... inaworst‐casescenario, the contagioncouldshutdown the entirebankingsystem.Thisfearisnottotallyunjustified.Banking and relatedpanicshaveoccurredbefore—notonlyinpriorerasbutalsoinmorerecenttimes.InJanuary1991,forexample,duetoaflood of withdrawalsbypanickeddepositors,RhodeIslandGovernorBruceSundlundeclaredabankingemergency and shutdownall45state‐charteredsavingsbanks and creditunionsinhisstate.Shortlythereafter,wewitnessedasimilarsituationinMaryland. The lessonwasthatpanic and contagionwasnotstrictlyaphenomenonthatendedin the 1930s.AnInstructiveCaseStudy: The Role of RegulatorsinaMajorDisintermediationCrisisAmongLifeInsurersEvenmorepertinentlessonscanbelearnedfrom the disintermediationthatstruckseverallargeU.S.life and healthinsurersin the early1990s.Theirproblemscanbetracedto the early1980swhenmanyinsurershadguaranteedtopayhigh,fixedyieldstoinvestors,butfoundthemselvesunabletomeetthosepromisesasinterestratesdeclined.Tobridge the gap,severalreachedouttolowerrated,higher‐yieldingsecurities,includingjunkbonds and unratedbonds.Untilthisjuncture,higherriskbondportfoliosin the industrycouldbeexplainedasastopgapsolutiontofallinginterestrates.Butafewinsurers—especiallyExecutiveLife of California,FidelityBankersLife, and FirstCapitalLife—saw the potential of high‐riskbondportfoliosasamajorbusinessopportunity.Thesecompaniesweren’tsimplyreluctantbuyers of junk and unratedbondstofulfillpriorcommitments.Theirentirebusinessplanwaslargelypredicatedon the concept of junkbondsfrom the outset. The keywastokeep the junkbondaspectlargelyhiddenfrompublicview,whileexploiting the faith the publicstillhadin the inherentsafety of insurance.Tomake the modelasuccess,however,theyneededtwoadditionalelements: the cooperation of the WallStreetratingsagencies and the blessing of the stateinsurancecommissioners. The cooperation of the ratingagencieswasrelativelyeasy.Formanyyears, the standardoperatingprocedure of the leadinginsurancecompanyratingagency,A.M.Best&Co.,wastoworkcloselywith the insurers:If the companydidnotlike the rating and requesteditnotbepublished,Bestcomplied.If the companywassatisfiedwith the rating,Bestwouldcharge the companytoprintitsratingreports,whichcouldbeusedby the insurer’ssalesforcetomarketitsproducts.25Threenewerentrantsto the business of ratinginsurancecompanies—Moody’s,S&P, and Duff&Phelps(nowFitch)—offeredessentially the sameservice.Butinstead of earningtheirmoneyfromreprints of ratingsreports,theycharged the insurancecompaniesaflatfeeforeachrating,rangingfrom$10,000to$50,000perinsurancecompanysubsidiary,peryear.Later,A.M.Bestdecidedtochangeitspricestructuretomatch the otherthree,charging the ratedcompaniessimilarup‐frontfees.Asawhole, the ratingsprocesswasstackedinfavor of the companiesfromstarttofinish. The companieswereempoweredtodecideif and when and bywhomtheyweretoberated.Theyweregivenapreview of theirratingbeforeitwasrevealedto the public.Theyhad the righttoappealanadverserating and delayitspublication. And, asmentionedabove,iftheywerestillunhappywith the rating,most of the ratingagenciesallowedthemtosuppressitspublication.Notsurprisingly, the ratingagenciesgaveoutgoodgradeslikecandy.AtA.M.Best, the gradeinflationwassoseverethatindustryinsiderswidelyrecognizedthata“good”Bestratingwasactuallybad.Ithadtobe“excellent”toreallybegood.Thus,inthisfriendlyratingsenvironment,itwasnotdifficultfor the insurerswithlargejunkbondportfoliostogetexcellentgradesfrommost of the ratingagencies.Gettingsimilarcooperationfrom the insuranceregulatorswasnotquiteaseasy.Infact,stateinsurancecommissionersweregettingsoconcernedabout the industry’sbulginginvestmentsinjunk and unratedbonds,theydecidedtosetupaspecialofficeinNewYork— the SecuritiesValuationOffice—tomonitor the situation.Akeyquestionhotlydebated