daily in the newspaper for another six month and ever since January 1996 are printed daily on the front page of the New Light of Myanmar. The 12 national goals encompass the following political, economic and social objectives: Four political objectives Stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order National reconsolidation Emergence of a new enduring State Constitution Building of a new modern developed nation in accord with the new State Constitution Four economic objectives Development of agriculture as the base and all–round development of other sectors of the economy as well Proper evolution of the market-oriented economic system Development of the economy inviting participation in terms of technical knowhow and investments from sources inside the country and abroad The initiative to shape the national economy must be kept in the hands of the state and the national peoples Four social objectives Uplift of he moral and morality of the entire nation Uplift of national prestige and integrity and preservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage and national character Uplift of dynamism of patriotic spirit Uplift of health, fitness and education standards of the entire nation 72 Working People’s Daily, March 26, 1990. 29 These goals described the appropriate way “towards a modern nation through all-round development.”73 In the absence of a particular political vision that formed the basis of military rule and a need to legitimate one’s rule, the military turned its immediate September 1988 crisis vocabulary into a long-term strategy. The notion of non-disintegration of the Union and national sovereignty formed an important bedrock of SLORC/SPDC ideology. In order to feel compelled to prevent the disintegration of the Union and national sovereignty a tangible threat needed to be produced. Whether this threat is tangible or realistic in the Myanmar case can be doubted, but more important here is, that the military created this threat in their propaganda like writings and speeches. Saw Maung (SLORC chairman, 1988 – 1992) and Khin Nyunt (intelligence chief 1984 - 2004 and later prime minister 2003 - 2004) published books in 1989 that contributed to the notion of dangerous conspiracies towards the Myanmar nation. Khin Nyunt elaborated on an alleged Communist Party of Burma (CBP) – Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conspiracy in his publication. According to Khin Nyunt the CBP and CIA had initiated the 1988 demonstrations and were controlling the National League for Democracy (NLD). Saw Maung elaborated on the role of British Broadcasting Company (BBC), Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the lies they were spreading to cause unrest and instability.74 During the last 20 years not much has changed in the approach of the government to create and portray enemies. The statement “Skyful liars attempting to destroy nation: BBC lying, VOA deceiving, RFA setting up hostilities. Beware! Don’t be bought by this ill-wisher,”75 was published in a June 2008 issue of the New Light of Myanmar, can be found on many other days throughout the last 20 years regularly in the New Light of Myanmar. The army declared martial law and annulled the constitution in September 1988. Democratic elections were promised by SLORC and political parties were allowed to register. Elections were held in 1990 and won by the NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin Oo and Aung Gyi. Political power was not handed over to the NLD, but stayed in the hands of the military. The SLORC announced that a national convention was about to 73 New Light of Myanmar, January 28, 1996, Sunday supplement. James F. Guyot and John Badgley, “Myanmar in 1989: Tatmadaw V”, Asian Survey 30.2 (1990): 189. 75 New Light of Myanmar, June 11, 2008. 74 74 30 convene that would draft a new constitution. The new constitution was to ensure the “non-disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of national sovereignty; consolidation and perpetuation of sovereignty.” 76 The military government has a liking for portraying in particular Burmese political groups as subversive elements. They are discredited for undermining stability of the state, to invite chaotic situations or to defy any government activity: ”11 expatriate destructive elements including former ABSDF member Ko Oo (a) My Oo arrested. “At a time when the government is endeavouring for nationbuilding tasks to bring about better foundation for future State after laying down political, economic and social objectives for emergence of a democratic state, expatriate NLD anti-government organisations outside the country and terrorist groups are committing destructive acts in various means to disparage the dignity of the government and to incite civil uprising.”77 A more recent example that illustrates the same objectives locates NLD in latest political events in Myanmar: “As is known to all, NLD sticks to the policy of disturbing the State and people. Maybe it has laid down a policy “Oppose whatever the government does” in addition to the mottoes such as “utter devastation”, “confrontation” and “defy every order”. […] NLD issued a special announcement dated 10 June 2008. The theme of the announcement was to oppose the already-approved State constitution (draft)(2008). […] The State constitution (2008) was approved with the support of 92.48 per cent of the voters or the support of more than none of every then voters. […] Traumatized by nearly cent-per-cent of the people nodded, NLD made various accusations saying it was unfair, the people were forced and threatened and the government abused the power. […] So, NLD should choose the way in which the party is to stand for the 2010 election in accord with the already approved constitution so as to continue its survival.”78 Besides accusing political parties of inciting unrest and civil disobedience, a repeated charge of the government relates to receiving outside financial support. According to Myanmar law it was illegal for political parties to receive financial support from funding agencies outside Myanmar. The government portrays domestic political parties to function as puppets of outside funding organisations, more specifically Western organisations and governments. 76 Working People’s Daily, October 3, 1992 New Light of Myanmar, July 13, 2000. 78 New Light of Myanmar, June 16, 2008. 77 31 Figure 1.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar August 13, 2000 The image above illustrates the accusation of being (financial) dependent puppets in a vivid manner. On the club of the left baseball player the letters ABSDF (All Burma Students Democratic Front) are written. The ABSDF was formed in November 1988 along the Thai – Myanmar border as a result of the demonstrations in August and September 1988. Many students had fled to Thailand to escape the grip of military. In order to continue the political struggle that had been taken out into the public by students and concerned citizens in mid 1988 some of the political refugees decided to organise a formal organisation that would continue its political struggle by way of armed force and political activities. The batter is branded “neo-colonialist”, the pitcher has written the words NGO on his shirt and is labelled “runaway, fugitive” and the field player is the “internal axehandle”. Their thought clouds are illustrating their intentions. The “neo-colonialist” is attempting to interfere in internal affairs, the “internal axe-handle” is his subservient domestic intermediary who executes whatever the outsider plans and the runaway fugitive throws instructions at the neo-colonialist. ABSDF and the internal axe-handle are tightly held by the neo-colonialist who does not let go of the club, or allegorical spoken of the influence on Burmese political activists. 32 Figure 1.2 Signboard opposite the former American embassy The government does not only communicate the idea of the necessity to be aware of enemies of the nation through newspapers or speeches, but in other public ways as well. Signboards are placed in strategic positions to remind the public of who the enemy is. Above is a photograph of a signboard that proclaims the: People’s desire Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative views Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of the nation Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State Crash all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy This signboard was placed opposite the former American embassy on Merchant Road in Yangon. However, it was destroyed during the cyclone Nargis and only shattered pieces of the “people’s desire” were to be found on Merchant Road after the storm. Similarly, an identical signboard that had been placed at the corner of University Avenue and Kabe Aye Pagoda Road close to the house of Aung San Suu Kyi was destroyed by Nargis. Complementary to the notion of needing to fear the nation’s enemy is the strong call for national unity by the government. The call for unity has played an important role throughout post-colonial Myanmar and is not a new feature of the SPDC government. 33 “However, the government, the people and the Tatmadaw are marching toward a discipline-flourishing democracy in unity. And now, they are nearly reaching their goal. […] Myanmar had encountered such bitter experiences. Soon after it regained independence there emerged internal armed insurgency as the national unity was undermined by foreign nations. The internal armed that reigned since 1948-1949 lasted for about 40 years. The impact of the 40-year long internal armed insurgency on the nation was far greater than that of the sever storm Nargis. This who triggered the internal armed insurgency that were worse than Nargis are the ones who are more cruel and brutal than the storm, owing to alien instigation, the nation had suffered much in the past.”79 Figure 1.3 Father and son statue in People’s Park, Yangon A famous story in Myanmar that is published in the primary school books that are used countrywide in Myanmar and depicted in the photograph above is the story of the father and his three sons. “A father gives a bundle of wood to his three sons and asks them to break it apart. The sons try one after another, but fail to break the bundle into two. Then, the father unties the bundle and hands three smaller bundles back to his sons. This time the sons easily succeed in breaking the wood. Once the sons have accomplished to break the wood the father takes them aside and says; “Sons, as long as the wood was one bundle you were not able to break. Only after I untied the bundle and 79 New Light of Myanmar, June 8, 2008. 34 separated it you succeeded in breaking it. As long as you three will stand close together nothing can come in between you. Only when you separate you can easily be broken.”80 This story is often used as allegory to the nation. As long as the nation stands united no harm can be done, only once small cracks will appear, bigger cracks can easily follow and can lead to the destruction of the nation. The photograph of the monument above was taken few weeks after the cyclone Nargis. The People’s Park on Pyay Road in Yangon, where the statue can be found, had been turned into an uprooted tree dump and was closed for the public. Nevertheless, it can clearly be seen through the fence that not only the bundle of wood is broken into two (which was not the case before the storm), but the son also has “broken” his arm. Irony wants it that one of the iconic portrayals of national unity has not been destroyed by the long dreaded external enemies, but by a natural disaster. The topic of national unity needs to be understood within the light of armed civil conflicts in Myanmar. The current government has achieved the signing of 26 ceasefire agreements, more than in any point of Myanmar post-colonial history.81 Already in the past, the government used to portray themselves as concerned with the creation of peaceful conditions and the achievement of national unity. However, since the government had few tangible results to present to the public these issues were not as dominant in the nation-building discourse as they are today. SLORC/SPDC used the implementation of the ceasefire agreements as an opportunity to portray themselves more prominently as acting in the interest of national peace and unity. Furthermore, in 1991, with the announcement of the national convention that convened in order to draft a new constitution, ethnicity and ethnic rights were addressed in a more active way. The national convention provided a suitable platform to further promote their central role in brining together groups of various ethnic descents. The government stressed the ethnic diversity of Myanmar and suggested political reform that assumingly would grant more political rights to ethnic nationality populations.82 The government has increasingly celebrated ethnic diversity in public and declared the diverse cultural heritage a pride of the country. However, even the government seems to realise that this a very contentious issue and does not attempt to mimic the uncontested acceptance of diverse cultural heritage in public. 80 My own very free translation from primary school reader, 3rd standard. Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 1. 82 David Steinberg, “Myanmar in 1991: The Miasma in Burma,” Asian Survey 32.2 (1992): 147. 81 35 An important part of this nation-building strategy was the writing of “the biography of nation”83 and the emphasis in this biography on the fundamental role of the military. Only the military is able to protect the nation from its external enemies and other threats to national unity. In September 1988 an article under the title “Do not make easy things difficult” set the tone for self-portrayal of the military: “As the nation was being confronted with an entire train of evil threats as mentioned above, the Tatmadaw which has in all its historical tradition been dutiful in carrying out its responsibilities intervened to save the general deteriorating situation in the whole country on 18-09-88. The Tatmadaw publicly declared four fundamental tasks which were its objectives as well as its basic duty. 1. maintenance of law and order; prevalence of regional peace and tranquillity. 2. provide secure and smooth transportation. 3. strive for the better conditions of food, clothing and shelter of the people. 4. to hold multiparty democracy general elections.”84 Figure 1.4 83 84 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2008 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 2002), 205. Working People’s Daily, September 26, 1988. 36 This image from the New Light of Myanmar illustrates the historical portray of the armed forces by themselves nicely. The soldier stands in front of houses that are drawn on a Myanmar map. His role is to defend the interest of the state and the people. It remains unclear whether state and people have the same interest, but no matter whether it’s the same or different interest, the soldier is able to defend both of them. The political history of the country is broken down into four major period: 1948-1949, the immediate years after independence in which Communist attacks were the most prevalent challenge to central state power; 1958, the year in which the AFPFL split; 1962, the year in which claims for the Revolutionary Council made it their task to implement Socialism and 1988, the latest rupture in Myanmar’s political history, where people had taken to the streets to demand the replacement of the one-party system with a multi-party system. In all these years it was the military who stood above supposed outside threats (1948-49), petty party politics (1958), parochial bigotry (1962) and violent attacks (1988). Splits, factionalism and prejudice have characterised the recent political history of Myanmar according to this illustration, but the Tatmadaw are the only institution that have stood united and firm as a rock. A publication issued by the government under the pen name Nawratha85, in a similar vein, re-iterates the role of the military as unified, perpetual protector in divisive political times: “The GCBA is regarded as the first ever political organisation to have emerged in Myanmar. The GCBA split into two. The two halves further splintered into several political arties. All these parties disappeared before the war. In Myanmar, the first ever political party to demand complete Independence was Dah Bamar Asiayon. […] Today it is part of history. The Burma Communist Party is the most senior among all political parties. It ultimately perished as an underground organisation. […] The People’s Revolutionary Party emerged soon after the Burma Communist Party and converted itself into the Socialist Party. But its name had almost completely been forgotten even at the time of achievement of independence. The Anti-Fascist Organisation formed jointly by the Tatmadaw […] became the AFPFL. It wielded power for ten years after independence and split into two in 1958 and collapsed. The Burma Socialist Programme Party functioned for twenty-four years […] collapsed in 1988. The KNU appeared even before independence but, as of now, it has been reduced to a skeleton. […] The only organisation that has been functioning until now with discipline and cohesion and gained the most political experience is the Tatmadaw.”86 85 The name Nawratha is a straightforward reference to King Anawratha (1044 – 1077) who is widely considered the king to rule the first united Burmese kingdom Pagan (950 - 1300). 86 Nawratha, Destiny of the Nation (Yangon: U Hla Kyin, 1995), 11. 37 The post-1988 military repeatedly stresses its own performed unified character and commitment to the nation. The military hailed its political achievements in for example a series of publications entitled “Tatmadaw’s traditional national leadership role.”87 In 1996 a typical slogan appeared in repeated issues of the New Light of Myanmar: “The Tatmadaw has been sacrificing much of its blood and sweat to prevent disintegration of the Union. All nationalities of the union are urged to give all co-operation and assistance in this great task.” These publications stress the historical importance of the military and often elaborate upon the wide support that the military enjoyed historically: “In their quest for independence, the Myanmar made their way into Karl Marx’s revolution. They read voraciously, and afterwards some became Communists, some Socialists. There broke our argument on ideology. However, they were unanimous that there must be a Tatmadaw for armed revolt against the British.”88 These selected instances represent a continuous effort by the government to celebrate and praise itself. The government renamed itself in 1997 from SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The name, however, did not indicate a shift in ideology. One additional important ingredient of the nation-building discourse is the role of the constitution. The national convention that had convened to draft the constitution over a time span of 16 years finally presented the final version in 2008. While the constitution arguably might primarily serve as a means to advance structural state-building, in the rhetoric of the SPDC it at the same time is a means of nation-building. The role of the constitution as a milestone in ‘completing’ the nation-building project was reminiscent of constitution drafting process in the 70’s. Once again is the constitution to ensure a viable political system that will allow political participation for all ethnic nationalities.89 Summary and Conclusion The main purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the main nationbuilding policies of the respective ruling governments since 1948. I showed that the nation-building project in Myanmar was contested right after the early years of independence and consecutive post-colonial governments struggled to address these competing visions of the nation. After independence competing factions quarrelled about 87 Working People’s Daily, October 9 – 15, 1992 and October 17 - 22, 1992. Nawratha, Destiny of the Nation (Yangon: U Hla Kyin, 1995): 3. 