Banking reforms in the transitional economy of china

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Banking reforms in the transitional economy of china

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BANKING REFORMS IN THE TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY OF CHINA CONNIE CHUNG WEE - WEE (B.A., B. Soc. Sci. (Hons.), M. Soc. Sci., NUS) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PH. D. (ECONOMICS) DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2005 To my beloved parents i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Associate Professor Jose L. Tongzon, for his invaluable advice, encouragement and enthusiasm. He demonstrates empathy and guidance skills through his ongoing enthusiasm in my work. Professor Tongzon avails himself readily whenever I need to consult him on issues relating to my areas of research, despite his busy working schedule. His patience and tenacity are noteworthy. His good listening skills has helped me to move forward positively in my academic pursuit. We have an excellent working relationship. Other positive support came from Associate Professor Tilak Abeysinghe, Associate Professor Gavin Peebles, Dr. Yu Qiao, fellow peers OG and Enrico, Diana, the administration staff of the Department of Economics, and the library personnel of the National University of Singapore and the East Asia Institute. My inner strength comes from family members and friends, including those from afar, who believe in the “paradigm shift” that I am embarking on in my life. I am thankful to them for their outpourings of good wishes and bountiful blessings. I am, ultimately, eternally grateful to the Most High for His unfailing love, mercy and grace. ii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii SUMMARY v LIST OF TABLES viii LIST OF FIGURES x LIST OF ACRONYMS xi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE: Banking reforms: policy changes, implementation Issues and implications 1.1 Introduction and motivation of the thesis 1.2 Economic performance 1.3 1979-1993 1.3.1 Assessments and implementation issues 1.4 1994-2003 1.4.1 Issues and implications 1.5 Conclusion 15 20 24 31 44 CHAPTER TWO: 48 Whither the impact of financial deepening on China’s economic growth 25 years on? 2.1 Introduction and motivation 2.2 Financial deepening and economic growth 2.3 Data analysis 2.3.1 The Chinese financial sector is dominated by the banking system 2.3.2 Indicators of financial deepening and economic growth 2.4 Empirical test and results 2.5 The role of financial deepening in a growing Chinese economy 2.5.1 The growing importance of the non-state sector to China’s economic growth 48 52 56 56 59 63 73 73 iii 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 2.5.5 2.5.6 2.6 Bias in credit allocation Non-state enterprises “thriving on a tilted playing field” The role of the curb market financing Growth is driven by China’s high savings rates Role of the central bank in mitigating the negative effects of growth in indirect financing Conclusion CHAPTER THREE: Evaluating the efficiency of Chinese banks: a non-parametric approach 77 79 80 82 83 85 87 3.1 Introduction and motivation 3.2 Literature review 3.3 DEA methodology 3.4 Data Analysis 3.4.1 The sample banks 3.4.2 The intermediation approach 3.4.3 The choice of input and output variables 3.5 Empirical results 3.5.1 Evaluating the efficiency of the sample of Chinese banks 3.5.2 Evaluating the efficiency of the banking segments 3.5.3 Percentage reduction in input usage recommended for the inefficient banks 3.6 Conclusion 87 90 96 106 107 115 116 120 121 126 133 CHAPTER FOUR: 146 A paradigm shift for China’s central banking system 4.1 Introduction and motivation 4.2 Literature review 4.3 Monetary policy management 4.4 Is the PBC an independent central bank? 4.4.1 Political and policy independence 4.4.1.1 Leadership appointments 4.4.1.2 Boardroom decision-making process 4.4.1.3 Resistance at the grassroots level 4.4.1.4 Role in policy lending 4.4.2 Financial independence 4.4.3 The relationship between the government and the party 4.5 A paradigm shift for the PBC 4.6 Conclusion 140 146 149 152 159 161 162 163 165 167 170 170 174 180 iv CHAPTER FIVE: Confronting the new Chinese banking environment post-WTO: implications and strategies 183 5.1 Introduction and literature survey 5.2 Analytics of financial liberalization 5.3 Implications of WTO’s accession on domestic banking 5.4 Strategies to counter competition 5.4.1 Capitalize on current strength 5.4.2 Diversify product and service offerings 5.4.3 Market repositioning-target segmentation 5.4.4 Restructuring 5.4.5 M&A and alliance strategies 5.4.6 Organizational transformations 5.5 The new Chinese banking environment post-WTO 5.6 Concluding remarks 183 189 191 196 196 197 203 203 207 212 215 220 CHAPTER SIX: 222 Conclusion: Does China’s banking system still have a long way to go? 6.1 The China approach 6.2 Banking reforms at the “new” crossroads 6.3 The contributions of my thesis 222 225 232 BIBLIOGRAPHY 236 APPENDIX 264 I. II. 264 273 Chronology of Foreign Banking Reforms DEA Results v SUMMARY The banking reforms in China have played an instrumental role in the country’s overall effort to transform a centrally-planned economy into a market-driven economy. The thesis examines the changes that took place in the banking system from 1979 to 2003. It