Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law Part 5 docx

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the mandate system of the league of nations 135 McNair’s view which may be traced back to Kant’s idea of the ‘demo- cratic peace’ suggests that international jurists gradually were accept- ing the insights of political scientists and theorists. Nevertheless, the interior of the state remained outside the control or even scrutiny of international law, which could address state behaviour only when it emerged into the conscious sphere, as it were, when it manifested itself in the external actions of the state and thereby became a properly inter- national issue. 81 The frustration for inter-war jurists was that, while they could vaguely conceptualise the interior in various ways, they were unable to act upon it. 82 The discovery of interiority is central to the phenomenon of moder- nity as a whole. 83 The great literature of modernity the works of Joseph Conrad, T. S. Eliot, Henry James, James Joyce and Virginia Woolf are preoccupied with mapping the interior, with tracing and examining theworkings of an inner consciousness. 84 International jurists sensed that access to the interior of the state would revolutionise their disci- pline in much the same way that Joyce had revolutionised the novel and Freud had revolutionised our understanding of human nature. And yet, this inquiry was precluded by sovereignty doctrine. We might under- stand the monumental significance of international human rights law in these terms: it enabled international law and institutions to enter the interior, to address the unconscious, and thereby to administer ‘civiliz- ing therapy’ to the body politic of the sovereign state. Whereas previously the internal character of the sovereign European state was immune from scrutiny, in the inter-war period it was precisely through the Mandate System that international law and institutions had complete access to the interior of a society. It was in the operations of the Mandate System, then, that it became possible for international law not merely to enter the interior realm, but also to create the social and political infrastructure necessary to support a functioning sovereign 81 See text accompanying nn. 75 80. 82 Freud’s work, of course, had a far more direct relevance to international law and the whole question of war and aggression, as it sought to identify the origins of aggression and the death drive. See Sigmund Freud, James Strachey (ed. and trans.), Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961). 83 See generally H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Knopf, 1958). 84 See generally, e.g., Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1881); Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1902); James Joyce, Ulysses (Paris: Shakespeare & Co., 1922); Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1925); T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1922). 136 imperialism, sovereignty and international law state. 85 Here, then, sovereignty was to be studied not in the context of theproblem of war and of collective security, but in a very different constellation of relationships that are central to the understanding of sovereignty in the non-European world. Within the Mandate System, sovereignty is shaped by, and connected with, issues of economic relations between the colonizer and the col- onized on the one hand, and comprehensively developed notions of the cultural difference between advanced Western states and backward mandate peoples, on the other. It was in the Mandate System that inter- national law and institutions could conduct experiments and develop technologies that were hardly possible in the sovereign Western world. It was in the Mandate System, furthermore, that many of the interests of jurists such as Pound, Alvarez and Hudson could find expression. This was because the task confronting the Mandate System involved far more than the granting of a simple juridical status. Rather, interna- tional law and institutions were required to create the economic, politi- cal and social conditions under which a sovereign state could come into being. In this sense, law had to be combined with sociology, political science and economics in order to achieve the goals of the Mandate System. It was through international institutions that such a task of synthesis could be addressed. Precisely because of this, the aspirations of pragmatic jurists to make law more socially oriented could be given effect; international institutions made pragmatic jurisprudence a possi- bility in the field of international relations. It is, then, by studying how this occurred that we may gain an understanding of both the unique character of non-European sovereignty and, conversely, of the identities that international institutions developed in the course of bringing such sovereignty into being. The Mandate System and colonial problems Introduction Although the Mandate System, in strictly legal terms, applied only to theterritories formerly annexed to Germany and the Ottoman Empire, inter-war lawyers and scholars understood that it had a far broader 85 Another relationship is suggested in seeing the mandate society as the unconscious. Most often, the encounter with the unconscious is characterized as a journey into the past, an encounter with the primitive: in this case, the backward mandate people. This is one interpretation of Marlow’s journey upriver in Heart of Darkness. See Conrad, Heart of Darkness. the mandate system of the league of nations 137 significance. It represented the international community’s aspiration, through the League, to address colonial problems in general in a system- atic, coordinated and ethical manner. At the highest level, it embodied ‘the ideal policy of European civilization towards the cultures of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific’. 