89 The role of the constitution in post-colonial Myanmar is more extensively elaborated upon in chapter 2. 88 38 the adequate form of Socialism/Marxism to be introduced to Myanmar. The ideological fights alienated parts of the population further and created deep schisms in the political landscape. The Socialist government under military tutelage stood firmly behind the implementation of its socialist policies. The government appeared more united than its predecessors and was not hesitant to implement radical socialist policies that in particular aimed at restructuring the national economy. Although often referred to as military government, it was shown that its rule stood on a firm socialist basis that differed considerably from the successive government. However, the initially strong focus on Socialism and economic self-sufficiency did not serve to provide a unifying basis for multiples voices and visions of the nation. I suggested in this chapter that in particular under the rule of the SLORC/SPDC since 1988 the government abandoned the attempt to offer a possibly unifying ideology for competing visions of the nation, but attempted to impose its grip by instilling fear and threat among citizens if they do not act in the interest of the nation as prescribed by the government. Citizens are urged to stand together in order not to allow foreign elements to destroy the nation. No political ideology acts as guiding force behind the rhetoric of the state, citizens are hardly offered opportunity to ideological identify with the nation. What I demonstrated here by means of literature review will be echoed in the following chapters by my empirical research. The following chapter provides perspectives by veteran politicians on the nation-building project in Myanmar. It will show that although competing visions are present, the current attempts of the government to build and shape the nation have, if nothing else, provides an element that unifies these men. 39 Chapter 2: Shattered Visions: Veteran Politicians’ Perspectives on NationBuilding Nation-building is a top-down process. The goal of this process is to influence and mould citizens’ perception of nationhood according to the state’s notion. Accordingly, the “success” or “failure” of the state’s attempt to create a common sense of national identity is often judged on the basis of citizens’ behaviour and perception. There is common perception that the Myanmar state has failed in its nation-building attempts and that studying nation-building in Myanmar is not worthwhile since the project is discarded as failure and meaningless.90 However, more is to be gained when nationbuilding projects are considered work in progress not automatically subject to undergo value judgements. In order to understand mechanisms in place and nuances in the perceptions of citizens one needs to go beyond a success/failure approach in the study of nation-building. In this chapter I will present and analyse the perspectives of veteran Burmese politicians on the nation-building project gleaned from personal interviews. The group of veteran politicians are senior politicians who were actively involved in politics during the fight for independence and the post-independence period. Many of them were politically isolated because of their political views when the Socialist regime took power. All of them remained involved in politics; some are currently members of political parties, and some train more junior politicians. The majority among the veteran politicians has risen above fear of political persecution. Their age, in many cases more than 80 or 90 provides them with serenity and indifference to petty politics. It provides them not only with composure, but also with a unique perspective on nation-building in Myanmar. Every individual’s views and opinions are coined by their lifelong personal and professional experiences. Whether these experiences are positive or negative, they are always only representative for a small segment of the population. When one reads the perspective of the veteran politicians in the following paragraphs of this chapter, one should keep in mind that many of them have received harsh treatment by the various Burmese governments. Their skills and expertise have not only not been recognised, but they also often have undergone personal harassment by the government to prevent their 90 I experienced this attitude personally when I shared my research interest with a history professor of Myanmar. He laughed ironically and asked how I intended to fill enough pages for writing a thesis. 40 views and opinions to be circulated. These experiences do not make their views or perspective less valid, but merely distinguishes them from many other citizens. The interviews occurred all in different settings and places. Among my interviewees, one person emerged as the key informant who suggested possible other interviewees and who mostly arranged the interviews. Besides formal interviews I attended the birthday reception of one former politician where I informally met and chatted with additional (solely) men. My interviewees were not meant to provide a representative sample of Myanmar’s population, but were to provide insight into the opinions and views of a group of citizens who in depth have reflected about nationbuilding in Myanmar. The veteran politicians widely echoed that the nation-building project has been a failure. They describe politics as on the steady decline since 1948; the situation within which the country finds itself has deteriorated continuously. Constitutional reform plays an important role in the perspective of the veteran politicians. In their eyes, constitutional reform has repeatedly failed (the latest 2008 constitution is considered a failure already) and therefore no development worth mentioning has occurred. Appropriate state building which includes constitutional reform, needs to precede nation-building. From their point of view, the signing of recent ceasefire agreements or allowing civil societal organisations to work more freely are irrelevant. Many politicians echo, that the nationbuilding project in Myanmar can only progress when a strong leader emerges. This idea of a strong leader is closely linked to the figure of Aung San. Aung San looms large in the mind of these experienced politicians. His leadership is still widely held in regard and a similar figure as Aung San is considered necessary in order to create a unified nation. The veteran politicians paint the future of the Myanmar nation in highly pessimistic terms and see no solution unless constitutional reform succeeds and a strong leading figure will arise. Although their ideas about the appropriate way to build a nation differ in detail, they all agreed that it is not unreasonable to, if required by the circumstances, join in armed struggle against the central government. Economic Stagnation and failed Political Reforms: Myanmar in inexorable Decline Myanmar had a bright future outlook at the time of independence. It was rich in natural resources, had a productive agricultural sector, possessed a good educational system and educated young able (wo-)men who were willing to make sacrifices for their 41 country. Many of the people who stood at the forefront of the political struggle were heavily influenced by Socialist and Marxist doctrine. In the light of colonialism, socialism and Marxism were appealing ideologies that promised to bring an end to economic inequalities and political elitism. Despite these prospects and ideological convictions, or maybe because of them, the developments that occurred during the last 60 years did not match the predictions. Many respondents described the political, social and economic situation as worse than 60 years ago.91 The path that has led to this view was characterised by political rivalry, personal disappointments and the loss of many illusions. Burman student’s groups dominated the independence movement before 1948. The movement developed from a religious movement into a full fledged political movement. Aung San, first commander-in-chief of the BNA and later president of the AFPFL, and his followers demanded full independence from the British Empire. In contrast to the enthusiasm of the Burman-led political independence movement, politicians and traditional rulers from the peripheral areas of the country were more hesitant to agree to support the calls for full independence from the British within a Union of Burma. Many politicians or hereditary federal rulers, such as the saophas of the Shan states had not lost all their political power under colonial rule, but had been able to retain political rights and privileges. Under the new political system these leaders were likely to loose political power, no matter how a political compromise took shape. In contrast, Burman political groups had everything to gain. In 1922 the dyarchy political system had been put in place. It allowed some political participation for Burman politicians, but not enough to satisfy them.92 Burmans had pushed strongly for independence and associated high hopes with independence from the British. The pressure to perform well was high; the ambitious nation-builders needed to show that were able to hold the Union together and to install a well-functioning political system. Different priorities prevailed among politicians in the young country, on one the side already established politicians and traditional rulers wanting to retain their traditional political power and on the other side young, ambitious political newcomers who still needed to create their political role. 91 Personal interviews, May 26, May 31, June 01 and June 03 2008. John F. Cady, A History of modern Burma (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), 242246. 92 42 During the early years of independence enthusiasm prevailed about the newly acclaimed status as independent country. The way forward had been paved by the signing of the Panglong agreement in February 1947 often celebrated as a document that laid the basis for a federal state in which equal treatment and the participation of all citizens in the Union of Burma was possible. Aung San had invited politicians from all parts of the country to meet and to discuss political demands. The Panglong agreement, named after the town where the meeting took place, laid the foundation for the state system that was to be implemented by the constitution. The constitution granted rights of succession to the Karenni, Shan and Karen (state borders were not yet agreed on) after the first ten years of independence. Other minority groups, for example the Kachin and Mons, were not offered such rights. Four ethnic states were created, Shan, Kachin, Karen and Karenni, and the Chin special division. However, not all participants were likewise pleased with the agreement since some felt that not enough of their demands were accommodated. 93 Before Myanmar gained independence in January 1948 Aung San was assassinated in July 1947. The loss of Aung San was to prove disastrous in the following years as his diplomatic skills and negotiation power were unmatched by any other politician. With hindsight it is possible to say that it was the constitution that resulted from the Panglong agreement that caused friction and disagreement among contesting political parties until armed struggle was seen as the only viable solution. Early fights about the interpretation and value of the constitution broke out. Of the six people who had negotiated the terms and conditions of the constitution with the British it was said, “four are dead and neither of the other 2 sits in the Cabinet,”94 at the time when the constitution became effective. The eminent senior Shan leader E remarked that the state form that was agreed upon in the Panglong agreement never really constituted a federal state, instead it functioned more like a unitary state. “From the beginning it always deviated, we never achieved our goal. From our wish for a federal state we ended up with a military unitary state.”95 Once the optimism of the first hours receded, it was surpassed by contending claims to know the right way forwards. “It was the tragedy of Burma that in those crucial years after the war, energy could not be channelled entirely into creative purposes. It was tragic that 93 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: ZedBooks, 1999), 79. E. Burke Inlow, “The Constitution of Burma,” Far Eastern Survey 17.22 (1948): 267. 95 Personal interview, May 26, 2008. 94 43 available talent and leadership and resources could not be marshalled into nation-building and the winning together, without anger or bitterness, of selfgovernment for Burma. They meant well, and they served; the Governor, his loyal politicians, the revolutionary AFPFL, U Saw, Dr. Ba Maw, the men in the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, but fate and circumstances tore them apart, and as they were torn, the country’s rehabilitation was hampered and delayed. As the bitterness in politics increased, so did lawlessness in the country, and restlessness. Standards of behaviour declined: the means were unimportant, if the end was achieved.”96 As mentioned in chapter one factional struggle emerged between contending AFPFL groups. Aung San, who had played an important mediating role between opposing factions, was greatly missed. He had reached legendary status and was widely admired: “Aung San was the hero of the hour, the Bogyoke – the Supremo. People needed someone whom they could trust without reservation, and blindly follow, and Aung San was that someone. He was without selfishness; he was as poor as the people themselves, having acquired nothing during the war – when people in his position were gathering fortunes – except a loving family, and a solid reputation with the people.”97 Aung San was not only missed in mediating and negotiating between rival AFPFL factions, but also to continue the dialogue with political leaders of ethnic nationalities. 98 The dialogue that he had started and been formalised in the Panglong agreement did not continue in his absence. Young, ambitious, inexperienced politicians were blind to the consequences of their actions for the nation-building project. As the Burman Thakin B said during an interview while pointing to the opposite side of the table where the aged Shan leader E was sitting: “60 years ago I used to fight against this guy. We were young and naïve. Only today, now that I have reached this age, we can sit down together and talk. After 10 years of fighting I started to ask myself what we were doing, but then it was too late already.”99 Despite the deteriorating political conditions and emerging civil war, the period between 1948 and 1962 is remembered more fondly than the ensuing years. The senior Mon leader C brushed off my question why from his point of view, the armed struggle between the central government and ethnic parties emerged with the remark that only 96 Maung Maung, Burma’s Constitution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961): 75. Ibid, 71. 98 The term ethnic nationalities is widely used in Myanmar when it is necessary to refer to ethnic minority populations in the English language. It is used by ethnic minority populations and is a translation from the Burmese term lu myo which literally means type/kind of person. 99 Personal interview, May 26, 2008. 97 44 the Karen, Mon and Karenni were involved in armed struggle and only after 1962 many more parties decided to take up arms.100 The largely positive assessment of the period from 1948 until 1962 needs to be understood with regard to later political developments. The take over of state power by the Revolutionary Council was “the end of democracy”. 101 The RC aimed at creating a highly centralised state under its aegis. In order to achieve this goal, it initiated the drafting of a new constitution. The constitution that was drafted under the RC was the “worst constitution of all, because it was not amendable.”102 The constitution had been drafted with popular participation and was approved in a referendum in 1973. The core functions of the new constitution were to implement socialism through a legal framework and to address problems that the RC perceived with the 1948 constitution. In public statements government officials declared in reference to the 1948 constitution: “The weaknesses and loopholes in the Constitution weakened the unity of the nationals of the Union of Burma.”103 The RC had taken great dislike at party politics. In their eyes the multi-party federalist system did not prevent abuse and exploitation by politicians and profit seeking capitalists and invited misuse.”104 Although party politics might have been divisive, the attempts of the RC to build a highly centralised socialist state were more detrimental to the general state of affairs than any earlier political reforms. This attempt to centralise and concentrate state power in the hands of the central government was one of the major points of contention that led and fuelled the armed ethnic insurgency movement. The reluctance of the central government to accommodate demands for more federal structure under Prime Minister Nu resulted in the emergence and escalation of the civil war. Part of the goal to centralise state power was the transformation of the social, political and economic landscape of the whole country. The establishment of any political associations outside direct government control was banned. Spaces for governmental independent political organisations were rendered inaccessible.105 This period meant for many veteran politicians to being put on a political sidetrack. For example, one of my respondents had submitted a constitution draft during 100 Personal interview, May 31, 2008. Personal interview with Mon leader C, May 31, 2008. 102 Personal interview with Shan leader E, May 26, 2008. 103 Albert D. Moscotti, Burma’s Constitution and Elections of 1974 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1977): 14. 104 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987): 292. 105 Tin Maung Maung Than, “The essential tension,” South East Asia Research 12.2 (2004): 187212. 101 45 the process leading towards the 1974 constitution, but it was ignored and his ideas were not taken into account. Another politician who had committed himself to armed struggle from the jungle between 1948 – 1958 had returned from the jungle in order to be a founding member of a political party that contested in the 1960 elections. However, the RC who took power in 1962 declared all political parties illegal and severely hampered opportunities to participate in the political development of the country. The military coup of 1988 did not mean improvement for most veteran politicians. The same ethnic leader who is mentioned in the preceding paragraph for example was elected member of parliament in the 1990 elections, but never came to work in this office. Another respondent was imprisoned in 1993, and another former independence fighter was sentenced to death the third time (but fortunately is still alive and well) after 1988. The 1990 elections had given many of these men back the opportunity to enter the formal political sphere, but only for a short time. During one interview three elected members of parliament were present; none of them had ever worked in their function as MP.106 Great dissatisfaction prevailed among all respondents with the current constitution and its role in the nation-building process. The Arakanese politician F exclaimed repeatedly that the recently approved constitution had been forced upon the people and was rigged. The formerly elected Mon MP D lamented the harassment and discrimination that he and members of his political party faced during the period preceding the constitutional vote. The government had attempted to intimidate them and to prevent campaigning. Another Arakanese politician G criticised citizens’ systematic exclusion from the drafting process and the inadequate time allowed for the study of the constitution. 