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Freedom and Information
Assessing Publicly Available Data
Regarding U.S. Transportation
Infrastructure Security
Eric Landree, Christopher Paul, Beth Grill,
Aruna Balakrishnan, Bradley Wilson,
Martin C. Libicki
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis
and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors
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© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or
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Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation
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To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Landree, Eric.
Freedom and information : assessing publicly available data regarding U.S. transportation infrastructure
security / Eric Landree [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8330-4031-2 (pbk.)
1. Terrorism—United States—Prevention—Evaluation. 2. Terrorism—Risk assessment—United States.
3. Transportation—Effect of terrorism on—United States. 4. Transportation—Security measures—United
States. 5. Infrastructure (Economics)—United States—Safety measures. 6. National security—United States—
Planning. I. Title.
HV6432.L363 2004
363.325'93880973—dc22
2006032345
The research described in this report was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland
Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE).
iii
Preface
e goal of this investigation was to determine how much data regarding U.S. anti- and coun-
terterrorism systems, countermeasures, and defenses are publicly available and could be found
by individuals seeking to harm U.S. domestic interests. e study focused on information
that would be freely accessible through Web search and review of library materials. To obtain
a reasonably detailed picture of the available information while still covering a range of pos-
sible scenarios, researchers examined six different hypothetical terrorist operations involving
three categories of transportation infrastructure: air, rail, and maritime. e research team
also developed a framework for comparing the amount of information that is publicly available
across different terror attack scenarios and infrastructure targets.
e Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, Office of
Comparative Studies sponsored the study. is report is a response to the U.S. General Ser-
vices Administration Request for Quotation 41016-Homeland Security Research Studies.
e information presented here should be of interest to homeland security policymakers,
and owners, operators, and defenders of elements of the U.S. transportation infrastructure that
rely on anti- and counterterrorism defenses for security from terrorist attacks.
is report is one of two under the study “Understanding Terrorist Motives, Targets,
and Responses,” with Martin Libicki as Principal Investigator. e companion monograph is
Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences (Libicki, Chalk, and Sisson, 2007).
The RAND Homeland Security Program
is research was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within
RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment (ISE). e mission of RAND Infrastruc-
ture, Safety, and Environment is to improve the development, operation, use, and protection
of society’s essential physical assets and natural resources and to enhance the related social
assets of safety and security of individuals in transit and in their workplaces and communities.
Homeland Security Program research supports the Department of Homeland Security and
other agencies charged with preventing and mitigating the effects of terrorist activity within
U.S. borders. Projects address critical infrastructure protection, emergency management, ter-
rorism risk management, border control, first responders and preparedness, domestic threat
assessments, domestic intelligence, and workforce and training.
iv Freedom and Informatiion
Questions or comments about this report should be sent to the project leader, Eric Lan-
dree (Eric_Landree@rand.org). Information about the Homeland Security Program is avail-
able online (http://www.rand.org/ise/security/). Inquiries about homeland security research
projects should be sent to the following address:
Michael Wermuth, Director
Homeland Security Program, ISE
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050
703-413-1100, x5414
Michael_Wermuth@rand.org
Contents
v
Preface iii
Figures
vii
Tables
ix
Summary
xi
Acknowledgments
xv
Abbreviations
xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 1
Levels of Risk in Information Gathering
3
Negligible-Risk Information Gathering
3
Low-Risk Information Gathering
3
Medium-Risk Information Gathering
4
High-Risk Information Gathering
4
Determinants of Information Gathering
4
Choice of Target
5
Stage of Attack Planning
5
Availability of Information on the World Wide Web
6
Information in the Public Domain: How Much? What Kind?
7
Assessing the Results of Information Search: How Much Is Enough?