86 The last major conference to be held on colonial problems was the Berlin Conference of 1884 5. 87 The character of the relationship between the European and non-European world had changed profoundly since that time as a consequence of numerous developments, includ- ing the First World War, the emergence of anticolonial movements and the condemnation of colonialism within the West itself. It was in these complex circumstances that the mandate had to legitimize its existence and demonstrate that the creation of international institutions would result in a better way of addressing colonial problems. More broadly, the Mandate System generated a debate among international lawyers on therole of their discipline in legitimizing colonial conquest. The cre- ation and operation of the Mandate System, then, can be understood best in terms of these debates regarding colonialism and its significance for international law and relations. Legitimizing the Mandate System: colonial problems in the inter-war period By the end of the First World War, if not earlier, it was clear that many non-Western states would become sovereign states. 88 This point was most dramatically demonstrated by Japan’s acceptance into the family of nations, which was followed in 1905 by the Japanese defeat of Russia, which marked not only Japan’s military ascendancy but also its assump- tion of the role of a colonial power, as the war was fought essentially 86 Wright, Mandates,p.vii. 87 Although the largest conferences were held in 1885, Western powers held numerous other conferences relating to colonial problems between 1885 and 1912. Africa had the doubtful distinction of being the object of concern of many of these conferences. G. L. Beer, the American expert on Africa, stated that ‘no other region had called forth more international cooperation or had been subjected to more comprehensive international control’. See Hall, Mandates,p.103 (quoting G. L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference; With Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Colonial Settlement, NewYork: The Macmillan Co., 1923,p.193). Beer was among several American experts on colonial affairs; others included Colonel House, who accompanied Wilson to the peace talks. 88 Foranaccount of the non-European states that had been accepted, even if only partially, into the family of nations, see Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty’, 607 608. 138 imperialism, sovereignty and international law over Korea. 89 Japan participated in the Peace Conference as one of the major powers, 90 for with the conclusion of the First World War it was not only the United States but also Japan that emerged with greater strength. 91 Equally important, Siam and China 92 were signatories at the Treaty of Peace although, significantly, Islamic countries were initially excluded from the League. 93 Egypt won independence from the British in 1922. 94 All these events illustrated that non-European societies could become sovereign states despite the view powerfully promulgated prior to thewar that Europeans alone had the capacity to govern. The war, of course, had a profound effect on the issue of colonial relations at a number of different levels. It had not merely devastated Europe, but also severely weakened its claims to moral superiority and, indeed, to be civilized. 95 In addition, the Allies had sought to justify themselves by arguing that the war was one of principle, fought for the preservation of freedom. Many colonies had sent soldiers to the war. At least 1.4 million Indians had been mobilised to serve in France, the Middle East and Africa; 96 in return, the Indian Secretary of State had promised to allow the gradual development of self-governing institutions for India within the overall framework of the Empire. 97 Most significantly, nationalist movements were asserting themselves in colonial societies throughout the globe. Imperial powers, intent on 89 See Carl F. Petry and M. W. Daly (eds.), The Cambridge History of Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 250. 90 The five great powers at the Peace Conference, as listed by Oppenheim, were the British Empire, America, France, Italy and Japan. McNair, International Law,I,§167a. 91 Indeed, the United States and Japan emerged as imperial powers at approximately the same time, and sought to accommodate each other’s ambitions. David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415 1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 118. Thus, ‘the Roosevelt administration formally acquiesced in the Japanese takeover of Korea in return for a free hand in the Philippines and an agreement to bar Japanese immigration to the United States’. Boyle, Foundations,p.95. 92 McNair, International Law,I,§167b. 93 Foraneloquent argument about this, see Syed Ameer Ali, ‘Islam in the League of Nations’, (1919)5Transactions of the Grotius Society 126. 94 See Petry and Daly, Cambridge History of Egypt,p.250. 