between the industry and regulatorswas:What’sajunkbond? The standardWallStreetanswerwasundisputed:anybondwitharatingfromS&PorMoody’s of double‐Borlower.However,insurerswithsubstantialholdings of junkbondswerenotsatisfiedwiththatdefinition.Theyknewitwouldexpose the truesize of theirjunkbondholdingsto the public.Sotheylobbied the insurancecommissionerstoredefine the definition of ajunkbond. The commissionersinitiallystruggledwiththisrequest,buttheyultimatelyobliged.Instead of the standardWallStreetdefinition of junk, the SecuritiesValuationOfficeestablished the followingfourbondclasses“yes,”“no*,”“no**,” and “no.” The firstcategorywasconsideredinvestmentgrade,while the three“no”categorieswereconsideredjunkbonds.However, the “yes”categoryactuallyincludedbillions of dollars of bondsratedBBorlower (the standarddefinition of junk)by the leadingratingagencies.Thiscontinuedforseveralyears.Finally,however,afterprotestsfromindustrywatchdogs, the insurancecommissionersrealizedthisamountedtoajunkbondcover‐up and made the decisiontoend the charade,adopting the standarddouble‐Bdefinition, and reclassifyingover$30billionin“secure”bondsasjunkbonds.Basedon the faultydefinition of junkbondsuseduntil1989, the insurancecommissionershadreportedthatFirstCapitalLifehad$842million,or20.2percent of itsinvestedassetsinjunkbondsatyear‐end1989.However,basedon the correct,standarddefinition of junkbonds,which the commissionersfinallybeganusingin1990,itturnedoutthatFirstCapitalactuallyhad$1.6billioninjunkbonds,or40.7percent of itsinvestedassets.FidelityBankersLife’sjunkbondholdings,previouslyreportedat$639million,or18.3percent of investedassets,jumpedto$1.5billion,or37.6percent of investedassets.Alltold, the industry’sjunkbond26holdingsreportedby the regulatorssurgedfrom$51billiononDecember31,1988to$84billiononDecember31,1990,withvirtually the entireincreaseattributableto the changeindefinition.20Large,institutionalinvestorsholdingguaranteedinvestmentcontracts(GICs)were the firsttorushfor the exits,creatingasilentrunon the companies’assets; and inresponse,company and stateofficialsdeclaredthattheywere“safe.”But the presspublicized the newofficialjunkbonddata,triggeringmasswithdrawalsby the public.Tostem the tide of disintermediation,allfourweretakenoverby the stateinsurancecommissioners. And thisaction,inturn,was the preludetoanevenlargerfailure—MutualBenefitLife of NewJersey,whichfellunder the weight of lossesinspeculativerealestate.Meanwhile, the stateguaranteemechanismalsofailed.Mostinsurancepolicyholdershadbeengiven the impressionthat,in the event of afailure,theirstateguaranteeassociationswouldpromptlyreimbursethem,muchlike the FDICdoesfordepositorsinfailedbanks.However,asarule, the insuranceguaranteefundshadlittleornofunds;theirstandardoperatingprocedurewastoraise the moneywithnewpremiumassessmentsafter the fact.Thatapproachtendstoworkefficientlywhenjustafewsmallcompaniesfail.Butwhen the failuresarelarge,thereisinsufficienttime and resourcestoraise the neededpremiumsfrom the survivinginsurers,most of whicharesmallerthan the largefailedcompanies.Asaresult,inadditiontotakingover the operations of the failedinsurers, the stateinsurancecommissionershadnochoicebuttodeclarealong‐termblanketmoratoriumonallcashwithdrawalsbypolicyholders.Wereviewed the statutoryfilings of each of the failedinsurers and determinedthattheyhad5.95millionindividual and grouppolicyholders,amongwhich1.9millionheldfixedannuities and otherpolicieswithcashvalue.Consumersinthislattergroupweredeniedaccesstotheirfundsformanymonths.Moreover,asadevicetolegallyavoidinvoking the stateguaranteemechanism,ratherthandeclaring the companiesbankrupt,theypronounced the firms“financiallyimpaired,”or“inrehabilitation.”Aftermanymonths, the