Risk management and behaviour modification 395 consequences of the behaviour are also listed and analysed to establish the features they possess. It can be seen that the avoidance of musculoskeletal injury or eyestrain are weak consequences because they are ‘late’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘negative’ in nature. The other consequences arising from not adjusting the workstation are ‘immediate’, certain’, and ‘positive’ to the individuals and thus reinforce the unwanted behaviour. Whilst it is possible to debate each component the overall balance of consequences is disproportional and in favour of reinforcing the unwanted behaviour, namely the failure to adjust the chair height, or alter the screen tilt, or draw the blinds so as to prevent glare from windows etc. The next step in the process is to state in precise terms the observable behaviours which are desired. Then the antecedents and consequences which influence the desired behaviour can be added. This is demon- strated in Figure 2.8.6. The antecedents are likely to focus around education and training followed by ongoing reminders. The consequences would include comments and intervention by supervisors and fellow workers. For the consequences to be effective, supervisors would need regularly and frequently to observe and comment on the individual’s use of, and performance at, the workstation. The comments should be positive and approving when the desired behaviour has occurred. Commenting only when the desired behaviour has not occurred is far less effective. Reducing accidents in the workplace requires that the performance management approach is applied to all unsafe behaviours. Clearly this is a mammoth task that should be approached systematically. It can be achieved either by an analysis of the accident data (i.e. using historical data) or by using Job Hazard Analysis of tasks undertaken (i.e. using Antecedent Behaviour Consequence s/l c/u +/– Understanding of injury potential Training in use Expectation of comment by supervisor Expectation of ongoing reminders to use workstation correctly Computer workstation adjusted by user before use Observation and comment by supervisor Expectation of colleagues Observation and comment by colleagues s s s c c c + + + ·Ά s/l – soon/late c/u – certain/uncertain +/– – positive/negative Figure 2.8.6 Revised ABC analysis of computer workstations 396 Safety at Work predictive data). In either case the analysis is looked at from a behavioural perspective. Using the accidents analysis data, the first step is to group it by task and by area, e.g. ‘fork-lift truck accidents in the distribution area’. The second step is to examine how each accident occurred and to identify the significant behaviours which contributed to the accident. This list is variously termed the ‘critical behaviour list’ or the ‘key behaviour list’ for fork-lift truck accidents in the area. The third step is to analyse each of the critical behaviours identifying their antecedents and consequences, and the features of each consequence (the ‘ABC’ analysis). The fourth step is to state the desired behaviour which would avoid the accident and to give it consequences which will reinforce the use of the desired consequences. At this stage this analysis is complete. Job hazard analysis begins by examining the task and listing the desired behaviours to accomplish it safely. Each desired behaviour is examined and the necessary antecedents and consequences added. The analysis is the first part of the programme which then has to be implemented. In practice this means that a number of observers have to be trained. Their task is to understand the safety critical behaviours for the workplace and to become skilled in identifying them. The observers audit the work area recording the number of safety critical behaviours observed and the number of unsafe behaviours observed to produce a ‘percentage safe behaviour’ score as follows: % Safe behaviour score = number of safe behaviours observed total number of behaviours observed This data is plotted and posted in the workplace so that the workgroup is encouraged to work toward a rising trend. A typical graph of the results is shown in Figure 2.8.7. Figure 2.8.7 Typical effect of behaviour intervention process in the workplace Risk management and behaviour modification 397 The strength of the process is more than an analysis of actions in the workplace and observations of activity. It works best where the employees take a leading role in managing and implementing it. Employees thus undertake the analysis of behaviours, add the con- sequences necessary to achieve the safe behaviours and subsequently audit each other. By this means greater commitment to improving safety occurs. In addition the workgroup often know how a job is actually done (as opposed to what the procedure for it says) and is in the best position to draw up the list of desired safety behaviours in the first place and to monitor compliance with it. When accidents occur they are analysed to see what might have gone wrong. It may be that the safety critical behaviours were not identified correctly in the first place. Alternatively the analysis might reveal that the consequence modifiers are ineffective and have to be rethought. 2.8.2.2 The structural feedback approach Performance management requires that consequences are first analysed and then restructured to encourage the preferred (safe) behaviours. The chart demonstrating the improvement in the percentage of safe behav- iours is a feedback tool demonstrating the gains made. Other work by Cooper et al. 10,11,12,13 places greater emphasis upon the feedback process. In particular they stress that publicly displaying a chart showing how well, or otherwise, a group of employees is doing in relation to the areas of safety in which improvement is sought is itself a very powerful agent for change. Consequently it becomes important that feedback charts are posted prominently and are regularly updated. In order to achieve this it is necessary that managers adopt a particular role, namely: 1 Champion the behavioural process and inform his workpeople of it and of his support for it. 2 Encourage employees to become active in the process especially as observers. 