attempts to address four main areas when analyzing the banking industry during this period. Firstly, the thesis finds answers to some important policy-related questions concerning the impact of banking industry development on China’s overall economic growth. The Granger-causality empirical outcomes reveal that banking industry development helps explain its economic growth in the reform era. There is a “supply-leading” causality relationship between two financial deepening indicators, that is, real M1 to real GDP growth, and real M2 to real GDP growth, and the economic growth indicator, that is, real GDP growth. With the exception of real quasi-money to real GDP growth, the empirical test also demonstrates a similar “supply-leading” causal relationship between all the other financial deepening indicators and real fixed assets investments growth. The study concludes that the more productive non-state sector should not be overlooked in the financial deepening process as it will be the new engine of growth for China in the foreseeable future. It recognizes, however, that the primary shortcoming of this empirical test is that it completely ignores the role of curb market financing in non-state sector development. vi Secondly, the relative technical and scale efficiencies of a sample of Chinese banks are analyzed using a non-parametric technique, called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This technique allows the identification of both the “relatively” efficient and inefficient banks. Recommendations are made to all the inefficient banks to implement percentage reductions of their various input usage areas so as to attain full efficiency or move to the “efficient frontier”. The results also allow management to revisit the way resources are currently utilized and better plan for their organizations’ future. Thirdly, in analyzing the effectiveness of the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), as a monetary policy manager, financial supervisor and regulator, the thesis concludes that it has only gained some operational independence and not complete independence as China’s central banker. As China progressively opens to the rest of the world, it is timely that the PBC revisits its roles and functions and makes a quantum leap to genuine central bank management, as practiced in market economies. Finally, in assessing the implications of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on domestic banking, the thesis highlights that the banks need to embark on six major strategies to counter the increasing competition amongst themselves as well as from their foreign counterparts. The new banking landscape ultimately will still be shaped by China’s trade and investment liberalization and overall economic reform program. vii It is apt that the thesis concludes with a pragmatic analysis of the many challenges that a post-WTO environment would bring about, with China’s banking industry moving on to a higher plane, and the banking reforms starting on a new journey in this new millennium. viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Economic performance (per cent) 10 Table 1.2: Market share in major export markets (imports from China divided by total imports, in per cent) 12 Table 1.3: Sources of imports (as a percent of China’s total imports) 12 Table 1.4: The ten largest holders of foreign exchange reserves in 2003 (USD million) 13 Table 1.5: Social indicators (per cent) 14 Table 1.6: Interest rates (5-year average) 18 Table 1.7: Comparisons of interest rate spreads 18 Table 1.8: Summary of closure of financial institutions in China 31 Table 1.9: Subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises 33 Table 1.10: Market Shares of Financial Institutions, September 2003 (in percent of total) 35 Table 1.11: Non-performing loans based on the five-tier classification system 37 Table 1.12: Comparison of China’s gross domestic savings with other countries’ 39 Table 2.1: Sources of funds in 2003 58 Table 2.2: Monetary Depth and Financial Intermediation Ratio 61 Table 2.3: Time series properties of the variables – Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics 69 Table 2.4: Pairwise Granger Causality tests between financial deepening and economic growth indicators 71 Table 2.5: Statistics on China’s GDP, Fixed Assets Investments and Gross Industrial Output (RMB 100 million) 75 Table 2.6: Share of industrial output by the state sector and non-state sector (per cent) 76 261 White, G. and Bowles, P., 1996. “The Political Economy of Late Development in East Asia: China’s Financial Reforms in Comparative Perspective.” In B.L. McCormick and J. Unger (eds.), China After Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia? pp. 149-180, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Wong, C., 1992. “Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic Sequencing of Reform in Post - Mao China.” Modern China, 18 (2), pp. 197-227. Wong, J., and Liu, Z., 2000. “China’s progress in banking reform and financial liberalization.” EAI Working Paper, No. 52, Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Wong, J., 2003. “China’s economic reform and development – The impact on the Asia-Pacific region” In S.J. Yao and X.M. Liu (eds.), Sustaining China’s Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 41-54, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Woo, W.T., 