B O I H C KINH T TP.HCM - N T TIN TRONG QU V P B NG CH NG TH C NGHI M LU TP H 2014 VI T NAM B O I H C KINH T TP.HCM - N T TIN TRONG QU V P B NG CH NG TH C NGHI M : : 60340201 LU ng d n khoa h TP H 2014 VI T NAM L uc th c hi n Ngu n d li u d li ng ch xu ng t ngu n CafeF T cs d t c cung c p b i Vietstock m n i dung lu ct i cl b t k m i th c hi n T M CL C TRANG PH L M CL C DANH M VI T T T DANH M NG t 1 GI I THI U T N N T NG 11 tin qu p 11 tin p 14 c 14 nh y c m ct n 17 19 tin 21 pc ng c a Malmendier & Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008) 21 pc 25 LI U 31 tin 31 3.2 D li u 35 3.3 M t s v u 44 3.3.1 D li u b ch l a ch n m u 44 3.3.2 Ma tr n h s ng n 45 b 3.3.4 V chu tin 48 i ng quan c a nhi u 52 s R2 K T QU 4.1 K t qu t 4.2 K t qu h i quy t 52 U 55 tin 55 57 K T LU N 61 U THAM KH O u Gi 3SLS nh AAER n ck CEO CFO FCF n t FEM ng c nh FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange GICS u GPPE T ng chi mua s HNX S Giao d ch Ch HoSE S Giao d ch Ch ICB nc nh Chu H i Large 100 n l n nh t M&A p METI B Kinh t NAICS H th NPPE NPV s nc Hi p (Nh t B n) cM nh h n OLS nh t ` PPE nc nh h R&D n REM ng ng S&P 500 SIC SMEs VSIC ng ty v H th t Nam B ng 1.1 Trang 33 B ng 1.2 Trang 34 B ng 1.3 Trang 35 B ng 1.4 Trang 36 B ng th i Vietstock Trang 40 B ng 3.1 Ma tr n h s i m u d li n Trang 43 B ng 3.2 Ma tr n h s i m u d li n Trang 43 B ng 3.3 Ma tr n h s i m u d li B ng 4.1 K t qu h i quy v i m u d li u b Trang 43 n Trang 45 B ng 4.2 K t qu h i quy v i m u d li u b n Trang 46 B ng 4.3 K t qu h i quy v i m u d li u b B ng 4.4 t qu ki i Trang 47 nh Hausman Trang 51 B ng K t qu h i quy v Trang 55 ` TIN TRONG QU P: B NG CH NG TH C NGHI M u ki m ch ng a tin qu ng quy th ng ch VI T NAM c n 2008-2012 c s d u ch c a ban qu i v i vi c gi i p K t qu i di u kh (1) Nh Net Buyer tin nh m nh m r ng: tin s nm t nh y c ph m (2) Hi u qu nh y c tin th hi n m nh m c bi a nv t tr i chu n theo ng c n uc a d m u nh c u cho th y r ng c ng cu v ng nh t ng c m li u b t b n Th c t li u b n v m t k thu t ng m c Vi t Nam ng gi i GI I THI U: Ra quy t nh ng ti nghi p ng nh t c a m t doanh c nh quy B i l , quy nh cc c, th ns c th ng nh c gi a l n tr i v i t ng l a ch n Nh ng quy t n ct mang c r t nhi u quy nh Nh ng quy a doanh nghi p th tranh lu n v t b i r t nhi t ph c ng c a m t n n kinh t ph thu c v n v c hi u bi t th y ut quy t c bi t n quy h nghi p u & Miller (1958), cho th y r ng m am sinh l i t ph thu a h s Q c a Tobin Modigliani ng b ng thu gi a n - v n c ph n c c u nm n u ki n th ng ch ng g thu r ph thu cg s ph thu c c nm t nm b Theo Hubbard (1998) : b o th n m t V n nh y c m n (2003)) nh ng n n t ng v n ti Th ti n nh Th ba, ng d i v i nhi u ho n kho, R&D, nhu c u vi ng c Sau u ti Theo Stein (2003): b n tr r i ro Th nt ts u xem c uv ng b