10
Attacks on the Transportation Infrastructure: Six Scenarios
10
Scenarios for Attacks on the Rail Infrastructure
11
Scenarios for Attacks on the Air Infrastructure
11
Scenarios for Attacks on the Sea Infrastructure
11
An Illustrative Red-Team Approach
13
Overview of the Report
14
CHAPTER TWO
Defining Terrorists’ Information Requirements: e ModIPB Framework 15
e al Qaeda Manual
16
e Modified IPB Framework
19
Moving from Abstract Framework to Real-World Information Requirements
24
vi Freedom and Informatiion
CHAPTER THRE
E
Summary of Red-Team Findings and Validation 27
Scenario 1: A Poison Gas Attack on the NYC Subway (42nd Street Station)
27
Scenario 2: Bomb in a Passenger Plane Cargo Hold (at LAX)
28
Scenario 3: Shipping a Nuclear Device in a Cargo Container rough LA/LB
28
Scenario 4: Madrid-Style Bomb Attack on Commuter Train in the NYC East River Tunnel
29
Scenario 5: MANPADS Attack on a Flight Bound into LAX
30
Scenario 6: Suicide Boat Rams a Docked Cruise Ship at the Port of Los Angeles
31
Validation
31
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions and Recommendations 33
Availability of Information in Public Sources
33
Stoplight Summary
35
Implications of the Availability of Information
40
Policy Recommendations
41
Summary
43
APPENDIXES
A. What the Red Team Found 45
B.
Crosswalk of ModIPB and al Qaeda Manual
75
Bibliography
81
Figures
vii
S.1. Notional Representation of Information Collected by Red Team xiii
1.1. Notional View of Information About a Target
9
A.1. Schematic Diagrams of Times Square Station
52
A.2. Station Map of the MTA Long Island Rail Road
66
A.3. Photograph of Douglaston Station
68
[...]... to these data and, in many cases, are obliged to protect them This report should give those charged with infrastructure security and relevant policymakers a good idea of the shape and general contents of the off-site, publicly available information set for selected scenarios and elements of the U.S transportation infrastructure By understand- 10 Freedom and Information ing all three sets and their intersections,... terrorists in the act of gathering information on-site Finally, the third set consists of information that is on-site “employee information, ” that is, information available to those who are employees of or closely affiliated with the infrastructure itself Employee information would include both public information and insider information A Venn diagram of these overlapping sets of information is presented in... relative sizes and overlap of these different sets of information depends on many factors, such as the specific responsibilities of the employee and the skill, motivation, or goals of the information gatherers Introduction 9 Figure 1.1 Notional View of Information About a Target Set 1: Off-site, Public Information (A) Set 3: On-site, Employee Information Set 2: On-site, Public Information (B) (C) RAND TR360-1.1... overhead images, schemat- xiv Freedom and Informatiion ics of sites and equipment, and news reports Moreover, new information is being added to the public domain every day, along with new capabilities for searching and fusing information Thus, procedures for securing sensitive information should be evaluated regularly, taking into account developments in technologies for storing and retrieving data, with... constellations of factors that identify information- gathering activities as constituting no-, low-, medium-, and high-risk information gathering Negligible-Risk Information Gathering Negligible-risk information gathering6 includes surfing the Web, listening to or watching mass media, reading for-sale material (e.g., newspapers), and perusing information in public libraries The information that these sources... quite costly, and involves a great deal of effort Here, we discuss three factors that are likely to affect information gathering: target choice, attack-planning stage, and availability of information on the World Wide Web We note, however, that the relationship between these variables and information gathering is complex For example, target choice will certainly affect information gathering, but information. .. within the set of information defined as “on-site employee information (point C in Figure 1.1) Information that can only be found in the third set (on-site employee information) and in neither of the two sets is insider information Once policymakers or infrastructure defenders have a good idea of the kinds of data in each of these information sets, they can decide more readily which information to try... public information about security can have paradoxical effects On the one hand, it can help them plan operations; on the other hand, it may deter the execution of those operations Finding a proper balance and deciding what “should” be publicly available remains a challenge and is beyond the scope of this report Policymakers and infrastructure owners and operators must also know not only what information. .. New information requirements that emerge later in the planning process may merit renewed low-cost, low-risk, and low-effort research Overall, the phase of operational planning influences what information terrorists need and, consequently, what they must do to get it and what risks and costs to bear in the process There are, of course, critical differences between likely terrorist researchers and the RAND... empirical question and may well include information that is sought to provide assurance and confidence to the terrorists but would not affect any decision made about the operation 15 16 Freedom and Information items deemed relevant to each scenario Upon review, for each scenario, a subset of the IPB categories was identified as “critical” or “showstopper” information requirements A showstopper is information . public
and private sectors around the world.
Visit RAND at www.rand.org
Explore RAND Homeland Security Program
View document details
For More Information
Purchase. (Eric_Landree@rand.org). Information about the Homeland Security Program is avail-
able online (http://www.rand.org/ise/security/). Inquiries about homeland
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