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NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
EVALUATING
NOVEL THREATS
TO THE HOMELAND
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
AND CRUISE MISSILES
Brian A. Jackson, David R. Frelinger
Michael J. Lostumbo, Robert W. Button
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing
objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s
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R
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© Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation
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Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth
The research described in this report was prepared for the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency. The research was conducted in the RAND
National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and
development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department
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iii
Preface
Deciding how to invest homeland security resources wisely in the
United States can often appear to be an intractable problem because
the large, open American society seems to be so vulnerable to so many
threats in every corner of the country. is monograph is intended to
help bound the problem in order to aid policy and resource decisions
about one type of potential threat to the homeland: cruise missiles
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Importantly, the methodology
used can be applied to other modes of attack, and the insights gained
from this methodology extend to other threats as well. e focus of
the research is on a specific class of weapons, but those weapons are
not assessed in isolation; rather, it considers class of weapons as one of
many options open to a potential attacker and seeks to identify invest-
ment strategies that are effective against multiple threats.
is monograph should be of interest to homeland security poli-
cymakers, military and defense planners, analysts examining the ter-
rorist threat, technology and defense system designers, and individuals
charged with protecting potential targets in the U.S. homeland from
terrorist attack.
is research was sponsored by the Defense reat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) and conducted within the International Security and
Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Insti-
tute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Uni-
fied Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine
Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on RAND’s International Security and
Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can
be reached by email at Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100,
extension 5134; or by mail at RAND, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arling-
ton, Virginia 22202. More information about RAND is available at
www.rand.org.
iv Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland
v
Contents
Preface iii
Summary
xiii
Acknowledgments
xix
Abbreviations
xxi
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 1
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cruise Missiles: Technological Change
Producing a Potential reat
2
e RAND Approach
7
Task 1: Conduct a Red Analysis of Alternatives
8
Task 2: Assess the Implications for the Defense
8
About is Report
9
CHAPTER TWO
UAVs and Cruise Missiles as Asymmetric reats: How Do ese
Systems Compare with Alternative Attack Modes?
11
Characteristics of UAVs and Cruise Missiles
14
Comparing the Capabilities of UAVs and Cruise Missiles in Attack
Scenarios to ose of Alternative Attack Modes
16
Direct Attack
18
Indirect Attack
23
Aerial Dispersal
25
Conclusions
25
CHAPTER THREE
What Adversary Operational Problems Can UAVs and Cruise
Missiles Best Solve and How Do UAVs and Cruise Missiles
Compare with Alternative Solutions?
27
1. Enable Attack over Perimeter Defenses
29
Alternative Means for Defeating Perimeter Defenses
31
Assessment of Options for Defeating Perimeter Defenses
35
2. Enable Attack over National Borders
37
Alternative Means for Attacking Across National Borders
39
Assessment of Options for Attacking Across National Borders
41
3. Enable Multiple Simultaneous Attacks
42
Alternative Means for Staging Multiple Simultaneous Attacks
43
Assessment of Options for Staging Multiple Simultaneous Attacks
45
4. Enable an Attack Campaign
47
Alternative Means for Sustaining an Attack Campaign
49
Assessment of Options for Sustaining an Attack Campaign
51
5. Enable Aerial Attack of Area Targets with Unconventional Weapons
52
Alternative Means for Dispersing Weapons over Area Targets
53
Assessment of Options for Dispersing Weapons over Area Targets
55
Conclusions
57
CHAPTER FOUR
What Are the Terrorist Group Characteristics and Preferences
Relevant to the Acquisition and Use of Technology?
61
Access to and Costs Associated with UAV and Cruise-Missile
Technologies
62
Access to and Costs Associated with Alternative Technologies
64
Ability and Willingness to Develop the Expertise Necessary to
Operate the Systems
65
Technological Preferences
66
Conclusions: Two Decisionmaking Pathways
66
Path I
68
Path II
69
vi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland
CHAPTER FIVE
Considering Defensive Strategies and Options 71
Options Available to the Defender
73
Identifying and Catching the Perpetrators: Intelligence, Law
Enforcement, and Forensics
73
Controlling the Spread of UAVs and Cruise Missiles:
Counterproliferation
76
Enabling Targeted Sites to React Before Impact: Detection and
Warning
77
Acting Against the Incoming Weapon or the Launcher: Active
Defenses and Prelaunch Engagement
79
Strengthening Targets to Survive Attack: Passive Defenses
80
Bouncing Back from Attack: Response, Recovery, and
Reconstitution
81
Comparing the Options: Bases for a Blue Analysis of Alternatives
82
How Do the Options Differ in eir Effect on the reat from
UAVs and Cruise Missiles?