107 The drafting process of the constitution was also criticised by the senior Mon leader C: “The ceasefire and gentlemen’s agreements allow people to work, but not to establish political parties. There are no rights to establish political parties and there is no right to gather until now. The ethnic nationalities who attended the National Convention were forced to withdraw; instead they put in ceasefire groups. The ceasefire groups were illegal parties; they had no right to attend the National Convention. The government refused the ethnic nationalities; they only allowed ceasefire groups to attend, even as illegal parties. Later they [the ceasefire groups, authors’ remark] were made legitimate. The National Convention was created for ensuring national rights, all nationalities attended, 28 parties. Because of threats of the government only 13 groups remained. Equality 106 107 Personal interview, May 31, 2008. Personal interview, June 03, 2008. 46 and self-determination are the most important demands of ethnic nationalities. But even the groups who attend have no influence. They can’t discuss their demands and requirement. No solution how nationalities will get equality and self-determination has been suggested. There are only ceasefire agreements, but no basic solutions.”108 Strong Man, Constitution and armed Struggle: the Way forward? The accounts above offer a perception of 60 years of political decline. Hope, optimism and positive outlook were not reflected in any comments of my respondents. I asked my respondents to locate their responses in particular within the political developments of the last 20 years. During the early 1990’s unprecedented political developments occurred. SPDC (then still SLORC) ceased its battles against the Karen National Union and attempted to convince insurgent groups to give up fighting and enter ceasefire agreements. An interplay and combination of factors led to approximately 28 insurgent groups signing ceasefire agreements until 2007.109 These ceasefire agreements cannot be seen as offering a permanent solution to the underlying conflicts. While they have brought many armed clashes to a standstill, they hardly contributed to addressing economic, political or constitutional issues and grievances in a sustainable manner. The complexity of interaction between the various groups has hardly been reduced. Many community-based organisations developed since the mid 1990’s in the border regions (and in other parts of the country). International non-governmental organisation’s entered the country as well. Unicef listed in 2005 92 local NGOs (of which 20 are orphanages) and 50 international non-government organisations (INGO) countrywide. 110 Some of these organisations are religious, but others are the result of local community groups organising themselves into NGOs. Most senior politicians rejected strongly the suggestion that these developments could be understood as positive developments within the nation-building trajectory. The respondents suggested three scenarios that in their eyes could lead to building a nation: the writing of a fair and just constitution, the emergence of a strong man who can hold opposing factions together or armed struggle. The single most important issue is the writing of a fair and just constitution. The Mon politician H remarked that the situation for the Mon remained difficult since they were geographically integrated into Myanmar and not as secluded as for 108 Personal interview, May 31, 2008. Martin Smith, State of Strife (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 6. 110 Unicef. Directory of Local Non-Governmental Organizations in Myanmar. 2005. 109 47 example the Kachins. Mon keep up their own literary tradition and language, but are not able to teach Mon language in schools. In Kachin state, since it is more secluded and a separate administrative area, it is possible to teach Kachin literature. He continued to say: “For a sustainable nation a political solution needs to come first. Culture and literature follow only afterwards based on political reform.”111 The Mon leader C supported politician H by emphasising that the military so far refused to enter a tripartite discussion with the democratic groups. 112 The current constitution will not allow stability and peace for the country. Although he refrained from making a prediction about the political situation, he was confident to reiterate that no stability and democracy will come to Myanmar soon under the new constitution.113 In a similar vein, the senior Shan leader E did not see any improvement with regard to ethnic nationality cultural developments as a path towards a future nation. He stated that the government is pushing Burmese culture. Other cultures are only nominally tolerated. Although there is freedom of culture, there is no support available to non-Burman groups. 114 He severely criticised the current constitution. Although the state is federal in name according to the 2008 constitution, it remains a military state and not a democracy. 75 % of the votes in parliament are needed to amend the constitution. This provision makes it necessary to obtain approval of the military representatives in parliament. He published a book recently that elaborates on possibilities for an alternative constitution and sees such a constitution as the only way forward. Thakin B suggested that the government has been somewhat successful in establishing relations with ethnic nationalities. Nevertheless, cultural issues remain a topic of contestation. While he thinks that the authorities might not structurally deny any cultural rights he suggested the term “molestation of culture” to understand the contemporary setting. He said that in 60 years three constitutions have been approved and although there are differences among them, no constitution was sufficient spiritually and mentally to unite the people. Thakin B described the necessity for a constitution in the following words: “If you want to gain friendship with the ethnic nationalities you need to act like the Burmese kings. You need to give full self-determination to ethnic nationalities. They can do whatever they want, only when there is foreign aggression 111 Personal interview, May 31, 2008. The three parties included in a hypothetical tripartite discussion are the military, the NLD and the ethnic nationality parties. 113 Personal interview, May 31, 2008. 114 Personal interview May 26, 2008. 112 48 then they can call on the help of the government, otherwise you leave them alone. The constitution will keep the political system in place.”115 Changes during the last 20 years were acknowledged by the Zomi youth leader 116 I. However, he indicated that the changes were not towards betterment, but the ways of cultural oppression had simply changed and the suffering had remained the same.117 Overall, the path taken by the government during the last 20 years is not considered as having introduced any reforms that could promote a sustainable sense of nationhood. These reforms failed to materialise because of a lack of viable constitutional reform. A strong leader has been lacking to salvage the situation.118 The recurring call for a fair and just constitution most likely has its origin in the circumstances within which most of the veteran politicians were politically educated. Aung San, the political hero of the independence years, had stressed the importance of a constitution to regulate relations between the numerous ethnic groups in Myanmar. A constitution would be an appropriate instrument to provide a regulated framework to avoid conflict. Under the British written law was introduced and for these young men it was a sign of modernity and development to follow the footsteps of the British in this aspect. During the independence negotiation process the British had insisted on a constitutional draft that was acceptable to all different ethnic parties. This approach to nation-building has been ingrained in these men during their formative years. This emphasis on writing a constitution in order to build the nation as echoed above is one of the points in which the veteran politicians agree with the government. The government has used the first months in 2008 to announce the referendum and highlight the necessity of having a constitution. 119 However, it is of course not the existence of the constitution itself that the veteran politicians contest, but the paragraphs and the drafting process. The drafting of an agreeable constitution is in the eyes of most respondents not enough. Although many appeared short of hope that the situation would change, they suggested that the emergence of a strong leader could provide a way out of the deadlock. Thakin A said that “the cause of the political conflict was ideology and 115 Personal interview, May 26, 2008. Zomi is the self-chosen name for the ethnic nationality group who is otherwise known as Chin. 117 Personal interview, June 03, 2008. 118 ibid 119 New Light of Myanmar, April 22, 2008: “Accordingly, Myanmar has yet to exercise an enduring new constitution. Only then, will it be possible to build a modern and developed nation in accordance with the new constitution.” 116 49 personal prejudice. The Communists had a dogmatic view of the international and Burmese situation. Very dogmatic and suspicious, suspicious of any other parties.” In contrast, Aung San was painted as a pragmatist who advocated the overthrow with arms for the freedom of Myanmar.120 The former independence fighter J who carries a 1st class honour medal for his achievements in the independence struggle was convinced that the nation-building trajectory would have taken a completely different turn if Aung San had lived longer. One of the concepts that Aung San treasured highly was equality. People would have been treated equally and nowadays people would not differentiate among ethnic nationality groups if Aung San had been able to pursue his visions.121 In a similar vein, Thakin B praised the qualities of Aung San in uniting the minds and spirits of people: “Aung San was the first person to create an army. He united all national forces, even people who were enemies at one time, and he emerged as a leader of a united front. This national front drove the Japanese away. We had no independence yet, but needed to struggle further. The 3rd united front enabled us to have independence. What we need now is a national united front. Anyone can be the leader of the united front, an army general can also be the leader. We need to follow Aung San’s footsteps and not become foolish again like in 1948.”122 This adoration of Aung San is not only common among senior politicians, but also common among many ordinary citizens. His image can be found in many different places in Myanmar; for example laminated in a copy shop to inform clients about the lamination process available or dangling from the back mirror in a taxi. In all these places it is not only the picture of Aung San that can be seen, but also his association with shattered hopes and visions. The current government is aware of the strong symbolic power of Aung San. They have undertaken steps to decrease his public presence, Aung San’s image was taken of the kyat bills, the Aung San museum in Yangon has been closed for ‘temporary’ renovations, and according to most recent reports some speeches given by Aung San have been removed from the curriculum of the 10th standard. 123 If a figure resembling Aung San fails to rise from the ashes, my respondents offered one last idea in order to influence the nation-building project: armed struggle. The Arakanese politician F sees armed struggle as the consequence of political struggle. 120 Personal interview, June 01, 2008. ibid 122 Personal interview, May 26, 2008. 123 Democratic Voice of Burma, June 26, 2008. 121 50 The Mon leader D explained how the opposition towards the government has grown stronger and stronger over the years. When the youth Zomi leader I proclaimed that “armed struggle would be an option, not the first option, but a possibility in the end,”124 eight fellow politicians sitting at the same table all nodded in agreement. My follow-up question to every individual was whether all of them considered armed struggle a viable option and the answer given in unison was yes.125 Summary and Conclusion Years of challenging political struggle have left most veteran politicians with few illusions about their means to influence the nation-building project in Myanmar. The role of the constitution as the appropriate nation-building tool looms large in all accounts. However, on the one hand, many veteran politicians see the constitution as a suitable way formally to regulate relations among different parties that have grown more and more contentious over the years and to prevent discrimination against any group in society. On the other hand, it is the constitution itself that has provided a potent object of conflict and that has caused political tensions ever since independence. Any developments outside constitutional reforms are considered irrelevant since they only provide improvement on a small scale and might not be sustainable unless constitutional reform has been achieved. Another way to achieve sustainable nation-building is the emergence of a strong man, hereby clearly referring to a person such as Aung San. It is irrelevant whether the Aung San admiration is justified based upon his achievement or personality. Aung San has come to stand for many things that Myanmar has not been able to achieve. He not only represents the strong political figure that could have led Myanmar into a stable political future to politicians, but also hope for common citizens for a better future. Sarcastically spoken, the heroic figure that Aung San has come to be, is most likely only possible because of his premature death. Aung San is not associated with the banalities of daily political factionalism that set in early after independence; he has not betrayed anyone’s hopes or wishes and never needed to show that he would have been able to lead the country into a peaceful and united future. A last resort in order to partake in the implementation of a national vision is armed struggle. It appears as an anachronistic way that would only be pursued by the 124 125 Personal interview, June 03, 2008. ibid 51 hopeless. Many years of armed struggle have created the current situation and not been able to provide a basis for the creation of a bright future. Overall, political reform is seen paramount to any other developments. In the absence of political reform other attempts at nation-building are minimalist corrections of a project on an altogether wrong track. Although it is not surprising that most interviewees hold antagonistic views of the government in general, their criticism of the nation-building endeavour goes beyond merely rejecting them for the sake of opposing the policies of the government. I choose to include the voices presented in this chapter, because they represent those of an educated, political class who have reflected in depth about the various ways to build a nation (though their visions never were put to test). In chapter one I suggested that the government had failed to provide appealing means of identification for building a common sense of nationhood. This interpretation of the nation-building project was supported by the views echoed in the preceding paragraphs. The interviewees claimed to in particular represent the interest of their specific (ethnic) groups, corresponding to the deeply-embedded factionalism as suggested in chapter one. However, the visions of the different interviewees merged in their agreement on the possibility of armed struggle which supports the possibility that the government has provided itself as a strong basis for identification through a common dislike. Though the state’s attempt to reach out to their citizens had largely been rejected, its activities nevertheless have not failed to impact citizens in their way of thinking and action. In the following chapter I will present ways which individuals have developed to engage in nation-building from below. It will suggest that in the absence of the development of a meaningful nation-building platform by the government individuals have appropriated some forms of nation-building. 52 Chapter 3: Pragmatism rules: engaging Nation-Building from below through social Development As mentioned in the introduction, the definition here and overarching goal of nation-building is the formation of a common national sense of belonging, created through directed guidance of political, economic and social developments.. In the former chapters the emphasis was on the one hand the government’s attempt to achieve this common ideological outlook and sense of belonging and on the other hand the views of a selective group of citizens on the political aspects of this project. The focus on analysis of the political aspects of nation-building is a common emphasis placed by scholars in Myanmar studies. However, as was echoed in the previous chapter as well, the state has not been willing to share nation-building competence with regard to political aspects and many scholars and political actors disregard other opportunities to engage in nationbuilding. The goal of this chapter is to broaden the analytical focus on nation-building in Myanmar by discussing nation-building through social developments. Nation-building and civil engagement There are varying understandings about the components that nation-building projects entail. It is widely accepted that nation-building entails a strengthening of a national outlook through political developments.126 Yet, in particular over the last 20 years, a strengthening of social and civil participation has increasingly come to be considered an equally important aspect of nation-building. Hill and Lian for example suggest that mediating structures like voluntary associations and/or civil society groups based upon for example religious or ethnic affiliations can play an important role in creating a meaningful sense of national belonging. These groups provide a link between “the individual in private life and the large institutions of public life.”127 Civil society groups are usually considered to be functioning autonomously from the state. This is, however, not always the case. As the case study of Singapore shows, civil society has been set up purposely to strengthen the nation-building project, and at the same time to operate within the functional restrictions as defined by the Singaporean government. In Singapore, the creation of a strong state was the initial task of the nation 126 See for example Reinhard Bendix, Nationbuilding and Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 127 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995): 161. 