P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 256 Vor texes of Danger Meanwhile, and equally important, the American government is going to have to decide how to respond to China’s growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. In the 1960s, when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced such a decision, the Soviet Union’s ballistic missiles were a unique and unprece- dented threat to the United States. Even today, only Russian missiles present a similar threat. China, however, may soon acquire a similar strategic nuclear capability, and we are going to have to decide what to do about it. Most of us thought the risk of global nuclear war had disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Of course, we recognized the risk of nuclear terrorism, but we thought that global nuclear war could never happen because the United States is, and seems likely to remain, the world’s only conventional military superpower. Will we confront more Able Archers in the future? Will other American presidents be confronted with nuclear brinksmanship over Ta iwan, or the collateral risks of nuclear exchange stemming from hostilities among other nuclear states? Unfortunately, the answer most likely is “yes.” The reality is that the end of the Cold War has not ended the risk of nuclear war, and that what was at one time a snake with one head is now a hydra- headed monster. We had planned at first for a general reduction in the risk of nuclear war, but this hasn’t happened and we are now attempting to rely on the old methods of balance of forces and mutual assured destruction. But there is no possible balance among the many nations now building nuclear strength, and there is no formula like MAD on which we can rely to avoid war – though our leaders may wish to try. In today’s situation, we can only strive unceasingly to eliminate nuclear weapons, while trying to protect ourselves if arms control falls apart. Both courses involve significant and considerable risk. We could find ourselves eliminating our own nuclear arsenals on the promise that others will do the same, when in fact our potential adversaries have deceived us. Deception about arms reduction happened on a large scale before World War II, and could happen again. Further, governments could disarm, while terrorists do not. The risks do not make a persuasive argument against arms control efforts, but do constitute reasons to conducting them very carefully. This illustrates exactly why we need to dominate every inch of space – so that our satellites can see both underground and evaluate enemy satellites’ technical capabilities. The quickest way to shut a country down is to destroy its satellites! China is most likely developing a strategy to do this. Destroying enemy satellites would be a good preemptive tactic, where one is required. We must recognize that nuclear arms remain attractive to many govern- ments in today’s world. They are often cheaper than conventional forces to acquire and maintain. For states that aspire to be major powers – especially P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 The Next Big Wars 257 Russia and China – nuclear weapons are available, affordable, and credible counters to American power. 18 They are not likely to give them up. Hence, there are significant limitations on what may be achieved by disarmament in the nuclear arena. Defense against nuclear attack has its risks as well. We may be unable to build an effective defense, and may delude ourselves into a false security. This could lead us into aggressive behavior that could bring on war. These risks again are no argument against efforts to build a missile defense, but constitute an argument to be very careful about being sure that it will work. We return to this topic when we discuss the important role of national missile defense in ensuring the Strategic Independence of the United States in Chapter 14. THE DYNAMICS OF WORLD DISORDER Suddenlyand without warning, inthe pastdecades, growth inEurope, Russia and Japan began to decelerate, all converging asymptotically toward zero. China alone marched to its own drummer. For a time these recuperating states continued to close the gap, but by the nineties the tide turned, with America pulling ahead of Europe, Russia and Japan, despite their widely vaunted liberalizations. For proponents of convergence this was merely the pause that refreshed. Time however hasn’t validated the surmise. Masters of Illusion need to be resolute on this point because contem- porary patterns of reconfiguring global wealth and power are promoting both high- and low-intensity conflicts by shifting perceptions of capabili- ties, vulnerabilities, national interest, rights, prerogatives, and redressable grievances. China’s rapid economic, technological and military moderniza- tions challenge established relations in Asia, including vital American inter- ests in Japan, Taiwan and the sea-lanes of the Pacific. It is easy to see how Beijing’s leaders might conclude with the passing years that Japan could be intimidated and enticed into surrendering its claims to the Senkoku Islands and surrounding petroleum rich seabeds. Similar tactics could be applied in other seabed territorial disputes off the coast of Indonesia, and America could be cowed into accepting an invasion of Taiwan. The reactions of Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the United States however might not fol- low Beijing’s script, and could heighten tensions. China’s rivals in the Asia Pacific region could dig in their heels, enhancing their offensive and defen- sive capabilities, forming economic and military anti-Chinese alliances, and engaging in brinksmanship. The struggle for shrinking petroleum supplies P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 258 Vor texes of Danger could be particularly combustible, as it was in the years preceding the Second Worl d War II. China’s ascendance and Japan’s relative decline don’t necessitate Amer- ican embroilment in an