i v u qu b p i di n d h i: + Th nh i th ng v ng c p m ng ti p ng v n n i b cung c p m ng ti p cho t + Th cho t ng d nh ng v n m r ng c kinh t Vi c r gi i d y t v doanh nghi p yc mv ts ng ti n m t - Theo i di n cho r ng: thu l i nh ng l ng v s gi i h n kh c th cs - c a m cd heo tb m t ch ng m c vi c nm t n h qu cho r ng: b h n ch ngu phi u b nm ts m thi u s i m c t th c tr Nh t th c t c u ti n m t s u 54 B t qu ki nh Hausman nu ng FEM t n FE, tin FE, Oconf-FE, m Oconf-FE, (2) (3) (4) (5) Prob > 5.17 0.5227 33.22 0.0016 11.47 0.1765 35.32 0.0022 B (FEM B ng 4.1) Prob > 6.76 0.3432 7.63 0.8133 14.15 0.0779 14.95 0.3815 B (FEM B ng 4.2) Prob > 3.36 0.7623 25.57 0.0194 8.76 0.3632 26.15 0.0365 B i (FEM B ng 4.3) m Hausman test thi t ki Ho (gi thi M u d li u nh c a Hausman: ): H1 (gi thi t ch p nh n): u qu ; p; p u qu n n 55 4.1 K t qu t tin B ng 4.1, B t qu h ng v i c li i) chung, k t qu c gi ng r li u b t gi t qu ut ng c yc u th y nh ng v c n tin qu n ng, y u t tin c t qu cho th y m i quan h h n (1) C th , c hai y u t ng (Q) ng bi n v thuy tin c d li u t qu ng c a m i quan h t m t cao ng c ng FEM K t qu i v i bi ti n N iv i h s m iv ic b n u cho m t s gi n ki th y, c b ng, h s c i M i N c n (B ng 4.2) v n gi i tr ngh ch bi i m i quan h hai b m im i chi 56 quan gi i chi n ki cl t hi ng c a h s n i di ng c nr tv v ng c ng c i nh qua t t c t, ki ng, s i ng (Q) v n (CF) l tin , bi n p (Size) r t i m iv ng c n: FEM v ih uh ng, ngo i tr b m c m c 10% nghi p m r n n cho th n xu ng c i v i ho Tr l i v uc s i c ng ng c th hi n m i quan h gi tin c a ban qu li u b pc n i m i tr tin c y K t qu v i k t qu u c a Malmendier & Tate (2005a) t i M nh y c v t tc ng cho m tin c iv ib ng y, n pc i li c bi um iv ib i 57 nh ng h p d li u b 10 v im cn nh m i cho th y m y, nh tin s m n u u ph K t qu ng th a u 4.2 K t qu h i quy t m Ph yc li u b th nghi t lu n ng t ng th ( t ch v ng r t t t c a b d li c i di n cho k t qu c B m u nh i di n ch t qu B ng ch t chu m nh x i c a nhi u K t qu cho th theo nh y c tin so v i u t nhi u tin c u ng i B ng 1.1 th v ym t qu l t t B ng kh ch nhi b ng RE nh ban qu th nh y c 10 i tin c a h ng m n n iv ng h cl ng FEM u qu 58 B ng K t qu h i quy v HoSE HNX Large 100 SMEs Sai s theo CF Q Owp Size Gov Q*CF Owp*CF Size*CF Gov*CF Oconf Oconf*CF Constant theo theo ty, Ind-CF ty ty, Ind-CF ty ty, Ind-CF (1) 0.004 (0.012) 0.042** (2.234) -0.199 (-1.263) 0.022*** (2.779) 0.011 (0.336) -0.070** (-2.062) 1.207 (1.542) 0.015 (0.454) 0.034 (0.673) -0.036** (-2.088) 0.175 (1.294) -0.199** (-2.053) Ind-CF (2) -0.591 (-1.159) 0.045** (2.440) -0.232 (-1.474) 0.018** (2.267) 0.013 (0.385) -0.087** (-2.423) 1.456* (1.782) 0.045 (1.103) 0.050 (0.927) -0.045** (-2.496) 0.186 (1.396) -0.165* (-1.663) (3) 0.035** (2.579) 0.062 (0.184) 