2003. “China – Confronting restructuring and stability” In S.J. Yao and X.M. Liu (eds.), Sustaining China’s Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 13-40, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. World Bank, 1990. China, financial sector policies and institutional development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 262 Xie, D., (2001). “China Currency Market Development”, Chinese Finance, Vol. 7. Xu, X., 1998. China’s Financial System Under Transition. London: Macmillan. Yeh, Q.J., 1996. “The application of Data Envelopment Analysis in conjunction with financial ratios for bank performance evaluation.” Journal of the Operational Research Society, 47, pp. 980-988. Yong, G., 2002. Banking reforms and monetary policy in People’s Republic of China: Is the Chinese central banking system ready for joining the WTO? New York: Palgrave. Yue, P., 1992. “Data Envelopment Analysis and commercial bank performance: A primer with applications to Missouri banks.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Review, January/ February, pp. 31-45. Zhang, H. J., and Zheng, X. J., 1993. “Challenges and Opportunities for Foreign Banks in China.” Policy Paper 7, Australia: Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change, Murdoch University. Zhao, X., 1991. “Economic Change Creates New Market.” Beijing Review, June 12-30, No. 14. 263 ________, 2000. “State-owned commercial banks efficiency analysis.” Journal of Economic Science (Jing Ji Ke Xue), 6, pp. 45-50. Zhao, X., Zhong J.M., and Jiang, Z.S., 2001.”An analysis of the efficiency of state-owned banks with examples.” South China Financial Research (Hu Nan Jin Rong Yan Jiu), 16, pp. 25-27. 264 APPENDIX I. Chronology of Foreign Banking Reforms Major reforms and events Year 19791981 • Representative offices allowed for liaison and market research purposes. No banking businesses allowed. • 21 foreign banks established representative offices in Beijing, two liaison offices in Guangzhou, and one liaison office in Shanghai. 1982 • Branches were allowed to be established in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) only, namely in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou. Allowed to limited banking businesses. Wholly-owned foreign bank subsidiaries and Sino-foreign joint venture banks were still restricted. 1984 • Foreign currency deposits-taking and loans businesses granted to the branches in the SEZs and six banks that remained in Shanghai after 1949. Customers were joint ventures, fully-owned foreign enterprises and Overseas-Chinese concerns. • First joint venture bank established, Xiamen International Bank, by the Fujian provincial branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Fujian Investment Business Company, and the Fan Yin Group Company of Hong Kong. 265 1985 • The enactment of regulations governing the administration of representative offices, foreign banks and joint venture banks in SEZs: - “The Regulations of Foreign Financial Institutions’ China Resident Missions of the People’s Bank of China”. - “The Regulations on Administration of Foreign Banks and Joint Venture Banks in Special Economic Zones of 1985”. • Leasing joint ventures allowed to be established. • HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of East Asia, OCBC allowed to reactivate operations in Shanghai (they had maintained a presence in China after 1949). 1986 • The China International Finance Company was established, a joint venture of the Bank of China, Bank of East Asia, the Security Pacific Bank of California, the Sumitomo Bank and Nomura Securities of Japan. 1989 • The Shanghai Municipal Administrative Council announced plans to develop the Putong New Development Zone in Shanghai, to restore Shanghai as China’s main financial center. 1990 • 1985’s law promulgated replaced by “The Rules on Administration of Foreign and Joint Venture Financial Institutions in Shanghai of 1990”. 266 1991 • Promulgation of “The Rules on Administration of Establishment of Representative Offices by Foreign Financial Institutions in China”. • Branches were allowed to operate in Shanghai. The pioneer batch of foreign banks setting up branches here included Banque Indosuez (which maintained a liquidation presence in Shanghai since 1949) and HSBC (only the Shanghai branch remained after 1949 and the bank was effectively dormant until allowed into the SEZs in the 1980s). 1992 • Foreign banking businesses were allowed in additional 12 cities (mainly coastal): Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shantou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Xiamen and Shenzhen. • Another joint venture bank established, the International Bank of Paris and Shanghai. 1993 • By the end of 1993, representative offices and operational institutions (branches, wholly-owned foreign bank subsidiaries or Sino - foreign joint venture banks) of over 150 foreign banks from about 30 countries were established. Established names included the Citibank, Bank of Tokyo and Westpac Banking Corporation. 