95 For detailed studies of this period, see V. G. Kiernan, From Conquest to Collapse: European Empires from 1815 to 1960 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 191 207. See generally A. S. Kanya-Forstner, ‘The War, Imperialism, and Decolonization’, in Jay Winter, Geoffrey Parker and Mary R. Habeck (eds.), The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 231; Abernethy, The Dynamics.For an important study on which I have relied and which focuses specifically on the Mandate System, see Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 111 142. 96 Abernethy, The Dynamics,p.109. 97 Ibid. the mandate system of the league of nations 139 maintaining their Empires despite the war and its toll on their credibil- ity and strength, now had to confront these movements, whose ambi- tions were expanding rapidly from requests for more participation in government to demands for outright independence the result of bro- kenpromises and authoritarian rule by the imperial powers. The deliber- ations at Versailles occurred in the shadow of the massacre at Amritsar and Mahatma Gandhi’s first Satyagraha campaigns. Protest, if not rebel- lion against colonial rule, took place in Sierra Leone, Saigon, the Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya and South Africa. 98 Marcus Garvey’s demand ‘Africa for the Africans’ caused great concern to colonial powers. 99 It was understandable then, that even at Versailles the A mandatories were characterized explicitly as well advanced in their progress toward independence. 100 Furthermore, as Grovogui argues, the Bolshevik Rev- olution in Russia gave inspiration to anticolonial struggles on the one hand, and made Western statesmen aware of the importance of offering greater voice to colonized peoples, on the other. 101 Anticolonial resis- tance, then, played a crucial role in shaping the League’s policies toward the mandate territories. Matters were complicated further by President Wilson’s forceful pro- motion of the concept of self-determination, which he claimed was one of the major principles over which the war had been fought. Wilson’s ideas had to be treated with respect. Consequently, the vic- torious European powers, intent on preserving, if not extending, their Empires, presented their claims in a manner that appeared to con- form with Wilson’s views. 102 Wilson’s assertion that each distinctive culture was entitled to become an independent state was as relevant to thegreat colonial territories such as India as it was to the people of Europe to whom they primarily were addressed. 103 Consequently, Algerian, Vietnamese and Tunisian nationalist movements seized on the concept of self-determination to advance their claims for self- government. 104 Further, Grovogui argues, the recognition of the newly 98 Ibid., p. 129. For a good overview of anticolonial resistance during this period, see Young, Postcolonialism, pp. 161 181. 99 Abernethy, The Dynamics,p.129. 100 This is suggested by the phrasing of Article 22, which asserts that these communities ‘havereached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized’. Wright, Mandates,p.591 (citing Article 22 of The Mandate Articles of the League of Nations Covenant). For a larger discussion, see generally ibid. 101 Grovogui, Sovereigns,p.113. 102 Kanya-Forstner, ‘The War’, p. 239. 103 Wright, Mandates,p.15. 104 Ibid., p. 242. 140 imperialism, sovereignty and international law emergent Balkan states by the Western powers further gave impetus to nationalist demands for self-determination by the non-Europeans. In these ways, Wilson’s condemnation of colonialism and his promotion of self-determination had far-reaching consequences that he could hardly have anticipated. 105 Various criticisms of past colonialism made it vital for the League to establish that the Mandate System was not a form of veiled colonialism and that it could effectively protect native peoples, promote their inter- ests and guide them toward self-government. Self-government had hardly been prominent in the colonial policies adopted by the traditional impe- rial powers. 106 The one example of a colonial power that professed itself intent on developing self-government and as acting in the interests of the native peoples was provided by one of the newest colonial powers, the United States, in its administration of the Philippines after the Spanish American War of 1898. The character of this administration will be dis- cussed in more detail in chapter 6. But it is clear that the US adminis- tration of the Philippines had some impact on the Mandate System, as it was Wilson himself, who had declared that the United States was a ‘trustee of the Filipino people’, 107 who had authored the Mandate System as well. The Mandate System, by adopting the concept of trusteeship, justified the management of colonized peoples by presenting it as directed by con- cern for native interests and a desire to promote their self-government rather than by the selfish desires of the colonial power. 105 The obscure young Vietnamese nationalist leader, Nguyen Ai Quoc (later to emerge as Ho Chi Minh), hopeful that Wilson would understand the aspirations of his people for liberation from France, attempted to meet him, but was shown the door. Kanya-Forstner, ‘The War’, p. 242; see also Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam & America: The Making of Post-Colonial Vietnam, 1919 1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 10 11. 106 Hobson, at least, asserted: ‘Upon the vast majority of the populations throughout our Empire we have bestowed no real powers of self-government, nor have we any serious belief that it is possible for us to do so.’ J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (4th edn., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), p. 114. For a contrasting view, see Hall, Mandates, pp. 94 95. For a survey of of the different forms of government established in various British territories in the period immediately after the Second World War, see A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 278 283. 107 Wright, Mandates,p.14,n. 24. the mandate system of the league of nations 141 The economics of colonial relations in the inter-war period Even as the colonies were demanding self-government and increased political freedoms, imperial powers were becoming acutely aware of the economic importance of their colonial territories. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century large trading companies, such as the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, had driven the colonial enterprise. The activities of these companies had embroiled European states in costly colonial conflicts, and, as a consequence, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was the imperial state that established economic links with its colonies on a sustained and organised basis. Imperialism had always been motivated by economic gain. But whereas ‘in 1880 a conscious policy of economic imperialism hardly existed’, 108 by the end of the century this situation had changed dra- matically, and imperialism had acquired a new and singular form. It wasnow theimperial European state, with its formidable powers and massive military and economic resources, that systematically set about thetask of making profit out of the colonies. 109 This preoccupation with profit contrasted somewhat with the noble visions of Empire so evoca- tively produced by authors such as Kipling. 110 The commercial well being 108 See Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1920), p. 37. 109 See ibid., pp. 44 45. Woolf gives a pointed account of the singular nature of this form of imperialism. Ibid., chapter 3. Woolf spoke with particular authority. He was a civil servant in Ceylon for seven years, during which time he developed a particularly intense dislike for the imperial system that he had very conscientiously administered and whose assumptions he did not entirely escape. Abruptly transported to the jungles of Ceylon from his beloved Trinity College and the company of his mentors and friends who included G. E. Moore, Lytton Strachey and John Maynard Keynes Woolf eventually resolved to live in Ceylon, looking after his district, but not as a Government Agent. His marriage to Virginia Stephen changed his plans. Woolf wrote one remarkable novel, set in Ceylon. See generally Leonard Woolf, The Village in the Jungle (London: Arnold, 1913). 110 Orwell, who saw this dimension of imperialism only too clearly, explains Kipling’s loss of popularity partly in these terms: He could not understand what was happening, because he had never any grasp of the economic forces underlying imperial expansion. It is notable that Kipling does not seem to realize, any more than the average soldier or colonial administrator, that an empire is primarily a money-making concern. Imperialism as he sees it is a sort of forcible evangelising. You turn a Gatling gun on a mob of unarmed ‘natives’ and then you establish ‘the Law’, which includes roads, railways, and a court house. (George Orwell, ‘Rudyard Kipling’, in Dickens, Dali & Others,New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946, pp. 143 144) 142 imperialism, sovereignty and international law of the European state and its national economy were perceived as being connected intimately with its overseas possessions and its ability to pro- tect and expand its overseas markets. Indeed, the character and func- tion of the European state itself was altered profoundly by this shift in emphasis. Joseph Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, made these points clear in a speech in 1895, where he asserted that the principal purpose of his government in effect was ‘the development and maintenance of that vast agricultural, manufacturing and commercial enterprise upon which the welfare and even the existence of our great population exists’. 111 This involved ‘finding new markets and . . . defend- ing old ones’, 112 and the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the War Office and the Admiralty were all involved, in their different capacities, in this great endeavour. Chamberlain went further in claiming that the promotion of such commerce was the principal function of government itself. 113 By the beginning of the First World War, then, the central importance of colonial possessions for the economic well being of the metropolitan power was proclaimed widely and acted upon. The economic dimension of this new form of imperialism had been analysed by scholars such as Hobson years before the war, 114 and many scholars such as Woolf elab- orated and refined these analyses immediately afterwards. 115 The war itself further demonstrated how important colonies were for the home state. Not only did the colonies provide soldiers to fight on the Western Front, but they also provided raw materials for the war effort including cotton, rubber, tin, leather and jute. 116 All this suggested that ‘[c]olonies 111 Woolf, Empire,p.7. 112 Ibid. 113 ‘Therefore it is not too much to say that commerce is the greatest of all political interests, and that the Government deserves most the popular approval which does most to increase our trade and to settle it on a firm foundation.’ Ibid. 114 See generally Hobson, Imperialism. Hobson believed that ‘[i]mperialism is the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital which they cannot use at home.’ Ibid.atp.85. Hobson’s view of imperialism focused more on the theme of colonies as markets than on the importance of colonies as a source of raw materials. His views of imperialism were powerfully shaped by the class struggle in England, and he argued that England would be better off if it invested in developing its own markets rather than in seeking them abroad. 115 Lenin went a stage further in his analysis, which pointed to the centrality of colonialism to the entire capitalist system. See generally, V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939). 116 Abernethy, The Dynamics,p.112;Kanya-Forstner, ‘The War’, p. 247. the mandate system of the league of nations 143 could be even more valuable in the future, so the thinking went, if their economic potential were realized’. 117 The economic importance of colonies was emphasized by the most eminent colonial administrators, Albert Sarraut and Frederick Lugard, who further distinguished between economic ‘development’ and what could be termed economic ‘exploita- tion’. 118 The latter policy would exhaust the colony, whereas develop- ment would produce ongoing benefits to the metropolis. It hardly was surprising, then, that the economic resources of the mandate territories were an important part of the debates regarding thestructure of the Mandate System. The principal controversy focused on the ‘open door policy’. The United States was opposed to becom- ing a mandate power; 119 nevertheless, it was implacable in asserting its economic interests by insisting that the ‘open door policy’ be imple- mented in all mandate territories. This would ensure that all states could trade and invest on an equal footing, and without fear of dis- crimination, in mandate territories. This was a manifestation of Point Three of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. 120 Thus, the Mandate Agreements of B mandates contained provisions explicitly guaranteeing this. 121 Neverthe- less, this hardly satisfied the United States, which had wanted the ‘open door policy’ to apply to the A mandates of the Middle East, and which 117 Abernethy, The Dynamics,p.112. 118 Lugard’s views are discussed later in this chapter. Sarraut argued: ‘It is not by wearing out its colonies that a nation acquires power, wealth and influence; the past has already shown that development, prosperity, consistent growth and vitality in the colonies are the prime conditions for the economic power and external influence of a colonial metropolis.’ Abernethy, The Dynamics,p.112. 119 The United States requested a reservation to the Mandate Article: ‘Acceptance of a mandate is optional no Power need accept a mandate unless it so chooses.’ Cranston, The Story of Woodrow Wilson,p.337. Other delegates protested, arguing that the United States should share the responsibility of managing backward territories. Colonel House, one of Wilson’s advisers at the Conference on colonial affairs, responded by pointing out that Americans disliked acquiring ‘imperial appendages’. Ibid. 120 Point Three called for ‘[t]he removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and theestablishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance’. President Woodrow Wilson, ‘The Fourteen Points’ (8 January 1918), reprinted in Cranston, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 461 463. 121 Thus, the Mandate Agreement for Tanganyika, for example, included a provision stating: ‘Further, the Mandatory shall ensure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations, on the same footing as to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality.’ Wright, Mandates,p.614 (citing Article 7 of the Mandate for Tanganyika). Generally, the‘open door policy’ did not apply to A and C mandates, and this was a source of dispute for the United States. Ibid., p. 236. See generally ibid., pp. 476 480. 144 imperialism, sovereignty and international law engaged in a long series of contentious negotiations with the British in order to gain access to the oil fields of Mesopotamia. 122 France and Great Britain were intent on gaining control over the oil resources in their Mid- dle Eastern mandates and went so far as to redraw the boundaries of the mandate territories of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria in order to enable a more efficient exploitation of their oil reserves. 123 Protracted negotiations about access to these economic resources delayed confir- mation of some of the mandates for several years. 124 Similarly, Australia and New Zealand did little to conceal their desire to annex the mandate territory of Nauru because of its valuable phosphate deposits. 125 The paradox, then, was that colonial peoples were striving toward the ever more real goal of independence at precisely the time when their economic value and their significance for the metropolis were becom- ing increasingly evident. This was one of the fundamental tensions con- fronting the Mandate System, which simultaneously had to promote the self-government of the mandate territory, on the one hand, and a prob- lematic form of economic development, on the other. Reinterpreting the relationship between colonialism and international law The liberal humanist sentiment that animated Wilson’s condemnation of colonialism was shared by a number of important international lawyers. 126 Further, jurists of the League period, including Wright and Lindley, 127 pointed out that many of their distinguished nineteenth- and early twentieth-century predecessors, such as Lawrence, Westlake and Oppenheim, had endorsed, if not authored, a system of international law that sanctioned conquest and exploitation. 