0.015** (2.416) -0.020 (-0.973) -0.081** (-2.103) 5.248 (1.016) 0.075 (1.560) -0.051 (-0.788) -0.033* (-1.750) 0.482** (2.278) -0.082 (-1.226) (4) 0.037*** (2.638) -0.062 (-0.170) 0.017*** (2.787) -0.041 (-1.505) -0.118** (-2.191) 5.960 (1.103) 0.055 (1.091) -0.051 (-0.690) -0.031 (-1.492) 0.486** (2.141) -0.077 (-1.138) (5) -1.853** (-2.478) 0.053** (2.590) 0.204 (0.566) 0.028*** (2.694) 0.021 (0.714) -0.271*** (-2.675) 3.366* (1.751) 0.178*** (2.659) 0.002 (0.032) -0.008 (-0.293) -0.026 (-0.121) -0.344*** (-2.753) (6) -0.532 (-0.425) 0.056** (2.549) 0.316 (0.813) 0.026** (2.573) 0.017 (0.483) -0.263** (-2.389) 3.216* (1.671) 0.186*** (2.727) 0.001 (0.011) -0.015 (-0.609) 0.002 (0.009) -0.329** (-2.563) (7) 0.138 (0.478) 0.047*** (2.810) -0.105 (-0.716) 0.014** (2.400) -0.042* (-1.940) -0.082*** (-2.744) -0.476 (-0.659) 0.021 (0.565) -0.069 (-1.289) -0.044*** (-3.448) 0.415** (2.599) -0.058 (-1.084) (8) 0.094 (0.151) 0.047*** (2.638) -0.240* (-1.658) 0.014** (2.181) -0.036* (-1.762) -0.095*** (-2.812) 0.407 (0.484) 0.026 (0.624) -0.044 (-0.673) -0.049*** (-3.412) 0.438*** (2.645) -0.051 (-0.882) 608 0.170 608 0.192 528 0.176 528 0.192 434 0.210 434 0.219 702 0.185 702 0.205 Year fixed effects Firm fixed effects (Year fixed effects)*CF (Industry fixed effects)*CF N R-sq ng m c a t-statistics ngo 59 n theo k , n nh (SMEs) K t qu vi : hi u B ng kh hai c a nh y c qu tin th hi n m nh m nh (SMEs), m hi u iv nv nh v tin c c bi chu t tr i a ti n: m tin c K t qu nh cho k t lu u ph c t ng th th n, hi u n nh t th y, k t qu h i quy t c a u: qu m ng ng c m nh m nh y c hai ng ti n m t c a nh c th hi n nhi K t qu v t qu iv i d nb ng B ng 1.1 c k -2012) c ng (Size = 10.5) c i, i9t ng (Size = 9.1) nh y c tin th hi n m nh m nh y c iv gi nv c truy n th ng nh y c m c m nh m thu c nhi nc a pv iv Nh t nn ib s a vi im tv ic n v n n i b quy n ib 60 c ti t qu hai c a nm tc a u c p c ng c Malmendier & Tate (2005a) cho r nh y c nh cl c th hi n (b cv thu c v n c ph n L p lu n nh ng h n ch p c n th ng v h ng ph thu nv nn ib c l i, h im tv iv ch hi u ng theo i th t s m ch ng cho th y hi u ng m c gia n c ph n) nh m trang tr c nhu c im tv iv ty nh v i nhi ki ti p c n nhi u nhi t ch c b i nh n tr n n m gi c ph n l V ph m vi c a u n (B ng 1.4 ys c , s t t l s h u c ph n tn m gi ph iv l t qu h i quy ng c a vi c s h u c ph n c v b nh y c y c (Gov) ng bi n nv i c tin a n B c n nh t ( c chu ng xu cl y b ng ch ng m ng c nh y c 61 c ,s cl p thu c nh quan h ngh ch bi n nh t C th B ng cho th y m i tin c y gi a bi y s cl mm cho th B ng 1.4 n l n nh t (Large 100), s c l p m i (nhi u nh i); - SMEs), s i (nhi u nh qu i) hi c l p ban ps ng vi c quy n trung l p c a h Quy t nh ng quy nh quan tr ng nh t c a m t doanh nghi p c nh ng quy ct n v c bi t i di n r t nhi u quy quy c hi