53 building project as defined by the government. Once this step was achieved, the government declared the next step in its nation building endeavours the creation of a civic society. Important here is the use of the term civic instead of civil. The term civic “signifies a non-political variant of the civil society concept”128 in which the “state demarcates the limits of civil society”129 and “only the state […] possesses political expertise.”130 There are meaningful comparisons that can be drawn between the Singapore and the Myanmar case which shows the role of nation-building through civil engagement. Creating Opportunities for Participation in Nation-Building The developments that led to the opportunity for an increased participation in nation-building from below started in the early 1990’s, a time that was marked by the initiation and implementation of ceasefire agreements between armed insurgent groups and the state. Although civil society had never fully ceased to exist in Myanmar before the 1990’s, its functioning had been more restricted than during last 20 years. The Burma Socialist Party Programme (BSPP) government who ruled the country from 1962-1988 aimed at creating a highly centralised state under its aegis. This attempt to centralise and concentrate state power in the hands of the central government was one of the major points of contention that lead and fuelled the armed ethnic insurgency movement. The reluctance of the central government to accommodate demands for more federal structures under Prime Minister Nu resulted in the emergence and escalation of the civil war. Part of the goal to centralise state power was the transformation of the social, political and economic landscape in the whole country. The establishment of any political associations outside direct government control was banned, thus any spaces for governmental independent political organisations were rendered inaccessible. In contrast, social and cultural organisations were not legally banned, but attempts were made to channel and control their activities.131 128 Ibid, 225. Ibid, 224. 130 Ibid, 224. 131 For more detailed information about policies of the BSPP government see for example Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imaging togetherness, practicing difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan and Leo Suryadinata, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 150-180 or Robert Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009) or Tin Maung Maung Than, “The essential Tension: Democratisation and the Unitary State in Myanmar (Burma).” South East Asia Research 12.2 (2004): 187-212. 129 54 The attempt of the BSPP government to channel and control all social and cultural organisations in the country resulted in organisations such as the Literary Workers’ association or the Lanzin Youth organisation to be founded. These organisations were functioning within government control and were compelled to directly report any suspicious occurrences inside and outside their organisation that might pose challenges to BSPP. Besides these BSPP initiated organisations other independent social and culturally organisations were allowed continuing to exist. Nevertheless, the actual leeway of these groups was severely limited. The government was constantly on the lookout for irregularities in the functioning of communal groups and used every possible opportunity to declare them illegal.132 Grass-root organisations that continued to exist and operate under rule of the BSPP were for example the Shan student organisation and the Mon cultural organisation. However, their space to manoeuvre was severely limited. A request by the Shan student organisation in the late 60’s to introduce a new Shan script was turned down by the Shan state council since in their eyes the new script was associated with Shan nationalism and consequently the insurgent movement. Local teachers nonetheless considered to teach the new script at schools which in turn led to the complete suspension of teaching in Shan language at public schools under the jurisdiction of this Shan state council.133 With the end of the BSPP rule the situation for community based or organised groups changed slowly. The CPB, one of the longest active insurgent groups in Myanmar, had lost its earlier strength to attack military strongholds in towns and cities in central Myanmar and its territory was confined to small pockets in the border areas. The financial support of the Chinese government had largely come to a halt and it was apparent that communism as a durable political ideology had failed to establish itself. Communist regimes all over the world lost their grip on power and were not able to regain their former strength. Other insurgent groups in Myanmar, who had relied on financial support from the CPB, suffered from the decline of the CPB. Furthermore, many insurgent groups had financed their armed struggle with trade across the border to Thailand, which had largely ceased. The Thai government implemented a policy shift 132 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imaging togetherness, practicing difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan and Leo Suryadinata, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 156. 133 Ibid. 55 and engaged with the Myanmar central government in trade, thereby bypassing the insurgent groups and denying them income. The CPB, shaken by internal dissent about the appropriate way to continue its political revolution, could not avoid various factions breaking away and forming separate strands. The SPDC (then still called SLORC) government was able to use this tense situation to offer peace deals to some of the break-away factions and in 1989 the CPB finally dissolved. Earlier attempts at ceasefire negotiations had failed, but in the early 1990’s personnel and policy shifts took place and resulted in more successful peace negotiations. 134 By 2006, over 25 armed groups entertained ceasefire agreements with the central government.135 The end of many armed conflicts led to a considerable improvement in the human security situation for ordinary citizens who lived in what once had constituted battle zones. The issues that had been at stake during 40 years of warfare, such as greater federal autonomy and more political say in the nation-building project, were nevertheless hardly addressed during the ceasefire negotiations. The state’s willingness to compromise and grant quasi-autonomous zones to some groups did in principle not affect its project to establish a highly centralised state and did not change its mind to continue to hold a monopoly on nation-building through political participation. The state offered investments into local economies to lure more insurgent groups into ceasefire deals following the notion that socio-economic development would help create national unity. The national convention, the body that was convened to draft a new constitution, was open only for those ethnic parties that had signed ceasefire agreements.136 The tension that accompanied the (in the past rare) dialogues between the military junta and insurgent parties over political change in Myanmar continued during the negotiations. Informal and formal dialogues during the national convention did not result in a mutually agreed plan about the implementation process of political change. However, an issue that all parties agreed upon was the urgent need for improvement of 134 Josef Silverstein, “The Civil War, the Minorities and Burma’s new Politics,” in Burma: The Challenge of Change in a divided Society, ed. Peter Carey (Oxford: Macmillian Press Ltd, 1997): 149. 135 The most well-known ceasefire groups are the CPB, New Democratic Army-Kachin, KIO, New Mon State Party, United Wa State Army, Shan State Army and Kachin Defense Army. For a complete overview of the status of ethnic parties see Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 67-69. 136 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar (Burma),” in Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia eds. Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005), 93. 56 the social conditions or “peace through development.”137 This agreement laid the foundation for participation in the state’s nation-building project from below. A project in line with the “peace through development” idea was the border development programme initiated by the SPDC. Its overall objective was to improve “infrastructure and human resource development, social welfare enhancement, economic activities in agriculture, forestry, livestock breeding, trade, energy generation and mineral exploration and exploitation”138 in the border areas. Grass-root organisations could receive support with the implementation of social and cultural activities. This programme was supposed to improve living conditions in the often neglected border areas to create an environment that allowed peaceful existence. Critics of the development project argue that the development measures are only another way of imposing state control and contribute to further state centralisation.139 No matter whether this is the ultimate goal behind the programme, improvements for the local population have occurred. This border development programme was one of the few programmes introduced on a broad scale in the North-Eastern frontier areas. Additional initiatives and activities were more dependent on the specific political conditions in the respective areas and willingness to engage in nation-building initiatives. The developments outlined above have in particular created new opportunities to engage in social and cultural activities in the border areas. In other parts of the country that had not been as affected by the civil war as the border areas conditions had been more tolerable for social organisations to engage in their work. During the Socialist period, the RC had strongly restricted non governmental work and initiated social and cultural organisations under the direct leadership of the BSPP. Besides these BSPP initiated organisations other independent social and cultural organisations were allowed to continue to exist. Nevertheless, the actual leeway of these groups was severely limited. The government was constantly on the lookout for irregularities in the functioning of communal groups and used every possible opportunity to declare them illegal.140 137 Martin Smith, “Ethnic Participation and National Reconciliation in Myanmar: Challenges in a transitional Landscape,” in Myanmar’s long Road to National Reconciliation ed. Trevor Wilson (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), 54. 138 Tin Maung Maung Than, “The essential Tension,” South East Asia Research 12.2 (2004): 207. 139 Curtis Lambrecht, “Oxymoronic Development: the Military as Benefactor in the Border Regions of Burma,” in Civilising the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). 140 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Associational Life in Myanmar: Past and Present,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 156. 57 In the mid-1990’s the government allowed more NGOs to exist and work. Political activities were not tolerated, but organisations that for example engage in the health or environmental sector were able relatively freely to operate. This development was closely linked to the political role of Khin Nyunt, who played an important role in facilitating the work of NGOs and INGOs. The forced end of his political career in 2004 has resulted in a halt in the expansion of NGOs and INGOs and it has become more difficult again for INGOs to operate. As of now, it is unclear how this development will continue to unfold.141 “They learn to overcome their Fear”142 One NGO founded in 1998 as a result of the ceasefire agreements is the NGO X which is based in Yangon. The NGO X was founded in order to complement the peace process started by the government and former insurgent armies. Many civil war refugees had started to return to their former homes and often basic infrastructure to allow people to earn a living was lacking. Initially, only the former civil war areas were target areas for NGO X. While in 1998, the NGO started with 10-12 projects in former civil war areas, they now operate in six states and four divisions and support over 120 projects. The NGO X works in a variety of fields, but its overall goal is to improve the living conditions of local populations through, for example, income generating activity trainings or agriculture, livestock, health care and additional skill trainings. 143 Another NGO that was founded as a result of the ceasefire agreements is the Shalom foundation. The Shalom foundation, “a local NGO working for peace and development among various ethnic nationality groups,”144 was founded in Kachin state after ceasefire talks had been initiated. During these talks it became apparent that immense distrust existed between the KIO and the SPDC, and also among other groups. A peace agreement would not be sufficient to bridge gaps that had been created during 40 years of armed warfare. Sustainable peace would mean more than signing an agreement. The Shalom foundation declared that its focus would be on “changing the attitudes, values and perceptions of individuals as the fundamental principle for 141 Personal interview with long time INGO worker, June 2007. Personal interview, June 06, 2008 143 ibid 144 Ja Nan Lahtaw, “Peace Initiatives among Ethnic Nationalities: the Kachin Case,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 237. 142 58 peace.“145 The organisation tries to achieve these goals by providing peace-building trainings, mediating dialogues about conflict-prone topics such as religious or political issues, trauma healing and development projects. In a similar vein, peace building efforts in Karen state that had been initiated as a result of negotiations between the SPDC and the KNU called for a greater participation of the local communities, outside the formal dialogue. Therefore, in 1994 the Karen Development Committee (KDC) was formed with the “aims to mobilise and promote Karen people’s participation in self-development and social progress.”146 Under the patronage of the peace mediator group the KDC developed into a broad community based organisation. The goal formulated in the early days was re-formulated and respecified ten years later into the “KDC aims to serve as a humanitarian and development assistance organisation and is organised to provide services through five departments, namely literature and culture, health, education, economic and social.”147 Through their initiatives leadership training programmes are organised, social services provided to people whose lives were affected by the armed conflict and exchange and training with other organisations inside Myanmar take place. The religiously oriented organisation Y founded in the early 20th century, defines its two foremost work fields as evangelism and social work. Both work fields can be understood as nation-building activities. Although Myanmar is a secular state, Buddhism enjoyed the government’s support in the last two decades and has been the only religion promoted in public on a large scale. Employees of the organisation Y can use their profession to spread an alternative religious view that is different from the state’s view as promoted in the nation-building process. Their headquarters are in Yangon and 18 branches are found all over Myanmar. The evangelical work is practised through approximately 200 missionaries who are sent to particular ethnic nationality areas such as Kachin, Chin and Shan states. The social work aspect consists of relief and development work with, for example, displaced communities. The organisation narrowly defines itself through its religious affiliation and aims at promoting its faith and/or helping 145 Ibid, 253. Alan Saw U, “Reflections on Confidence-building and Cooperation among Ethnic Groups in Myanmar: A Karen Case Study,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 226. 147 Ibid, 227. 146 59 those who already adhere to the same faith through their relief and development works.148 One last organisation whose work is introduced here is the Karen Baptist Theological Seminary (KBTS). The seminary is located in Insein township, Yangon, and is especially designed for Karen Baptist students. Although students from all Christian denominations are accepted, Baptist beliefs are taught and propagated. The KBTS was established in 1845 with the goal to train “Karen students and those indigenous races”149 in Christian scripture and prepare them for Christian professions. The seminary offers five different theological study programmes, four liberal arts courses and three general training courses. The theological study programmes offer two Bachelor’s degrees in theological studies and theology and two Master’s degree programmes in religion and divinity. These study programmes are recognised by the Southeast Asian Theology Organisation and undergo an accreditation process once every four years. Graduates from these programmes can pursue further studies overseas at other universities. The liberal arts programmes are held at night and do not offer any accredited bachelor’s or master’s degrees, but offer diplomas instead. While none of the organisations introduced above sees its explicit goal in contributing to nation-building in Myanmar, all of these organisations contribute implicitly to that goal through their activities. They have a say in creating a more informed citizenry with decision-making skills and they stimulate social and cultural developments. All these organisations have in common that they operate with the tacit or overt approval of the government. This need for governmental approval makes it difficult openly to criticise or challenge the performance of the current government. Nevertheless, the capacity only to engage in subtle criticism does not withhold actors from having a critical mind. However, the urge to criticise is restrained for the sake of obtaining tacit/open approval to perform one’s activities. The teacher V who teaches at the KBTS for 26 years outlined challenges of its educational activities. The KBTS does not need to obtain official approval for its religious education programmes, but government officers regularly visit the school or attend classes to monitor the teaching contents. Although foreign visitors are generally welcomed for in particular guest lectures or worship sessions, KBTS endorses their 148 149 Personal interview, May 27, 2008. Information brochure Karen Baptist Theological Seminary, Seminary Hill, Insein 2007 60 presence only to a limited extent. “When too many foreigners visit the school, the government becomes suspicious, they come and investigate. Generally foreigners are invited to come and worship, some come to give some lectures and bible study. But we only invite them within certain limits.”150 The KBTS does not cooperate with any other Karen groups, be it political, social or cultural groups, since if associated with the work of groups that the governments saw as seditious its educational activities would immediately be suspended.151 Overall, the KBTS enjoys freedom to engage in independent religious education. The decision to introduce additional liberal arts programmes was partly guided by the need to supplement secular education offered by the state. “The quality of the religious education here is satisfactory; the secular educational sector however is bad. Many changes need to be made to improve secular education.”152 The KBTS strictly focuses on emphasising religious education. Only Christian students are admitted to its liberal arts programmes and there the bible and Christian contents are propagated as well. Likewise, the leading figure W within the organisation Y stressed that their organisation can engage freely in religious activities; freedom of worship and religious festivals exists. The greatest challenges in their interaction with the government are the ever changing rules and regulations. It often is problematic that there is a discrepancy between official and unofficial regulations. While rules and regulations change regularly, it is difficult to say in how far written rules provide de facto guidelines according to which one can act. In order to deal with these changing rules it is crucial to have a good working relationship with local authorities. “With government officials on the local level good relations exist. But often the lowest level government official is from the village and therefore has an interest in the programs for the village. Higher ranking officers are busy with their own work; they do not bother what happens on the village level.”153 This means, that in places where the organisation Y has good relationships with local officials, these officials are not only willing to share their nation-building competence, but might abstain from their responsibilities fully and make way for the activities of organisation Y. My enquiries during the interview concerning further challenges relating to the necessary cooperation with the government were answered with mischievous smiles. Uneasiness prevailed about discussing this issue and instead my respondents 150 Personal interview, June 12, 2008. ibid 152 ibid 153 Personal interview, May 27, 2008. 