3 Allow employees the time to be involved in the training and meetings needed for goal setting. 4 Allow each observer one observation session each working day. An observation session should last no longer than 20 to 30 minutes. 5 Be committed to attend goal setting sessions with the observers thereby demonstrating his support. 6 Praise employees who work safely. 7 Encourage employees to reach the safety goals. 8 Arrange for senior managers to visit the workplace each week to encourage the safety improvement effort. The observers, who are members of the workgroup, commence their training by analysing local accident data. They identify contributory factors for each accident and subdivide them into observable behaviours or situations which are safe or unsafe. These observable data form the 398 Safety at Work basis of a checklist. Emphasis is placed upon gaining agreement from the workforce that the items that form the checklist of behaviours are valid. This is an important step as the workforce is assessed and scored against the list that has been generated. The process of gaining agreement is itself a type of feedback which seeks to gain involvement of and ownership by employees of the safety programme. Scoring takes the conventional form of making observations in the workplace of safe and unsafe behaviours to generate a ‘percentage safe behaviour score’. The data are charted and posted visibly in the workplace. Feedback of the data is not the only emphasis. The employees are asked by their observers to establish their own goals and subgoals against which the performance is measured 2.8.2.3 Behaviour observation and counselling techniques Any behaviour modification technique must involve an interaction with people. As an accident can occur at almost any time and the consequences in terms of injury outcome are not predictable, concentrating on a list of identified safety critical behaviours can have the following limitations: 1 The critical behaviour list may be incomplete. 2 Behaviours may appear on the list as a result of a perception of, rather than an analysis of, an actual risk. This is more likely if the list has been compiled from a job hazard analysis. 3 As the size of the list grows to encompass more behaviours (a result of ongoing accident experience and the desire to eradicate all accidents by adding more safety critical behaviours) the whole system can become unwieldy because too may behaviours are included in the observation process. 4 The very existence of a list may limit the focus of employees and observers to only those behaviours which are on the list. This becomes a more significant problem if observers are under pressure to complete a quota of observations per week or per month. Under these circumstances the objective can alter subtly from one of using the technique to reduce accidents to becoming merely an exercise in completing a checklist. The resultant quality fall-off which takes place can undermine and discredit the entire effort. Other approaches have been developed such as the DuPont Safety Training Observation Program (‘STOP’) or their similar ‘Safety Manage- ment Audit Programme’ 14 . In both these programmes the approach tends to be less analytical in defining prescribed unsafe behaviours with a different emphasis that requires a management top-down approach in which one level of manager, having been taught the process, subse- quently teaches the next subordinate level. The emphasis is upon observation of employee behaviour and immediate counselling of the observed employees. Implementation of the process is through members of line management from team leaders to senior managers. Each undertakes a workplace safety behaviour audit to an agreed schedule. For Risk management and behaviour modification 399 example, a team leader of a large workgroup may be expected to undertake a daily audit, middle managers may do an audit each week, and senior managers and directors an audit each month. The training they receive assumes a degree of knowledge of the workplace and the hazards it contains. This is not unreasonable given that many managers will have several years’ experience and knowledge of the work areas. Furthermore they are not necessarily expected to know in detail how safe working on each job should be achieved. They are expected, however, to recognise how injury might occur. The training emphasises the skill in observing people as they work and learning to approach and discuss safety with them in a constructive manner. This applies to employees who are observed working safely as well as those working unsafely. In the former case discussion can commend the safe behaviour and be widened to encompass other tasks the employee might do, seeking out any safety concerns arising from them. The very fact that a person in authority is discussing safety issues with the employee is of great importance in raising awareness and commitment to accident-free working. Thus in these programmes, there is greater emphasis on observation and immediate intervention than on observation, completion of a checklist, and the posting of a chart in the workplace. Nevertheless as employees do voice their concerns they have expectations that remedial measures will be taken. Feedback in this case often takes the form of a list of actions identified from the audits and a rolling calculation of the percentage completed. 