u bi t th u t nghi n quy tin qu n doanh nghi iv nh y c t truy n th u i s nh y c thuy i di n tb n theo ch qu gi cl su t sinh l l i d c kh c ph th p T kh p b u, t t nh u i n 62 ch , ph n l d li u ti p c n ch c quan) t m r (Malmendier & Tate (2005b, 2008)) phong v c c quan T xu t tin c nh ng pc ng s i CEO nv m tin cb cl ng c (outsiders) c m nh n v CEO uc a n k th a t ng t C th cb cl s d c Net Buyer (thu i ph ni m tin ng CEO v n c ph i ah th Net Buyer u c ph n n i b c a nhi u qu ng Vi t Nam, p cao ch pc nc a (2008) Tuy v d mc a ng c a u t bi n ch s ban qu hi n v th ng s Vi t Nam nh b ng n cl n n t ng Malmendier & Tate (2005a), (1) a nh ti n m t nhi u: t a nh t nh y c n m t c a nh c th hi n nhi i CEO i tr m t s y u t u ki tin ch i r tg n v cho r v th mua yc mv 63 v a Malmendier & Tate (2005a), ch v ph pc u ch nh iv cv n quy th , ngh cho r ng s c th hi ti u b ng (FEM chu c ng ng c i v i m u t ng th nh ng v i li u b m t (d t c th n nh k t qu (SMEs)) ng c a c ng c m nh m qu t u C th , k t tin t ng th cho th y nh t tin s nm m ph t qu h i quy t nh y c m n r ng, hi u nh y c m tin th hi n m nh m nv nh v tin c c bi (SMEs), m t tr iv a hi u chu n theo n: m i tin c V n, k t qu ng uc a iv im nt ch ng h tr s linh ho ng v i k t qu c a Malmendier & nh y c tin qu a, k t qu c a Net Buyer n th cung c p b ng u 64 u m i quan h gi tin qu p c cung c p b ng ch ng m nh m cho r t ng d n vi ct n th a th i n i b th hi n m pv ph t gi vi li uv theo d li u b c u thu t c Vi i Th c t t pc n uc a li u b cho th y r ng vi vi ng cu i us t qu i di Gi i h n c b gi i quy t tr c ti th hai c a Malmendier & Tate (2005a) c a nh nh y c cl cv c th hi tin c p t k t qu c ng c iv ng thu c v n c ph n p lu n m m nm t u iv b u t qu n tr l n m gi v n c ph n c c c l p vi p t ki m ch ng tr c ti Malmendier & Tate (2005a) v n thi r ng cho vi t hai c a t ph u m i quan h gi Vi t Nam u Baker, M., Ruback, R., & Wurgler, J (2007) Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey In E Eckbo (Ed.), In The Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance New York: Elsevier/North Holland Baltagi, B H., (2001) Economic analysis of panel data, (2nd ed.) 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(non-monotonic) gi a s doanh nghi tm ct cho s t tin qu a ch khuy tin tr o i quy n nh c n t tin bi tin Slothouber, 2010: c n nh doanh nghi p hi n quy n ch n c tin CEO d i CEO tin th c Net Buyer ng:... c n doanh nghi p n tr Ph n 5: T ng k t nh ng n i dung tr nc c u 11 2.1 tin qu Trong nh ng th p g n c quan, ng tin c bi t kinh t u Nh u u ng S th hi i v i kh y Nh tin ng x y m t s s ki n tin. .. ch p nh n s d r tin s t su t sinh l c iv it tc u r ng vi s ah tin; n tin v kho d ng h thu nh n hi n vi i m c Tuy v y, c hai u tin r ng vi tin s t cm r qu v n vi n hi c Theo nh tin s d quan ch