Asian Pacific cold or hot war, but they do raise risks that won’t be countervailed by balloting and globalized markets. The turbulence caused by the reconfiguration of global wealth and power given systemic realities are likely to outweigh latent forces of enlightened demo- cratic free enterprise. America also could be reluctantly drawn into territorial tussles between China and Russia. Regardless of the positive tone of recent Sino-Soviet relations, as China discovers its new found powers it could lay claim to vast tracks of Siberia and the Russian Far East which were under its sway during the Yuan dynasty. These lands have enormous natural resource reserves, and are only sparsely populated. The Kremlin has powerful nuclear forces targetedon the Sino-Russian border, buttheir effectiveness isbeing degraded by illegal Chinese settlement someclaim abetted by complicitRussianborder guards selling forged citizenship papers. It has been alleged that there already are millions of Chinese “Russian” immigrants in Siberia and Primoriya, and that the situation will worsen as Russia’s population diminishes from 143 million today to 80 million in 2050, as Soviet era residents return to Moscow andSaint Petersburg, and moreof the 120 million Chinese along the Sino-Russian border infiltrate. Moreover, this demographic asymmetry is exacerbated by gapping disparities in GDPs and living standards. Although Japan, China’s other regional rival will remain a great economic power during the next half century, Russia won’t. Starting from a humble level in 1989, per capita Chinese GDP will soon eclipse Russia’s, and its GDP could surpass it by a factor of twenty by 2050, allowing Beijing to modernize its armed forces beyond Russia’s means, and to build a credible nuclear deterrent that will reduce the credibility of Moscow’s border defense. The Kremlin is aware of the problem, and is in denial, continuing to perceive itself as the superior power in command, hoping that China will be self- restrained. Russia’s unfavorable position in the reconfiguration of global wealth and power also may prove destabilizing along its western and southern borders. The Kremlin’s addiction to economic-favoritism and martial police state authoritarianism is a constant source of friction with America and the EU. Both not only periodically chide Russia for its tsarist-like vices, but com- pete for influence in the former Soviet Republics known as the near abroad, including Central Asia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The EU has talked about discussing Ukrainian membership, and America the P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 The Next Big Wars 259 possibility of the near abroad joining NATO.Moscow has responded byalter- natively declaring its version of the Monroe doctrine for the near abroad, and acknowledging these states’ autonomy, while harboring ambitions for their formal reincorporation into the Russian Federation, superceding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) political, economic and mili- tary alliance. The stakes from the Kremlin’s viewpoint are high. Central Asia has enormous reserves of petroleum and natural gas, while the Ukraine provides important access to the Black Sea. Both are also geostrategic assets. Defection from Moscow’s orbit could bring China, Turkey, and NATO to its southern and western flanks, as has already occurred in the Baltics, and in the Ukrainian case thwart ambitions for projecting forces into the Middle East, if and when the oil sheikdoms collapse, precipitating a great power free for all. Russia’s economic and military weakness compels Moscow to bide its time until the full spectrum military modernization program com- mencing in 2006 comes up to speed in 2010. Putin chose to turn the other cheek at Vladimir Yushchenko’s EU leaning antics November-December 2004, but hasn’t accepted Ukrainian defection. As Russia reemerges as a military superpower 2010–2050, the Kremlin is apt to be more tena- cious, creating the possibility of a war no one wants, but like World War I could happen. What Our Leaders Should Do The threats we face are not commensurate with each other. One sort of threat is to the lives of thousands or tens of thousands of our citizens; another is to the lives of tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of us. They are both terrible, but they are not of equal size. This is a horrible calculus. The moralist in us wishes to say that the death of one person is as important as the death of many. But this is an illusion itself. It confuses our sense of proportion and our decisions. It leads to thinking in which we are prepared to sacrifice millions of people to save a few. In the current situation, it causes us to focus our attention on the risk of terrorist attacks while ignoring the risk of nuclear exchanges. Terrorist attacks would kill thousands; nuclear exchanges would kill tens or hundreds of millions. The worst conceivable terrorist attack would be a small fraction of the horror of a nuclear exchange. Islamic fundamentalism threatens us with terrorist attacks; Russia with nuclear exchange, and China is racing to be able to do the same. To allow ourselves to neglect the danger of great power nuclear war in preference for a focus on terrorism is one of the most serious errors into which we could fall. P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 260 Vor texes of Danger Effective leadership of America in these times requires that this crucial sense of priorities and proportion not be lost. A war with another great power is the most significant danger we face and it must not be placed on a back burner because of a much less significant threat now. In no way does this attempt to clarify our priorities mean that we should ignore the smaller threats now to focus on the larger. It means instead that we must not lose sight of greater dangers as we focus on eliminating smaller ones. We must undertake a strong response to terrorism and do all we can to stamp it out. But