2.8.2.4 Behaviour modification and the lone worker Behaviour modification is most easily applied where large groups of people work in a systematic activity. Examples of applications include factory production lines, call centres, packaging and assembly lines and large construction sites. In these situations the tasks can be easily identified and the safe behaviours required to perform them without injury specified. Other jobs, where employees work alone and away from the direct control of the supervisor present different challenges. An example is maintenance tasks that require employees to work away from the workshop. In these situations specific risks can arise that cannot be identified until the job is underway. For example, maintaining a pump on a workbench is far simpler than performing the same task while the pump remains in its original location two miles away from the workshop. Typical of the problems that can arise are: ᭹ Access to the pump is restricted. ᭹ Bolt fixings may be corroded and the use of a blow torch to free them may not be permitted in the area. ᭹ Particular internal parts of the pump may need additional main- tenance work due to unexpected wear and tear, but the spare parts are at the workshop and the mechanic must make a decision to use the existing part believing ‘it will last until next time’ or stop production while the part is replaced. 400 Safety at Work The individual employee can rarely be kept under observation as these decisions and actions are taken. Guidance from the Health and Safety Executive 15 recommends the use of: ᭹ structured incident reviews where the assessor lists contributing causes and seeks clarification and comment from employees; ᭹ workforce questionnaires that seek to capture the perception of employees in identifying which of a list of eighteen management issues warrant improvement. Approaches such as this are indirect behaviour modification and can be effective where there is extensive employee participation with feedback provided on progress made. Communication is critical to success. The objective is to address and influence the behaviour of the remote maintenance worker so that he can deal with the hazard at the time when it becomes a serious risk. 2.8.2.5 Behaviour modification and employee involvement The application of behavioural techniques to improve the control of risks in normal employment have usually occurred as a result of a senior management initiative. It occurs as a dictate from on high and is imposed on the workforce. A typical response from the workforce is three-fold: ᭹ it is seen as a management lay-on by middle managers and supervisors adding greater burden to their (the operator’s) busy working lives; ᭹ it is viewed with scepticism by employees who have seen initiatives come and go over past years (‘flavour-of-the-month’ syndrome); ᭹ managers, supervisors and employees alike do not expect the initiative to last beyond the lifespan of the current senior management team or until something else comes along to distract their attention. The result of these attitudes is that a minimum commitment is made to the initiative until senior management show by continuous example that the initiative is here to stay. A significant new safety initiative is likely to require at least two years of operations to convince middle managers and supervisors and four years to convince employees that the initiative is seriously intended! In order to gain acceptance of behaviour change initiatives, but also to promote a wider safety culture, the involvement of employees in a partnership is recommended. A Health and Safety Executive publica- tion 16 suggests that workforce involvement can improve performance in an organisation which: ᭹ does not involve the workforce in determining company policy; ᭹ does not treat the workforce or its representatives as equal partners in the health and safety committee; ᭹ does not allow employees to set the health and safety agenda during meetings; and Risk management and behaviour modification 401 ᭹ does not involve workers in writing safe operating procedures. If these and other aspects show that workforce involvement is limited, it is unlikely that a positive health and safety culture exists. The concept of partnership is promoted in a union publication 17 that quotes from a study by Reilly et al. 18 which shows that in-depth consultation with employees reduces serious injury rates. Data are reproduced in Figure 2.8.8. 2.8.2.6 Refreshing behaviour modification processes Employee behaviour modification processes, as with all other human processes, can become stale and ineffective. A significant proportion of the safety improvement comes from the early interaction between the observer and the observed. If this process becomes superficial then few improvements in safety performance can be expected. Refreshing the whole intervention process periodically is essential and can be achieved by: ᭹ training new observers; ᭹ using trained observers from one department in an adjacent department; ᭹ changing the mix of observers to include managers, supervisors and employees in rotation; ᭹ revising the checklist of critical behaviours. If some behaviours always remain on the critical list then generate two lists and mix the observation sequence; ᭹ revising the checklist and discussing the changes in the light of incident experience from within the area and from appropriate external data. 2.8.2.7 Generic behaviour modification model Most studies have focused upon modifying the behaviour of production operators to improve safety performance. While variations in detail exist, the basic generic behavioural process consists of: Consultation model Serious injury rate per 1000 workers No union