83
Do the Options Provide Defensive Benefits with Respect to Other
Forms of Attack Beyond UAVs and Cruise Missiles?
85
How Do the Costs Compare?
86
Are the Solutions Appropriate for the Homeland?
88
Are ere Technical or Organizational Challenges at Might
reaten the Benefits of an Option’s Being Realized?
89
Defense Conclusions: Choosing Among Available Options
89
Deterring Asymmetrtic Use of UAVs and Cruise Missiles?
94
Deterrence by Punishment
94
Deterrence by Denial
95
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions 97
Anticipating the Attractiveness of a Novel reat to Adversaries
98
Implications for the Defense
98
Bibliography
101
vii
Contents vii
[...]... expected to sell into the international marketplace (Zaloga, no date) The total number of countries believed to be developing some type of UAV is 18, 13 of which are currently exporting the systems (Bolkcom, 4 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland 2002, p 15) In addition, 22 other countries are reported to be capable of transitioning to producing cruise missiles As with the UAVs themselves, the costs... and the nature of the threat they posed, have similarly challenged established security concepts In the wake of the shifts brought about by both these now-historic cases, major efforts were focused on understanding both what had happened and how the world had changed, and the reaction to the shifts led to redoubled efforts at foresight to better understand whether more such shifts were on the horizon, to. .. of new responses to every threat that arises has the potential to spread a defensive effort thin or to dissipate resources that would be better used in pursuit of other national goals Consequently, security planners must examine new threats to determine what about them is not novel By explor- 1 2 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland ing a new threat’s similarities with dangers the United States... How to invest homeland security resources wisely in the United States can appear to be an intractable problem because the large, open American society seems to be vulnerable to so many threats in every corner of the country This monograph is intended to present a defense-planning approach to bound the problem and thereby aid policy and resource decisions about one type of potential threat to the homeland: ... the attacker’s perspective, we conclude that they do xvi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland not appear to have major advantages over other ways of carrying out operations against similar targets, although they cannot be dismissed outright as a potential threat Where they did appear preferable, the choice for these systems was driven by the actions of the defense or inplace security measures—i.e.,... systems—and of the systems themselves—have raised questions about whether the relative threat posed to the United States by adversary use of such systems is changing enough to warrant greater attention The availability of UAVs and cruise missiles to potential attackers will be determined to a large degree by their availability to legitimate military and civilian users around the world The most attractive... cruise missiles in the context of where their advantages are likely to be most important Through such an analysis, it is possible to identify the key characteristics of the systems that distinguish them from other means of attack and highlight the specific factors that might lead adversaries to acquire and use them After analyzing cruise missiles and UAVs in their most favorable light from the attacker’s... using other satellite systems, such as the European Galileo, Russian GLONASS, or Chinese Beidou satellite navigation systems 6 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland C-802 anti-ship missile from Iran to Hezbollah), and have been employed in combat (see Myre, 2006) Western cruise missiles are available for on the order of $0.5 million at the low end to more than $2 million on the high end for the most-capable... (2001, pp 183–213) 8 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland (2) defensive options to address the threat must be considered broadly These principles are reflected in two study tasks Task 1: Conduct a Red Analysis of Alternatives In pursuing their goals, terrorist organizations and other potential adversaries frequently consider a range of options Therefore, the attractiveness of these technologies will... cruise-missile or other air-defense assets for the nation, the problem needs to be bounded so that scarce resources can be focused productively Examining the Threat from UAVs and Cruise Missiles via a “Red Analysis of Alternatives” In essence, to assess the threat of cruise missiles and UAVs to the homeland, we cannot consider them in isolation; instead, we must consider the problem from the attacker’s . sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department
of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense. 68
Path II
69
vi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland
CHAPTER FIVE
Considering Defensive Strategies and Options 71
Options Available to the Defender
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