we must not take our eye off the bigger threats that lie just beyond the horizon, despite the fact that we have become unwisely complacent about them. Ye t, ask our leadership today what is the most important threat which Americans face, and they will almost uniformly reply, terrorist attack. This sudden confusion of proportion, and thus priorities, and the lack of good judgment that results, is a great danger to us. The developments among the great powers are an unprecedented chal- lenge to American presidential leadership. The current administration is able to draft a coherent shift of our national defense strategy; and it is able to take decisive action, as in Iraq. These are major strengths. Butitseems unable to explain to the American people convincingly the necessity for its new doctrine and its course of action; it has allowed domestic affairs to get completely out of control, diverting national atten- tion and energy away foreign affairs just when it is most needed; 19 it’s unable to generate sufficient confidence in its ability to lead the nation in these times; and it’s allowing itself to be drawn into damaging and unnecessary controversies with our erstwhile allies. In effect, the end of the Cold War is now permitting the allies of that conflict to sepa- rate and regroup; and we in America, the leader of the coalition that was successful in the cold war, are unable to glimpse the world beyond the old coalitions. To our disadvantage, European leadership has seized upon America as a useful rival around which European solidarity can be built. American defense analysis is surprisingly unsophisticated about the threats we face, possibly because a focus on military capabilities of poten- tial adversaries is too narrow a focus – economic capabilities now and in the future and geopolitical objectives are crucial to longer-term threat assessments. “Who might future threats be? [Defense Department] ana- lysts predicted they would include warlords, tribal chiefs, drug traffickers, international criminal cartels, terrorists, and cyber-bandits ” 20 General P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 The Next Big Wars 261 Kennedy headed the analysts studying future threats for the Defense Depart- ment during the early 1990s. Ye t this is not the best way to view the future. It stresses not the challenge, but its form, especially as it diverges from the sort of military preparations we’vemade. Implicit in this formulation, which has great currency outside as well as inside the military, is the presumption for a military response (that is, defense means military defense), and whereas if challenged this way on the matter, even military planners will acknowledge that presuming a military response is too narrow, yet this is how Americans tend to look at the future. American leaders must learn to look over the horizon, to see the dangers possibly facing us, and suggest how they can be addressed now. JohnMearsheimeris aperceptive Americanwriter whopresents himselfas arealistabout international affairs,and though he is critical ofwhat he sees as his countrymen’s aversion to realism (preferring he says their optimism and moralism), he still reassures Americans that “Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic.” 21 Unfortunately, he’s too optimistic. The thinking of Americans – politicians and bureaucrats alike – who make national security policy is blurred by wishful thinking. During the Cold War, they were badly confused about Soviet economic and military capabilities; they were confused about the full extent of the terrorist threat before 9/11, and in both instances actually faked intelligence data to support their presuppositions, examples of which are provided later. America needs unfiltered realism, not wishful thinking. Our people are mature enough for truth in how we look at the world and honesty from our government about it. Furthermore, presidents today risk a mixed success at best by acting militarily without the full support of Americans. We face serious challenges in the world not based exclusively on economic deprivation, but rooted in different cultures, religions, and the ongoing human rivalry for power and dominance. Our leaders should provide us with a cold logic of defense, grounded in a geopolitical orientation but without the cynicism of Old World power politics. The perspective of our leaders should be American and their intent should be to defend America and to pursue American interests, but in an enlightened fashion, with due regard to the interests of others in the world. We examine how to meet these requirements in the different threats that face us in the chapters that follow. P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 262 Vor texes of Danger An American defense policy that follows from the considerations set forward in this chapter would involve: r Recognition that “elbowing” among the great powers makes deep and continuing engagement a poor peg on which to hang our foreign policy. This is especially true with regard to the European Union. r The demotion of peaceful engagement from a major element of our defense strategy to a less important role requires us to upgrade military preparedness. r This means first and foremost that we should pursue Strategic Indepen- dence with respect to all threats. r We should restructureour nationalmissile defense initiative to meetlarge- scale threats from major powers, and upgrade our defense against tactical missiles. r Resources being spent on Iraqi democratization should be transferred to these other purposes. r Counterterrorism shouldbe fundedfor the rest ofthis decade, butfunding should be reduced thereafter. r The American public must be informed about the continuing need for a robust defense. r We should inform the world that our policies can be adjusted, if others become more cooperative. This involves directly a challenge to our president to master the illusions of our public culture which insist that the world is already becoming more like