authoritiesthencreatednewcompanieswithnew,reformedannuitiesyieldingfarlessthan the originalpolicies,whilegivingpolicyholderstwochoices.Either ... areatalossregardingwheretogoforfurtherinformation.Insum,wehaveadangerouscombination of (a)officialstatements the publiccannottrust and (b)criticalinformation the publiccannotfind,leaving the fieldwideopentorumor and contagion.Ratherthanmakingitpossibleforconsumerstorationallyshifttheirfundsfromweakertostrongerinstitutions,bankingregulatorshavecreatedanenvironmentthat,inadeepeningdepression,maydriveconsumerstowithdrawtheirfundsfrom the bankingsystemasawhole.Initseffortstoprotectallbanks and depositors, the governmentisultimatelyprotectingnone.Initszealtoavertpanicatallcosts,itmayactuallyberendering the systemmorevulnerabletoafarmorecostlypanic.31PartVGovernmentRescuesHaveBothFailedtoResolve the DebtCrisis AND Weakened the BankingSystemWith the exception of LehmanBrothers, the federalgovernment’sresponseto the debtcrisishasbeentoavoidlargefinancialfailuresatallcosts.Moreover, the consensusviewisthat the Lehmanfailurewasresponsiblefor the implosion of globalcreditmarketsin the fall of 2008,reinforcing the “toobigtofail”doctrine.Inlinewiththisdoctrine,multiplenovelstrategieshavebeenimplemented and manymoreproposed.However,mosttendtofallunderone of the threefollowinggeneralapproaches:(1)government‐backedmergersorbuyouts,(2)governmentpurchases of toxicpaper, and (3)nationalization.Beloware the irgeneralgoals,alongwithourcommentsontheirlikelyconsequences.Approach#1.Government‐BackedMergers and BuyoutsTraditionally,whenafinancialinstitutionfails, the applicableregulatoryauthoritiesstepin,takeover the operation, and fire the seniormanagement.Theythenseektofindabuyerfor the company,rehabilitate the institutionunderreceivership,orsell the assets.However,under the too‐big‐to‐faildoctrine, the authoritiesbypassstandardbankruptcyprocedures:Theybrokerashotgunmergerorbuy‐out,typicallyassumingsomeresponsibilityforfuturelossesif the assetssinkfurtheror the dealturnssour.Allpartiesinvolvedin the transaction— the seller, the buyer and the regulators—recognizethat the institutionhasfailed.Buttheytacitlyagreetomaintain the fictionithasnot.Accordingly,inrecentmonths,federalauthoritieshavearm‐twistedlargefinancialconglomeratestoacquirefailingcompaniesin the midst of the debtcrisis,turningablindeyeto the enormousrisks,whileoffering the carrot of muchlargermarketshares.Threemegabanks—Bank of America, JPMorganChase and WellsFargo—standoutasprimeexamples and serveasimmediatelyrelevantcasestudies.CaseStudy#1.Bank of America In2007,as the realestatebubblewasbursting,Bank of America steppeduptoassistCountrywideFinancial,makinga$2billioninvestmentinwhatwasthen the nation’slargestresidentialmortgagelenderbyvolume.However,asCountrywide’slossesmountedthrough the secondhalf of 2007,itbecameclearthatBank of America wouldhavetopourinmorecapitaltoprotectitsinvestment.InJanuary2008, the Charlotte,N.C.bankinggiantagreedtopurchaseCountrywideforanadditional$4billion,transformingBank of America into the largesthomemortgagelender and mortgageservicerin the world.CompletedonJuly1,itwas the largestmergerin the history of the mortgageindustry.Justtenweekslater,onSeptember15,2008,in the wake of the collapse of LehmanBrothersHoldings,Bank of America embarkedonafarlargerdeal,agreeingtoacquireMerrillLynch&Co.inanall‐stocktransactionvaluedat$50billionwhen the agreementwassigned,withBank of America receivinga$15billionTARPinfusiononOctober28. ... As the GAOclearlyimpliedinitsreport, the rapidgrowth of unregulatedOTCderivativesnowposesaseriousthreatto the globalfinancialsystem.2. As the GAOwarned, the concentration of tradingamongasmallnumber of largeplayershaspinned the future of the financialsystemonahandful of high‐rollers.3....