267 1994 • Foreign banking businesses allowed in ten more cities: Shijiazhuang, Wuhan, Hefei, Xi’an, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Kunming, Haikou, Chongqing and Suzhou. • China unified its previously two-tier exchange rate system. • “The Regulations on the Administration of the Foreign Financial Institutions in the People’s Republic of China”, replaced the two previous sets of regulations, promulgated in 1985 and 1990 respectively. Other rules implemented included “The Administrative Regulations on the Establishment of Resident Representative Offices in China by the Foreign Financial Institutions by the People’s Bank of China”. • Foreign banks were allowed to participate in foreign exchange swap markets, albeit restricted only to one “leg” of the transaction, meaning they can only sell foreign exchange into the market. 1995 • Five foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Beijing: HSBC, Citibank, Bank of Tokyo, Banque Indosuez, Bank of East Asia. • New regulations promulgated included: - “The Regulations governing Chinese and Foreign Investment Banks”. - “The Regulations for the establishment of investment funds from abroad”. 268 1996 • Local currency, Renminbi (RMB), businesses allowed for four banks in Shanghai only, with restrictions: Citibank, HSBC, Industrial Bank of Japan, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. • Foreign banks were allowed to conduct dual-leg foreign exchange transactions on China’s inter-bank market in four trial locations. 1997 • Sino-US WTO agreement reached which allow foreign banks to conduct RMB business with business organizations and retail business two years and five years, respectively, from the signing of the agreement. 1998 • Ten additional banks granted licenses for RMB business. Foreign banks allowed to operate RMB business in Shenzhen. 1999 • Removal of restrictions on RMB loans with maturity periods more than four months from the inter-bank market. • By the end of 1999, there were 248 representative offices, 157 branches, six wholly-owned foreign banks, seven joint ventures and seven finance companies. • Foreign banks accounted for 1.5 per cent of the total banking assets and only about RMB 6.7 billion, or 3.7 per cent, of the local currency loans. 269 2001 • As of November, 30 banks were allowed to conduct limited RMB business in Shanghai and Shenzhen. • Announced liberalization of the financial sector as China gained membership into the WTO (11th December). The Chinese government agreed to open up the financial sector to foreign financial institutions. • China agreed to commit to full access in five years from the accession for foreign banks. The contents of liberalization included: 1. General rights - Foreign banks will have the same rights (national treatment) as Chinese banks (timing – at the accession) 2. Geographic and customer restrictions - None for the foreign currency business (timing – at the accession) - Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business with non-Chinese enterprises in designated area (timing – at the accession) - Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business with Chinese enterprises in designated area (timing – 11th December, 2003) 270 - Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business with Chinese individuals (timing – 11th December, 2006) - Both geographic and customer restrictions will be removed (timing – 11th December, 2006) 3. Cross-border supply of services - The provision and transfer of financial information, financial data processing, and related software by suppliers of other financial services, as well as advisory, intermediation, and other auxiliary financial services are allowed (timing – at the accession) 2002 • Since 1st January, all foreign banks have been allowed to provide foreign currency-related services in China. • The authorities published the Rules for Implementing the Regulations Governing Foreign Financial Institutions in the People’s Republic of China (January) – on detailed regulations for implementing the administration of the establishment, registration, scope of business, qualification, supervision, dissolution and liquidation of foreign financial institutions. • Foreign banks were allowed to commence RMB-denominated business in Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao Nanjing and Wuhan (1st December). 271 2004 • The China Banking Regulatory Commission allowed foreign banks to expand their local currency business in Shenyang and Xian (December). 2005 • Foreign banks in Ningbo and Shantou were allowed to expand their local currency business. China went beyond its WTO commitments and opened five other cities – Changchun, Harbin, Lazhou, Nanning and Yinchuan, to foreign banks’ local currency businesses (5th December). 2006 • As of the end of August, there were already 14 banking organizations registered in China with wholly foreign funded and joint ventures, which had 17 branches, sub-branches and subsidiaries. By the end of September, all 73 foreign banks owned a total of 191 branches. • The total amount of local and foreign currency of the foreign banks was USD102.5 billion, accounting for 1.9 per cent of the total assets of all the financial institutions in the banking industry. Their deposits and loans in foreign currency accounted for per cent and 21 per cent of the total amounts, respectively. • The Chinese government removed regional and other restrictions on foreign banks, treating them the same as Chinese banks, for example, they can now sell insurance products just like domestic banks and the government will apply the same standards covering 272 registered capital, operating funds, information disclosure