us and safer of its own volition. CHAPTER 11: KEY POINTS American opinion leaders have been lulled into complacency by an unwar- ranted faith in international harmony,and fail to see thatthe world is becom- ing unstable. Contrary to a vision of peace and prosperity, the world is once again drifting back toward sharp economic and political rivalries and the danger of thermonuclear war. Five major trends are driving the world toward the brink: 1. Nuclear proliferation; 2. Economic success and economic failure for different nations; 3. Distress of those nations falling behind economically; P1: FCW 0521857449c11 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:7 The Next Big Wars 263 4. Powerseeking by all nations, especially those with the fastest growing economies; and 5. Increasing nonnuclear conflict. The West has won an ideological struggle, but not the economic and geo- political contests, which continue. Ideology was merely a weapon in the other struggles, so all that has really happened is that our adversaries have been partially, and temporarily, disarmed in one aspect of the conflict. Our leaders often dismiss such concerns. Their advisors demand to know the causal sequence which links the reconfiguration of global wealth and power – which they recognize – with nuclear risk before treating the dangers seriously. There is such a sequence, and this book describes it. 1. Russia is rearming and by hook or crook the United States will be transformed into an adversary. The Russian threat will peak in 2010 to 2020. 2. China is currently enlarging its nuclear missile capability with the intent of targeting the entire United States. It is building economic strength, developing superior space capabilities and modernizing its entire military establishment. The Chinese threat will peak in 2020 to 2030. 3. The current U.S. military dominance is certain to be challenged in the next decade. Russia will regain superpower status in weaponry by 2010 and China by 2020. 4. Each adversary will have a different strategy. The Russians on mass force; the Chinese on economic growth supplemented by growing missile capability and space dominance. 5. For forty years, we have relied on Mutual Assured Destruction to pre- vent nuclear war. Yet during this time, the world has several times stumbled to the brink of nuclear war. Furthermore, the logic of MAD requires us to either strengthen our adversaries to parity with us or to wait uncertainly in a risky situation until they on their own reach parity. Either course seems fraught with danger. 6. Because MAD is no longer viable in a world of many nuclear powers, the United States should pursue a policy of Strategic Independence. P1: FCW 0521857449c12 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:24 twelve The Middle East THE CRESCENT OF FIRE When the World Trade Center was attacked, the threats potentially posed by Russia and China were subordinated to the more immediate terrorist menace, even though the contours of the danger were obscure. Terrorism isn’t an end in itself. It is a means to ends like victory or retribution, and can take many forms from sabotage to mass annihilation. 1 Moreover,whereas terrorism, like crime and war, involves unlawful coercion, it occupies a middle ground in international jurisprudence between them. 2 States are permitted to suppress terrorism more vigorously than crime, but cannot act with the impunity permissible under a formal declaration of war. 3 In this sense, war on terrorism is an acknowledgment that terror should be combated with counterterrorist methods, and a warning that America will escalate beyond this boundary to full-scale state to state war if necessary. The dimensions of the terrorist threat are correspondingly elastic. At one end of the spectrum, demented individuals could bring about the “end of days” with weapons of mass destruction for no rational purpose, 4 but this is a remote possibility. At the other extreme, these same individuals like Hamas could seize the reins of state, transforming themselves from outlaws like Yasser Arafat into statesmen subject to standard rules of international engagement. And, of course, terrorism could persist somewhere in the mid- dle, circumscribed but deadly. All perils deserve attention. It is in America’s interest to deter and contain. But the expected benefits don’t warrant unlim- ited expense. No amount of effort can preclude doomsday, and like the Cold Waritisunwise to spend prodigally on defense, as the Soviets ruefully discovered. Terror that cannot get beyond sabotage doesn’t threaten Amer- ica’s survival, and terrorists who seize national power become vulnerable to conventional counterstrikes. 264 P1: FCW 0521857449c12 Printer: cupusbw CUNY475B/Rosefielde 0 521 85744 9 November 5, 2006 14:24 The Middle East 265 We’reinconflict with a militant branch of Islam that uses terrorism as a major tactic; 5 so our government has defined us as at war with terrorism. But we have also been at war with governments who aide the terrorists, and we have used military force to overthrow governments that had not themselves attacked us, but who were in league with terrorists who either had attacked us (Afghanistan) or were sympathizers and allies of those who had attacked us (Iraq). In late 2005, President Bush apparently changed our enemy from the tactic of terrorism to people who seek to create a radical Islamic empire from Spain to Indonesia. Dangerous and heartbreaking as is this conflict, it must be kept in per- spective. Terrorists do not threaten the existence of our country – not the way a major conflict with a nuclear-armed rival threatens our country. So we must be sure that what we do in the war on terrorism does not endan- ger other important concerns of our country. Yet already we have stretched ourselves in Iraq, trying to fashion a new future for the country in the mold of western capitalist democracy. Our public culture results in dramatic reversals of political stance. Thus, many of those who most strongly