128 The inter-war lawyers, then, sought not only to challenge the formalist law of their predeces- sors, but also to reform the international law that had legitimized the dispossession of non-European peoples. In looking within their own discipline for jurists who could act as a foundation for such a humanist project, the League lawyers returned 122 Foranaccount of this dispute, see ibid., pp. 48 63. 123 Ibid., p. 51. For a detailed study of the settlement of the Middle East by the Allied Powers following the Great War, see David Fromkin, APeace to End All Peace (New York: H. Holt, 1989). 124 See Wright, Mandates, pp. 48 56 (discussing negotiations over oil interests). 125 See Weeramantry, Nauru,chapters 5 6. 126 See, e.g., Lauterpacht, ‘The Mandate’, p. 39. 127 See Wright, Mandates,p.6. 128 Ibid., p. 7. [...]... judge of the ICJ, characterized the new international law as being embodied by the Mandate System and the trusteeship system of the United Nations that succeeded it: But it is from the angle of international law that the creation of those institutions [the mandate and trusteeship systems] presents the greatest interest The spirit and certain characteristics of what may be called the new international law. .. largely through the work of the PMC, which had primary responsibility for supervising the operation of the system Once the basic framework of the Mandate System had been established, it was the PMC that had the task of ensuring the progress of the mandate territories and monitoring the everyday workings of the system While the legal principles embodied in the mandate articles and mandate agreements... guide both mandatory powers and the League, these principles failed to provide any clear sense of the final end of the Mandate System According to Article 22 of the Covenant, the primary purpose of the Mandate System was to secure the ‘well-being and development’ of the peoples of the mandate 138 139 Issues relating to the Mandate System have been litigated extensively before the ICJ See, e.g., International. .. is the point made by Judge Jessup in comparing the broad phrases used in the mandate ‘material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants’ of the mandate 152 153 154 155 Other topics include: Status of the Territory, Status of the Native Inhabitants, International Relations, Public Finance, General Administration, and Trade Statistics Ibid Questions of this sort focused on laws... extinguishing and invalidating the legal systems of non-European peoples and endorsing their replacement with the systems of law established by the colonizers This basic feature of nineteenth-century international law remained unchallenged by the new international law of the mandates that now presumed the triumph of European international law and the unequal international relations that had arisen as a result The. .. provisions in the US Constitution. 156 The full realization of the pragmatic, sociological international law comes into being, then, through international institutions that profoundly expand the technologies of international law that are applied uniquely to the mandate territories We may see this system, then, as an embodiment of the new international law called for by Alvarez and Hudson This is the system... and vivid detail, by the bureaucrats of the League The sociology of the non-European state and the new international law The Mandate System has generated an extremely rich jurisprudence.138 For the purpose of my argument, however, this analysis focuses on the administrative facets of the system My argument is that the unique character of the Mandate System, and the principles the League formulated... set of problem solving processes was devised and applied to colonial issues through the League, and I argue that these correspond closely with the ideas of advocates of the new international law It is in the unique circumstances of the Mandate System -unique because of the connection between sociology and sovereignty, and unique because it gave institutions access to the interior of the state that international. .. one hand and their markets on the other’.169 The economic policies pursued under the Mandate System were governed by the same vision of the mandates as a source of raw materials, on the one hand, and markets, on the other In examining the operation of the mandate, then, I have followed the PMC in drawing upon the literature relating to colonial administration as a whole Economic development and native... volumes of information on an expanding range of issues, a process that in turn led to demands for more information on further issues and the formulation of further standards None of this, however, undermined the legal character of the system The entire structure of administration and supervision was still based on legal norms and gave rise to justiciable legal obligations on the part of the mandatory . 147 The Mandate System and the construction of the non-European state The mandates and the problem of sovereignty The primary novelty of the Mandate System for many jurists of the inter- war period. international law of the mandates that now presumed the triumph of European international law and the unequal international relations that had arisen as a result. The new international law, therefore,. be opposed to the codification of standards. 150 This synthesis of law and administration is illustrated by the list of questions the PMC presented to the Mandatory Powers. 151 PartNfocuses 147 Ibid.,

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