and affiliated deals to both domestic and foreign banks. • The State Council promulgated the Regulations on Administration of Foreign Invested Banks, signifying that China has fully opened its banking industry to foreign investors (11th November), which came into effect on 11th December, the fifth anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO. Sources: Reynolds (1982); Zhang and Zheng (1993); Dipchand et al. (1994); Romeyer (1994); Duncan (1995); Lees and Liaw (1996); People’s Bank of China (1998); Wong and Liu (2000); Salomon Smith Barney, 21st September 2000. “China & the WTO”, Economic & Market Analysis: China; various articles from the Business Times and the Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore; and websites (http://en.ce.cn; http: //www.buyusa.gov; http://www,calasia.org; http://www.celent.com; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn) 273 II. DEA Results A. Detailed Results of Banks’ Efficiency MODEL A BANK ICBC BOC CCB ABC BOCOMM CITICIB CEB CMSB HXB CMB SPDB IB SZDB BOS BJCCB TJCCB HZCCB DGCCB NJCCB XCCB DLCCB WXCCB WHUCB NBCB JNCCB CQCB QDCCB ZNJCCB MODEL B TE PTE SE RTS TE PTE SE RTS 0.9010 1.0000 0.7622 0.7320 1.0000 1.0000 0.8231 0.9033 0.7373 0.8699 0.9374 0.8653 1.0000 0.9041 1.0000 0.5363 0.8326 0.4289 0.6227 0.6161 1.0000 0.6891 0.6023 0.7491 1.0000 0.6390 1.0000 0.8102 1.0000 1.0000 0.9220 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8680 0.9571 0.7378 0.8699 0.9527 0.8830 1.0000 0.9114 1.0000 0.5504 0.9133 0.4881 0.7206 0.6476 1.0000 0.7453 0.6746 0.7981 1.0000 0.7658 1.0000 1.0000 0.9010 1.0000 0.8266 0.7320 1.0000 1.0000 0.9483 0.9438 0.9994 0.9999 0.9839 0.9800 1.0000 0.9920 1.0000 0.9744 0.9117 0.8786 0.8642 0.9514 1.0000 0.9246 0.8928 0.9387 1.0000 0.8344 1.0000 0.8102 Decreasing Constant Decreasing Decreasing Constant Constant Decreasing Decreasing Increasing Increasing Decreasing Decreasing Constant Increasing Constant Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Constant Increasing Increasing Increasing Constant Increasing Constant Increasing 0.8228 1.0000 0.6894 0.6060 1.0000 0.9633 0.7065 0.7913 0.6664 0.8085 0.8614 0.7433 0.7841 0.9834 1.0000 0.4988 0.8765 0.3740 0.5147 0.4694 0.8653 0.7052 0.4837 0.6331 0.7916 0.4973 0.8049 0.5292 1.0000 1.0000 0.8403 0.7668 1.0000 1.0000 0.7946 0.8973 0.6704 0.8497 0.9100 0.7654 0.8148 0.9878 1.0000 0.5578 1.0000 0.4525 0.6110 0.5585 1.0000 0.8922 0.6310 0.7318 0.9086 0.6856 1.0000 1.0000 0.8228 1.0000 0.8204 0.7903 1.0000 0.9633 0.8891 0.8818 0.9940 0.9516 0.9465 0.9711 0.9623 0.9955 1.0000 0.8942 0.8765 0.8264 0.8424 0.8405 0.8653 0.7904 0.7667 0.8652 0.8712 0.7253 0.8049 0.5292 Decreasing Constant Decreasing Decreasing Constant Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing Increasing Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing Decreasing Increasing Constant Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing 274 B. Sources of Scale Inefficiency Organizational Status MODEL A IRS MODEL B No. of banks with CRS DRS IRS No. of banks with CRS DRS All banks 13 15 10 State-owned commercial banks Nation-wide banks Regional banks City commercial banks 11 14 275 C. Relationship between PTE, SE and Banks’ Assets and Net Income (RMB million) i. MODEL A BANKS TE PTE SE ICBC BOC CCB ABC BOCOMM CITICIB CEB CMSB HXB CMB SPDB IB SZDB BOS BJCCB TJCCB HZCCB DGCCB NJCCB XCCB DLCCB WXCCB WHUCB NBCB JNCCB CQCB QDCCB ZNJCCB 0.9010 1.0000 0.7622 0.7320 1.0000 1.0000 0.8231 0.9033 0.7373 0.8699 0.9374 0.8653 1.0000 0.9041 1.0000 0.5363 0.8326 0.4289 0.6227 0.6161 1.0000 0.6891 0.6023 0.7491 1.0000 0.6390 1.0000 0.8102 1.0000 1.0000 0.9220 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8680 0.9571 0.7378 0.8699 0.9527 0.8830 1.0000 0.9114 1.0000 0.5504 0.9133 0.4881 0.7206 0.6476 1.0000 0.7453 0.6746 0.7981 1.0000 0.7658 1.0000 1.0000 0.9010 1.0000 0.8266 0.7320 1.0000 1.0000 0.9483 0.9438 0.9994 0.9999 0.9839 0.9800 1.0000 0.9920 1.0000 0.9744 0.9117 0.8786 0.8642 0.9514 1.0000 0.9246 0.8928 0.9387 1.0000 0.8344 1.0000 0.8102 ASSETS 4,776,773.0000 3,593,908.0000 3,083,195.0000 2,976,566.0000 766,874.0000 335,162.6000 328,343.1000 241,671.0000 178,146.5000 371,659.9000 279,300.7000 178,277.5000 164,768.4000 168,600.0000 135,272.0000 44,223.2000 32,131.9000 24,742.9000 23,895.3000 22,680.4000 21,133.0000 19,218.9000 18,968.6000 18,965.1000 16,738.6000 14,866.0000 14,231.6000 4,757.3000 NET INCOME 6,749.0000 10,924.0000 4,304.0000 2,897.0000 1,227.7000 1,416.3000 271.6000 884.6000 705.5000 1,734.3000 1,285.3000 476.5000 386.9000 800.0000 607.8000 407.0000 149.7000 151.9000 166.0000 81.3000 100.5000 26.9000 52.7000 27.3000 49.0000 22.0000 27.0000 12.1000 276 ii. MODEL B BANKS ICBC BOC CCB ABC BOCOMM CITICIB CEB CMSB HXB CMB SPDB IB SZDB BOS BJCCB TJCCB HZCCB DGCCB NJCCB XCCB DLCCB WXCCB WHUCB NBCB JNCCB CQCB QDCCB ZNJCCB TE PTE SE 0.8228 1.0000 0.6894 0.6060 1.0000 0.9633 0.7065 0.7913 0.6664 0.8085 0.8614 0.7433 0.7841 0.9834 1.0000 0.4988 0.8765 0.3740 0.5147 0.4694 0.8653 0.7052 0.4837 0.6331 0.7916 0.4973 0.8049 0.5292 1.0000 1.0000 0.8403 0.7668 1.0000 1.0000 0.7946 0.8973 0.6704 0.8497 0.9100 0.7654 0.8148 0.9878 1.0000 0.5578 1.0000 0.4525 0.6110 0.5585 1.0000 0.8922 0.6310 0.7318 0.9086 0.6856 1.0000 1.0000 0.8228 1.0000 0.8204 0.7903 1.0000 0.9633 0.8891 0.8818 0.9940 0.9516 0.9465 0.9711 0.9623 0.9955 1.0000 0.8942 0.8765 0.8264 0.8424 0.8405 0.8653 0.7904 0.7667 0.8652 0.8712 0.7253 0.8049 0.5292 ASSETS 4,776,773.0000 3,593,908.0000 3,083,195.0000 2,976,566.0000 766,874.0000 335,162.6000 328,343.1000 241,671.0000 178,146.5000 371,659.9000 279,300.7000 178,277.5000 164,768.4000 168,600.0000 135,272.0000 44,223.2000 32,131.9000 24,742.9000 23,895.3000 22,680.4000 21,133.0000 19,218.9000 18,968.6000 18,965.1000 16,738.6000 14,866.0000 14,231.6000 4,757.3000 NET INCOME 6,749.0000 10,924.0000 4,304.0000 2,897.0000 1,227.7000 1,416.3000 271.6000 884.6000 705.5000 1,734.3000 1,285.3000 476.5000 386.9000 800.0000 607.8000 407.0000 149.7000 151.9000 166.0000 81.3000 100.5000 26.9000 52.7000 27.3000 49.0000 22.0000 27.0000 12.1000 [...]