151 61 were keen on introducing me to their successes in implementing water and sanitation, food security, fish and animal farming, rice growing and other income generating projects and not elaborating too much on the difficult issues.154 In a similar vein, the NGO worker Z of the NGO X acknowledged many problems relating to overarching governmental structures that regulate their work, but was proud to report successes and thought it more important to focus on opportunities than to complain about restrictions: “The administration system of the country doesn’t encourage participation. In our work the villages decide themselves what they need. They approach us, receive training from us and in their villages need to write a development action plan. People become involved in their own affairs and realise that they need to initiate change.”155 All activities of the NGO X are approved by the responsible authorities: “The local communities need to negotiate with the local authorities. They need to decide who approaches the authorities, what needs to be discussed and how the discussion is to be held. Authorities always know about the activities of NGO X. The local authorities need to report to higher authorities, so the higher authorities are aware of what is happening as well.”156 This approach is not only helpful because it encourages people to participate in the organisation of their own affairs, but also it provides the best solution to dealing with local authorities: “The people learn to overcome their fears. In the beginning they didn’t even dare talking to simple clerks; they learn how to deal with authorities. The locals know best what is possible and how the authorities need to be approached.”157 In this case again, to participate in some aspects of the state’s nation-building project has become possible because local government officials and local villagers interact with each other and both can profit from this interaction. The work of the KDC was challenging from its early days onwards. The KDC had been formed to promote self-help initiatives among Karen people within the greater trajectory of negotiation of a ceasefire agreement. The negotiations surrounding the ceasefire agreement were contested by various parties. While “idealists who are determined to achieve only “peace with justice,””158 were mocking those who were willing 154 Personal interview, May 27, 2008. Personal interview, June 06, 2008. 156 ibid 157 ibid 158 Alan Saw U, “Reflections on Confidence-building and Cooperation among Ethnic Groups in Myanmar: A Karen Case Study,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 223. 155 62 to achieve “peace at any price,”159 a group of pragmatists emerged who argued that to achieve peace with justice was a long process and not a product that could be demanded. This group of people emphasised the need for ordinary citizens to become involved in their own affairs and to contribute to a sustainable solution. Accordingly, initiatives that stimulate self-awareness and involvement such as literature and culture programmes, livelihood and economic development strategy trainings and health and medical care programmes were initiated.160 The very circumstances within which the KDC was formed demanded great social and negotiation skills. The ceasefire negotiations between the KNU and the SPDC were tense and came to a halt several times. The KDC wanted to play a neutral role whose work was not only acceptable to KNU and SPDC, but also and in particular provided a positive addition to the ongoing talks and improvement of the lives of ordinary Karen people. In order to be able to play this role, compromise and a strong will to focus on the immediate needs of the population were the starting points of all initiatives and projects. There were not only tensions between Karen groups and SPDC, but tensions existed also among manifold Karen groups. Accordingly, it was necessary to identity work fields that were in the interest of followers of any political affiliation to pursue, and personal interests were subordinated to the greater good of the Karen community.161 Creating Bonds, creating Divisions While nation-building aims at the creation of a common national spirit through social, economic and cultural development among a largely unconnected citizenry, these projects primarily aim at creating a common social or educational outlook among smaller (regional) communities. The wish of the civil society actors to contribute to the improvement of the lives of the population in the end often is executed according to specific social lines, such as religious affiliation. Despite wanting to contribute to dialogue among different groups and an overall betterment of social, cultural and economic living conditions in Myanmar, the activities of the organisations introduced above often enforce social divisions within society. Although the NGO worker Z stressed that their NGO is strictly secular and does not discriminate against any parts of the population who want to participate in their 159 Ibid, 223. Ibid, 226. 161 Ibid, 227. 160 63 programs, it has been unavoidable in the past often to work along lines of religious affiliation: ”We operate in cooperation with partner organisations, in the beginning in particular with church and ceasefire groups. The church sends representatives, meetings could be held inside churches. Church communities were chosen particularly because they provided the necessary safe environment for conducting our work.”162 This reason for working in particular with church communities is primarily pragmatic, but nevertheless it had unintended consequences. Pastors were chosen in the early years as middlemen between NGO X and local communities. People started to look up to pastors and follow their instructions. They took few initiatives themselves. When the NGO X observed this development, it decided to discourage the role of pastors as community leaders and to stress religious diversity among the participants in their projects. Z sees this tendency easily to follow and to eschew participation in decision making processes among ordinary participants in their projects as a consequence of arbitrary ruling structures: “For Myanmar people it is difficult to express themselves, in particular for ethnic people. In ethnic areas populations have to deal with many different groups. Local ethnic governments, representatives of the central government and some other ethnic groups and all have different demands and different expectations of the population. The safest strategy for people is to keep quiet.”163 Another illustration of this strategy is provided in the following example: “In one project people introduced themselves as being from all different Christian denomination backgrounds, afterwards it appeared they all were from the same church. We want to support diversity and they were afraid not to get support anymore when it would be clear that they are all from the same church.”164 The KBTS is explicitly interested in attracting only Christian students. While they do accept Christian students of non-Karen descent and non-Baptist affiliation, they reject students adhering to non-Christian beliefs. The teacher V elaborated that while there is a strong preference for Baptist students to attend the KBTS, other denominations can study at the Myanmar Institute of Theology. It does not discriminate against any denominations, and it accepts non-Christian students into its liberal arts programmes. According to V, political conditions make it impossible to accept non-Christian students: 162 Personal interview, June 06, 2008. ibid 164 ibid 163 64 “There are no non-Christian Karen students at the seminary; we are afraid that they are from government. They will ask for opportunities to put up Buddha statues here and there, so we need to be prepared.”165 The KDC’s original purpose was to foster cohesion within the Karen community. Although it aims at cooperation and dialogue among different groups, it does not strive to address inter-ethnic dialogue, but focuses on overcoming social divisions within the Karen community. “Due to the difference in dialects (Sgaw, Pwo), lifestyles and livelihood (educated, not educated), religious affiliations (Buddhist, Christian) and political perspectives (pro-ceasefire, anti-ceasefire), the groups are quite diverse […].166 The organisation Y defines its identity through a common religious affiliation; this religious affiliation supersedes any other perceived social, cultural or ethnic differences. In the office in Yangon all employees speak one common minority language and are of the same ethnic descent. Nevertheless, their common religious identity is more meaningful in their daily work: “We do work in our ethnic state, but our work is not concentrated their. In XX state167 many people are not Christians and we have preference to work with Christian people rather than with XX people. In the past many people have misunderstood our work and we have been accused of missionary work, while we only wanted to engage in community work. Therefore we prefer working with people who are already Christian.”168 Despite the emphasis on religious affiliation, a special bond is perceived with one’s ethnic background. One department of the organisation Y is specially set up to maintain and promote XX culture and language. The prominence of ethnic identities strongly varies among the community and this department was set up to inform and educate future leaders and generations about their own cultural heritage and customs.169 Summary and Conclusion While the state continuously has been uncompromising in its stance to share responsibility for political aspects of nation-building, it has ceded responsibility to socially 165 Personal interview, June 12, 2008. Alan Saw U, “Reflections on Confidence-building and Cooperation among Ethnic Groups in Myanmar: A Karen Case Study,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, eds. N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 229. 167 I substitute the name of the state and the name of the ethnic nationality with the connotation XX. 168 Personal interview, May 27, 2008. 169 ibid 166 65 active groups to let them participate in the state’s project. During the last 20 years, the state has conceded to domestic pressure to let non-governmental actors participate in nation-building through social development and allowed more civil societal organisations to organise and function relatively independent of constant government supervision. This illustrates nicely in which ways the state can shape and guide citizens behaviour despite or rather primarily because of its lack of effectiveness and willingness to act. Since the government has been reluctant to invest resources into social, cultural and educational projects they can benefit from positive achievements of these groups and their social performance record will improve by letting engaged citizens to lay out and implement their visions of social and civil societal progress. From the perspective of many outside observers this participation is considered a mere cosmetic correction and has not been accorded as much importance as the continuously denied political participation in the nation-building project. However, for those citizens who engage and actively shape the recently enlarged social and cultural space this comparison is meaningless. There is little understanding why one would want to focus on missed and denied opportunities while pressing social issues can be addressed within the current framework. While the state perceives the wish of citizens to participate in nation-building through political activities as a threat, it does not perceive the growing participation of citizens in the nation-building project through social and cultural activities as an equally strong threat. The state has shared social nation-building responsibility and allows the work of groups whose goal is to create a society of engaged social citizens. The political conditions have created a citizenry that has learned to watch other people taking decisions on their behalf. Through stimulating self-help initiatives many civil society actors hope that people will realise that it is everybody’s task to become involved in creating a more positive living environment. Those who have chosen to be engaged in community and civil projects are united in their disappointment towards the social and civil nation-building efforts of the state. The state’s perceived insufficient project provides a platform for agreement and fuels the common wish to achieve betterment independent of the state’s efforts. In their eyes, an engaged community will take their fates into their own hands, improve their living conditions and influence the nation-building project from below on their own terms. As was demonstrated above, in many cases a sense of inclusiveness/exclusiveness prevails among people participating or initiating civil society activities. This sense hinders 66 an easy surmounting of religious or other socially constructed barriers. Accordingly, civil societal actors enforce a divide within the nation that they initially attempted to overcome through their work. The state continuously has demonstrated little interest in aiding citizens to improve their livelihoods. It has not necessarily relinquished control, but has allowed non-state actors to partially fill the gap it on purpose left unfilled. 67 Chapter 4: Together, Apart?: a Nation put to Test Two events drew the attention of Myanmar observers in the first half of 2008, the referendum to approve the constitution and Cyclone Nargis. In this chapter, these two unrelated events will serve to reflect upon nation-building in Myanmar. In the previous chapters I suggested that although the nation-building project of the state is largely outright rejected or ignored, some aspects of it have nevertheless influenced and shaped citizens’ thinking and behaviour in one way or another. This chapter will similarly suggest that the state’s active engagement in particular aspects of nation-building on the one hand leaves many citizens oblivious. On the other hand, with regard to other aspects of nation-building in which the state fails to meet common expectation, citizens gather and act jointly despite the absence of central guidance. The vote on the constitution was portrayed as a high profile event relevant to the lives of Myanmar citizens. The government had invested heavily before the vote to mobilise citizens to participate in the vote by reminding them of their duty to vote as loyal citizens. These efforts showed few results. The event was barely meaningful for most Myanmar citizens and the day of vote passed by as a very ordinary day. In contrast, Cyclone Nargis, not only because of the obvious devastating (longterm) consequences, turned into an event that moved the lives of many people. Citizens from all strands of society stood together and helped their fellow countrymen in need. In particular the failure of the government to respond appropriately in handling the needs of the affected population in the aftermath of the catastrophe accelerated the responses of ordinary citizens. There are examples from numerous countries where ordinary citizens in the face of a humanitarian crisis come to the help of the victims, and I do not mean to suggest that the mere act of Myanmar citizens providing assistance to fellow countrymen is a unique case. I rather suggest that in the case of Cyclone Nargis the negligence of the government in providing more adequate support to the victims provided a unique catalyst that united people who otherwise rarely gather behind the same cause. Myanmar’s history has been characterised by open conflict between groups in society and it has not been the rule to support each other beyond familial ties in times of need. 170 I suggest that this feeling of responsibility towards unknown fellow citizens 170 See for example Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or terrorised? (Canberra: Australian National University, 2003), Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: diverse Voices, uncertain Ends (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008). 