recognition and no joint committee 10.9 Worker representation but no joint committee 7.3 Joint committee but no trade union safety representatives 6.1 to 7.6 Full union recognition and joint committee 5.3 Figure 2.8.8 Type of consultation and serious injury rates 402 Safety at Work ᭹ Specify/know the behaviours that are necessary for safe working. ᭹ Observe. The observation step can take the form of a general observation of an employee’s behaviour and counselling in the appropriate target behaviour. Alternatively the observer can refer to a previously established critical behaviour checklist and score the number of safe and unsafe behaviours observed. ᭹ Intervene and discuss. The observer discusses with the individual their personal safety performance. This step can take several forms. The discussion can simply be a comparison of their performance against the critical behaviour checklist, safe behaviours and an emphasising of the recommended advice on the immediate corrective action, that should be taken to remedy unsafe situations. ᭹ Follow-up action. A review of the data are collected and the action necessary to ensure safe operator behaviour. ᭹ Feedback can take a number of forms ranging from a chart showing the percentage of safe and unsafe behaviours to a rolling list of open and closed corrective actions. 2.8.3 Behaviour modification for managers and supervisors Wrong behaviour occurs at all levels. The narrow focus on front line employees behaviour has been criticised by labour unions 19 because it infers: ᭹ only front line employee behaviour causes accidents; ᭹ the employee is to blame; ᭹ that a blame environment drives safety problems underground; ᭹ that capital expenditure is not authorised because incidents would be avoided if employees did not make errors. Figure 2.8.9 provides an illustrative example that demonstrates how several levels and functions of management as well as front line employees can contribute to the occurrence of an unsafe situation. It is therefore important that behaviour modification processes are applied to people in management and supervisory roles. The generic behaviour modification model can be applied to managers and supervisors as illustrated in Figure 2.8.10. The observer of a supervisor’s behaviour can be the direct manager or a third party, such as a safety professional. A procedure that has proved successful comprises a list of fifty behaviours that align with the overall safety initiative for that year (Figure 2.8.11) with the results plotted on a ‘radar screen’ chart (Figure 2.8.12). Measurement occurred in several different ways which included: ᭹ personal self-assessment by the individual manager and supervisor; Risk management and behaviour modification 403 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ERRORS LEADING TO A PIPE RUPTURE WITH CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS OF OUTPUT The research chemist The chemist recommended in his report a minimum operating temperature for the new compound but failed to emphasise that it froze below that temperature and expanded as it froze. The design engineer The designer did not allow for extremes of temperature and failed to specify adequate heat tracing for a heat exchanger bypass line. The construction contractor Because the bypass pipe was awkward to get at, did not lay the trace heating evenly along its length. The supervisor Wrote into the operating instructions turning on the trace heating when the temperature of the incoming compound dropped below a specified temperature. He did not incorporate a check to ensure the compound was flowing. The plant operator Neglected to check that the trace heating was on and that the compound was flowing. The maintenance mechanic Failed to report or repair damage to the trace heating caused during earlier maintenance. The plant manager Delayed activating the trace heating system to save energy but failed to recognise the cooling effect of a cold spell. The corporate director Cut the plant budget causing staff shortages that prevented all the safety checks being carried out, particularly to the trace heating system. Result Compound temperature dropped and it froze, expanded and fractured the bypass pipe. Process shut down for 6 hours while a repair was effected. No injuries but much lost production. Figure 2.8.9 Error opportunities at different organisational levels (adapted from Lorenzo 20 ) Figure 2.8.10 Generic behavioural check for managers and supervisors TASK EXAMPLE Specify the supervisors behaviour that is required To hold a weekly toolbox talk on the previous weeks safety issues Observe that the behaviour is occurring Check/attend/sample the toolbox talks Intervene to commend the activity or counsel if improvements are needed Provide comment to the supervisor on the content and the impact of the toolbox talk Follow-up on actions that the observer has undertaken If the supervisor needs training in running group meetings ensure it is arranged Feedback on overall performance periodically Discuss the safety behaviours at the annual performance review BEHAVIOR DIMENSION A BEHAVIOR DIMENSION B BEHAVIOR DIMENSION C BEHAVIOR DIMENSION D BEHAVIOR DIMENSION E Management Commitment, Involvement and Leadership Training and Education Employee Involvement Hazard Identification and Analysis Hazard Prevention, Elimination and Control ᮀ I have an HSE policy, supported by annual goals and objectives, which is written and shared with my direct reports ᮀ The rules for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in my area are posted and the safety signage is unambiguous ᮀ My areas have safety committees which meet at least quarterly ᮀ My area investigates all significant incidents immediately (whether a person is injured or a serious near-miss occurs) ᮀ I ensure that