... roles, and the accession of China into the WTO 7 This chapter provides adequate background knowledge on China s endeavors in reforming its banking industry, so as to allow better understanding of the other areas of analysis in the subsequent chapters of the thesis In all, the thesis meets its objectives of effectively scrutinizing the layers below the “ice-berg” of banking reforms in China through... PBC, the Bank of China and the People’s Construction Bank of China 2 While the Bank of China took care of the international business and the People’s Construction Bank of China provided the funding for the construction of infrastructure, the PBC also held a second portfolio of running the industrial, commercial and savings banking businesses Their functions were mainly to accommodate the central planning... was the state of financial intermediation in the initial 25 years of reform? 3 - does the development of the banking industry help to explain China s economic growth during the reform era and vice versa? - have both the state and non-state sectors benefited equally from the development of the banking industry?, and - does financial intermediation include the role of informal finance or curb market financing... domestic banking, and analyze the major strategies that these banks could embark on to counter the problems that may impair their competitiveness in a post-WTO setting CHAPTER TWO of the thesis, entitled “Whither the impact of financial deepening on China s economic growth 25 years on?” seeks to address the following questions regarding the development of the banking industry These include the following:... its lack of independence is found in CHAPTER FOUR of this thesis, “A paradigm shift for China s central banking system” (pp 146-182) Other banking developments included the creation of a formal banking structure and state banks with their own economic niche roles; the increase in savings or investment channels for the individuals and enterprises; the development of a wide variety of financial instruments,... prevented the successful implementation of these banking reforms The main players, that is, the central bank, the specialized state banks, the state-owned enterprises and the local governments, were not capable of functioning in this new banking environment during this period This was because they were either continuing to operate under the rules of the old regime, or they were resisting operating under the. .. questions concerning the impact of banking industry development on China s overall economic growth during the reform era, 2 analyze the relative efficiencies of the financial intermediaries, 3 analyze the effectiveness of the central bank, that is, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) as a monetary policy manager, financial supervisor and regulator, and 4 assess the implications of China s accession to the World... of the austerity measures undertaken by the government to combat inflation and an overheated economy (Dipchand et al., 1994, pp 129) The foreign banks, on the other hand, began to play an instrumental role in channeling foreign funds to China and transferring banking technical and management know-how, these being critical ingredients in the reforms of the financial sector These were necessary for the. .. “monobanking” system, credit from the PBC had to be repaid Since 1986, the two-tiered banking structure was replaced by a three-category “Specialized Banking System” This included a new player, that is, the “other financial institutions”, namely, the non-bank financial institutions This new structure formed the cornerstone of a new financial system in China during this period It laid the stage for the. .. implementation of the financial reform package in 1994, however, put the conflicting relationships between the non-bank financial institutions and their founding companies under close government’s scrutiny, where banks had to divest their security, trust and investment businesses Fourthly, there was inefficiency in the allocation of capital in the banking system, with the continued use of the three-pronged . the following questions regarding the development of the banking industry. These include the following: - how was the state of financial intermediation in the initial 25 years of reform?. the development of the banking industry?, and - does financial intermediation include the role of informal finance or curb market financing in private sector development? In CHAPTER THREE,. Other banking developments included the creation of a formal banking structure and state banks with their own economic niche roles; the increase in savings or investment channels for the individuals