68 emerged under extraordinary conditions and reflects the existence of an underlying feeling of national solidarity. In earlier chapters I suggested that the nation-building project as initiated by the government has largely been rejected in at least specific aspects of it. However, as mentioned in preceding chapters as well, those citizens interviewed do not remain oblivious to the nation as a whole and in particular stand together when the government offers itself as an imaginary platform for identifying commonalities. Therefore, I suggest that the state has not created a common national identity through the content of its nation-building campaign, but it has turned itself into a strong object of national identification through the delivery and performance of its nation-building campaign. The antagonistic campaign of the state allows citizens to create a bond of national loyalty whereby the state is the object of dislike at the centre of the nationhood creating platform. A comparison of the responses of both the state and society to the vote on the constitution and Cyclone Nargis reveals the contrasting conceptual underpinnings for the state of the nation-building project in Myanmar in 2008. Despite popular claims that politics is an important element in people’s lives in Myanmar, it is argued here, that politics has served as a means to disengage a nation. In contrast, a humanitarian catastrophe in its non-political nature mobilised a nation to stand up. Fighting Elites and apathetic Masses: constitutional Referendum 2008 In February 2008 the SPDC announced that a popular referendum would be held in May 2008 to approve the constitution. This announcement evoked criticism from many observers. People who earlier criticised the SPDC for stalling the constitution drafting process, now criticised the SPDC for wanting hasty approval of the constitution. The constitutional vote dominated national and international press coverage for weeks. The SPDC celebrated it in the New Light of Myanmar as the final missing link for the Myanmar nation to rise like the phoenix from the ashes and become a prosperous, united, democratic nation. Others, for example most of the veteran politicians, saw it as a heavy blow to their ambitions of creating a democratic nation. Proponents and opponents of the constitution stressed its political significance and fought over the attention, goodwill and votes of the people. Despite the portrayal of the constitutional vote as a high profile event, it meant little to most ordinary citizens. It was an opportunity for political elites to raise their voices and to seek (inter-)national attention. For most 69 citizens it passed as another political event that will not have an impact on their lives in any way. This is an indication that nation-building through politics has not created an engaged citizenry, but instead has disengaged people from participation in politics. First convened in 1993, the National Convention pursued an ambitious task for 15 years. The state hailed that “democracy cannot be achieved by anarchism or violence, but by Constitution.”171 Furthermore, the state proclaimed that “the draft constitution (2008) of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar safeguards Our Three Main National Causes and guarantees equal democratic rights to the entire people irrespective of wealth and status.”172 The state used the constitution drafting process as a tool to promote its vision of nationhood and after 15 years was keen on celebrating its success in finally finishing a draft constitution. However, after so many years the repeated call of the SPDC for an enduring, lasting constitution had started to sound merely like another integral, yet hollow, part of their nation-building repertoire and not as a means to build a nation. Throughout the post-colonial political history of Myanmar the national constitution has been an important pillar of nation-building, but in particular under the SPDC government it had become paramount in daily rhetoric. The announcement that the “emergence of the State Constitution is the duty of all citizens of Myanmar NaingNgan”173 in April 2008, in many issues of the New Light of Myanmar were reminiscent of earlier editions of the New Light of Myanmar. Already in 1994 citizens had been reminded that the “emergence of the State Constitution is the duty of all citizens of Myanmar Naing-Ngan”174 and that “the National Convention must succeed.”175 The government had always promoted law and order and the constitution as a central tool in ensuring them. It had initially announced that it would hold on to power until a new constitution was drafted and that the SPDC would play a guiding role in this constitution drafting process. The longer the process to draft a constitution took the more the drafting process itself became a reason to hold on to power. The possibility that the draft constitution would never be finalised appeared more and more likely.176 The call to finish 171 New Light of Myanmar, April 27, 2008. New Light of Myanmar, April 24, 2008. 173 See any issues of New Light of Myanmar in April 2008. 174 New Light of Myanmar, January 14, 1994. 175 New Light of Myanmar, January 19, 1994. 176 Robert H. Taylor compares in one of his articles the speed of the constitution 2008 drafting process to the travel in an ox cart: “When, in the reign of King Mindon, a young men was, in his 172 70 the constitution became so integral to the SPDC’s rhetoric that it became a reason d’étre for the SPDC’s rule. The announcement that a referendum would finally take place appeared to some like a miracle. According to the draft constitution, 25 % of the representatives in each of the legislative bodies are to be members of the military. In February 2008, pending approval of the constitution, the military was assured that they would continue to play a central role in shaping the nation-building trajectory. With the announcement of the referendum, the constitution was re-assigned its nation-building function. The SPDC, again, stressed the need for an enduring constitution in order to build the nation. Nevertheless, at the same time they continued to use the constitution in their vocabulary to promote the notion of an external threat. Figure 4.1 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar April 27, 2008 The SPDC used the months preceding the vote on the constitution to advocate the approval of the charter and devoted much of their pre-referendum campaign to portray opponents of the constitution as enemies of the state influenced by foreign nations. Similar illustrations to the one above appeared approximately every other day in turn, lamenting the slow pace at which they were traveling by ox cart on a pilgrimage to Bagan, his wise father assured him that “if we travel merely a furlong a day, where can Bagan go?” ” Robert H. Taylor, ““One Day, one Fathom, Bagan won’t move”: on the Myanmar Road to a Constitution,” in Myanmar’s long Road to National Reconciliation, ed. Trevor Wilson (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006): 3. 71 the New Light of Myanmar in April 2008. A group of people who are painted as representative of the whole of the Myanmar citizenry are on their way to approve the constitution, while a single individual outcast is sitting blind-folded on a small island. Although the word “expatriate” is written below the island where the individual sits and he has a long pointed nose that could indicate Caucasian descent, it is more likely that he represents a Myanmar citizen. He wears a typical Myanmar longyi and in his thought cloud he recognises that he has become a useless citizen. The above mentioned indication of foreign descent can also be understood as (misleading) foreign influence. The SPDC was aware of the many critical voices of the draft constitution and referendum inside and outside the country and actively addressed these critical voices. Figure 4.2 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, April 22, 2008. The illustration above is another example of the attempt of the SPDC to address dissenting point of views. The male character refers to non-official points of view by 72 saying “stop gossiping”, thereby discrediting non-SPDC endorsed perspectives as unsubstantiated gibberish. A mock dialogue from the New Light of Myanmar shows the SPDC’s awareness of recalcitrant opinions about the constitution and the constitutional referendum. The characters Maung Shwe Oh and Maung De Doh are involved in a playful exchange of point of views on the constitution, whereby Maung Shwe Oh asks critical questions that Maung De Doh is prepared to answer: “Oh: […] some say that 25 percent of the representatives to each of the legislative bodies are Tatmadaw member representatives, so there will not be cent per cent democracy. Moreover, some say that the Union government gets more power than that of state governments. […] If so, how can we say that the constitution is a good one? […] Doh: […] Whether the draft constitution meets the standard set by political science does not matter. What is more important is that the draft constitution is in conformity with our country’s geographical features, culture, custom and political historical background. (bold emphasis in the original text, authors remark) Oh: The more the draft constitution meets international standard, the better it is, isn’t it? […] Doh: I want to explain it for public knowledge. To answer your question, no constitution in the world meets the standard cent per cent. And no country can be boast of the fact that its people fully enjoy democracy both in form and in essence. If it is said that democracy is the rule of the representatives who have been elected […] I would say that in the democracy pioneer country, senate is formed with those who are descended from noble families and ministers. Here you can say that they are elected by the public. But, the representatives are from among the rich and the beautiful in the societies that rely on money. The preamble of the 200-year-old constitution of the democracy pioneer country says that God created man equally. However, only in the 1960s, would the Blacks in that country enjoy the right to vote. […] For example, the Blacks make up more than 10 per cent of the nation’s population. But, in more than 200 years, there has been only a Black senator. However, a tribe that constitutes less than 0.01 per cent of the nation’s population wins over 10 per cent of the seats in Senate. They are very rich. I would say it is the democracy of the beautiful. […] Oh: It will be good if things happen as you say. What I understand is that the constitution, as example that you give, is nutriment that is indispensable for a nation to survive. However, to be nutritional one cannot eat all what he likes. He needs to choose suitable foods according to his health condition although every food is beneficial to health. So also, we are to choose the most appropriate constitution capable of serving the national interest.” (bold emphasis in the original text, authors remark)177 The excerpt above not only illustrates the awareness of the SPDC to the existence of critical points of view, but also pointedly introduces the points of contention. 177 New Light of Myanmar, April 23, 2008. 73 While opponents in the early stage of the announcement of the referendum criticised specific points of the content of the constitution, in the later phase the constitution as a whole was rejected. There was widespread criticism that the constitutional draft was not available early enough for citizens or that it was sold instead of being distributed free of cost.178 While it was claimed that the government attempted to withhold the constitution, it was, however, already available at the Myanmar embassy in Singapore in March 2008. To distribute a copy of the draft constitution for free is an insurmountable challenge in a country like Myanmar where the technical infrastructure is poor and the state has few financial means to afford such a task. The 88 Generation Students group179 launched a “vote no” campaign in March 2008. In a public statement they called on “the people of Burma to reject the state constitution […], because (a) the people’s representatives elected from the 1990 general elections were not allowed to participate in the constitution writing process; (b) this constitution is not based on real federal system and does not guarantee the equality selfdetermination and minority rights for all ethnic nationalities; (c) this constitution does not intend to build a democratic society and does not protect the interest and security of the people. (2) The Referendum is expected to be a sham and the juntas plan is to steal and abuse the real desire of the people.”180 This call by the 88 Generation Students resulted in a vocal response, particularly from exile-based Burmese media groups. Internet newspapers published numerous articles about the promotion and success of the ‘no-vote’ campaign. For example the Democratic Voice of Burma,181 more popularly know as DVB, reported on citizens wearing T-Shirts with a “no” printed on them in order to promote the ‘no-vote’ campaign.182 The Irrawaddy 183 published an article “Vote ‘no’ landslide” and claimed that 178 See for example Irrawaddy, Constitution for sale, April 9, 2008, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=11350; DVB, NLD slams late release of constitution, April 10, 2008, http://english.dvb.no/news.php?id=1138 or Mizzima, Constitution draft copy will be released soon, April 2, 2008, http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/4-inside-burma/117constitution-draft-copy-will-be-released-soon. 179 The 88 Generation Students group is the name of a grouping of political activists in Myanmar. Eminent members are Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe and Min Zeya. Many of the members are former political prisoners who named their group after the political uprising in August 1988. 180 The 88 Generation Students, Statement 5/2008 (88), March 14, 2008. 181 The Democratic Voice of Burma is an Oslo-based Burmese non-profit media organisation. They run a news website, www.dvb.no, that is updated regularly and run a satellite TV programme. 182 Democratic Voice of Burma, T-Shirt campaign promotes No vote, May 26, 2008. http://english.dvb.no/news.php?id=1085 183 The Irrawaddy is a print magazine and a website that covers news on Myanmar and Southeast Asia. The print magazine appears monthly, the website is updated daily except on 74 according to their own survey 48 % of 300 people in Irrawaddy, Yangon and Sagaing divisions and in Shan state intended to ‘vote no’ in the upcoming constitutional referendum. 184 In a similar vein, Mizzima185 reported that “according to random interviews with people in the city, a majority of those questioned said they were ready to vote against the draft constitution.”186 These articles all suggest a strong, possibly nation-wide rejection of the constitution. It is indicated that people stood united in the face of a constitutional referendum that not only reverberated little among the people, but was also strongly rejected. This unified will to reject the constitution, however, appeared to present a distorted image of the situation among the Myanmar citizenry. A closer look at the articles cited above can easily reveal methodological shortcomings. Personal experiences paint a picture largely oblivious of the masses who considered the referendum meaningless. The Irrawaddy contacted 300 people, of whom 49 % would vote no, by phone. In Myanmar, to have a private phone connection is a privilege. Access to a private phone connection, whether a landline or a mobile connection, is largely confined to urban people who belong to the middle and upper classes. Furthermore, it is likely that the Irrawaddy contacted people whose numbers they possessed and did not hold a random survey. The urban – rural divide in Myanmar is, as in most Southeast Asian countries, striking. In rural areas, newspapers are more difficult to obtain, most people do not own a TV, internet connection is absent and radios will often be shared by families. Access to information is more difficult and the opinions of educated urban elites are in no way representative of rural populations. Mizzima, despite titling their article “Many ready to vote ‘no’ in Rangoon,”187 was reflective enough to recognise that the theoretical inclination to vote no does not need to translate into practice. Many of their respondents explained various reasons why their personal dislike of the draft constitution would not guide their voting behaviour. DVB weekends, www.irrwaddy.org. Their main office is located in Chiang Mai, Thailand and it is run by Myanmar citizens. 184 Irrawaddy, Vote ‘no’ landslide, based on Irrawaddy random survey, April 29, 2008. http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=11654 185 Mizzima was founded in 1998 and is an online news service that provides daily news updates on www.mizzima.com. They primarily employ Burmese citizens and have their main office in Delhi, India and a news bureau in Chiang Mai, Thailand. 186 Mizzima, Many ready to vote No in Rangoon, May 07, 2008. http://www.mizzima.com/referendum/17-referendum-watch/453--many-ready-to-vote-no-inrangoon 187 ibid 75 cautiously expressed that a “noticeable number of people” were wearing ‘vote no’ shirts. However, to whom these people were noticeable remained a secret. While not denying that opposition to the draft constitution and the constitutional referendum existed, it is important to stress that this dislike prevailed predominantly among educated urban elites. The Zomi youth leader I mentioned in chapter 2 shared his experience from touring Chin state to promote the “vote no” campaign in an interview. He recounted how many people were not informed at all about the constitutional referendum and how challenging it was to explain the relevance of the constitutional vote.188 Similarly, I experienced indifference and disinterest among citizens the weeks preceding the constitutional vote. In conversations with different people all were surprised when I asked whether they had read the draft of the constitution. One man in his early thirties mentioned that he did not have enough money to buy a draft, but expressed no interest when I offered to email him a digital copy (he has access to the Internet). Many people said that their vote would not make a difference to their lives. The day of the constitutional referendum, May 10, 2008, was markedly different from other days. The government had announced that people were to stay at home all day long and only to leave their houses to participate in the referendum. The usually very busy part of the city where I lived remained deserted all day long. However, this was the most remarkable feature of the day and by the next day no reminders persisted of the recent balloting. Streets remained empty on that day only because people followed an order from above. In a similar vein, participation in the referendum was an imposition of the state. Most people did not consider it their national duty to participate in the vote on the constitution. Before drawing any conclusions, one needs to mention that the mobilisation of the population to participate in the vote was monopolised by the government inside Myanmar. The government claimed that 92 % of the population had voted in favour f the constitution referendum. To verify or proof this claim to be wrong is nearly impossible, thus one cannot conclude that the “vote-no” campaign was entirely unsuccessful. The conditions under which the 88 generation needed to present their campaign were severely hampered by the tight restrictions placed by the SPDC on their leeway to act. The important point here is to suggest that any long- or short-term efforts by any party to create awareness and involvement in the constitutional referendum failed and the rare 188 Personal interview, June 03, 2008. 76 opportunity to participate in a political event, whether manipulated by the government or not, left most people indifferent. Cyclone Nargis: a State in Torpidity In contrast to the vote on the constitution, Cyclone Nargis, which ravaged the southern coast of Myanmar and Yangon in early May, touched the lives of many citizens in a deeply moving fashion. International media attention suddenly focused on Myanmar was intense, but short-lived. Journalists flooded the country, sipped their coffees and published their stories, but soon turned their backs again on a country that in the media’s eyes has few stories to offer. In the memory of the international public, Cyclone Nargis became another heart-rending event in a by misfortune-stricken country. However, for many Myanmar citizens Cyclone Nargis meant an important moment in their lives. On one level, the cyclone was a sheer human tragedy. Many people lost their lives during the storm, mothers saw children drown in the water and husbands needed to let go of wives who were swept away by the crushing floods. In the aftermath people died because of insufficient medical care. Many families lost their breadwinners and will struggle in the future to survive. The material damage amounted to 4 billion US $ and will put a heavy strain on a largely cash strapped population and government. On another level, the catastrophe provided room for an unprecedented emotional outcry of the nation. People from all walks of life expressed their sympathy with the victims. Volunteer workers rushed from all parts of the country to the affected areas, money was donated, infrastructural help offered wherever possible and many private initiatives mushroomed, all aimed at providing support for the victims. The government attempted to organise relief efforts, but was hesitant and appeared undecided on what to do. The constitutional referendum was scheduled for soon after the occurrence of the cyclone and the government seemed not to be able to rearrange their priorities. Only after the constitutional vote was over, did the state publicly invest more time into relief work. Nevertheless, the performance of the state was disappointing. Cyclone Nargis could have provided an opportunity for the SPDC to make its mark in international politics. The SPDC’s rule enjoys little appreciation internationally and Myanmar is often considered a pariah on the political stage. In the face of a gigantic humanitarian catastrophe, a fast and appropriate response on the part of the SPDC 77 could have resulted in a temporary silencing of critical voices about human rights and other problematic political issues or at least strengthened ASEAN and China in dampening relentless critical Western voice. However, the response of the government in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis fell short of all expectations. Initially, the government did not attempt to appear overly emotional or compassionate for the victims. The government sent soldiers to Yangon to help with the immediate relief works. Many streets were blocked by uprooted trees and residents and soldiers needed to work strenuously to make roads passable again. It is difficult to estimate how many soldiers were involved in this work. In downtown Yangon soldiers could be seen working on many streets, while citizens in townships further away from the city centre to a large extent had to rely on their own manpower. Power was cut in downtown Yangon for one week, in other townships it was 4-6 weeks until electricity was restored and in the Delta electricity was still not working after two months.189 Therefore, the transmission of information was severely hampered. The New Light of Myanmar resumed printing on May 8. While there were numerous reports about post-cyclone conditions, the constitutional vote continued as the most important story in the daily news. The referendum was postponed in cyclone affected areas until May 20, 2008, but the state put emphasis on a smooth vote in other parts of the country. 