opposed our entry into Iraq now oppose our exit. They argue that since we are there, we’ve assumed a responsibility for it. Hence, if we leave Iraq, even if our initial objectives have been met, then we’d lose the moral high ground, which they consider crucial. In this view, it’s not enough for us to defend America. We must do more. It is worth asking “Why?” We got into our current involvement in the Middle East because of the attack on the World Trade Center. It’s quite astretch to move from the attempt to defend our country by eliminating hostile regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan – in order to deny refuge to terrorists and prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into our adversaries hands – to bringing Western style democracy to the Middle East. Asserting that only if there is democracy will we be safe from terrorist attack doesn’t lessen the stretch. Initially, we sought a regime change and a guarantee there were no weapons of mass destruction. We changed the regime and we discovered no weapons of mass destruction. Why should we now remain in Iraq? Shouldn’t we go, having fulfilled our stated obligations? Shouldn’t we let the Iraqis run their own country? If it becomes a terrorist center, we will have to respond to that – we’ve intervened in Iraq twice and we can do it again, if necessary. As for the broader context of the Iraqi war, we can retain bases in the area from which to protect ourselves from militants, Syrians and Iranians. “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East, and we achieved [...]... exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in every part of the world The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet (ALLAH’S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places – the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble... the canopy of the mass media is a body of evidence suggesting that Saddam had such weapons but had them removed to Syria by the Russians before the American attack .61 The logic of his intervention then required withdrawal But instead, the president went off base by shifting the grounds of the intervention to nation-building and democracy spreading In taking this course President Bush succumbed to the. .. setback to the terrorists in the Middle East and had strengthened its hands in the geopolitical rivalries that are always continuing Instead, the Administration announced that it was going to build a new nation on the Western model in Iraq No longer was the motive of defending America sufficient; now we added aggrandizement to it – increasing the reach of the American culture in the world The media immediately... economical situation of the country and the frightening future in the view of the enormous amount of debts and interest owed by the government; this is at the time when the wealth of the Ummah being wasted to satisfy personal desires of certain individuals!! while imposing more custom duties and taxes on the nation The miserable situation of the social services and infra-structure especially the water service... proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions ”39 It is sometimes argued that the beginning of the Islamists’ use of terror bombing as a tactic against the West was the bombing of the U.S Marine barracks in Beirut in 1984 That bombing caused the American superpower to withdraw from Lebanon in just six weeks or so, and is alleged to have proved to Islamic radicals the value of terror bombing... and Stalin always) It is a weapon of choice, and employed in different ways It is neither the result of poverty; nor is it the peculiar weapon of the desperate instead of the strong Finally, in the indirect connection between poverty and terrorism, the nexus lies in comparative poverty, not absolute deprivation The Middle East is not one of the poorest regions of the globe But it has some of the world’s... American intervention in Iraq .66 There was nothing wrong with the geopolitical objectives that the Administration pursued in the Iraqi invasion As described by one commentator, an invasion of Iraq by the Americans made Osama bin Laden not only the man who humbled America in the World Trade Center attack, but also the man who lost Baghdad thereafter to the Americans “A violent tyrant who had applauded the. .. Land of the two Holy Places in particular We wish to study the means that we could follow to return the situation to its normal path The inability of the [Saudi] regime to protect the country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah – the American crusader forces – to occupy the land for the longest of years The crusader forces became the main cause of our disastrous condition, particularly in the economical... result of turmoil in Palestine; rather the reverse The tail (Palestine) is too tiny (about four million people in Palestine, the total population for United Palestine nine million) to wag the dog (an Arab world of some 165 to 235 million – depending on how much of north Africa is included) To insist that the tail does wag the dog is a fundamental misconception that leads to all sorts of errors of strategy... but to withdraw from Lebanon, leaving it ultimately in control of Syria for more than twenty years – a continuing haven for terrorists About the American reaction to the Beirut bombing Osama bin Laden remarked in an interview with John Miller of ABC News on May 28, 1998, “We have seen in the last decade the decline of the American government and the weakness of the American soldier, who is unprepared . BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places – the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of. exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in every part of the world. The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet. point of view often have an admirable motive. They wish to eliminate poverty since it is an evil in the world, and if they can only interest others in their objective by insisting that addressing