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  • Figure 1.1: Comprehensive Banking System 28

    • CHAPTER ONE

    • China has had a varied and “progressive” experience in the banking arena from the time of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911); to the founding of the Republic of China (ROC), by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen on 1st January 1912; the Communist takeover and founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, led by Chairman Mao Ze-Dong; the Cultural Revolution era (1966-1976); the Deng Xiao-Ping era with major economic reforms implemented from 1978; and to the present day when it faces challenges that comes with globalization and the advent of the New Economy (Samansky, 1981; Byrd, 1983; World Bank, 1990; Dipchand et al., 1994; Gang, 1994; Tam, 1995; Wan, 1999; Cheng, 2003).

    • Banks only began to play a dominant role in the country’s resource allocation process when the government converted its budgetary grants, mainly to state- owned enterprises, to loans which were subjected to interest charges. The central bank also changed its ways of doing business with the banks. Unlike under the “monobanking” system, credit from the PBC had to be repaid. Since 1986, the two-tiered banking structure was replaced by a three-category “Specialized Banking System”. This included a new player, that is, the “other financial institutions”, namely, the non-bank financial institutions. This new structure formed the cornerstone of a new financial system in China during this period. It laid the stage for the many major reforms that took place to lift the country out of its “closed-communist” economy and enter the international financial arena. The “other financial institutions” included new players such as the trust and investment companies, negotiable securities companies and financial companies funded by the local governments and enterprises, the rural and urban credit cooperatives societies, other commercial banks, regional banks and housing savings banks. It was also during this period that the reformed system also called for a decentralization of the existing credit management system. The banks were given the discretion to make loans, as long as the total sum still equaled the planned target figure, where previously the central bank called the shots. They were allowed to retain profits, although these were insignificant as the difference between the loan and deposits interest rates was small. As illustrated by Table 1.6, the 5-year average spreads for 1981-85 and 1986-90 were 0.9 per cent and 0.36 per cent, respectively (Ariff and Khalid, 2000). These were low compared to the 3.3 per cent spread for 2003 (World Development Indicators, 2005). Table 1.7 shows a comparison of China’s interest rate spread with other countries’ for 1990 and 2003. Its spread is relatively smaller than many of the other countries’, except for Japan in 2003. The Chinese banks were allowed to make working capital available to individuals at rates of up to 20 per cent greater than the central bank’s posted rate (Lardy, 2004) and since 1996 they were allowed to set their own interest rates “within a 30 per cent around a base rate set by the authorities” (Ariff and Khalid, 2005, pp. 82). The banks were also to make loans based on borrowers’ credit worthiness and not according to what their physical plans demanded, as was done previously (Dipchand et al., 1994; Gang, 1994).

  • People’s Bank of China (PBC)

  • Figure 1.1: Comprehensive Banking System

    • CHAPTER THREE

    • Evaluating the efficiency of Chinese banks: a non-parametric approach

      • Table 5.1: Foreign investments in domestic banks and financial institutions

  • APPENDIX

  • I. Chronology of Foreign Banking Reforms

    •  Representative offices allowed for liaison and market research purposes. No banking businesses allowed.

    •  Branches were allowed to be established in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) only, namely in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou. Allowed to do limited banking businesses. Wholly-owned foreign bank subsidiaries and Sino-foreign joint venture banks were still restricted.

    •  Foreign currency deposits-taking and loans businesses granted to the branches in the SEZs and six banks that remained in Shanghai after 1949. Customers were joint ventures, fully-owned foreign enterprises and Overseas-Chinese concerns.

    •  First joint venture bank established, Xiamen International Bank, by the Fujian provincial branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Fujian Investment Business Company, and the Fan Yin Group Company of Hong Kong.

    •  The enactment of regulations governing the administration of representative offices, foreign banks and joint venture banks in SEZs:

    • - “The Regulations of Foreign Financial Institutions’ China Resident Missions of the People’s Bank of China”.