189 It should be noted that there is no 24 hours, 7 days a week provision of electricity in ordinary times in Myanmar. Before the cyclone, most parts of downtown Yangon had power supply for approximately 10 hours a day. However, power supply fluctuates from township to township and some parts of the city would have electricity for not more than 10 hours a week. In post-cyclone Yangon, the power supply improved considerably after the initial complete power cut. 78 Figure 4.3 Illustration from New Light of Myanmar, May 11, 2008 The illustration above was printed in the New Light of Myanmar on May 11, nine days after the cyclone. It offers a glimpse into the mindset of the SPDC. On one side of the road a group of faceless and black figures stands, branded as “Nargis and international and external saboteurs.” On the other side of the road, a group of enthusiastically running citizens follow the call of a soldier and rush towards ballot boxes that lead to the “peaceful, modern and developed nation” in the background of the illustration. The thought clouds of the citizens show that despite the occurrence of a natural disaster and the attacks of internal and external saboteurs, there is no need to worry, only to follow the road laid out by the military. While one can consider the cartoon disrespectful and tasteless, it reveals the rigid mindset of the SPDC. The SPDC attempted to incorporate the cyclone into its existing nation-building scheme and repertoire without regard for the inappropriateness of such an act. The constitutional vote is portrayed as an act that will make the people as a nation stronger, even in the face of a natural disaster. Many stories circulated in Yangon during the days after the cyclone that echoed the dissatisfaction of the population with the government’s behaviour during the relief work. A Yangon citizen returned from a private trip to the Delta and shared one of those stories with me: 79 “In the night during the cyclone a ship of the marines was just off the coast at the southern tip of the Delta. After the storm, they approached the coast and were able to rescue people from the open waters who struggled to survive floating in the waters. After they had pulled maybe 100 people from the open sea the commander of the ship contacted higher authorities in Naypyidaw. He informed them about the injured and weak civilians on board and asked about instructions what to do with them. The response from Naypyidaw was clear. Why had he bothered to save these people? They would need medical treatment and might still not survive. He received instructions to dump them back into the water. The commander of the ship decided to not throw them back into the water, but to set them off on the coast, in a swamp area that was flooded and most likely would not receive any help for weeks to come. He left them to their own fate.”190 This deeply disturbing story is representative of a larger group of stories that all account highly inappropriate actions of the government. While most of them will be true, others might be exaggerations. Nevertheless, their repetition is in itself a manifestation of the discontent of the population with their government. As a matter of fact, eye witnesses reported that four weeks after the cyclone dead bodies were still floating in the waters and the government had ended all efforts to remove the corpses. The government announced on May 12191 that it had spent 20 billion kyat 192 and by May 19193 an additional 30 billion kyat on relief efforts. Considering the extent of the disaster, given the numbers are correct at all, these are negligible sums that it had spent. With the passing of time, the government staged wretched public performances to demonstrate their understanding and interest about the plight of the Nargis victims. Senior General Than Shwe, Head of the SPDC, only visited the Delta three weeks after the cyclone. 194 He was shown on TV strolling through a temporary shelter camp. He stepped from stone to stone, which had been laid out for him so as not to dirty his shoes, in the flooded camp as he stroked the hair of a little girl. A few days later, Vice-Senior General Maung Aye, Vice-Chairman of the SPDC, visited the Delta to show his support for the victims.195 In Yangon, rumours were rife that Maung Aye was not allowed to visit the Delta freely, and that Than Shwe wanted to remain fully in charge 190 Personal conversation, May 2008. New Light of Myanmar, Government already spent K 20 billion for emergency aid, May 12, 2008. 192 The exchange rate for the kyat varies considerably. In May 2008 the exchange rate was approximately US $ 1 = 1140 kyat. 193 New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe visits relief camps in Yangon Division: over K 50 billion spent on relief and rehabilitation tasks so far, May 19, 2008. 194 ibid 195 New Light of Myanmar, Vice-Senior General Maung Aye visits storm-hit villages in three townships, June 4, 2008. 191 80 and had imposed restrictions on his travel itineraries.196 These belated visits enraged the public more than they convinced them of the sincerity of the government to act responsibly. A Nation stands up Myanmar citizens meanwhile had developed their own formal and informal responses to the natural disaster. Many local organisations dedicated their work to immediate and long term relief efforts. While many existing NGOs channelled their existing capacities into relief work, other organisations were spontaneously founded. NGO X, mentioned already in chapter 3, used their existing networks in the Delta to provide fast and efficient relief aid. NGO X called on their existing donors to increase their financial budget and provided this money to local communities in the Delta with whom they had worked on earlier projects. Since local authorities were familiar with the work of NGO X, it was not necessary to obtain a permit or to go through any particular bureaucratic hurdles. But it was not only existing networks with state bodies that were capable of relief work. NGO X’s worker Z was convinced that victims of Cyclone Nargis had learned from earlier projects with NGO X that personal initiative will be rewarded: “The relief work in the Delta now is only possible so fast because NGO X has its network in place. And people are aware that they need to help themselves. Help will not come if they just sit around and wait.”197 Similarly, organisation Y operated in the Delta through two of their parishes. They informed the authorities about their activities, but were not required to obtain a special permit. Organisation Y focused on only providing relief materials for members of their church communities and did not operate outside their earlier fields of work. Meanwhile, while these organisations were able to profit from their existing networks, other organisations were founded in Yangon. Local aid relief groups were formed immediately by Myanmar citizens who were aware that besides official relief work, alternative channels of help needed to be provided. Some of the private initiatives obtained official permits to engage in relief works, while others operated on an ad-hoc basis, gathering relief goods and delivering them via private vehicles and boots. Many of the ad-hoc formed groups collected donations in kind among friends, rented boats and sent them 196 197 Personal conversation with relief worker, May 2008. Personal interview, June 06, 2008. 81 through the waterways into the Delta.198 People were suspicious of the relief work of the government and preferred to invest their own time and money into organising trips than to donate to the government. It should be noted that people could have refrained from engaging in relief work at all, but decided not to do so. In Yangon, at the Burnett Foundation, an office was assigned to coordinate the relief efforts of all the formal organisations, many of them spontaneously founded by young people.199 Those organisations that attempted to obtain a permit in order to operate in the Delta were often faster than international agencies to do so. Some of these organisations have been involved in philanthropic activities in Myanmar for a long time and necessary connections to obtain permits existed prior to the natural disaster. Yet, it is a mistake to assume that any local organisation that obtained a permit must be associated with the government. The government is aware that there are no political strings attached to their work and finds it easier to trust these organisations than international organisations that often have a history of tenuous relations with the government. The work of many of the private initiatives, whether conducted with a permit or not, has in many cases been made possible by generous donations from Myanmar businessmen and citizens, from home and abroad. In one example, a local businessman whom I met spoke of donating tens of thousands of dollars to trusted organisations and individuals. Students and young professionals from Yangon not only offered their time to victims of Nargis, but also their emotional support. Small teams of young people travelled to the Delta with a help organisation, to stay with the villagers in affected areas. Cyclone victims enthusiastically welcomed this effort. Many people in the Delta felt grateful for the material help they received, but they remained isolated from other parts of the country and the continuous stay of the young people gave them a sense of connection to other parts of the country. In this way, the young Yangonites were able to offer emotional support, and to provide important information about which items were needed in different places. 200 Volunteers from other parts of the country offered their expertise. Volunteers from Kachin state contacted organisations in Yangon. One group had earlier been trained in trauma counselling and saw a chance to offer their knowledge to distressed 198 Personal observation and conversation at the jetty in Yangon See for example http://operationnargis.org/. The founders are young people from Yangon who cooperate with other young people in Singapore. 200 Personal conversation with relief worker, May 2008. 199 82 families in the Delta. Another group was trained in the disposal of corpses and assisted with their professional experience.201 As a consequence of the cyclone, some destitute families from the cyclone affected areas sent their children to Yangon to earn a living. This was an opportunity for Yangon families to demonstrate their loyalty in a practical way. In a personal conversation I learned about families in Yangon who had offered food and accommodation for teenage boys from the Delta. The families in the affected areas could not afford to feed their children under the current circumstances and had hoped for the boys to find a place in Yangon to stay and work. The family who offered shelter to the boys attempted to find a public school for them, but because of the cyclone it had become increasingly difficult to accommodate all school-aged children in public education. Myanmar celebrities made public appearances amidst victims to demonstrate their sympathy with the victims. Zaw Win Htut, an eminent Burmese singer, who in September 2007 had shaved his hair to demonstrate his allegiance with the demonstrating monks, this time visited villagers in the Delta to gather information about their plight. Other singers, among them iconic Lay Phyu and Myo Gyi of Ironcross composed and dedicated a song for the Nargis victims. Their song “Let’s help with love”202 was recently released in an album of which all proceeds will go the victims of Nargis.203 A member of an influential intellectual writer’s family, Moe Hein, published a poem shortly after the cyclone to commemorate the victims: Nargis We heard… But too late. It hit. Winds ferocious, waves monstrous, Tools of the devil 201 Personal conversation with community worker, May 2008. The song can be downloaded on the following websites: http://www.imeem.com/people/KQMHIV/music/Y4GJQHD3/various_artist_our_helping_hands_to _nargis_survivors/ or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viedcfmCylI 203 Mizzima, First fund raising music album for Nargis victims released, August 11, 2008, http://www.mizzima.com/nargis-impact/18-nargis-impact/887-first-fund-raising-music-album-fornargis-released 202 83 Sped to slumbering shores And a land lulled illusively. We saw… As never before. The horror. Tearing, toppling, twisting, Bending, beating, blowing, All that stood in the way. Feasting off flesh and blood. We felt… ‘ice and ember’, Highly emotive. Shock, pity, fury, empathy, A thunder of hue and cry. Head and heart clamouring, Moaning for the dead and half-dead. We did… At utmost level. What’s possible, Morale and moral drove us To face odds, remove barriers, Hope and help to hook up. Truly, a colossal test of Storm and spirit. 204 Not all relief works of citizens were likewise appreciated by the government. There were reports of crackdowns on some private convoys into the Delta. It however remained difficult to detect logic behind the government’s action to restrict some convoys while many others were ignored, allowed or supported. The relief efforts of the comedian Zarganar turned into a high profile case that received the government’s public disapproval. Zarganar who is a comedian, film actor and film director is known for his political views that oppose military rule in Myanmar. He was imprisoned for the first time in 1988 after the uprising in August 1988 and ever since his work has partly been 204 Personal copy received through friends of the author 84 banned, restricted and closely observed by the authorities. In the aftermath of Nargis he initiated a private relief convoy, was imprisoned as a consequence and recently charged in court.205 The government perceived the involvement of a popular public figure like Zarganar as too politically contentious as to ignore his activities and public appearances. Accordingly, not all private efforts were tolerated or supported, but the government asserted its right to interfere in the public activities of citizens. All these efforts of individuals and groups reflect a strong sense of a compassionate obligation to fellow citizens. Celebrities used their status and positions to draw attention and exert positive influence for the plight of victims. Ordinary citizens invested their time and offered emotional and material comforting. This display of empathic support in particular by ordinary citizens is rather uncommon in Myanmar’s recent past and in the following paragraph I will analyse it more closely. Sometimes, somewhere, united they stand Conclusions can be drawn from the accounts above of these two unrelated events about the state of nation-building in Myanmar in 2008. The long anticipated constitutional referendum was celebrated as a high profile political event by Myanmar educated urban elites. Proponents and opponents of the constitutional draft engaged in heated debates about its value before and after the referendum. Although opponents of the constitutional draft attempted to portray resistance to the constitution as the common national will, this seemed to be far from the truth. The whole debate appeared to have little meaning to most citizens and the referendum passed without further ado. The state failed in mobilising citizens to oblige to their national duty, at least according to the government, to participate in the constitutional vote. Although the state can control the campaigning process inside Myanmar to a large extent, it has no means to in the end impose its will on its citizens. In contrast, many Myanmar citizens made their voices heard in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis and stood at the side of their fellow countrymen in times of need. Citizens responded to the state’s negligence of the victims needs with deeds and oftentimes ignored the call of authorities to limit individual relief efforts. Many political activists inside and outside Myanmar would like to make the public believe that the course of politics dictates the lives of citizens in Myanmar. However, I suggest that it 205 Mizzima, Burmese Comedian charged on seven accounts, August 15, 2008, http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/4-inside-burma/906-burmese-comedian-charged-onseven-counts 85 was the political nature of the constitutional referendum that left the masses largely oblivious and the non-political character of Cyclone Nargis that encouraged citizens to express themselves. Politics in Myanmar has for a long time been a hazardous way to spend ones time. While political affairs overall have become more peaceful, they have not become less contentious. To engage in politics in contemporary Myanmar requires tremendous dedication and no fear of repercussions. Successive post-colonial governments have responded fiercely to political opposition and there exists little room for political manoeuvring in contemporary Myanmar. Most citizens might not be de-politicised, but they have learned that the public expression of political opinion can result in personal persecution. Many are not willing to face these consequences. The veteran politicians whose point of view was presented earlier have paid a high price for their participation in politics. Politics has come to dominate their lives, not least because of the many personal sacrifices they have been forced to make. These sacrifices have partly caused a disregard for non-political affairs. The constitutional referendum was not just another political event for these men, but reiterated their point of view that the nation-building project is a failure. This, however, can only be said because politics dominates the understanding of the worldview of these senior politicians. Alternative angels to a primarily political point of view on the state of the nationbuilding project are provided by the relief efforts in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. The cyclone provided a non-political opportunity for many citizens to come to the aid of fellow citizens in need largely without fear of repercussions. Many citizens hurriedly distributed