individuals responsible for correcting hazards are identified and are set clear timelines to achieve the corrective action ᮀ I have reviewed performance against my policy, goals and objectives with my direct reports and my HSE staff this quarter ᮀ My area has a process to review work procedures with all employees regularly (not just the HSE people) and to ask them if changes are necessary ᮀ I chair my safety committee ᮀ A line manager or supervisor always leads the incident reviews, not an HSE staff person ᮀ I keep track of the corrective actions in my area ᮀ My safety policy states what I expect the line organization to do and what I expect the HSE staff organization to do ᮀ I have attended the Basic Law training class ᮀ My safety committee is comprised primarily of line people, with a minimum of HSE staff in attendance ᮀ I make clear my expectation that an injured person must go to Medical even if they also wish to see their private physician ᮀ I visit work areas and make it a point to comment on hazards I have identified and safety improvements achieved [...]... report to be reviewed at the senior safety committee Work procedures to be reviewed by the workplace representative Records of meeting minutes to be kept under review Data from safety committees to be summarised for the board Safety department to monitor compliance A report will be sent to the board, members of the management team and safety committee members – the audit will be available to employees... those behavioural aims A safety management system based on the model suggested by the Health and Safety Executive22 can be designed to generate the practical behaviours that make the system effective An example is provided in Figure 2 .8. 15 The process demonstrates the following features: ᭹ ᭹ ᭹ expectations are specific; expectations have an assigned owner; expectations are measurable The whole system... that the employees, who themselves suffer the accidents, are thoroughly immersed in the process Their involvement is crucial because they are the people who know the unsafe acts that are committed and the reasons for them Clearly the workgroup themselves are in the best position to know the antecedents and consequences which operate and how they can be adjusted to promote safer working 3 Effective feedback... will meet bimonthly etc Job responsibilities to be reviewed/checked by the safety department 1 Employees will receive a copy of the safety plan Operator reaction to be sampled by the safety reps The safety department to specify the training and ensure delivery of it ORGANISING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING 2 Suitable training will be undertaken for key plan personnel etc MEASURING PERFORMANCE 1 Safety committees... ensure that the policy is reviewed in cascaded discussions throughout the organisation 3 Independent auditors to assess that the policy covers all risks etc A policy less than three years old 1 Each job will have specified safety responsibilities which are reviewed every 3 years 2 All work procedures will be reviewed every three years 3 Safety committees at appropriate organisational levels will meet... allow, have caused written procedures and close supervision to become less easy to apply as an effective means of exerting control Effective safety measures will emerge from better education and training and the implementation of motivational theories to change attitudes and behaviour Whilst an understanding of the links between attitude, behaviour and the consequences of the behaviour are still developing,... should be treated as other corporate aims, and properly resourced 5 It must be a line management responsibility 6 ‘Ownership’ of health and safety must permeate at all levels of the workforce This requires employee involvement, training and communication 7 Realistic and achievable targets should be set and performance measured against them 8 Incidents should be thoroughly investigated 414 Safety at Work. .. to the hazards – the operators The deliberations in the boardroom lead to decisions that can affect the health and safety of employees If asked, employees can indicate the impact of these high level decisions and show whether their intentions and objectives are being achieved This reflects the ‘culture in being’ Understanding employees’ perceptions and opinions can be considered as a ‘reality check’... Advisory Service in 1972 This service, the nucleus of which was formed by the medical branch of the factory inspectorate, gives advice to employers, employees, trade unions and others on medical matters related to work Occupational Health Services in private industry were slow to develop and although there were rare instances of medical services at work even before the industrial revolution the first Workman’s... and the safety management system In chapter 2 .6 the elements of safety management systems were discussed Systems as systems can amount to no more than a list of sterile procedures and general expectations that deliver little improvement In order to put ‘flesh on the bones’ of a system thought must be given to the behaviour that is necessary to support it and the system must be constructed empathetically . reviewed every three years Work procedures to be reviewed by the workplace representative 3. Safety committees at appropriate organisational levels will meet bi- monthly etc. Records of meeting minutes. Each job will have specified safety responsibilities which are reviewed every 3 years Job responsibilities to be reviewed/checked by the safety department 2. All work procedures will be reviewed. their collective safety ᮀ My area has a process to review all workplace changes so that safety issues are addressed ᮀ I communicate my expectation of an overall ‘partnership’ in safety matters that creates