    • - “The Regulations on Administration of Foreign Banks and Joint Venture Banks in Special Economic Zones of 1985”.

    •  Leasing joint ventures allowed to be established.

    •  HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of East Asia, OCBC allowed to reactivate operations in Shanghai (they had maintained a presence in China after 1949).

    •  The China International Finance Company was established, a joint venture of the Bank of China, Bank of East Asia, the Security Pacific Bank of California, the Sumitomo Bank and Nomura Securities of Japan.

    •  The Shanghai Municipal Administrative Council announced plans to develop the Putong New Development Zone in Shanghai, to restore Shanghai as China’s main financial center.

    •  1985’s law promulgated replaced by “The Rules on Administration of Foreign and Joint Venture Financial Institutions in Shanghai of 1990”.

    •  Promulgation of “The Rules on Administration of Establishment of Representative Offices by Foreign Financial Institutions in China”.

    •  Branches were allowed to operate in Shanghai. The pioneer batch of foreign banks setting up branches here included Banque Indosuez (which maintained a liquidation presence in Shanghai since 1949) and HSBC (only the Shanghai branch remained after 1949 and the bank was effectively dormant until allowed into the SEZs in the 1980s).

    •  Foreign banking businesses were allowed in additional 12 cities (mainly coastal): Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shantou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Xiamen and Shenzhen.

    •  Another joint venture bank established, the International Bank of Paris and Shanghai.

    •  By the end of 1993, representative offices and operational institutions (branches, wholly-owned foreign bank subsidiaries or Sino - foreign joint venture banks) of over 150 foreign banks from about 30 countries were established. Established names included the Citibank, Bank of Tokyo and Westpac Banking Corporation.

    •  Foreign banking businesses allowed in ten more cities: Shijiazhuang, Wuhan, Hefei, Xi’an, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Kunming, Haikou, Chongqing and Suzhou.

    •  China unified its previously two-tier exchange rate system.

    •  “The Regulations on the Administration of the Foreign Financial Institutions in the People’s Republic of China”, replaced the two previous sets of regulations, promulgated in 1985 and 1990 respectively. Other rules implemented included “The Administrative Regulations on the Establishment of Resident Representative Offices in China by the Foreign Financial Institutions by the People’s Bank of China”.

    •  Foreign banks were allowed to participate in foreign exchange swap markets, albeit restricted only to one “leg” of the transaction, meaning they can only sell foreign exchange into the market.

    •  Five foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Beijing: HSBC, Citibank, Bank of Tokyo, Banque Indosuez, Bank of East Asia.

    •  New regulations promulgated included:

    • - “The Regulations for the establishment of investment funds from abroad”.

    •  Local currency, Renminbi (RMB), businesses allowed for four banks in Shanghai only, with restrictions: Citibank, HSBC, Industrial Bank of Japan, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.

    •  Foreign banks were allowed to conduct dual-leg foreign exchange transactions on China’s inter-bank market in four trial locations.

    •  Sino-US WTO agreement reached which allow foreign banks to conduct RMB business with business organizations and retail business two years and five years, respectively, from the signing of the agreement.

    •  Ten additional banks granted licenses for RMB business. Foreign banks allowed to operate RMB business in Shenzhen.

    •  Removal of restrictions on RMB loans with maturity periods more than four months from the inter-bank market.

    •  By the end of 1999, there were 248 representative offices, 157 branches, six wholly-owned foreign banks, seven joint ventures and seven finance companies.

    •  Foreign banks accounted for 1.5 per cent of the total banking assets and only about RMB 6.7 billion, or 3.7 per cent, of the local currency loans.

    •  As of November, 30 banks were allowed to conduct limited RMB business in Shanghai and Shenzhen.

    •  Announced liberalization of the financial sector as China gained membership into the WTO (11th December). The Chinese government agreed to open up the financial sector to foreign financial institutions.

    •  China agreed to commit to full access in five years from the accession for foreign banks. The contents of liberalization included:

    •  Since 1st January, all foreign banks have been allowed to provide foreign currency-related services in China.

    •  The authorities published the Rules for Implementing the Regulations Governing Foreign Financial Institutions in the People’s Republic of China (January) – on detailed regulations for implementing the administration of the establishment, registration, scope of business, qualification, supervision, dissolution and liquidation of foreign financial institutions.

    •  Foreign banks were allowed to commence RMB-denominated business in Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Qingdao Nanjing and Wuhan (1st December).

    •  The China Banking Regulatory Commission allowed foreign banks to expand their local currency business in Shenyang and Xian (December).

    •  Foreign banks in Ningbo and Shantou were allowed to expand their local currency business. China went beyond its WTO commitments and opened five other cities – Changchun, Harbin, Lazhou, Nanning and Yinchuan, to foreign banks’ local currency businesses (5th December).

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