their aid in their small private relief efforts, fearful of the possible irrational reaction of the authorities, but nevertheless they did not refrain from offering help. It was not only an opportunity to speak up, but to demonstrate the existence of a national bond. That the struggle of the Myanmar nation has mainly been a political struggle was forgotten for a moment and room made for untainted feelings of compassion and national loyalty. I argue that the insufficient relief efforts of the government did not only spur an increase in private efforts for practical reasons, but that the awareness among citizens of the governments negligence spurred relief efforts additionally by reminding citizens of a commonality that binds them together, a government that repeatedly fails to act in the interest of its citizens. This notion accelerated the readiness of citizens to come to the support of the victims. Although humanitarian assistance by citizens for other citizens is 86 very common in any situation of for example natural disasters, in Myanmar it would have not been possible to predict beforehand. In Myanmar, citizens have shown little interest in providing assistance to fellow citizens in need. 206 Cyclone Nargis in contrast elicited an overwhelming humanitarian response due to the particular circumstances of the situation. It provided a non-political platform for citizens to demonstrate what lingered under the surface, a common perception of nationhood and a common perception of the plight of a nation to provide for victims of Cyclone Nargis. In the preceding chapters I suggested that my interviewees shared their disappointment for the nation-building project and despite differences in opinions on various issues, agreed when the state provided itself as a platform as a unifier. A similar effect can be observed in this chapter. The state’s lack of initiative provided a platform for citizens to be stimulated and united in their support for the victims of Cyclone Nargis. An additional aspect that should at least be briefly mentioned that could play into the willingness of citizens to help the victims is religion. The majority of people in Myanmar adhere to Buddhism and it is not only Buddhist teachings that encourage to help others in need, but it may also provide a sense of belonging that ties people together outside independent of any nation-building discourses. As was suggested in chapter 3, the state has shared nation-building responsibility with civil society actors with regard to social and cultural aspects of nationbuilding. As Cyclone Nargis demonstrates, this shared responsibility might not only have resulted in a heightened awareness of the victims to need to help themselves, but also might have helped to create the sense of nationhood that surfaced in the light of Nargis. The time, dedication and constructive outlook of civil society actors could have instilled belief in a more peaceful common future for the Myanmar nation that surfaced when the right opportunity occurred. While the preceding paragraph recognises the contribution of intentional nationbuilding efforts, I suggest that the main contributing factor to the sense of nationhood lies in the unintentional side effect of the deficient performance and delivery of the nationbuilding project by the government. The state has failed to provide an ideologically meaningful nation-building project and the delivery of its antagonistic campaign has expressed disrespect and contempt for its citizens. The only recurring solid platform that 206 See for example Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or terrorised? (Canberra: Australian National University, 2003), Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: diverse Voices, uncertain Ends (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008). 87 has emerged for the creation of a common national identity is the state itself. It has turned itself through the delivery and performance of its nation-building campaign into a potent object of popular dislike and aversion. In the face of a common object to abhor, citizens were able to create a bond of national loyalty whereby the state provides the core catalyst in binding people in an experience of nationhood. 88 Summary and Conclusion This thesis is an exploration of the state of nation-building and the reach of the state in Myanmar. The examination of different points of view reveals nuances and diverging stances towards the nation-building project in Myanmar. The state’s postcolonial project is examined and contrasted with subjective experiences of citizens. The constitutional referendum and Cyclone Nargis provide case studies to put into perspective the state’s and citizen’s notion about nation-building. It is important to remind the reader of the limitations and the scope of the study here. This thesis attempts to provide a new perspective and thoughts on nation-building in Myanmar, based on limited empirical and archival research. The views presented by Myanmar citizens here are by no means representative of the whole population, but are meant to provide insights into the opinions and thoughts of a certain part of the population who have spent a considerable amount of time reflecting on nation-building in Myanmar. Given the scope of the research, this thesis does not offer any final conclusions, rather it attempts to provoke new ideas and alternative research approaches with regard to nation-building in Myanmar. The interpretation offered is not the only possible interpretation, but one that is reasonable and supported by the research materials. The state has aggressively pursued a nation-building campaign that not only focuses on constructing a central role for the state in the nation’s history, but also assigns the state in its rhetoric an indispensable role in ensuring the survival of the Myanmar nation in the future. On a more general level, the state and citizens interviewed disagreed about the role of the state in the nation-building project. Veteran politicians have different notions than the state about the nation that is in-the-making. Their continuous exclusion from political participation in the nation-building project has given them few opportunities to exert their voices and make their presence felt. Their notions about the right way to build a nation are marked by their experiences from their politically active periods as young visionary nation-builders. The right constitution to build a nation has never materialised in the post-colonial history of Myanmar, though a constitution is still considered the basis of any solution. If a strong man who can put an appropriate constitution in place, fails to appear many veteran politicians are willing in the extreme case to endorse armed struggle. Among those interviewed, citizens who might not be happy with the state’s monopoly on political participation have learned to accept it to such a degree that their 89 resentment does not restrain them from seeking alternative nation-building access. Civil society actors have sought out participation in the state’s nation-building project that increasingly arose during the last 20 years. While the state continues to pursue its highly centralised project and is persistent in its refusal to allow political participation in the nation-building project, it has allowed citizens to participate in social and cultural aspects of nation-building. The state ceded nation-building competence to socially engaged citizens since it was an opportunity to shift some of the state’s responsibilities of rebuilding society to other groups in society. Furthermore, it was an opportunity to disassociate interests of ethnic and other groups from political goals as proposed by for example the NLD. In order to be able to participate in nation-building from ground up it is often required to cooperate with government officials. This does not hold many civil society actors back from engaging in their projects. The opportunity to shape and create a more active citizenry according to their views and visions is more important than not to overcome dislike at interaction with government officials. The work of many civil society groups, however, reaches out to a specified segment of society that often is demarcated along social, religious or ethnic lines. Therefore social divisions that the civil society actors attempt to overcome are often instead enforced. It remains a contentious question whether the chance to participate in nation-building from below is a positive achievement or whether it is the intention of the state to create distraction from not allowing political participation. This question is not further pursued here, but invites discussion and additional research. The constitutional vote and Cyclone Nargis provided unique case-studies to approach the study of nation-building through real live events. The perspective of the state and society on nation-building are subjective experiences that each offer different views on a social process. To complement these views with a real life case study can reveal additional insights. It appeared that the constitutional vote left many people untouched, despite its portrayal by the government and political groups as a high profile and important event to the Myanmar people. In contrast, the insufficient response of the government in taking care of the victims of Cyclone Nargis created a platform for many citizens to stand up and become involved in providing assistance and help to fellow citizens. The non-political nature of Cyclone Nargis allowed people to reveal their sense 90 of national obligations towards compatriots, while the referendum in its highly political set-up disengaged citizens from participation. As was mentioned before, a natural disaster is an extraordinary situation that often will elicit extraordinary responses. In other countries as well, natural disasters provide case studies of unexpected reactions. I, however, have not attempted to construct an argument that turns the Myanmar case into an exception. The crucial aspect is that even the most unusual experience could only have elicited the response that occurred when the potential to act as a unified nation was present in the first place. Where no seeds are sown, no plants can grow, irrespective of the fertilizer. The seeds for the Myanmar nation have been planted and are now yielding fruit. However, who or what have planted the seeds is a crucial question. It was suggested that the nation-building project of the state has largely contributed to the creation of this sense of nationhood. While partly the work of the groups discussed in chapter 3 that have contributed to creating a more engaged nation, the main contribution lies in the state’s nation-building project. Yet, it is not the content of the project itself that has yielded fruit, but it is the performance of the state while delivering the project that has created a common sense of nationhood. The state has repeatedly acted in a hostile way towards society in its nation-building project. The contents are meaningless and aimed at glorifying the role of the state. The state shows little skill in approaching its citizens and has offered no ideological national platform for people to identify with. Although this ideological platform has failed to materialise the state has provided itself as the necessary platform for creating a sense of nationhood. Respondents from chapters 2 and 3 were united in their common dislike for the state. During the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis the state showed little respect or concern for the victims and thereby enforced what lingered for a long time, an expression of nationhood that is centred around a common dislike of the state. An additional factor that might contribute to creating a sense of nationhood that has not been explored in depth is religion or more specifically Buddhism. As was mentioned in chapter four, large parts of the population in Myanmar adhere to Buddhism and exercise Buddhist rituals intensively; accordingly it could be an important factor that offers people a common sense of tradition and belonging which is independent of any nation-building rhetoric. However, not all citizens follow Buddhist doctrine, thus religion does potentially not only have the power to unite, but to divide as well. 91 The interpretation that a nation is united in their dislike of the state provokes questions about the nature of nationhood. One might argue that nationhood can only be defined through the presence of certain positive binding forces such as language, cultural practices or ethnicity. Can nationhood be defined through the presence of a particular government? What if this factor is removed? What remains of the nation? It is the usually relatively fleeting nature of governments that triggers this question. One does not tend to ask what remains of nationhood when language or ethnicity are removed, since these factors are assumed to be more durable. It is argued here that a government can be enough of a catalyst to create a sense of nationhood and that this sense can match a sense of nationhood created through any other factors. As was elaborated in the beginning, nation-building is a continuous process that is in constant flux and should not be regarded a failure or a completed process. It remains a speculation as to what would happen to the sense of Myanmar nationhood if the government would be removed. The interpretation as laid out above suggests that it would not remain the same. Assuming that nation-building is a fluctuating process, it can be assumed that other factors would come to dominate the nation-building process and that an alternative form of nationhood could arise at some point of time. To get back to the research question of this study, one has to conclude that the reach of the state does not depend on its effectiveness or popularity. This study shows that although the state enjoys little popularity and is limited in its capacity to impose its will in Myanmar it would be erroneous to ignore its actions or deeds as purely propaganda. The state can ultimately not impose its visions or notions about nationhood on the population, but has at least created a powerful machinery to transmit its notions and ideas. These ideas might not be received by the population as the state wishes them to be, but in the first place it is important not to ignore the state’s behaviour. The state’s legitimacy, or lack thereof, does not alter its potential to attempt to influence citizens; it is always in the hands of the citizens to decide how to deal with the information or behaviour of the state. For future research, this study opens new opportunities that could be further pursued. While it gives a glimpse of the perspectives of citizens on the nation-building project, it does so to a limited extent. A deeper analysis of a more representative part of the Myanmar nation could provide alternative views and discourses that prevail among citizens. Questions regarding the role the self-perception of citizens in building the 92 Myanmar nation could be addressed and of course a deeper analysis of the state’s project would be possible. What drives the state to act the way they do in their nationbuilding campaign? What are the roles of the different generations of state and nationbuilders in developing and driving the current trajectory? It is hoped that this thesis encourages others to study the state and society in Myanmar from a more disengaged perspective. 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Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. http://www.unpo.org/downloads/UNPOBrochure.pdf (accessed July 11, 2008). 100 [...]... one I will review nation- building policies and actions in Myanmar since independence in 1948 When analysing nation- building endeavours in Myanmar one needs to make a distinction between official rhetoric on the one hand and actions of the Myanmar state on the other hand The rhetoric of the state often is a good expression of the state s mindset and analysing it helps understand reasoning or argumentation... ideological influence than another party The analysis of nation- building in Myanmar can help to unfold different point of views on the state and its ideological project It can reveal different mechanisms that are at play and show the reader that many factors influence the workings of the state I see my scholarly contribution in particular to the field of Myanmar studies and the understanding of state –... terms state, statebuilding, nation, nation- building and nation -state The state is defined as the governmental and administrative institutions of a society, and […] the ideological claim as to the sovereignty of those institutions.”11 State- building refers to the creation and strengthening of these institutions According to the definitions provided here, the term state is a political concept, whereas the. .. term nation can be considered a cultural concept The concept nation -state in turn is "the result of marrying a new cultural concept of the nation to an older legal and political concept of the state. "12 Accordingly, the term nation -state is the product of the attempt of governments to create an overlap between the concepts of state and nation In particular in the study of Myanmar the concepts of state, ... potent image of national identification Not the rejection of the nation- building project, but the dislike of the state accelerated by the nation- building project, provides an object that allows the imagination of a common national suffering and thereby creates a common national identity 14 Chapter 1: “Nurturing the Soul of a Nation: ”24 Nation- Building in PostColonial Myanmar Myanmar gained independence... 2002 61 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness, practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia, ed Lee Hock Guan and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007): 150 62 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, The Politics of Language Policy in Myanmar: Imagining togetherness, practising difference?” in Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia,... nation- building remains a topic of relevance and the nation -state a meaningful unit of analysis.5 In November 2007 Malaysia was afflicted with protests of members of the Indian community who expressed their discontent with their current standing within the Malaysian society, the south of Thailand has for many years now been the setting of violent clashes between the minority Muslim community and the Thai... inviting participation in terms of technical knowhow and investments from sources inside the country and abroad The initiative to shape the national economy must be kept in the hands of the state and the national peoples Four social objectives Uplift of he moral and morality of the entire nation Uplift of national prestige and integrity and preservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage and national... community and the Thai state, the dominance of the Philippine state continues to be challenged in Mindanao and in Myanmar the hegemony of the state has been challenged from many sites for nearly 60 years now Although many of these conflicts are closely linked to the existence of networks beyond national borders and the notion of individual or social groups to be part of these networks, these conflicts need... in the name of a people and therefore to define and mould that people”.28 State nationalism and nation- building became more powerful in the light of this development In a similar vein, the nation- building project in Myanmar was intensified after the end of colonial rule The AFPFL government that took power in 1948 was an alliance of several political factions It had not been formed on the basis of